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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
The study of whether and how learning from abroad matters for policy changes is a 
fundamental but hugely contested subject at the heart of contemporary policy transfer, 
policy diffusion, and cognate literatures. Cross-national learning is said to be one of the key 
mechanisms by which ideas, policies, and administrative reforms travel across jurisdictions. 
However, it is also said to be fraught with several difficulties, and thus to hardly exert any 
significant influence on policymaking. This thesis addresses this puzzle through various 
means. It asks a set of research questions and proposes an analytical framework to explore 
the relationship between cross-national learning and policy change. It then traces the 
making of Management for Results policies in Chile and Mexico, comparing policy 
developments in both countries across two decades (1990-2010).  
The thesis challenges conventional scholarly accounts on this subject. It shows that 
cross-national learning might bring about significant policy changes. However, this does 
not necessarily occur through the transfer or diffusion of policies or models intact. It 
happens through policymakers’ use of knowledge from policies abroad in many ways and 
at various stages of the policymaking process. Moreover, policy changes are neither 
secured once policy elements are adopted, nor are they completed once their process of 
adaptation to a receiving environment has started. In fact, policymakers need to devise 
strategies to ensure the new policies are effective, legitimate, and durable. Full policy 
convergence does not necessarily happen, but neither does absolute divergence. Across 
time, through sequences of learning and change, policymakers learn how to overcome 
cognitive biases and national barriers; how to combine experiential learning and knowledge 
from policies abroad; and how to better fit policies to their national conditions, while also 
keeping them in tune with international policy developments.  
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Politics finds its sources not only in power  
but also in uncertainty – men collectively wondering what to do.  
Finding feasible courses of actions includes,  
but is more than, locating which way the vectors  
of political pressure are pushing.  
Governments not only “power”  
(or whatever the verb form of that approach might be):  
they also puzzle. Policy-making is a form  
of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf;  
it entails both deciding and knowing. 
 
Hugh Heclo, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden  
 
 
 
Marco Polo describes a bridge, stone by stone. 
 – ‘But which is the stone that supports the bridge?’ – Kublai Khan asks. 
 – ‘The bridge is not supported by this stone or the other’ – Marco answers –,  
‘but by the line of the arch that they form’.  
Kublai Khan remains silent, reflecting. Then he adds:  
‘Why do you speak of the stones? The only thing that matters to me is the arch’. 
Polo answers: ‘Without stones there is no arch’. 
 
Italo Calvino, Las ciudades invisibles 
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‘[…] a proposition that policy adoption in one jurisdiction  
is attributable to similar actions elsewhere can only be substantiated if: 
 
1.It can be demonstrated that idiosyncratic domestic factors 
are not independently responsible for the policy adoption.  
2. It can be demonstrated that the adoption is not the result  
of the effects of similar modernizing forces having the same, 
 but separate, effects on different states. 
3. It can be demonstrated that policy makers  
are aware of the policy adoptions elsewhere. 
4. It can be demonstrated that this overseas evidence 
was utilized within domestic policy debates.  
 
Colin J. Bennett, ‘Understanding Ripple Effects’ 
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Francesco then drew his conclusion. 
'According to your reasoning, Susanna was very probably  
kidnapped by someone who knew she was going  
to take the unmade road that evening.  
Someone who lives around here.  
In that case we need to get to the bottom of this, 
 find out everybody's name, verify that –’ 
 
[Inspector Montalbano] – 'Stop. If you're going to start calculating and forming 
hypotheses, you must also be able to anticipate failure' 
 
Andrea Camilleri, The patience of the spider 
 
 
 
[Inspector Maigret] – ‘This is what we call an empty sort of day’  
[Mr. Pyke] – ‘So do we’ 
 
What could the Scotland Yard be thinking of him?  
He had come to study ‘Maigret’s methods  
and Maigret had no method.  
 
George Simenon, My Friend Maigret  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
The study of how learning from abroad might matter for policy changes, including 
administrative reforms, is a fundamental but hugely contested subject at the heart of the 
policy transfer, policy diffusion, and cognate literatures. During the past two decades, a 
significant number of scholars have argued that national policies are strongly influenced by 
policy developments in other countries (Waltman, 1980; Bennett, 1991b; Wolman, 1992, 
2009; Stone, 1999; Evans and Davies, 1999; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, 2000; Evans, 
2004a, 2009a, 2009b; Heclo, 2010). There are dozens (even hundreds) of articles and books 
in various fields which document how ideas, policies, programmes, and laws, have spread 
and travelled across jurisdictions (Berkowitz et al., 2003; Evans, 2004b; Czarniawska and 
Sevón, 2005; Simmons et al., 2008; Benson and Jordan, 2011; Börzel and Risse, 2012; 
Graham et al., 2013; Carroll and Common, 2013).  
Moreover, several scholars have argued that in many cases these so-called ‘policy 
interdependencies’ (Rose, 1991b; Elkins and Simmons, 2005; Gilardi, 2013) have not been 
the result of flagrant copying. Nor have they been related to external pressures, or 
harmonisation processes associated with supranational/international factors or actors. In 
fact, policy transfer and diffusion processes have allegedly resulted from national 
policymakers’ efforts to learn from abroad (Westney, 1987; Rose, 1991a, 1993, 2005; 
Evans, 2006). Recently, some diffusion scholars have stressed that patterns of cross-
national learning might even be characterised as ‘rational’ (Meseguer, 2009; Gilardi et al., 
2009; Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009; Gilardi, 2010).  
In response to these claims, several studies have shown that learning from other 
countries’ policies is a rather challenging, when not a frankly unsuccessful endeavour. 
Policymakers encounter several cognitive, administrative, and political constraints, which 
limit the amount of learning and borrowing that might actually take place (Wolman, 1992, 
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2009; Mossberger, 2000; Common, 2004; Weyland, 2006; Campbell et al., 2009; Page and 
Mark-Lawson, 2010; Ettelt et al., 2012; Dolowitz et al., 2012). Policymakers also confront 
issues when defining which practices are ‘best’ and why; understanding how foreign 
‘models’ really work; determining their relevance for one’s own jurisdiction; and adapting 
borrowed policies to a new environment (Wolman et al., 1994, 2004; Wolman and Page, 
2002; Pollitt, 2003; Mossberger and Wolman, 2003; Vettoreto, 2009; Dussauge-Laguna, 
2012c). Then they might face further problems which affect policymaking processes in 
general: limited resources; lack of time and attention; and political/bureaucratic conflicts 
(Robertson and Waltman, 1983; Karch, 2007; Dussauge-Laguna, 2013).  
Some scholars have further argued cross-national learning is limited even when 
institutional conditions initially seemed to be propitious. Thus, studies report learning from 
abroad has been rather problematic in the experience of the European Union’s ‘Open 
Method of Coordination’ and enlargement processes (Eyre and Lodge, 2000; Chalmers and 
Lodge, 2003; Jacoby, 2004; Casey and Gold, 2005; Kerber and Eckardt, 2007; Radaelli, 
2008; Zito and Schouut, 2009); the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s (OECD) peer reviews and benchmarking activities (Lodge, 2006; 
Dominique et al., forthcoming); and the United Kingdom’s devolution process (Keating et 
al., 2012). In some particular cases, scholars have suggested that the international spread of 
policies has actually inhibited learning (Deeg, 1995); has produced ‘policy (mis)learning’ 
(Larsen, 2002); or has resulted in ‘dysfunctional transfers’ (Sharman, 2010). 
Lastly, it has been remarked that even if national policymakers learn from abroad, 
borrowed policies enter a long process of adaptation to its receiving environment, after 
which little from the original ‘model’ remains. This might be due to policymakers’ 
deliberate efforts to better ‘fit’, ‘translate’, or ‘localize’ the imported idea (Rose, 1991, 
1993, 2005; Acharya, 2004; Sahlin and Wedlin, 2008; Stone, 2012). Or it might happen as 
a consequence of complicated processes of institutional ‘innovation’ or political 
‘accommodation’ (Westney, 1987; Heilmann and Schulte-Kulkmann, 2011). In either case, 
the resulting outcome is one of different national trajectories of policy change, and hardly 
one of cross-national similarities. 
An equally puzzling image is provided by studies on contemporary administrative 
reforms, for which cross-national learning also plays a central role. Since the early nineties, 
scholars in this field have flagged the emergence of certain international trends often (but 
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not only) associated with the ‘New Public Management’ paradigm (Caiden, 1991; Hood, 
1991; Wright, 1994; Toonen, 2003b; Roberts, 2010; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Many 
have underlined how international organisations, ‘epistemic communities’, and consultants 
have actively contributed to the diffusion of ideas; and thus to ‘isomorphic’ reform trends 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Saint-Martin, 2001; Sahlin-Andersson, 2002; King, 2005; 
Pal and Ireland, 2009; Dimitrakopolous and Passas, 2012; Pal, 2012).  
Studies have similarly discussed whether and how countries have converged around 
NPM or other reform doctrines (OECD, 1995; Common, 1998a; Kettl, 2000; Christensen 
and Laegreid, 2010). Many authors have shown that specific types of reform do seem to 
have spread across several jurisdictions, despite the significant variations in national 
institutions and points of departure. Thus, ‘privatisation’, ‘agencies’, ‘independent central 
banks’, ‘freedom of information laws’, ‘regulatory regimes’, ‘performance management’, 
and even ‘European style international courts’ have reportedly emerged in very different 
contexts (Peters, 1997; Bennett, 1997; Pollitt et al., 2001; Common, 2001; McCourt and 
Minogue, 2001; Roberts, 2006; Marcussen, 2007; Thatcher, 2007; Jordana et al., 2011; 
Alter, 2012).  
Yet also in this case scepticism has grown rapidly on various fronts. When 
transfer/diffusion processes are acknowledged as the source of reform, explanations are 
often found in mechanisms of policy change other than learning. For instance, a desire to 
‘emulate’ reform leaders (Ingraham, 1993); the ‘ritualistic/symbolic’ aims of politicians 
involved in the process (Nakano, 2004; Goldfinch, 2006); or the pressures exerted by 
international organisations or other foreign institutions (Ramió and Salvador, 2000, 2005; 
Bissessar, 2003; Larmour, 2005; Vicher, 2009). In some cases, it has been even suggested 
that reforms originated in national political dynamics, rather than international examples or 
trends (Barzelay, 2003; Barzelay et al., 2003; Cejudo, 2003, 2008). 
Some administrative reform scholars have suggested reform convergence has 
mainly been a ‘useful myth’ (Pollitt, 2001). In fact, what has disseminated internationally is 
reform ‘talk’, and perhaps some ‘accounts of practice’ (Sahlin-Andersson, 2002:54). Other 
authors have flagged that national patterns/paths, institutional conditions, and 
‘administrative traditions’ have heavily conditioned both modernisation attempts and the 
real impacts of borrowed models and ideas (Roberts, 1997; Premfors, 1998; Lodge, 2003, 
2012; Cheung, 2005; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2009; Painter and Peters, 2010). Then, several 
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observers have wondered whether convergence around the administrative reforms advanced 
by developed countries is appropriate or even possible for developing countries with 
limited administrative capacities (Schick, 1998; McCourt et al., 2001; Minogue, 2001; 
Nickson, 2002; Laking and Norman, 2007; Dussauge-Laguna, 2009b; Pritchett et al., 2010; 
Andrews, 2010, 2012; Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg, 2012). 
The former debates raise a number of important questions, which could be 
summarised around the following puzzle: if the process of drawing relevant information 
about foreign experiences in a particular policy field, and converting it to changes of some 
sort is so complicated, how is it possible that we find so many documented examples of 
policy ‘transfer’ and ‘diffusion’, particularly in the field of administrative reforms? 
Moreover, leaving aside other mechanisms like ‘coercion’ or ‘legal harmonisation’, how is 
it that many of these changes have not actually remained just at the level or ‘talk’, but have 
gone to include some degree of convergence in policy contents, which would further point 
towards complex learning processes?  
In a way, this situation might simply relate to how scholars talk about similar 
questions in different terms. For instance, recent diffusion studies which focus on ‘learning’ 
define this term as a process by which policymakers update or change their beliefs on the 
basis of information about policy effects in other jurisdictions (Shipan and Volden, 2008; 
Meseguer, 2009; Gilardi et al., 2009; Gilardi, 2010; Graham et al., 2013). Once 
policymakers know that a policy (e.g. capital controls; hospital financing reforms; 
antismoking principles) has worked well elsewhere, they will aim to adopt it. Cross-
jurisdictional learning will thus lead to policy changes. Moreover, because diffusion 
scholars usually understand policies in a dichotomous way (Howlett and Rayner, 2008; 
Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Shipan and Volden, 2012), the adoption of a similar policy 
across jurisdictions will usually imply convergence.  
For policy transfer and lesson-drawing scholars, the story is slightly even if not 
completely different. Lessons, policies, or more general knowledge might be transposed 
from A to B, or used by policymakers in other jurisdictions (Rose, 1991, 1993; Page, 2000; 
Evans, 2004a, 2004b; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, 2000). While scholars do not usually 
provide a clear definition of learning, they tend to assume it happens in the way of some 
assessment carried out by policymakers between a particular issue they face in their 
jurisdiction and the potential solution provided by a policy elsewhere, which is then 
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transferred. In contrast to their diffusion colleagues, students of transfer/lesson-drawing 
make two further assumptions. First, policies are not just ‘either/or’ decisions, but bundles 
of objectives, instruments, and settings (Howlett and Rayner, 2008; Benson and Jordan, 
2011). Second, during cross-national transfer/learning process, policymakers aim to ‘fit’ or 
‘translate’ the borrowed policy/lesson to the receiving jurisdiction (Rose, 2005; Stone, 
2012). Therefore, learning from abroad might trigger policy changes in the way of lessons 
or policies being transferred. Yet, because of the former two assumptions, these changes 
will hardly lead to cross-national convergence.  
However, by looking at these differences between the policy diffusion and policy 
transfer approaches one cannot fully understand why contemporary discussions on cross-
national policy learning and administrative reforms offer such a puzzling perspective. 
Conceptual/definitional aspects do contribute to making sense about how scholars offer 
contrasting assessments on the amount of convergence in any given policy field (Marsh and 
Sharman, 2009). On the other hand, they do not say much about those other cases in which 
convergence actually went beyond the level of decisions or ‘labels’ (e.g. Thatcher, 2007; 
Alter, 2012; Nutley et al., 2012). Nor do they account for why policy changes are attributed 
to cross-national learning processes despite the challenges which are commonly associated 
with the latter.  
In fact, the problems of the policy diffusion and policy transfer approaches to fully 
understand the relationships between cross-national learning and policy changes (and 
potential policy convergence) would seem to lie elsewhere. First, in the limited 
conceptualisation they offer about what learning really is. As mentioned above, diffusion 
scholars assert that policymakers learn from the effects/successes of policies in other 
jurisdictions. However, leaving aside some exceptions (Mossberger, 2000; Weyland, 2006), 
the literature does not say much about how policymakers learn; what they learn about 
(other than ‘effects’); or how they use this learning beyond the policy adoption stage. In 
many ways, this is actually a literature about learning without learners. Among policy 
transfer scholars the problem is different, but strongly related. Here it is possible to identify 
specific policymakers, who might learn about many ‘elements of policy’ (Benson and 
Jordan, 2011). However, in the end learning is a task mainly related with ‘transferring’ and 
‘transposing’ policies, lessons, or models, and not much else (but see Bennett, 1991a; 
Wolman and Page, 2002; Page and Mark-Lawson, 2010; Common, 2012).  
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Second, while both literatures stress that policy changes result from cross-national 
learning, they do not offer much in the way of explaining how policymakers actually link 
these two variables. The policy diffusion scholarship has traditionally focused on patterns 
and processes, rather than in actors or agency (Rose, 1991; Marsh and Sharman, 2009). The 
only exception to this can be found in works focused on how policy entrepreneurs aim to 
mobilise support for the adoption of policies existing elsewhere (Mintrom, 1997). Policy 
transfer/lesson-drawing scholars have long paid attention to what policymakers do. Yet this 
has been usually in relation to how policymakers learn and draw lessons/models from 
abroad (Wolman and Page, 2002; Wolman and Mossberger, 2003; Rose, 2005); or about 
how they ‘fit’, ‘adapt’, ‘edit’, or ‘translate’ borrowed policies (Sahlin and Wedlin, 2008; 
Stone, 2012; Peyroux et al., 2012; McCann and Ward, 2012, 2013). However, in the end 
little is said about how policymakers advance policy changes on the basis of information 
from other countries’ policies; or about how they might make sure changes are not reversed 
once enacted.   
Third, these are two bodies of literature that study processes of learning-change, 
which nonetheless generally neglect the temporal implications of such processes. Diffusion 
scholarship has traditionally cared about time in two senses: when highlighting patterns of 
diffusion; or when exploring how various diffusion mechanisms work differently at various 
points in time (Rogers, 2003; Shipan and Volden, 2008; Jordana et al., 2011; Graham et al., 
2013). However, given their focus on policy adoption, diffusion scholars ignore other 
changes in policy which might take place during the implementation phase and thus across 
time (Shipan and Volden, 2012; but see Acharya, 2007; Karch, 2007; Heilmann and 
Schulte-Kulkmann, 2011). Policy transfer/lesson-drawing scholars similarly acknowledge 
the relevance of time in two ways: by contrasting the degree of policy changes in t
2
 
(moment of transfer) versus t
1
 (original conditions; e.g. Common, 2001); and by indicating 
that after the transfer stage, the new policy will enter a long process of adaptation in the 
‘importer jurisdiction’ (Page, 2000). Yet the latter assertion implies a rather deterministic 
view regarding potential policy outcomes. It also impedes thinking about ‘iterations’, 
‘loops’, and changing roles across time (Walt et al., 2004; Fawcett and Marsh, 2012; 
Carroll, 2012).  
Thus, contemporary debates within the policy diffusion, policy transfer, and cognate 
literatures have remarked the relevance that cross-national policy learning might have for 
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policymaking processes, including those related to administrative reforms. Yet the same 
literature has flagged that learning from abroad is complicated, rarely leads to significant 
policy changes, and hardly ever produces cross-national convergence. This puzzling image 
is partly a result of different conceptual and definitional points of departure among scholars 
on different camps. But above all, it is related to their shared limitations for providing a 
broader understanding of cross-national learning; the way policymakers manage to link 
knowledge from abroad and policy changes; and the temporal implications of these 
processes.  
 
The Focus of This Thesis 
This thesis takes as its point of departure the former puzzle and on-going debates. The main 
research question it addresses is whether and how cross-national policy learning matters for 
making policy changes. To explore this subject in more detail, the thesis asks four other 
questions which are strongly linked: What kinds of policy outcomes result from cross-
national learning? How do policymakers use knowledge from abroad in making national 
policies? What strategies do policymakers pursue to advance policy changes? How do 
cognitive, national, and international factors influence cross-national policy learning 
processes?  
The former questions are directly related to the scholarly concerns summarised 
above. They are also questions about areas where theoretical and conceptual developments 
remain limited. Of course, as Page (2000:8) has noted, ‘[i]identifying which gaps are more 
important than others is highly subjective’. Thus, the thesis does not claim the former 
questions are the most pressing for the academic literature. At the same time, it might not 
be wrong to argue they have received far less attention than others, such as ‘where do ideas 
come from’; or ‘how do policymakers learn from abroad’ (Rose, 1991, 1993; Mossberger, 
2000; Wolman and Page, 2002; James and Lodge, 2003; Weyland, 2004b, 2005, 2006; 
Meseguer, 2009; Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009; Gilardi, 2010; Page and Mark-Lawson, 
2010). 
In empirical terms, the thesis focuses on the processes by which the governments of 
Chile and Mexico introduced ‘Management for Results’ (MFR) policies throughout 1990-
2010. The research traces the general policy developments associated with the emergence 
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and institutionalisation of MFR. It focuses specifically on the way government officials in 
those countries gathered information about MFR practices and ideas in other jurisdictions, 
and then deliberately used it for (re)designing their own MFR policy.  
In contrast to most transfer/diffusion studies, this thesis does not equate the term 
‘policy’ with a specific MFR programme, law, or institution. As it is further described 
below, it assumes a broader conceptualisation. This is with the aim of incorporating into the 
analysis the various actions and decisions (including goals, programmes, and settings) 
made by these governments on the subject of MFR across two decades. In the case of Chile, 
this implies looking mainly (albeit not exclusively) at policy developments related to the 
performance management and evaluation tools of the Sistema de Evaluación y Control de 
Gestión (SECG). In the case of Mexico, the analysis covers the performance management 
and evaluation tools advanced in the past two decades, but requires taking into account the 
more complex and diverse institutional setting which has evolved in the absence of a 
centralised MFR system.  
The thesis challenges conventional scholarly accounts on the subject. It shows that 
cross-national learning might bring about significant policy changes. However, this does 
not necessarily occur through the transfer or diffusion of policies or models intact. It 
happens through policymakers’ use of knowledge from abroad in many ways and at various 
stages of the policymaking process. Moreover, policy changes are neither secured once 
policy elements are adopted, nor are they completed once their process of adaptation to a 
receiving environment has started. In fact, policymakers need to devise strategies to ensure 
the new policies are effective, legitimate, and durable. Full policy convergence does not 
happen, but neither does absolute divergence. Across time, through sequences of learning 
and change, policymakers learn how to overcome cognitive biases and national barriers; 
how to combine experiential learning and knowledge from policies abroad; and how to 
better fit policies to their national conditions, while also keeping them in tune with 
international policy developments. 
 
The Scholarly Point of Departure 
This thesis builds on academic debates on policy transfer and policy diffusion, as well as 
those in other literatures which have traditionally been flagged as related to them: policy 
borrowing/copying, lesson-drawing, policy learning, and policy convergence (Waltman, 
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1980; Bennett, 1991a, 1991b, 1997; Wolman, 1992, 2009; Rose, 1991, 1993, 2005; 
Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, 2000; Newmark, 2002; Knill, 2005; Holzinger and Knill, 2005; 
Benson and Jordan, 2011; Knill and Tosun, 2012; Marsh and Evans, 2012a, 2012b).  
However, as it will be further discussed in Chapter 2, the thesis will also add 
theoretical and analytical insights from other literatures. These include ‘knowledge 
utilisation’, ‘organisational learning’, and the ‘influence’ of international organisations. 
These are literatures which have often been suggested as relevant for the study of cross-
national learning, transfer, and diffusion processes (James and Lodge, 2003; Bennett, 
1991a, 1991b; Wolman and Page, 2002; Pollitt, 2003; Common, 2004; Wolman, 2009; 
Radaelli, 2009; Ottoson, 2009; Ettelt et al., 2012; Dussauge-Laguna, 2012b). Furthermore, 
just as transfer/diffusion does ‘not occur in a vacuum, but as part of the broader policy 
development process’ (Wolman, 1992:34), this research is ultimately embedded in broader 
public policy/administration and political science discussions. 
While the use of the transfer/diffusion academic literature as a departure point is 
mostly self-explanatory, there are some significant reasons behind the choice which are 
worth mentioning. These scholarly fields have been criticised because of a number of 
important limitations, including some related to its theoretical purchase and conceptual 
clarity (Stone, 1999, 2012; Mossberger, 2000; Page, 2000; James and Lodge, 2003, 
Howlett and Rayner, 2008; Evans, 2009b; Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Benson and Jordan, 
2011; McCann and Ward, 2012, 2013). However, they do offer a set of guiding questions, 
propositions, empirical findings, and gaps to which this thesis’ preoccupations and findings 
might be usefully related (Page, 2000:1).  
Furthermore, some alternative approaches, which a priori seemed to perhaps be 
equally or better suited for framing this thesis, were not completely so on closer inspection. 
For instance, James and Lodge (2003:185-186) suggest that scholars might be better off 
referring (among other options) to studies on ‘the power of ideas’. Yet in a major overview 
of the latter field, Béland and Cox (2011:7; Béland, 2009) have recently argued that the 
‘burgeoning’ literature on policy borrowing and diffusion actually represents one of several 
‘ideational’ strands. Indeed, transfer/diffusion studies focus on understanding and/or 
explaining how ‘ideas’ (e.g. concepts, lessons, models, or labels) which travel across 
jurisdictions might contribute to policy changes, in contrast to explanations mainly focused 
on ‘interests’ or ‘institutional’ accounts (see Carroll and Common, 2013).  
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In other cases, alternative theoretical approaches did not look that promising once 
their differences regarding transfer/diffusion studies were taken into account. One example 
might be found in Thatcher’s (2007) study of how internationalisation processes affect 
national economic regimes. He takes as a theoretical point of departure a ‘policy approach’ 
that combines International Relations and Comparative Politics insights. Yet his findings 
about changes in the utilities sectors of various European countries are similar to those 
previously produced by cross-national diffusion scholars (pp. 262-265). Another potential 
alternative was that offered by discussions on ‘isomorphism’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Lodge, 2003; Radaelli, 2000; Knill and Tosun, 2012). However, the main ideas of this 
approach (e.g. about ‘coercive’, ‘mimetic’, and ‘normative’ sources of change) have long 
been included in transfer/diffusion discussions, even if not always under the same labels 
(Westney, 1987; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Page, 2003a; Knill, 2005; Simmons et al., 
2008).  
Lastly, two other well-known analytical frameworks could have been used here 
instead of the transfer/diffusion literatures. One is the ‘institutional processualist’ take on 
‘public management policy making’. This has been extensively employed by Michael 
Barzelay and his colleagues (Barzelay, 2003; Barzelay et al., 2003; Cejudo, 2003; Barzelay 
and Gallego, 2006). The other is the ‘Advocacy Coalitions’ framework developed by Paul 
Sabatier and his colleagues (Sabatier, 1988, 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). 
Nonetheless, in using the elaborate set of concepts and categories upon which these 
approaches are built, the thesis could have easily fallen into a situation where the 
theoretical/analytical ‘means’ became an ‘end’ in itself. The empirical information from the 
Chilean and Mexican experiences would not have served the objective of better 
understanding how cross-national policy learning matters for policy changes. It would have 
contributed to fill the various ‘boxes’ suggested by these frameworks. 
 
Basic Concepts and Definitions  
The thesis focuses on ‘cross-national policy learning’ and how it might matter for the 
making of ‘administrative reforms’ (specifically ‘MFR’ ones). But in stating that, one still 
leaves open the question of what each of those terms actually mean. Some simple 
definitions would solve this issue for the sake of the basic conceptual considerations that 
need to be taken into account in comparative analyses like this (Sartori, 1970; Rose, 1991b; 
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Collier and Gerring, 2008). However, it might be useful to elaborate on how these terms 
will be employed throughout the thesis and why. This is particularly relevant because of the 
multiple ways in which they are defined and referred to in the academic literature; the 
plurality of cognate concepts that exist (with regards to ‘cross-national policy learning’); 
and the various policy options which could have been chosen for developing the study (in 
the case of the category of ‘management for results’ within the universe of administrative 
reforms).    
 
On ‘cross-national policy learning’ 
Cross-national policy learning might be defined as a process by which the beliefs of 
policymakers (e.g. government officials) are transformed in response to information they 
obtained about other jurisdictions’ experience in a given policy field, which they then might 
seek to use for introducing some sort of change in a similar policy field in their own 
jurisdiction (e.g. regarding a policy’s conceptualisation, institutional design, or 
programmatic arrangements). This definition has several implications. First, it seeks to be a 
rather focused one to avoid some of the problems that have affected related concepts, such 
as policy transfer or lesson-drawing (James and Lodge, 2003; Massey, 2009; Page and 
Mark-Lawson, 2010). Secondly, the definition uses the general term of ‘information’ to 
allow for the various aspects from which government officials might eventually learn: 
broad ideas, specific know-how, policy templates, policy solutions, problem definitions, 
and even general approaches to policy implementation taking place abroad (Wolman and 
Page, 2002; Béland and Cox, 2011; Mehta, 2011).  
 Yet an explicit focus on cross-national policy learning, instead of policy transfer, 
lesson-drawing, or diffusion goes beyond the conceptual criticisms which have been raised 
against these terms. The research tries to better understand the various ways in which 
learning from abroad might matter for the making of administrative reforms, and thus might 
bring about policy changes of some sort. As Bennett and Howlett (1992:275) remark, 
‘[p]olicies change in a variety of different ways’. Because learning from abroad might be 
employed in various manners to produce different kinds of policy changes, it thus makes 
sense to talk about cross-national learning from the beginning.  
Moreover, by focusing on cross-national policy learning, the research aims to leave 
aside other mechanisms of policy change which are commonly discussed in the literature: 
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legal harmonisation, competition, copying/emulation, and coercion (Waltman, 1980; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Bennett, 1991b; Page, 2003a; Knill, 2005; Thatcher, 2007; 
Simmons et al., 2008; Radaelli, 2009; Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Page and Mark-Lawson, 
2010). A potential downside of this narrowed focus is, of course, that any findings of the 
research might only be extended to similar studies, but not to discussions on, say, cross-
national learning within the European Union’s Open Method of Coordination. Yet this 
might be worth doing for the sake of increasing the research’s analytical clarity.  
In any case, in assessing how much cross-national learning actually takes place, the 
empirical chapters will pay attention to these and other rival hypotheses. For example, that 
there actually was no learning; or that policy convergence resulted from broader socio-
economic or political developments (Collier and Messick, 1975; Bennett, 1991b, 1997; 
Radaelli, 2009). Some authors would not agree with of use of only two country studies for 
determining the relative influence of the various mechanisms and hypotheses mentioned 
above (King et al., 1994). But a multiple hypotheses testing exercise is actually quite 
common in ‘small-n’ qualitative studies such as this one (Panke, 2012).   
 A final reason for choosing the term cross-national policy learning has to do with 
the way in which these pages understand the ‘policy’ concept. There have been numerous 
discussions in the public policy literature regarding the best (or least imprecise) way to 
conceptualise the term ‘policy’ (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Heclo, 1972, 2010; Page, 2006; 
Howlett and Rayner, 2008; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2009). These have shown that policy is 
hardly ‘a self-evident term’ (Heclo, 1972:84), as definitions vary widely in wording, 
contents, and assumptions. Some scholars prefer more specific approximations. For 
instance, Rose (2005:15-16) states that policy ‘is an inadequate word to use in lesson-
drawing because it has multiple meanings’. He thus advocates a focus on ‘programmes’. 
Others favour broader takes on the concept, such as policy as ‘a course of action or inaction 
pursued under the authority of government’ (Heclo, 2010:4; Heclo, 1972).  
In line with the latter conceptualisation, policy will be understood here as the set of 
decisions and actions (or inactions) made by government officials on a given subject (e.g. 
MFR, as elaborated below), which might then translate into a set of specific goals, 
programmes, instruments, and/or settings. If the thesis were to use the concepts of policy 
transfer, policy diffusion, or even lesson-drawing, it would get closer to the former and 
more restrictive approach. More importantly, it would be sending the message that its 
 28 
 
 
interest lies on determining how government officials learned about a given 
institution/programme in jurisdiction A, and then transposed it to jurisdiction B within a 
very specific period of time. However, as it has been remarked above, the research’s 
concerns are related to wider questions about learning from abroad and its various uses, as 
well as about broader policy change processes that might unfold across a longer temporal 
frame.  
  
On ‘Management for Results’ Reforms 
As implied in the thesis title, this research focuses on a particular kind of policy: 
administrative reforms, which in turn comprise the set of decisions and actions related to 
changing the government’s structures, procedures, or systems to improve its administrative 
functioning or its social legitimacy (Caiden, 1991; Hood, 1991; Wright, 1994; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2011; Toonen, 2012a, 2012b). More specifically, the research focuses on those 
administrative reforms associated with the term ‘Management for Results’ (MFR). This is 
commonly discussed in the academic and international development literatures also as 
‘performance management’, ‘results-based/oriented management’, ‘management for 
development results’, or ‘monitoring and evaluation systems’ (Schick, 1995; Mackay, 
2006; de Bruijn, 2007; OECD-World Bank, 2008; Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008; 
Moynihan, 2008, 2012; UNICEF, 2009; Görgens and Kusek, 2009; Arizti et al., 2010; 
López-Acevedo et al., 2010, 2012; García and García, 2011).  
The topic of MFR has several administrative and political implications which are 
worth mentioning at least briefly. In broad terms, the idea of MFR implies the development 
of certain measures to regularly and systematically follow up (‘monitor’) the way in which 
government activities are being performed; and/or assess (‘evaluate’) the extent to which 
the objectives of public policies/programmes are being achieved (Görgens and Kusek, 
2009:2; Van Dooren et al., 2010:1-15). These measures might refer to a variety of 
administrative aspects (e.g. efficiency, effectiveness, cost, quality), or dimensions (e.g. 
inputs, processes, outputs, outcomes; OECD, 2009).  
Furthermore, measures of performance are commonly referred to (or inserted into) 
various tools: ‘performance indicators’, ‘targets’, ‘performance-pay systems’, ‘performance 
budgets’, ‘performance audits’, ‘programme evaluations’, or ‘impact evaluations’ 
(Ingraham, 1993; OECD, 1995, 1997, 2007; Curristine, 2005; Bouckaert and Halligan, 
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2008; OECD-World Bank, 2008; Hilton and Joyce, 2012). Despite their different 
methodological bases and overall rationale, these instruments seek to generate/use 
performance information for one or more of the following purposes: learning, improving 
programme design/efficiency, sanctioning, rewarding, (re)allocating budgetary resources, 
increasing transparency, strengthening accountability, or gaining public trust, among others 
(de Bruijn, 2007:3-16; Moynihan, 2008:26-38; Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008; Arizti et al., 
2010; Van Dooren et al., 2010). Of course, MFR tools might also bring with them negative 
consequences (de Bruijn, 2007; Moynihan, 2012). Moreover, their practical operation is 
generally (if not always) surrounded by several political, informational, and administrative 
hurdles (Schick, 1995, 2003; Hood, 2006; Hood and Bevan, 2006; Bouckaert and Halligan, 
2008; Moynihan, 2008; Hilton and Joyce, 2012).  
 The study of administrative reforms in connection to cross-national learning 
processes, and particularly those associated with MFR ideas and practices, seems relevant 
for several reasons. As Peters (1997:71) noted some time ago, ‘[a]dministrative reform has 
been one of the few growth industries in an era otherwise characterised by a declining 
concern with the public sector’ (Caiden, 1991; Hood, 1991). The already extensive 
literature on the subject has certainly pointed at frequent and extensive international 
exchanges on the subject, in which national governments, international organisations, and 
‘global policy networks’ (Pal and Ireland, 2009) have each played significant roles.  
In this ‘age of administrative reforms’ (Wright, 1994), MFR has occupied a most 
prominent place. For example, Ingraham (2005:390), remarks that ‘[f]or much of the 
twentieth century – and certainly for the last 25 years – performance has been a siren’s song 
for nations around the world’ (Peters, 1997; Schick, 2003; Moynihan, 2008, 2012). Pollitt 
and Bouckaert (2011:119) similarly suggest that a central feature of the ‘Neo-Weberian 
state’ that has emerged across many countries is ‘a greater orientation on the achievement 
of results, rather than merely the correct following of procedure’, which might ‘take the 
form of a degree of performance management’. Therefore, if there is a policy field (and a 
specific type of reform) from which it might be possible to gain a broader understanding of 
whether and how cross-national policy learning happens and matters for policy changes, it 
is probably this one.     
A focus on MFR policies is also relevant because of the significant attention this 
topic has received in both Chile and Mexico. Since the mid-2000s Chile has stood out as 
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‘probably the country in the region that marks the frontier in terms of monitoring and 
evaluation systems’ (May, 2006b:xv). Similarly, Castro et al. (2009ii:v) have remarked that 
‘[t]here is intense activity on M&E issues in more than 20 countries in the region, and 
Mexico is one of the leading countries’. More recently, a major study conducted by the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) on the state of ‘Managing for Development 
Results’ in Latin America and the Caribbean ranked Chile and Mexico as first and fourth, 
respectively, in the region (García and García, 2011:19).  
Indeed, as discussed throughout the empirical chapters, the topic has often been 
(even if with marked ‘ups and downs’) in the government agenda since the mid-1990s and 
up to this date. In his first ‘Address to the Nation’ (May 27, 2010), the current president of 
Chile Sebastián Piñera stressed the need for ‘a new form of governing. So that Chileans can 
benefit from results, and do not just stay hoping for good intentions. A government that 
does not remain at the level of discourses and words, but of targets and achievements’. In 
very similar terms, the president of Mexico Enrique Peña Nieto stated during the 
congressional ceremony for the change of administration that, ‘we need to advance towards 
a democracy which provides tangible results, and we need it urgently’ (December 1, 2012).  
Because of all this, a focus on MFR policies would seem to be both justified and 
highly relevant. At the same time, however, this might also raise concerns about the issue 
of selecting cases with attention to the ‘dependent variable’ (Geddes, 2003:89-129). The 
thesis’ research design is discussed in detail in the following section. But it might suffice to 
remark here that this is not necessarily an issue for qualitative studies like this, which are 
mainly focused on theory building and conceptual refinement (Brady and Collier, 2004).   
 
Research Design 
This thesis is built upon a ‘small-n’ comparative historical analysis of two country reform 
experiences (Rueschemeyer, 2003; Gerring, 2007; della Porta and Keating, 2008; della 
Porta, 2008). It follows a ‘structured’ and ‘focused’ logic of comparison (George and 
Bennett, 2005:69), which is broadly inspired in the ‘most different cases’ approach (Peters, 
1998; Brans, 2012). In addition to the comparison, the thesis presents a ‘within-unit’ 
analysis based on the ‘process-tracing’ methodology. This ‘attempts to identify the 
intervening causal process –the causal chain and causal mechanism– between an 
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independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable’ (George and 
Bennett, 2005:206; Brady and Collier, 2004).  
Apart from the relevant scholarly references, the thesis makes extensive use of 
primary sources such as interviews, government documents, and legislation, as well as 
reports prepared by international organisations. As a whole, this qualitative research design 
responds to the thesis’ ‘inductive’ rather than deductive logic of inquiry (della Porta and 
Keating, 2008; Page, 2012a:23). This aims to better understand and build theoretical 
propositions about whether and how cross-national policy learning matters for 
administrative reforms/policy changes.  
 
A Comparative Approach   
The main reason for developing a comparative study instead of a single case study is, quite 
simply, to provide a richer, more meaningful, and less ‘provincial’ perspective (Marmor et 
al., 2005:340; Dogan and Pelassy, 1990; Lodge, 2006). As Heidenheimer et al. (1990:22) 
have put it, ‘[b]y comparing, we learn to see better’ (see Page, 2012a). Thus, the 
assumption was that more could be learned by discussing the Chilean and Mexican 
experiences in parallel, instead of just focusing on what had happened in either one of 
them. Of course, a single country study could have also contributed to the broader 
‘comparative conversation’ on cross-national policy learning (Page, 1995:129; Rose, 
1991b:447). Yet it might not have been very helpful in terms of looking for policy patterns 
that occur beyond the country studied (Page, 2012b).  
A focus on just two countries, and not say three to six as in other ‘small-n’ 
comparative public policy studies (e.g. Common, 2001; Thatcher, 2007; Page, 2012a), has  
methodological and logistical justifications. The focus on only two countries allowed for a 
more systematic and detailed discussion (Rose, 1991b; Heclo, 2010:14), in line with the 
research’s general objectives. By adding more countries to the comparison, this kind of 
fine-grained analysis would have been more difficult to develop. 
A ‘Large-N’ comparison might have offered a broader take on the subject, and the 
opportunity to produce stronger inferences and more generalizable conclusions (King et al., 
1994; Gerring, 2007; della Porta, 2008). However, one of the main issues faced by this kind 
of study, in which most policy diffusion scholarship falls, is limited ability to unveil 
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complex relationships and multiple causal links in the political/policymaking processes 
under analysis (George and Bennett, 2005:3-33; Howlett and Rayner, 2008:389; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2009:183-186). Because neither finding statistically significant correlations, nor 
proposing ‘silver bullet’ explanations were essential concerns for this research, a ‘Large-N’ 
approach was not deemed relevant.  
In terms of the ‘logic of comparison’ used here, it could be said that it is ‘structured’ 
and ‘focused’ (George and Bennett, 2005:67-72). The comparison is ‘structured’ because 
the analysis of two countries, and the four empirical chapters, takes as a point of departure 
the same set of research questions already described: What kinds of policy outcomes result 
from cross-national learning? How do policymakers use knowledge from abroad in making 
national policies? What strategies do policymakers pursue to advance policy changes? How 
do cognitive, national and international factors influence cross-national learning processes? 
Furthermore, the discussion only focuses on those aspects and events which appear to have 
been directly related to MFR policies in Chile and Mexico, and cross-national policy 
learning processes linked to them. Events associated with other administrative reform 
topics, including those in which learning from abroad might have played a significant role 
in the decisions of government officials, are only discussed when relevant for the thesis’ 
central topics. 
The comparison is ‘historical’ in the sense that it covers policy developments in 
each country across two decades: 1990-2010. A few references to previous (or subsequent) 
events have been included in the empirical chapters when they contribute directly to the 
main discussion. For example, comments about new MFR initiatives in Chile during the 
Piñera administration’s initial years; or about the original evaluation initiatives in Mexico 
in the 1970s. While ‘[n]o choice of period is perfect for all analytical purposes’, as Pollitt 
and Bouckaert (2009:5) have suggested, a focus on MFR policy developments during 1990-
2010 has been considered appropriate for at least two reasons (Sabatier, 1993; Capano and 
Howlett, 2009; Radaelli, 2009:1146): it allows telling the complete story of both countries’ 
MFR policies, from their beginnings up to almost present date; and it offers the opportunity 
to trace how cross-national policy learning mattered in different ways across time.    
Lastly, the comparison of Chile and Mexico has been broadly inspired by the ‘most 
different cases’ approach (Dogan and Pelassy, 1990:132-150; Peters, 1998:37-41; Brans, 
2012). The adverb broadly is added because these two countries obviously share the same 
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language and many cultural and administrative features. For instance, an administrative 
tradition characterised for its ‘extreme formalism’, ‘ritualism’, and ‘hyper-legalism’, which 
‘do not constitute substantive indicators, let alone predictors, of responsiveness, 
effectiveness or democratic accountability’ (Nef, 2003:532; Méndez, 1997; Marcel, 1998c; 
Nickson, 2002). Also, their political systems are structured on the basis of presidential 
principles, in which the executive power (and its bureaucratic structure) is separated from 
the legislative power.  
Furthermore, these are two countries which during the past two decades have gone 
through so-called ‘dual transitions’: from authoritarianism to democracy; and from a 
relatively closed economy to a liberalised/market one (González, 2008i:1-14). Little more 
than two decades ago, both Chile and Mexico were governed by authoritarian regimes: the 
Pinochet dictatorship, and (in Mario Vargas Llosa’s inaccurate but catchy phrase) the 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional’s ‘perfect dictatorship’, respectively. These were 
governments which certainly cared about political and even administrative ‘effectiveness’; 
but not necessarily about ‘democratic results’. 
Despite these commonalities, the Chilean and Mexican experiences also possess 
sufficient contrasting attributes to fit the ‘most different cases’ comparative approach 
(Elizondo and Maira, 2000; Teichman, 2001, 2007; Weyland, 2006; González, 2008:14-15; 
Murillo, 2009:13-14;). First, whereas Chile has been traditionally characterised by low 
levels of administrative corruption, Mexico’s public sector continues to be perceived as a 
relatively corrupt country (Transparency International, 2012). Second, the Chilean 
administration has been regularly perceived to be quite professionalised, even before a 
formal civil service law was enacted in 2003 (Echebarría and Cortázar, 2007). On the 
contrary, Mexico’s public personnel practices have been historically portrayed as following 
the features of a ‘spoils (or quasi-spoils) system’, even after the passing of a merit-based 
civil service law in 2003 (Grindle, 1977; Arellano, 1999; Dussauge-Laguna, 2011).  
Third, the constitutional and legal authorities that Congress possesses (and might 
potentially use) to influence budgetary policymaking differ quite a lot between the two 
countries. The Chilean Congress cannot intervene in the preparation or execution of the 
budget (Blöndal and Curristine, 2003; Boeninger, 2007; Aninat et al., 2008). The Mexican 
Congress does have the power to amend budgetary proposals submitted by the executive 
power. In fact, it has increasingly used those authorities since 1997 (Hernández, 1998; Díaz 
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and Magaloni, 1998; Casar, 2008). Fourth, whereas Chile is a centralised country, Mexico 
is structured along federal principles (with 32 subnational and over 2,400 municipal 
governments, all autonomous from the federal government). Last but not least, significant 
differences exist between the two countries regarding the size of their public 
administrations; their payroll/budget levels as a percentage of national GDP; and the quality 
of their public organisations (Echebarría and Cortázar, 2007). 
As a whole, the presence of certain similarities in combination with a number of 
significant politico-administrative differences allows for a sensible comparative analysis in 
at least two aspects (Dogan and Pelassy, 1990:128; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2009:10-11; 
Heclo, 2010:14-15). Because Chile and Mexico are not completely different, it is possible 
to avoid the issue of whether it actually makes sense to compare them in the first place. 
Furthermore, given the variation in these countries independent variables, by comparing 
them one can focus on finding out (and thus better understanding about) those aspects or 
patterns of cross-national policy learning and policy changes which are common to them.      
  
Sources of Information  
This thesis makes extensive use of primary sources of information, including 62 semi-
structured interviews, legislation, and several official documents from both the Chilean and 
Mexican governments. Conducting interviews was considered essential for two reasons. 
First, in order to better understand MFR policy developments in both countries, it just 
seemed natural to ask the people who had been involved in the process about the 
motivations behind the reform initiatives; the politico-administrative circumstances 
(pressures and favourable conditions) they had faced; the people with whom they had 
interacted; the information sources (both foreign and national) they had consulted; and the 
ways in which they had used (or not) what they learned from abroad (or from previous 
experiences). As Weyland (2004b:26) has put it, ‘[w]ho could provide better information 
about learning from foreign models than the decision makers who may have drawn the 
lessons?’ (Wolman and Page, 2002; Page and Jenkins, 2005; Evans, 2009b:251; Page, 
2012a). 
Second, when this research project began, there were just a few published accounts 
of MFR reforms. Most of these had been written by policymakers who were (or had been) 
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involved in these processes. This situation has significantly changed in the past few years, 
as an increasing number of academic studies has been produced. Yet the literature still 
shows a tendency towards simply describing the MFR tools’ features; the laws/rules which 
integrate each of the systems; and the set of key dates which form the history of the reforms 
in both countries. Moreover, the specialised literature has not explored the question of 
cross-national policy learning in relation to MFR reforms, nor has any study engaged in a 
comparison such as the one offered by this thesis.  
All interviews were conducted face to face between 2009 and 2011, in Santiago de 
Chile, Mexico City, and Washington, D.C. Interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes, 
with most taking about one hour. With the exception of four interviewees, all were willing 
to go ‘on the record’, regardless of whether citations in the thesis would be attributed or 
not. However, in following academic conventions in studies which make extensive use of 
interviews (e.g. Page and Jenkins, 2005; Hood and Lodge, 2006; Thatcher, 2007; Page, 
2012a), as well as to avoid potential negative effects to the careers of those interviewed, 
citations from interviews are anonymous. The interview protocol was structured on the 
basis of some general topics (e.g. international reform experiences ‘studied’; participation 
of international organisations; role of congressional actors or other ministries); and specific 
questions tailored to take advantage of the interviewee’s current or former official position 
(Richards, 1996:202). 
The sample of interviewees consisted of current and former government officials; 
international organisation experts; and public policy/administration scholars. In the first 
case, the focus was on middle-level and senior officials (including some former political 
appointees) who at some point had/have been directly involved in the making of MFR 
policies. This could have been in terms of gathering cross-national information, or 
designing related regulations (generally middle-level officials). Also, in terms of leading 
the reforms; coordinating the overall implementation of the latter; or negotiating the 
approval of a new regulatory or programme major change (senior officials).  
These interviewees were selected because of one or more of the following reasons: 
they were mentioned in the relevant literature; they have authored institutional reports or 
articles/books describing their country’s reform experiences; or by what Richards (1996: 
200) calls a ‘snowball effect’, when an interviewee suggested it would be useful to talk to 
another person as well. Since only a handful of potential interviewees (and certainly not the 
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most important ones) either declined to participate or could not be located, the sample of 
interviews could be seen as ‘highly representative’ (Richards, 1996:200).  
Regarding international organisation experts, the sample of interviews was more 
limited, mainly due to practical constraints (e.g. difficulties coordinating agendas, or 
travelling for a second time to Washington, DC). Also, a few of the interviewees had 
previously worked as government officials. They kindly answered questions related to both 
their current international positions, as well as their previous government ones. Yet their 
interviews have been categorised as ‘former officials’ because discussions mostly related to 
their previous role. The small sample of international experts interviewed is certainly a 
limitation. It should be noted, however, that opinions from people in this group nicely 
complemented and confirmed, rather than contradicted what government officials said.  
Lastly, a number of public policy/administration scholars from both countries were 
also interviewed. This was mainly to gain a broader perspective about the politico-
administrative systems of Chile and Mexico. It was also to gather some critical comments 
about the actual performance of MFR policies. As in the case of international experts, these 
scholars were selected because of their academic contributions to the study of MFR and/or 
broader administrative reforms in each country.  
A number of measures were taken to secure the veracity of the information gathered 
during the interviews, and thus its relevance for the thesis. As a means to ‘reduce the noise’ 
(e.g. increase the confidence; Davies, 2001:78-79), most of the questions and general topics 
of the interview protocol were asked to at least two interviewees. This was particularly the 
case for contentious aspects (e.g. inter-ministerial conflicts; the occurrence of international 
coercion). Another ‘triangulation’ measure used was to compare the interview findings 
against published accounts and existing academic analyses. Neither of these measures, of 
course, eliminates all potential sources of bias (e.g. interviewees not remembering 
accurately, or exaggerating the relevance of an event or someone’s involvement).  
In fact, ‘triangulation’ was particularly problematic because most publications on 
the subject have been produced by the reformers themselves. Or in the case of academic 
publications, scholars have heavily based their analyses on interviews with the same group 
of people who was contacted for this research project. However, as Page and Jenkins 
(2005:xiii) have remarked, interviews such as the ones used for this project ‘cannot be 
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conducted in a context of low trust’. Thus, the decision was to take as much advantage as 
possible from this source of information for two main purposes: to fill the gaps about the 
story of MFR reforms in Chile and Mexico; and to enrich interpretations about how 
learning from abroad had taken place, and with what policy consequences.  
Another primary source used was the set of official publications that each 
government has produced on the subject. In the case of Chile, these were basically reports 
prepared by DIPRES. These explain in detail the various aspects of the country’s MFR 
tools as they have evolved. For the case of Mexico, documents were mainly presidential 
decrees, laws, and secondary regulations published in the Diario Oficial (Official Journal); 
and administrative reform programmes (e.g. the Programa de Modernización de la 
Administración Pública, 1995-2000). These documents were useful to obtain a better 
understanding of the rationale and programmatic particularities of both countries’ MFR 
components, as well as to further check on some specific data gathered during the 
interviews. Furthermore, they provided an excellent means to find how foreign practices 
have been used for advancing MFR policy changes, at least in a formal aspect (Bennett, 
1991b:222).  
 
Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into four parts. Part One sets out the theoretical, methodological, and 
analytical points of departure of the study. It includes this introductory chapter and a 
second one on ‘Studying Cross-National Policy Learning’. The latter introduces the 
analytical framework which guides the description and comparative discussion of the 
Chilean and Mexican experiences. The second chapter discusses the central place of 
‘learning’ in policy transfer, policy diffusion, and lesson-drawing debates. Building on 
these and related literatures, the chapter introduces the variables which might be more 
important to analyse the relationship between cross-national learning and policy changes, 
and the policy outcomes which might result from this. In particular, the chapter discusses 
the central place that the ‘uses of knowledge’ and ‘policy strategies’ have; the potential 
influence exerted by cognitive, national, and international variables; and the relevance of 
taking the ‘time’ variable explicitly into account. 
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Part Two and Three present the bulk of the empirical evidence of the thesis. Each 
part covers roughly one decade. Taking ten years at a time for each country was convenient 
to present the various reform events. The division also responds to the fact that MFR policy 
developments partly followed political cycles. For instance, in both countries there was a 
presidential transition in 2000, which had a number of significant implications for MFR 
reforms. Furthermore, while different policy changes took place throughout the two 
decades, it is certainly possible to see a period in which MFR were first introduced to Chile 
and Mexico (1990-2000); and a second period in which policymakers managed to 
institutionalise some kind of MFR schemes, building on previous developments and further 
ideas from abroad (2000-2010). Lastly, while there are no set rules for dividing up the 
periods under study, the policy learning/change literature does point at the relevance of 
using a decade or so as a basis (Sabatier, 1988, 1993). 
Part Two is centred on developments between 1990 and 2010. It discusses how and 
why MFR ideas gained currency in both the Chilean and Mexican governments’ agendas; 
and how officials formulated a first round of MFR practices mostly by using information 
from policies abroad. Chapter 3 focuses on the Chilean experience. It argues that the 
process by which MFR entered the country’s administrative modernisation plans was much 
more problematic than usually thought. The chapter further shows that Chilean reforms 
were heavily influenced by the British, Australian, and New Zealand MFR experiences. 
However, this did not result in a copy of any of these models.  
Chapter 4 then turns to the Mexican experience. It argues that the emergence of 
MFR is certainly associated with the country’s democratisation, albeit not necessarily in the 
sense it has been commonly suggested. The chapter then shows that the country’s accession 
to the OECD increased officials’ awareness of MFR ideas. Yet the process by which this 
led to policy changes does not reflect external imposition. Nor were the contacts with the 
OECD the only channel through which policymakers gathered knowledge about 
international MFR developments. This was particularly the case in the social policy field. 
As a whole, both chapters show how despite the efforts of policymakers, in the 1990s MFR 
ideas and practices went through an interesting but mostly unsuccessful initial 
implementation process. This second part also shows that, by the end of the decade, the 
future of MFR was not very promising in either country.  
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 Part Three covers the period between 2000 and 2010. It elaborates on how and why 
MFR ideas and practices regained a place in the government agenda of both Chile and 
Mexico; how and why they achieved a certain degree of institutionalisation; and how and 
why these national MFR schemes even gained a status as ‘successful’ experiences, worthy 
of further dissemination across the Latin American region. Chapter 5 presents the Chilean 
experience and argues that officials from its Budget Office skilfully developed certain 
strategies to reconceptualise, promote, and secure the legitimacy of the new MFR system 
introduced in 2000. It also shows that knowledge about foreign practices played a different 
role in this decade, and was combined with DIPRES officials’ previous experiences in the 
design and implementation of MFR tools.  
Chapter 6 analyses the Mexican experience. It argues that the country’s alleged 
progress from a social policy sector’s Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system to a 
government-wide one is inaccurate for two reasons: it ignores how developments in other 
MFR ‘strands’ conditioned the reform process; and it overestimates the extent to which a 
unitary ‘system’ actually exists. The chapter demonstrates that knowledge from abroad, and 
particularly from the Chilean scheme, was ably used by government officials to develop 
more sophisticated MFR tools. Together, the two chapters in Part Three show how 
international organisations were not only keen to follow policy developments in both 
countries, but also played a prominent role in providing them with a ‘stamp of approval’ for 
their MFR tools and reformist efforts.   
Part Four is integrated by two chapters which seek to put together the main findings 
and ideas of the thesis. Chapter 7, ‘Comparing Cross-National Policy Learning Processes in 
Chile and Mexico’, looks back at the empirical chapters in the light of the 
theoretical/analytical discussion offered in Chapter 2. This is particularly important because 
Chapters 3 to 6 obviously address the research questions posed above, but they do not 
follow the same structure in order to privilege a fluent description of the reform stories. Yet 
Chapter 7 does assume a comparative ‘matrix mode’ (Rose, 1991b). It first summarises the 
empirical findings, particularly in terms of policy outcomes (e.g. policy changes and 
degrees of policy convergence). The chapter then seeks to explain them by looking at how 
policymakers used knowledge from abroad; which strategies they devised to advance 
policy changes; and how other factors (cognitive, national, and international) influenced the 
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relationship between cross-national learning and policy changes in Chile and Mexico 
between 1990 and 2010.  
Chapter 8 presents the general conclusions of the thesis. It looks back at the main 
empirical, conceptual, analytical, and theoretical contributions that this research offers to 
three sets of literatures: administrative reforms in Chile and Mexico; policy transfer and 
policy diffusion; and broader political science discussions about policy learning and policy 
change.  
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Studying Cross-National Policy Learning  
 
 
 
The complex circumstances in which  
public policy borrowing occurs make the processes  
that accompany it inherently difficult to characterize and explain. 
 
David Robertson and Jerold L. Waltman, ‘The Politics of Policy Borrowing’  
 
 
The conceptualization of learning as a kind of intervening variable  
between the agency (independent variable) and the change (dependent variable),  
however, may never be successfully operationalized.  
It may be impossible to observe the learning activity in isolation  
from the change requiring explanation. We may only know  
that learning is taking place because policy change is taking place.  
 
Colin J. Bennett and Michael Howlett, ‘The lessons of learning’ 
 
 
Just as governments might learn from one another 
and facilitate policy diffusion, so too should political  
scientists working on different subfields learn 
from one another in order to facilitate the diffusion 
of useful tool and ideas in their studies. 
 
Erin R. Graham, Charles R. Shipan and Craig Volden,  
‘The Diffusion of Policy Diffusion Research in Political Science’ 
 
 
 
 
This second chapter introduces a framework for studying cross-national policy learning 
processes. It takes as a point of departure concepts and ideas which are at the core of 
contemporary policy transfer, lesson-drawing, and policy diffusion discussions. In 
particular, their focus on ‘learning’ as the key factor to be analysed, understood, and 
explained (Stone, 1999, 2012; Page, 2000; Evans and Davies, 1999; Shipan and Volden, 
2008; Meseguer, 2009; Graham et al., 2013). However, the following pages also tap 
insights from cognate literatures on policy/organisational learning, knowledge utilisation, 
and the influence of international organisations. Scholars have often stressed the need to 
better connect transfer/diffusion studies with these other scholarly fields (James and Lodge, 
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2003; Wolman, 2009; Marsh and Sharman, 2009). But up to this date there have been only 
a few limited attempts to do so (e.g. Wolman and Page, 2002; Newmark, 2002; Common 
2004; Ottoson, 2009; Ettelt et al., 2012).  
 While building on previous transfer/diffusion scholarship, the framework here 
proposed emphasises the need to focus on two variables: the ‘uses of knowledge’ from 
policies abroad; and the potential ‘strategies’ developed by policymakers. It then sets these 
elements into a broader context of cognitive, national, and international variables. Lastly, 
the framework explicitly underlines the relevance of taking the ‘temporal dimension’ into 
account. This approach to the study of cross-national policy learning contrasts with others, 
particularly the so-called ‘Dolowitz-Marsh Model’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, 2000; 
Dolowitz et al., 2000)
1
; and Rose’s steps for lesson-drawing (Rose, 1991, 1993, 2005)2. 
With regards to the former, the framework introduced here is less ‘encyclopaedic’ and more 
focused in terms of the topics it seeks to address. With regards to the latter, it is more 
elaborate and not really concerned about the degree of rationality which should characterise 
learning processes. Moreover, in comparison to most diffusion studies (e.g. Shipan and 
Volden, 2008; Meseguer, 2009; Gilardi, 2010), the framework described here allows for a 
richer analysis of cross-national learning processes.   
The chapter will be divided into six main sections. The first discusses the 
conceptual meaning(s) of ‘learning’, and the ‘types’ of learning which might take place in 
policy/organisational settings. The second reviews existing statements about the links 
between cross-national learning and policy changes across time. The third turns to the 
variables that might contribute to better understand these outcomes. It particularly focuses 
on the various ways in which policymakers might use knowledge from abroad, and their 
actions or strategic efforts to support policy changes. The fourth discusses the three sets of 
                                                          
  
1
 In their 2000 article, Dolowitz and Marsh discussed the following questions: Why do actors engage 
in policy transfer? Who are the key actors involved in the policy transfer process? What is transferred? From 
where are the lessons drawn? What are the different degrees of transfer? What restricts or facilitates the policy 
transfer process? How is the process of policy transfer related to policy “success” or “failure”?. While similar 
questions had been previously flagged by Westney (1987) and Wolman (1992), Dolowitz and Marsh’s take on 
the subject is probably the most commonly used and referred to. See, for instance, Common (2001); Larmour 
(2005); Stone (2012); or Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg (2012).  
2
 In its latest description, Rose (2005:8) spoke of ‘ten steps in lesson-drawing’: learn the key 
concepts (what a programme is, and what a lesson is and is not); catch the attention of policymakers; scan 
alternatives and decide where to look for lessons; learn by going abroad; abstract from what you observe a 
generalized model of how a foreign programme works; turn the model into a lesson fitting your own national 
context; decide whether the lesson should be adopted; decide whether the lesson can be applied; simplify the 
means and ends of a lesson to increase its chances of success; evaluate a lesson’s outcome prospectively and, 
if it is adopted, as it evolves over time.  
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variables which have been commonly said to influence (e.g. shape) cross-national policy 
learning processes: cognitive, national, and international variables. The last two sections 
offer a brief summary of the relevant variables for the analysis of cross-national learning 
described in previous sections, and the general conclusions of the chapter.  
 
The Study of (Cross-National) Learning 
The introductory chapter summarised contemporary debates on ‘cross-national policy 
learning’ processes. However, before starting the description of the various components of 
the analytical framework proposed in this chapter, it might be useful to briefly refer to 
learning’s central place in contemporary policy transfer, lesson-drawing, and policy 
diffusion debates. Also, it might be worth exploring what ‘learning’ actually means, and 
how ‘cross-national learning’ might relate to other categories.   
With regards to the policy transfer and lesson-drawing literatures, the study of 
‘learning’ has actually been a main theme since the beginnings of these fields. Dolowitz 
and Marsh have stressed that cross-national transfers might take place for several reasons 
including coercion. Yet their widely cited articles on the subject have underlined the 
centrality of learning on their titles: ‘who learns what from whom’ (1996), and ‘learning 
from abroad’ (2000). Similarly, Wolman and Page (2002:478) have remarked that ‘[p]olicy 
transfer is a subset of policy learning’ (Wolman, 1992, 2009; Page and Mark-Lawson, 
2010)
3
. And Evans (2009b:244) has stated that ‘[t]he study of policy transfer analysis 
should be restricted to action-oriented intentional learning’. Within the ‘lesson-drawing’ 
literature pioneered by Rose (1991, 1993, 2005; Asare and Studlar, 2009), the links 
between transfer and ‘learning’ are equally of essence. Rose (1991:4) notes, for example, 
that ‘[c]onfronted with a common problem, policymakers in cities, regional governments 
and nations can learn from how their counterparts elsewhere respond’.  
More recently, the study of learning has gained currency within policy diffusion 
studies. In contrast to its traditional focus on merely analysing ‘the process in which an 
innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a 
social system’ (Rogers, 2003:5; Walker, 1969; Gray, 1973; Collier and Messick, 1975; 
                                                          
3
 Page and Mark-Lawson (2010:49) even suggest that ‘[t]he use of foreign examples to shape 
domestic policy is thus invariably a matter of policy learning rather than policy transfer’. Common 
(2012:683) similarly stated that ‘[p]olicy transfer can only occur through policy learning’.  
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Jordana et al., 2011), some scholars have started to see learning as a relevant ‘mechanism’ 
that explains such diffusion processes (Elkins and Simmons, 2005; Simmons et al., 2008; 
Shipan and Volden, 2008). In other cases, scholars have sought to show how the cross-
national spread of policies has been particularly associated with the way in which 
policymakers learned ‘from policy and from political outcomes’ (Gilardi, 2010:651; Gilardi 
et al., 2009); or from ‘policy failures and successes’ (Meseguer, 2010:6; Meseguer and 
Gilardi, 2009). Lastly, Weyland (2004b, 2005, 2006) has aimed to show how and why 
certain reform ‘models’ have diffused across Latin America on the basis of ‘bounded’ 
learning patterns.  
The study of learning, however, has not been an exclusive concern of 
transfer/diffusion scholars. On the contrary, the topic has long received significant attention 
in broader public policy and organisational theory debates. In fact, cross-national policy 
learning represents only a particular instance of a wider phenomenon (Page et al., 2004; 
Common, 2004; Wolman and Page, 2002; Wolman, 2009). Thus, by looking at this broader 
literature one might get a better understanding of two important questions: what does 
learning actually mean? And how does learning from abroad relate to other processes of 
learning? Table 2.1 below summarises a number of definitions which are commonly used 
or debated in the literatures on policy, organisational, and cross-national learning.   
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Table 2.1 
Definitions of Policy/Organisational Learning 
 
Type of learning 
 
Author Definition 
Policy learning 
defined as… 
Heclo (2010:306) ‘Much political interaction has constituted a process of social learning 
expressed through policy. In its most general sense, learning can be taken 
to mean a relatively enduring alteration in behavior that results from 
experience; usually this alteration is conceptualized as a change in 
response made in reaction to some perceived stimulus’ 
   
Sabatier (1988:133) ‘policy-oriented learning refers to relatively enduring alterations of 
thought or behavioral intentions which result from experience and which 
are concerned with the attainment (or revision) of policy objectives’  
 
Hall (1993:278) ‘we can define social learning as a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals 
or techniques of policy in response to past experience and new 
information. Learning is indicated when policy changes as the result of 
such a process’  
 
Levy (1994:283) ‘I define experiential learning as a change of beliefs (or the degree of 
confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or 
procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience. 
This definition […] does not require that learning involve policy change, 
an improved understanding of the world, or an increasingly complex 
cognitive structure’ 
  
Meseguer (2009:216)  ‘policy makers are rational learners, meaning that they process all 
information in the same way. Starting with some initial beliefs that reflect 
the uncertainty about the outcomes of policies, policy makers use the 
evidence provided by their own and other countries’ experience to update 
their initial beliefs about outcomes’ 
 
Organisational 
learning defined 
as… 
Levitt and March 
(1988:320) 
‘organizations are seen as learning by encoding inferences from history 
into routines that guide behavior’  
 
Argyris and Schön 
(1996:20-21; bold font 
in original)  
‘By single-loop learning we mean instrumental learning that changes 
strategies of action or assumptions underlying strategies in ways that 
leave the values of a theory of action unchanged. [...] By double-loop 
learning, we mean learning that results in a change in the values of 
theory-in-use, as well as in its strategies and assumptions’  
 
Olsen and Peters 
(1996:4) 
‘the ability to detect and correct errors and thereby to improve the 
functioning of an organization. Organizational learning then implies to 
identify, remember, and use structures and procedures that improve the 
problem-solving capacity of an organization and make it better prepared 
for the future’ 
  
 Source: Author based on works cited.  
 
As many authors have remarked, the question of defining what learning really 
means, either in a policy or in an organisational setting, remains a rather complicated task 
(Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Dunlop and Radaelli, forthcoming)
4
. Indeed, the definitions 
                                                          
4
 Over two decades ago, Bennett and Howlett (1992:276) noted that ‘many of the fundamental 
elements of such learning remain conceptually unclear’; and complained about the prevailing ‘definitional 
ambiguity’. With regards to the ‘organisational learning’ literature, Mahler (2009:17) has similarly remarked 
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cited in Table 2.1 introduce particular emphases. Yet in spite of that, they all coincide in 
suggesting that ‘learning’ implies a process by which policymakers (or members of an 
organisation) update their beliefs and/or behaviours on the basis of new information or 
experiences.  
These broad points provide a good basis to think about what cross-national policy 
learning might mean. The latter could thus be defined as a process by which the beliefs of 
policymakers (e.g. government officials) are transformed in response to information they 
obtain about other jurisdictions’ experience in a given policy field, which they then might 
seek to use for introducing some sort of change in a similar policy field in their own 
jurisdiction (e.g. regarding a policy’s conceptualisation, institutional design, or 
programmatic arrangements). 
 The second relevant insight to be gathered from this broader literature relates to the 
various ‘types’ of learning which might take place. In the classic categorisation offered by 
Levitt and March (1988; Huber, 1991), organisations might learn in two ways. First, they 
might ‘learn by doing’, and thus obtain knowledge from cumulative experience. Within this 
category, Hood (1996:48-49) further distinguishes between ‘second chance learning’ and 
‘long tenure learning’. The former is related to the adaptation of behaviours in the light of 
experience after surviving a ‘shocking’ episode. The latter to how organisational 
members/policymakers are able to ‘feed experience back into activity’ because they remain 
in office for a long time. They thus have ‘more than “one-shot” at policy or institutional 
design’. Levitt and March’s (1988:329) second category is that of learning ‘from the 
experience of others’. This happens through the transfer/diffusion of ‘encoded experience 
in the form of technologies, codes, procedures, or similar routines’. Therefore, it is in this 
second class where one could locate cross-national policy learning processes.  
 Taking into account these categories of ‘learning’ is relevant for analytical and 
theoretical reasons (May, 1992; Olsen and Peters, 1996; Jacobs and Barnett, 2000; 
Busenberg, 2001; Karch, 2007a; Heilmann and Schulte-Kulkmann, 2011; Graham et al., 
2013). First, some transfer/diffusion contributions have stressed how instances of ‘learning 
by doing’ and ‘learning from others’ might take place at the same time within a given 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
that ‘creating a working definition of organizational learning is challenging because the literature offers such 
an untidy range of descriptions to work with’. See also Dodgson, 1993:376; and Zito and Schout, 2009:1104. 
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empirical experience. Therefore, awareness about both types (and subtypes) of learning 
might be useful for analytical purposes.  
Second, because some authors have shown that these two types of learning might 
somehow interact across time. For instance, Heclo’s (2010) classic study demonstrated that 
British and Swedish policymakers ‘puzzled’ over social problems and policy solutions. But 
at times the ideas and insights that triggered these puzzling processes originated in other 
jurisdictions. Similarly, Westney’s (1987) account of police and post reforms in 19th 
century Japan showed how ‘imitation’ from abroad was in the longer-term complemented 
by ‘innovation’ and adaptation of the imported institutions. Thus, thinking about both 
categories might contribute to developing a deeper theoretical understanding of how they 
might matter, separately or in combination, for policy changes.  
 Summing up, the study of cross-national policy learning processes is nowadays a 
central concern of transfer/diffusion discussions. However, by placing the analysis of this 
particular type of learning against the background of broader policy/organisational learning 
debates one can gain some useful insights: a better conceptual understanding of the term 
and what it really means; analytical power to distinguish it from other types of learning; 
and a theoretical leverage to generate propositions about how learning from abroad might 
relate with experiential learning across time.     
 
Cross-National Learning and Policy Change 
Having established what ‘learning’ of a ‘cross-national’ type means, one can now turn to 
discuss the policy outcomes which might result from this kind of processes. This is a 
central topic of transfer/diffusion discussions, as learning from abroad is associated with 
the travel of policies/ideas across jurisdictions. However, the links between these two 
variables might not be as straightforward as generally assumed (Levy, 1994:282; Capano, 
2009:8). Therefore, before assessing the extent to which MFR policies in Chile and Mexico 
originated and/or changed as a result of cross-national learning, it is useful to first look at 
two aspects: the types of potential relationships between learning and change; and the 
dimensions which might be employed to measure policy outcomes.  
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Types of Relationships between Cross-National Learning and Policy Change 
In the transfer/diffusion literatures, it is generally assumed that links between learning from 
abroad and policy changes are relatively straightforward: one can confidently speak about 
change when a given policy, programme, law, or institution has travelled across 
jurisdictions. Yet, this might be less straightforward than generally assumed, and one needs 
to be aware of other potential scenarios.  
First, some scholars have noted policy changes might result from other 
developments taking place in parallel to cross-national learning processes. For example, in 
discussing how the US ‘copied’ tax and social security policies from the UK, Waltman 
(1980:6) flagged two important points to be considered: ‘first, that accurate information on 
another nation’s, or several nations’ policies had been transferred into the system; and 
second, that this information actually affected the policymaking process’. Similarly, Collier 
and Messick’s (1975) study on the diffusion of social security policies, and Bennett’s 
(1997) analysis of the spread of accountability instruments, remarked the need to look at 
prerequisite conditions or alternative explanations (economic, social, and political 
developments)
5
.  
 Second, another potential scenario is when policymakers engage in cross-national 
learning, but no immediate policy changes follow because of a variety of reasons. First, as 
Rose (1993:ix) has suggested, ‘[l]essons can also be negative; examples of failure identify 
what not to emulate’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Weyland, 2004b:6)6. Second, 
policymakers might gather information about programmes/practices in other jurisdictions, 
only to later determine that this is not really useful, or that there are better alternatives 
(Boston, 1996:116-117; Mossberger, 2000:128; Wolman and Page, 2002:480-481). Third, 
the lack of use might be related to bureaucratic or political conflicts (Levy, 1994:288); to 
policymakers’ limited resources or capacity (Rose, 1993:14-15); or to the absence of 
appropriate political conditions (Boston, 1996; Jacobs and Barnett, 2000:194).  
                                                          
5
 Page and Mark-Lawson (2010:51) note that ‘in cases where there is prima facie strong evidence 
that policies have been substantially influenced by those from another jurisdiction, closer inspection shows 
that the influence of foreign experience is limited and does not appear to have been based on any such direct 
lessons’. 
6
 In a previous piece, Rose (1991:7) remarked that ‘[a] programme elsewhere may be evaluated 
negatively, or the conclusion may be that there is no way in which it could be transferred’. Based on his 
analysis of social policy changes in 19
th
 century Europe, Heclo (2010:70) also stated that ‘[p]ositive as well as 
negative lessons were being learned and disseminated’.  
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 Lastly, a few scholars have stressed that time might be a relevant variable to assess 
how learning from abroad and policy changes are related (Westney, 1987; Stone, 1999; 
Dussauge-Laguna, 2012a)
7
. While most studies focus on events closely associated with the 
moment/period in which a programme travelled across jurisdictions (Pollitt, 2002:475), 
‘transfer is not necessarily based on a single act’ (Page, 2000:5)8. Indeed, when discussing 
how international anti-money laundering principles were introduced to China, Heilmann 
and Schulte-Kulkmann’s (2011:640) argued that ‘the local accommodation of global norms 
should be understood as a contentious and open-ended process’. Walt et al. (2004:195) 
similarly concluded the influence of international organisations in the global spread of 
health policy ‘best practices’ followed ‘diffuse, iterative, and ‘‘looped’’’ patterns. Fawcett 
and Marsh (2012:183) remarked how the transfer of the Gateway programme followed 
several iterations: from the UK to Australia, then to subnational governments within the 
latter, and then back to the UK. Along these lines, Carroll (2012) has suggested that the 
transfer of statutory instruments from the UK (and other sources) to Australia has followed 
variable patterns across four different stages since the 19
th
 century.   
Summing up, the study of cross-national policy learning implies looking at how 
information about policies in one jurisdiction might influence developments in another 
jurisdiction’s policy in the same field. Yet in assessing these processes, one needs to 
carefully determine which policy changes are truly related to learning from abroad and 
which are not, even if they take place at the same time. Conversely, one should bear in 
mind that cross-national learning might take place even if policy changes did not in the 
form of the transfer/adoption of a programme. Moreover, it is important to take into 
account that relationships between cross-national learning and policy changes do not 
necessarily end at the moment in which a given policy travelled across jurisdictions. This 
highlights the need to be aware of the ‘temporal’ dimension of these processes.  
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 Zito and Schout (2009:1116) have recently remarked that the ‘scholarly literature is trying hard to 
become more precise regarding conditions for learning and questions about whether the time dimension of 
learning has been underestimated’   
8
 Page (2000:5) further argues that ‘the time period taken as the period of “transfer” […] is likely to 
have an impact on many of the other variables’, such as ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘how’, or ‘why’.   
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Dimensions of Policy Change  
Cross-national policy learning might lead to policy changes, but there obviously are various 
ways to ‘measure’ these changes. As discussed in the Introduction, diffusion scholars 
generally assume a ‘dichotomous view’: policy changes when one jurisdiction adopts an 
institution, law, or programme which already exists elsewhere (Howlett and Rayner, 2008; 
Marsh and Sharman, 2009)
9
. While widely used and valid for some research purposes, this 
way of measuring change is probably rather limited. This is particularly the case if one aims 
to know what happened to the policy under analysis after the adoption stage (Shipan and 
Volden, 2012). 
The policy transfer literature offers a more elaborate way of capturing policy 
changes. Scholars in this area suggest that changes might occur with regards to several 
‘elements of policy’ (Benson and Jordan, 2011:370). Thus, Dolowitz and Marsh (2000:12) 
have proposed ‘eight different categories: policy goals, policy content, policy instruments, 
policy programs, institutions, ideologies, ideas and attitudes and negative lessons’ (see 
Wolman, 1992:41; Stone, 1999; Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg, 2012).  
A third way of measuring policy changes is that related to levels or degrees of 
‘policy convergence’ (Bennett, 1991b; Pollitt, 2001, 2002; Knill, 2005; Holzinger and 
Knill, 2005; Holzinger et al., 2008). This implies looking at how a given jurisdiction 
increasingly resembles another from which it is taking policy information and guidance; or 
how two jurisdictions converge towards broader international standards. Thus, Bennett 
(1991b:218) has suggested ‘policy convergence’ might be measured with regards to 
‘expressed intents’ (policy goals); ‘statutes, administrative rules, regulations, court 
decisions’ (policy contents); ‘institutional tools available to administer policy’ (policy 
instruments); in terms of impacts, consequences, or results (policy outcomes); and in ‘the 
process by which policy responses are formulated’ (policy styles). Bennett (1991b:219) 
also remarks convergence is ‘a process of ‘becoming’, rather of ‘being’ more alike’.  
                                                          
9
 Although it is possible to find more elaborate perspectives. For instance, Mossberger (2000:xii) 
notes that changes associated with diffusion dynamics might simply happen at the level of ‘policy labels’, 
which are ‘a vague but symbolic idea that has the ability to assume varied forms and fulfill a multiplicity of 
purposes’. Weyland (2004b:22) suggests that ‘foreign models may not only teach policymakers how to pursue 
their existing goals better, but may also induce them to redefine these goals and pay attention to important 
concerns that they used to neglect’. Lastly, Rogers (2003:17) says that some innovations might be 
‘reinvented’ in the course of diffusion processes, meaning they could be ‘changed or modified by a user in the 
process of adoption and implementation’. 
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Summing up, one may try to ‘measure’ policy changes related to cross-national 
learning along various dimensions. This might be done simply through a ‘dichotomous’ 
perspective, as in most diffusion studies (e.g. ‘adoption/no adoption’ of a given 
programme, principle, or law). It might also be done using a more elaborate understanding 
of ‘elements of policy’, as it is usually the case with transfer studies. Lastly, on top of the 
previous dimensions, policy changes might be ‘measured’ in terms of how cross-national 
learning leads towards some degree of ‘convergence’ across time.  
 
Uses of Knowledge from Policies Abroad and Policymakers’ Strategies  
Apart from exploring whether (and what kind of) policy changes resulted from cross-
national learning, it is necessary to provide some explanation about how these happened. In 
order to do so, one needs to look at policymakers and the ways in which they link learning 
from abroad with national changes. More specifically, it is necessary to look at how 
policymakers actually use knowledge from policies abroad; and what actions or strategies 
they set in motion to transform this information into policy changes of some sort. While 
these are central questions for understanding transfer/diffusion processes, they have 
received only limited attention in the literature. However, for the purposes of this chapter, it 
is certainly possible to find some helpful propositions in previous academic works, as well 
as among cognate debates.    
 
The Uses of Knowledge from Policies Abroad 
The relevance of looking at transfer/diffusion as processes in which knowledge from 
policies in other jurisdictions is ‘used’ by policymakers has long been recognised. For 
instance, Bennett and Howlett (1992:276) underlined the need to focus on ‘knowledge 
acquisition and utilization’. In describing lesson-drawing, Rose (1993:24) similarly stressed 
that ‘policymakers in country Y want to use knowledge about what happens elsewhere to 
improve their future’. In the diffusion literature, Mossberger (2000:xi) has focused on ‘how 
the information [about enterprise zones] is used in the collective, political processes of 
decision making that characterize public policy’. Among policy transfer scholars, Wolman 
and Page (2002:480) have stated ‘transfer does require utilization of knowledge drawn from 
the experience of others, although it does not require actual adoption’. The idea of ‘using’ 
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knowledge from abroad is also central to Dolowitz and Marsh’s (2000:5)10 and Evans’ 
(2009b:243-244) concepts of policy transfer
11
. 
There have been some attempts to ‘operationalize’ how policymakers ‘use 
knowledge’ from policies abroad. Bennett (1991a) suggested evidence from abroad could 
be used in five ways. First, by showing how a certain topic is addressed in other 
jurisdictions, policymakers might try to put an issue on the political agenda. Second, 
knowledge from abroad might be used simply as a reaction, to ‘mollify’ political pressures. 
Third, a foreign program might be ‘emulated’, and thus used by policymakers as an 
exemplar for designing of similar programmes. Fourth, evidence from other countries may 
be used as an input in the search for the ‘best’ policy on a given subject. Lastly, knowledge 
from abroad might be used for legitimating conclusions already reached (see also Pedersen, 
2007:67; Dominique et al., forthcoming). More recently, Page and Mark-Lawson (2010) 
remarked policymakers use learning from abroad in three main ways: as ‘inspiration’, when 
they take ‘a basic idea, possibly loosely defined, and develop a form or version of it’; as 
‘demonstration’, to show that certain policies or decisions are feasible; and as ‘smart ideas’, 
offering guidance or ‘tricks’ to solve existing problems.  
 From a broader perspective, this topic has received substantial attention from the 
knowledge/research utilisation literature. For instance, Weiss and Bucuvalas (1977:224-
225) stated research findings could be used for several purposes. These include raising an 
issue to the attention of decision-makers; formulating new policies or programmes; 
evaluating the merits of alternative proposals; improving existing programmes; and 
mobilising support (Knorr, 1977; Radaelli, 1995; Rich, 1997). They also noted ‘research is 
useful not only when it helps to solve problems […] but research is also useful when it 
questions existing perspectives and definitions of the problematic’. Weiss (1979) also spoke 
about an ‘enlightenment’ effect. This refers to situations in which policymakers are not 
‘able to cite the findings of a specific study that influenced their decisions, but they have a 
sense that social science research has given them a backdrop of ideas and orientations that 
has had important consequences’ (p. 429).  
                                                          
10
 ‘[T]he process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and 
ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system’.  
11
 ‘[A] process or set of processes in which knowledge about institutions, policies or delivery systems 
at one sector or level of governance is used in the development of institutions, policies or delivery systems at 
another sector or level of governance’. 
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 Summing up, the former propositions provide some ideas about how policymakers 
might use knowledge from policies abroad. Information about policies in other jurisdictions 
might serve for advocating new policies, or for changing existing ones. Cross-national 
learning might be used for instrumental/technical purposes (e.g. formulating policies, 
improving programmes, or comparing alternatives); or for symbolic/political ones (e.g. 
arguing, attacking, or legitimating policy options; see also Boswell, 2008; Wolman, 2009). 
Lastly, these propositions further suggest knowledge from policies abroad might inform 
policy developments at the adoption and policy formulation stages, but also in other 
moments of the policymaking cycle(s).  
 
Policymakers’ Strategies for Advancing Policy Changes 
The literature has similarly flagged that policymakers develop some kinds of actions or 
‘strategies’ to further or support policy changes related to knowledge from policies abroad. 
According to Levy (1994:300), ‘learning has little impact unless those who learn are in a 
position to implement their preferred policies or to influence others to do so’. Similarly, 
Page (2003:173) has suggested that ‘drawing lessons from foreign experience and applying 
them requires commitment, energy, skill, and insight’. Therefore, one needs to look at 
certain groups of policymakers, and at how they go about linking learning and change.  
In terms of specific policymakers, the transfer/diffusion literature has long 
underlined the relevance of two main groups (Page, 2000). The first is that integrated by 
government officials. For example, in his study on how learning guided social policy 
changes in the UK and Sweden, Heclo (2010:301) remarked that civil servants were ‘the 
most consistently important’ group, ‘among all the separate political factors’. These 
‘administrators’ were responsible for ‘gathering, coding, storing, and interpreting policy 
experience’ (p. 303). They also provided ‘concrete substance to new policy initiatives and 
in elaborating already established approaches’ (p. 304).  
The second group is that of the so-called ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Westney, 1987; 
Rose, 1993:56-57; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996:345). In his work on the diffusion of school 
reforms across US state governments, Mintrom (1997:739) defined them as ‘people who 
seek to initiate dynamic policy change’. He stressed that ‘[t]o have them taken seriously, 
policy entrepreneurs must develop strategies for presenting their ideas to others’. Mintrom 
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further noted that these ‘policy entrepreneurs’ invest a significant amount of time 
‘networking in and around government’, in order ‘to determine what arguments will 
persuade others to support their policy ideas’12. Lastly, he remarked policy entrepreneurs 
try to build ‘coalitions’ (p.740).  
The literature has also suggested these groups of policymakers might develop some 
particular actions for advancing policy changes. Among transfer/lesson-drawing scholars, it 
is assumed policymakers ‘abstract’ models, ‘transfer’ programmes, ‘draw’ lessons, or 
‘adapt’/’translate’ any of these to the politico-administrative environment of an ‘importer’ 
jurisdiction (Rose, 1991, 1993, 2005; Evans and Davies, 1999; Page, 2000; Stone, 2012)
13
.  
Other studies have referred to the ‘strategic’ character of policymakers’ actions 
when linking knowledge from policies abroad and changes. In studying how American 
consultants revamped the Canadian civil service on the basis of management principles 
from the city of Chicago’s reform experience, Roberts (1996:11) argued this had been 
possible because of the ‘rhetorical strategy’ employed by the reformers14. Similarly, 
Gutiérrez (2010:60) has noted that Brazilian bureaucratic experts were capable of 
advancing water policy changes (originally inspired on the French experience and 
international standards) on the basis of three strategies. These included gaining 
appointments in ‘managerial positions related to water policy’; packaging reforms ‘within a 
government program or policy paradigm so as to upgrade the reform’s priority on the 
government agenda’; and promoting the ‘formation of a pro-reform coalition’. Lastly, Eyre 
and Lodge (2000:77) concluded that British and German policymakers ‘strategically’ 
selected and applied lessons from the European Union’s competition policy  
Summing up, previous scholarship has noted that certain groups of ‘administrators’ 
and/or ‘policy entrepreneurs’ develop some kinds of actions, even strategies, to link 
learning from abroad and changes in their own jurisdictions. These actions/strategies might 
                                                          
12
 Wolman and Page (2002:481) similarly state that ‘utilization might occur as part of the political 
process, with actors referring to the experience of other governments in an effort to persuade others of the 
desirability (or lack thereof) of a policy’. See Robertson (1991).  
13
 Recent discussions on the ‘circulation of ideas’ and ‘policy mobilities’ have similarly emphasised 
the role of policymakers as ‘editors’ and/or ‘translators’ of policies and models (Czarniawska and Sevón, 
2005; Sahlin and Wedlin, 2008; Theodore and Peck, 2011; McCann and Ward, 2012, 2013). 
14
 Roberts (1996:11) suggests the consultants’ strategy included three main ‘arguments’: ‘that civil 
service reform […] was a “science” that could only be properly discussed by trained technicians. A second 
argument consisted of an attack on the motives of individuals who challenged the authority of the experts. A 
third argument consisted of a demonstration that the members of the expert community had reached 
agreement that certain reforms should be regarded as “best practice”’.  
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be related to the formulation of policy contents, or to adapting new policies to their 
receiving environment. Some might be more in line with efforts to persuade or mobilise 
support. As a whole, these actions/strategies may be of administrative or political character. 
They may also be associated with ensuring the effectiveness of policy changes, and/or 
providing them with favourable (or at least less adverse) conditions.  
 
The Influence of Cognitive, National, and International Factors  
on Cross-National Policy Learning Processes  
The chapter has so far discussed those aspects which might help analyse, measure, and 
explain how cross-national learning might bring about some sort of policy changes. 
However, the relationship between these two variables does not obviously happen in a 
vacuum. On the contrary, it takes place surrounded by a number of other factors which 
might influence (e.g. shape) policy developments, particularly cognitive, national, and 
international. On the basis of previous works within the transfer/diffusion literature, and 
cognate scholarly discussions, how can we expect each one of these variables to affect 
cross-national policy learning processes?  
 
The Influence of Cognitive Factors  
The first set of factors which might influence how cross-national policy learning matter for 
policy changes is precisely that of what could be called here cognitive factors, or issues 
associated with how policymakers draw and process information from policies abroad. In 
principle, the concept of learning has a positive connotation, as it is associated with 
rationality and improvements. For example, in Rose’s (1991, 1993, 2005) lesson-drawing 
approach, policymakers obtain lessons after following a series of well-defined steps. These 
are similar to those commonly associated with the rational approach of decision-making
15
. 
Within the policy diffusion field, Meseguer (2009:3) has recently argued that ‘governments 
are rational (Bayesian) learners’. They ‘efficiently update their initial beliefs about 
expected outcomes with reference to information about policy outcomes in the past and 
elsewhere’. Then, they ‘choose the policies that are expected to yield the best result’ (see 
also Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009; Gilardi et al., 2009; Gilardi, 2010).  
                                                          
15
 Indeed, James and Lodge (2003:181) have remarked lesson-drawing ‘is very similar to 
conventional rational accounts of policy-making’. 
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However, several scholars have remarked that learning processes are actually 
fraught with complications. A number of studies have shown learning from abroad usually 
does not follow the rational model standards (De Jong, 2009; Page and Mark-Lawson, 
2010). Wolman’s (1992) study on the transfer of urban policies between the US and the 
UK, and Mossberger’s (2000:159-189) discussion on the diffusion of ‘enterprise zone’ 
across US states, illustrated how ‘organised anarchy’ and ‘bounded rationality’ processes 
are more frequent than fully rational ones (see also Mossberger and Wolman, 2003). 
Weyland (2004b, 2005, 2006) has suggested policymakers tend to follow decision 
‘heuristics’ (‘availability’, ‘representativeness’, and ‘anchoring’; see also Levitt and March, 
1988; Schneider and Ingram, 1998:62)
16. Instead of ‘rational’ standards, Wolman and Page 
(2002:484-485) have found that British local governments learn from other jurisdictions 
through ‘random and unfocused’ processes.  
 Learning might be hindered by the features of decision-making in democratic 
environments. Karch (2007a:204) notes that, ‘time constraints and electoral considerations 
have an especially profound impact’ on policy diffusion process across US state 
governments (see Rose, 1993:58; Robertson and Waltman, 1993:22; Wolman and Page, 
2002:488)
17
. Klein has remarked (1997:1270) ‘cross-national curiosity is not a neutral 
intellectual exercise’, but a process by which knowledge and ideas from other jurisdictions 
are employed to reinforce ‘policy predilections’, or fight against ‘prejudices’ (Robertson, 
1991; Bennett, 1991a; Larsen, 2002). Page and Mark-Lawson (2010:55) assert that cross-
national learning processes are surrounded by conflicting demands and pressures from 
various groups.  
Lack of information about a given policy/organisational experience might also 
affect learning. For example, Westney (1987:25) remarks that, ‘[p]erfect information about 
                                                          
16
 Weyland (2005:283-285) explains ‘[t]he availability heuristic refers to people’s tendency to place 
excessive importance on information that […] is especially immediate and striking, grabs their attention, and 
is therefore uniquely ‘available’. Thus, they do not pay balanced attention to all the relevant information. […] 
[T]he representativeness heuristic shapes their evaluation of experience. This cognitive shortcut induces 
people to draw excessively clear, confident, and firm inferences from a precarious base of data. Accordingly, 
they overestimate the extent to which patterns observed in a small sample are representative of the whole 
population. […] [T]he heuristic of anchoring limits the extent to which they adapt this model to their specific 
needs. Anchoring induces people to attach undue weight to an initial value, which strongly affects their 
subsequent judgments’.   
17
 Karch (2007:198) also adds that ‘[w]hen confronted with a social problem, state officials do not 
begin from first principles and analyse every possible policy solution. Instead, time-pressed policymakers are 
most likely to be drawn to politically salient policy innovations that have achieved a degree of visibility or 
notoriety’. 
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an organizational model is never available’ (see Mossberger, 2000:130; Page and Mark-
Lawson, 2010:54). In fact, even when officials go on ‘study tours’ to other jurisdiction, 
they usually get only partial and not necessarily balanced information about the policy 
under analysis (Wolman, 1992; Page et al., 2004)
18
. A related issue is that when the sample 
of available experiences is rather limited (‘of one or fewer’), which might constrain 
policymakers’ efforts to engage in more comprehensive international searches or analyses 
(March et al., 1991; Mossberger and Wolman, 2003).   
Nor is it generally easy to understand whether and how a policy has been effective 
or not. Mossberger and Wolman (2003:432-433) note that policymakers usually lack 
‘knowledge of domestic debates over programs, program evaluations, or research 
comparing the strengths and weaknesses of various program designs’ in other jurisdictions. 
They further add ‘ideas may diffuse before there is any possibility of demonstrated success 
in the original setting’ (Weyland, 2004b:10; Wolman and Page, 2002:492). Weyland 
(2004b:5) suggests that policymakers might ‘draw the wrong lessons, both from (seeming) 
failure and success’. Ettelt et al. (2012:502) have recently remarked cross-national learning 
comes with ‘the risk of misinterpretation’, as policymakers might have a limited 
understanding of the context and important details of policies elsewhere (Wolman, 1992; 
Mossberger and Wolman, 2003).  
Learning from the experience of others might be guided by ‘best’ or ‘good’ 
practices, but the task of identifying these is rather problematic. For instance, Kerber and 
Eckardt’s (2007:234) discussion of learning in the European Union show it is not always 
possible to identify ‘best practices’ (see de Vries, 2010). In fact, as the analyses on 
American ‘revitalised cities’ by Wolman and his colleagues (1994, 2004; Wolman, 2009) 
have demonstrated, ‘successful’ stories are not always so on closer inspection. Behberger et 
al. (2008:17) have similarly noted that ‘good practices’ are commonly identified by 
‘informed opinion rather than on any scientific evidence’. In studying the diffusion of 
spatial planning and environmental policies, Stead (2012:108) has also remarked that 
‘[a]ccounts of best practices are often condensed and sanitized and lacking in detail for 
application elsewhere’ (see Vettoreto, 2009).  
                                                          
18
 Page and Mark-Lawson (2010:54) remark that ‘the available evidence suggests that the host-guest 
relationship between the visitor and the host might both inhibit frank questioning of the merits of the 
programme being visited and/or lead to the host presenting the programme in the best possible light for both 
domestic and international consumption’. See also Pollitt (2003). 
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Summing up, despite the positive connotations of cross-national learning processes, 
these might not necessarily bring about policy changes of a beneficial nature because of 
several reasons. Among others, these include the ‘bounded rationality’ which characterises 
learning from abroad; the pressures exerted by democratic politics; the lack of detailed 
information about foreign practices; issues for understanding how and why a policy has 
been effective in other jurisdictions; and problems for identifying ‘best/good/ practices.  
 
The Influence of National Factors  
A second set of potentially influential variables is that related to national factors. Westney 
(1987:6) remarked, for example, that ‘[s]ince the environment in which the organizational 
model was anchored in its original setting will inevitably differ from one to which it is 
transplanted, even the most assiduous emulation will result in alterations of the original 
patterns to adjust them to their new context’. In similar terms, Rose (1991:21) has 
suggested that cross-national transfers cannot proceed ‘without history, culture and 
institutions being taken into account’. Whether referring to administrative traditions, 
national patterns, legacies of the past, or institutions more broadly, many scholars have 
noted that the cross-national travel of policies and ideas are conditioned by pre-existing 
national factors (Mamadouh et al., 2003; Peters, 2005; Thatcher, 2007; Béland, 2009; 
Painter and Peters, 2010; Lodge, 2003, 2012).  
A first national factor that might influence cross-national learning processes is the 
set of policy legacies or decisions ‘inherited’ from previous governments. For instance, 
Heclo (2010:17-18) stated that ‘[e]very innovator with a bright idea staggers forward with 
and against a vast deadweight of accumulated practices and ways of thinking’. Therefore, 
while partly originated in other countries’ experiences, modern social policies in Britain 
and Sweden were also a reaction to decisions made in previous times. Similarly, Rose 
(1993:78; Rose, 1990) has suggested that, ‘[p]olicy makers are inheritors before they are 
choosers’.  
 In close association, many scholars have underlined that national ‘institutions’ 
might significantly condition processes of learning from abroad in various ways. 
Comparing regulatory reforms in the UK and Germany, Lodge (2003) argued that different 
institutional frameworks (e.g. the structure of the politico-administrative nexus) influence 
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which foreign templates are perceived as legitimate and appropriate, and thus worthy of 
selection (see Busenberg, 2001:176). Researching how much learning and actual transfer 
has taken place around the European Union’s labour market peer-review process, Casey 
and Gold (2005:30-32) found a ‘battery of institutional constraints’, such as ‘the lack of the 
relevant supporting framework’; diverging legal systems; and different political structures 
(see Lenschow et al., 2005; Christensen et al., 2008). Similarly, Radaelli (2008:250) 
suggests ‘the heterogeneity of a union of 27 countries is a barrier to the transfer of lessons’. 
This is because ‘institutional legacies, state traditions, and the dominant legal culture’ set 
limits to how and which components of policy innovations might travel across jurisdictions 
(see Olsen and Peters, 2006; Roberts, 1997; Bulmer and Padgett, 2005).  
 Cultural factors (values and attitudes) might influence cross-national learning 
exchanges in various ways. Diffusion research has long remarked that policymakers tend to 
look at ‘the experiences of those countries with which they share an especially close set of 
cultural ties’ (Knill, 2005:770; see Robertson and Waltman, 1993:32; Elkins and Simmons, 
2005; Evans, 2009b:253). Halligan (2007:62) notes, for instance, that the diffusion of 
administrative reform ideas across ‘Anglo-American’ countries has historically been ‘easy’, 
because they have showed ‘a high propensity to absorb management and policy ideas from 
each other’ (Breul, 2006; Laking and Norman, 2007). Conversely, Dominique et al. 
(forthcoming) have found policymakers might acknowledge that international best practices 
and benchmarks offer ‘valuable lessons’; but at the same time they might insist their 
jurisdictions are ‘so exceptional that best practices from other contexts would not apply to 
their own’ (see Casey and Gold, 2005:32-34). 
The particular features of national bureaucracies might matter as well. Hood 
(1996:49-51) has argued that civil service structures and personnel management schemes 
may influence the extent to which government organisations learn both from their own 
experience, and from other organisations/jurisdictions. Brannan et al. (2008; Wolman, 
2009) have suggested governments with higher levels of professionalization and expertise 
might engage more in the generation and use of best practices. Along the same lines, 
Dodgson (1993:388) has stated the amount of resources an organisation dedicates to 
learning is important in terms of how much (and how well) learning takes place. Other 
authors have remarked personnel turnover might significantly affect a government’s 
learning capacity and institutional memory, particularly if there are no mechanisms in place 
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to institutionalise knowledge (Carley, 1992:41; Levy, 1994:289; Olsen and Peters, 1996:14; 
Hood, 1996:51; Pollitt, 2009). Weyland (2006:63) has argued that ‘institutional divergences 
inside the state’, such as different policy expertise, esprit de corps, policy priorities, or 
control over resources might be also affect how diffusion processes evolve.   
Lastly, a number of scholars have pointed at other political aspects. Heilmann and 
Schulte-Kulkmann (2011), for instance, remarked that ‘constant rivalries’ between various 
government agencies influenced the process by which China adopted international financial 
standards and rules. Weyland (2006:67) similarly argued that ‘[t]he balance of power’ that 
exist among different agencies (e.g. social vs. economy ministries) might determine ‘the 
political fate of the emulation proposals’. According to Robertson and Waltman (1993:29), 
the presence of divergent interests between relevant policy actors (e.g. ‘political executives’ 
vis-à-vis ‘career administrators’) might be equally relevant for policy borrowing exercises. 
Authors like Olsen and Peters (1996:32; Sabatier, 1988:137) and Cairney (2009) have 
suggested that ‘situational factors’, like crises, partisan control of the congress/parliament, 
and ‘windows of opportunity’ might influence the timing and features of learning 
processes.  
Summing up, the literature has flagged a number of national factors which might 
shape both the processes by which knowledge from policies abroad enters policymaking, 
and the policy changes which might result from this. Policymakers always ‘inherit’ a set of 
policy legacies and decisions that might trigger their willingness to look abroad, but 
simultaneously limit their room for manoeuvre. The country’s institutional framework and 
cultural values may partly determine which foreign examples policymakers study, as well 
as which ideas are eventually used or not. Finally, organisational features and other 
political factors might affect how much learning from abroad actually takes place, and 
when.   
 
The Influence of International Organisations 
A third and final set of important variables that might influence cross-national learning 
processes is that related to international organisations (IOs). A focus on IOs such as the 
World Bank (WB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) makes sense because they are 
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traditionally perceived as the most influential among international actors
19
. This is 
particularly the case within the literature on the transfer/diffusion of administrative reforms 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, 2000; Peters, 1997; Bissessar, 2002; Evans, 2004b; Pal, 2012).  
The influence of IOs is commonly associated with the idea of coercion, pressures, 
and/or conditions which these organisations might impose over countries engaged in cross-
national learning. Evans (2009b:256;) remarks that ‘[t]he influence of these global 
economic institutions has been particularly pronounced in developing countries, transition 
states and states emerging from conflict, which all depend heavily on external aid, loans 
and investment’ (see Marsh and Sharman, 2009:280). In the field of administrative reforms, 
Peters (1997:72) has noted that ‘much of the diffusion to the poorer countries of the world 
is done through donor agencies, so that the adoptions could hardly be seen as autonomous 
choices by governments’ (see Pollitt, 2003:128).  
Indeed, students of administrative reforms in the Latin American and Caribbean 
region have offered comments in this sense. Bissessar (2002:143) has suggested that ‘the 
imposition of structural adjustment measures […] was a clear case of a direct coercive 
transfer where policies were not merely transferred but rather ‘pushed’ by the international 
lending agencies with little or no input from the debtor country’. Ramió and Salvador 
(2008:555; Ramió and Salvador, 2005) have remarked that ‘international agencies 
promoting modernisation have relied on greater financial incentives, supported by political 
pressure’. Thus, ‘these external actors will have a greater impact on the design of Latin 
American public administration reform programmes’. 
There are other ways in which IOs might exert pressures and thus influence cross-
national learning processes. For instance, Finnemore (1993) has shown that UNESCO 
actively ‘taught’ several developing countries how science policy organisations had become 
an international ‘norm’ to be followed20. In studying the processes by which countries 
become OECD members, Carroll and Kellow (2011:147-166) have noted that national 
governments engage in a ‘voluntary but constrained policy transfer’. Throughout the ‘pre-
                                                          
19
 Of course, the transfer/diffusion literature has also discussed the roles performed by ‘epistemic 
communities’ (Haas, 1992; King, 2005); international consultants (Saint-Martin, 2001); global public policy 
networks (Stone, 2004; Pal and Ireland, 2009; McNutt and Pal, 2011); and independent policy institutes 
(Stone, 2002, 2004). 
20
 Finnemore (1993:593) underlines ‘[t]he fact that states adopt policies not as an outgrowth of their 
individual characteristics or conditions but in response to socially constructed norms and understandings held 
by the wider international community […]’.  
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accession, accession, and post accession’ stages, countries are ‘expected to share and 
commit’ to the organisation’s values, and thus adjust their national policies accordingly.  
The literature has noted that IOs may also exert a ‘normative influence’. This relates 
to ‘the creation, support and shaping of norm-building processes for issue-specific 
international cooperation’ (Biermann et al., 2009:48). Beyond legal frameworks, Pal 
(2012:xviii) remarks the normative influence may relate to ‘agreements, conventions, and 
recommendations around systemic reform’. For instance, the OECD’s Best Practices for 
Budget Transparency (see Pal and Ireland, 2009:648-649). In this broader sense, IOs might 
then play a double role of ‘standard-setters’ and ‘certifiers’ of these same standards, 
through peer-review and naming and shaming processes (Lodge, 2005).  
In addition, IOs might use their ‘cognitive influence’. According to Biermann et al. 
(2009:47), this means a capacity to change the knowledge and belief systems of national 
policymakers through the production of policy studies and other documents. Indeed, 
Brooks (2004:55) notes that ‘the most direct influence exerted by the World Bank on 
international pension reform trends [in Latin America] was its establishment of a new 
language and framework through which pension systems around the world could be 
evaluated and compared’ (see Lodge, 2005:654). Stone (2004:553) has similarly remarked 
that IOs contribute to spreading ‘forward thinking’ through their publications and related 
activities
21
.  
 In close relation, IOs might influence cross-national policy learning by constructing, 
branding, and establishing channels for the dissemination of ‘best’ or ‘good practices’ 
(Dimitrakopolous and Passas, 2012). In their studies on the diffusion of health policies, 
Walt and her colleagues (Walt et al., 2004; Ogden et al., 2003) have shown that IOs picked 
up some local medical practices, repackaged them, and then marketed their use 
internationally. With regards to NPM reforms, Sahlin-Andersson (2002:60-61) has argued 
that IOs (e.g. the OECD’s former PUMA committee) are ‘important editors of reform ideas 
and experiences’. Their reports introduce a logic to (‘rationalise’) countries’ experiences; 
attach ‘labels’ that might draw the attention of other jurisdictions; ‘package’ reforms; and 
promote ‘templates’ and ‘prototypes’ (see Premfors, 1998; Sahlin and Wedlin, 2008). 
                                                          
21
 Pal (2012:204) notes, for instance, that ‘any academic publication about almost any aspect of 
public management will contain at least one citation to OECD research’. 
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Moreover, Weyland (2004b:13) has argued IOs ‘systematically scan the world for relevant 
innovations’ with the purpose of disseminating ‘new policy approaches’ 
 IOs might shape cross-national learning through their ‘executive influence’. 
According to Biermann et al. (2009:48), this implies a ‘direct assistance’ to national 
governments, including activities (e.g. workshops or training programmes) which might 
enable them to implement international agreements, norms, or standards. Dimitrakopolous 
and Passas (2012:539) remark the WB regularly develops ‘learning programmes’ and 
‘training of trainers’ activities on several reform topics. Brooks (2004:76) has noted that the 
‘technical support’ offered by the IADB and WB to Latin American countries worked as an 
important ‘catalyst’ of health policy reforms. In a more indirect manner, Lodge (2005:662) 
suggests peer-review processes, such as those conducted by the OECD in the area of 
regulatory reform, might bring with it a ‘professionalisation effect’ among participant 
officials (see Pal and Ireland, 2009:650-651).  
Lastly, IOs might exert an indirect ‘political influence’ over policy reform 
processes. For example, Teichman (2007:569) suggests that IOs’ officials ‘play an 
important role in bolstering the preferences of certain policy actors over others’. While with 
a number of qualifications, Nelson (2004:49) states that IOs’ contributions ‘sometimes 
transform internal debates’; might help ‘the emergence of internal consensus’; and might 
even ‘make a crucial difference in key decisions or actions’. In the case of the Irish 
regulatory system, Lodge (2005:659) argues the ‘added value’ of the OECD’s peer review 
process was in facilitating ‘the progress of the long-held advocacy of statutory law 
revision’, as well as in establishing ‘better regulation’ as a reference for domestic 
negotiation and argumentation processes.  
Summing up, the literature has indicated a number of ways in which IOs might 
influence how cross-national policy learning processes take place. These range from 
coercion (e.g. loan conditionality) and pressures to introduce policies/practices (e.g. 
through ‘teaching norms’), to rather indirect ‘political influence’. Between these, IOs might 
shape the cross-national travel of policies and ideas by generating rules/standards 
(normative influence) or knowledge (cognitive influence) on a given policy subject. IOs 
might also contribute to policymakers’ learning about policies abroad through the 
dissemination of ‘best’ practices; or they might support capacity building (executive 
influence) activities in an area which is relevant for them.  
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Summary of Variables of Interest for the Analysis of  
Cross-National Policy Learning Processes 
So far, the chapter has discussed a number of variables which are of interest for studying 
cross-national policy learning. Figure 2.1 below aims to offer a graphic summary of these 
variables. This does not provide a ‘model’ for predicting these processes. Yet it does 
contribute to thinking about them as a whole, as the figure allows mapping out their 
potential interactions.  Figure 2.1 puts the relationship between learning from abroad and 
policy changes at its core. In the middle, it includes an arrow referring to policymakers 
‘uses of knowledge’ and ‘strategies’. These are the two variables that this chapter has 
proposed as most relevant for understanding the links between learning (from other nations’ 
policies, ‘best practices’, or international discussions/standards in a given policy area) and 
change (measured in ‘elements of policy’, or degrees of convergence).   
 
Figure 2.1 
Variables of Interest for the Analysis of Cross-National Policy Learning Processes 
 
Source: Author.  
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 Figure 2.1 then maps out the other variables of interest. At the left hand side of the 
core ‘learning-change’ relationship, the figure refers to the influence of cognitive variables, 
which includes two arrows. The first is ‘types of learning’. This relates to the fact that 
cross-national learning is but one representation of a wider phenomenon by which 
policymakers update their beliefs and behaviours. Learning ‘from experience’, via ‘second 
chances’ or ‘long tenure’, is the other major ‘type of learning’ which has been flagged in 
these pages. The second arrow, ‘learning limitations’, refers to the potential issues that 
policymakers might face in drawing insights from foreign experiences: bounded rationality, 
lack of information, problems for understanding policies in other jurisdictions, and 
complications associated with ‘best practices’.  
 Surrounding the core ‘learning-change’ relationship, Figure 2.1 refers to the 
potential influences exerted by national factors and international organisations. Below the 
core, there are arrows referring to policy legacies, institutions, culture, organisational 
features, and other political factors. Above the core, there are arrows for each one of the 
mechanisms of international influence: coercive, normative, cognitive, executive, and 
indirect political, as well as influence related to the dissemination of ‘best practices’.   
 Lastly, at the bottom of Figure 2.1 there is a rectangle and an arrow which refer to 
the temporal dimension of cross-national policy learning. As discussed in the Introduction 
to this thesis and throughout this chapter, these processes do not necessarily happen at once. 
On the contrary, the very idea of ‘a process’ implies the need to think about iterations; and 
thus about how relationships between learning from abroad and policy changes unfold 
across time. Taking into account the temporal dimension from the beginning is also 
relevant for understanding how cognitive, national, and international factors might exert 
different influences at different points in time.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has introduced a framework for the analysis of cross-national policy learning 
processes. The previous sections have built on conceptual, analytical, and theoretical 
propositions offered by the literatures on policy transfer, policy diffusion, and lesson-
drawing. Yet they have sought to include insights from cognate scholarly discussions, such 
as policy/organisational learning, knowledge utilisation, and international organisations.  
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The chapter first explored the conceptual foundations of cross-national learning. 
This has been defined here as a process by which the beliefs of policymakers (e.g. 
government officials) are transformed in response to information obtained about other 
jurisdictions’ experience in a given policy field, which they then might aim to use for 
introducing some sort of change in a similar policy in their own jurisdiction. In addition, it 
has been said that cross-national learning is but one ‘type’ of learning, with ‘learning from 
experience’ (via ‘second chances’ or ‘long tenure’) being the other major ‘type’.  
The chapter then discussed the potential ‘policy outcomes’ of cross-national policy 
learning processes. It has done so in two ways. First, by briefly touching on how learning 
from abroad and policy change might relate. Second, by referring to various means in 
which these changes might be measured, including ‘elements of policy’ (or the policy 
components introduced in one jurisdiction as a result of cross-national learning); and the 
degree or level in which these elements are similar (converge) with those existing in 
another jurisdiction. In both cases, cross-temporal comparisons might be relevant for fully 
understanding how much change has actually happened as a result of learning from abroad. 
The chapter has also explored the variables which might help us understand these 
policy outcomes. In particular, it has discussed how policymakers might ‘use knowledge’ 
from policies abroad (e.g. other nations’ policy experiences) in various ways. Then, it has 
described how ‘administrators’ and ‘policy entrepreneurs’ might develop some actions or 
‘strategies’ to advance or support policy changes of some sort. Lastly, the chapter has 
discussed how cognitive, national, and international factors might influence (e.g. shape) the 
relationships between cross-national learning and policy changes. It has thus summarised 
the various theoretical propositions offered in previous transfer/diffusion scholarly works.  
Taking as a background this framework, Chapters 3 to 6 will now analyse whether 
and how Chilean and Mexican policymakers learned from international developments in 
the field of ‘Management for Results’ (MFR); what policy outcomes resulted from this 
process of learning; how policymakers used knowledge about MFR; which 
actions/strategies they developed to advance policy changes on the basis of that knowledge; 
and how the various cognitive, national, and international factors affected reform processes. 
Chapter 7 will then come back to the variables flagged in these pages to compare the two 
national experiences, with the aim of providing some broader propositions about cross-
national learning and how it matters for policy changes.   
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Part Two 
 
 
 
 
The Emergence of   
‘Management for Results’  
in Chile and Mexico 
 
(1990-2000) 
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What more logical place to look than the policies of other nations?  
This is much easier than dreaming up new policies from scratch 
 
Jerome L. Waltman, Copying Other Nations’ Policies 
 
 
 
Ideas and slogans can travel,  
but once they disembark that is only the beginning of the story.  
They do not find their own way into practice in their new host country,  
neither can they generally shape policy  
without themselves being substantially amended in the process 
 
Edward C. Page, ‘Europeanization and the Persistence of Administrative Systems’  
 
 
He insisted that the other tried  
one Gallego kiwi and an oceanic one. 
 
– What does it taste like? These days  
you can cultivate tobacco in the North Pole;  
you create artificial environmental conditions  
and you can grow whatever you like.  
I started in business as a partner of a society  
which produced endives, those white Belgian salads.  
It was a disaster, but now they are quite common.  
Each thing has its own time and whatever comes before its own time  
in many cases ends up in ruins. History has neither heart nor mind.  
 
Manuel Vázquez Montalbán, Asesinato en el Comité Central 
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‘A Gradual, but Sustained Process’: 
The Emergence of ‘Management for Results’  
in the Chilean Public Sector  
 (1990-2000) 
 
 
 
The key to an effective modernisation process in Chile  
lies in turning the attention of authorities, executives  
and public servants towards the results of public management. 
 
Mario Marcel, former Head of DIPRES
22
   
 
 
We were about four people and we were like a ‘poor circus’.  
We performed, we ‘collected entrance tickets’, we did everything... 
 
Former middle-level official, DIPRES.   
 
 
Chile has been transitioning  from No Public Management                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
to New Public Management.  
 
Mario Waissbluth, Professor of Public Management
23
  
 
 
 
 
It is commonly assumed that the development of Chile’s ‘Management for Results’ (MFR) 
tools was the product of what Mario Marcel (2006:1; Marcel, 1998c) calls ‘a gradual, but 
sustained process’. Indeed, as both this and Chapter 5 will try to show, throughout the past 
two decades the Chilean government was able to incrementally design and consolidate a 
MFR system, which has even garnered significant international prestige (Mardones, 2002; 
Mackay, 2007; Zaltsman, 2009; García and García, 2011). Yet the story has not been as 
straightforward as Marcel’s phrase suggests.  
 This chapter will discuss the MFR reform initiatives which took place in Chile 
between 1990 and 2000: the System of Ministerial Goals; some agency-level performance 
                                                          
22
 The quote comes from Marcel (1993:104).  
23
 The quote comes from Waissbluth (2006:109).  
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management practices; the Pilot Plan for the Modernisation of Public Management; and the 
introduction of performance indicators, programme evaluations, General Management 
Reports, and the so–called Programmes for Management Improvement. More specifically, 
the chapter will discuss the extent to which these initiatives were associated with cross-
national learning and how. In doing so, it will expand on other authors’ general comments 
about how Chilean policymakers looked at administrative reforms in New Public 
Management (NPM) country exemplars, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and New 
Zealand (Orrego, 1999; Armijo, 2002, 2003; Guzmán, 2005; Marcel, 2006; Olavarría et al., 
2011; Figueroa et al., 2011; Tello, 2011). 
 The chapter will discuss in detail how information from these countries was actually 
used in the making of MFR reforms. It will show that Chilean officials did not engage in a 
process of emulation, as suggested by Orellana’s (2004) assertion that Chile ‘copied’ the 
British NPM model. Nor did they simply ‘transfer’ performance management tools used 
elsewhere. On the contrary, there seems to be enough evidence to think that Chilean 
policymakers gathered information from other nations’ experiences. They assessed this 
before introducing their own MFR proposals. Moreover, knowledge about policies in other 
jurisdictions was complemented with insights from other sources. These included officials’ 
own professional training and experience, and technical advice provided by international 
organisations. 
The chapter will also explore the strategies that Chilean policymakers developed 
during these years to advance MFR policy changes. For instance, trying to conceptualise 
what MFR ideas and tools were about; convincing other relevant actors about how and why 
the Chilean public sector could benefit from a focus on ‘results’; showing that MFR 
reforms were taking place in many other countries, particularly in advanced democracies; 
and building capacity for MFR activities within the Chilean public sector. All of these 
strategies were important in times in which the country’s politico-administrative attention 
was not focused on reforming bureaucratic structures.  
Despite the use of information from MFR policies abroad and the strategies 
developed, reformers faced a number of issues. By the end of the decade, there would be 
some MFR tools in place, but without a proven track record of success. The need to 
confront the legacies from Pinochet’s dictatorship; leadership changes inside the 
administration; and complications related to the design/implementation of performance 
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management tools were some of the factors which contributed to the rather erratic 
emergence of MFR in the Chilean government. Thus, in the period covered in this chapter, 
the country’s politico-administrative conditions complicated the transition from MFR ideas 
to effective MFR tools and practices.   
  The following pages will be divided into six sections. The first one briefly 
introduces the administrative legacy of the Pinochet Dictatorship and how it conditioned 
the reform agenda of the first democratic government led by president Patricio Aylwin. The 
second will try to explain how and why MFR slowly emerged in the government agenda. 
The third section will discuss which international examples were studied by Marcel and his 
team, and how they were used in developing the first round of performance management 
tools. The fourth section will summarize the actions and initiatives in the area of MFR 
which took place during the first half of president Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle’s 
administration. Then the fifth section will focus on the administration’s second half, and 
will explain why MFR lost its relevance. A section of conclusions closes the chapter.   
 
‘An Impoverished and Demoralised Administration’: 
Confronting the Legacy of the Pinochet Dictatorship 
The modern story of administrative reforms in Chile has been directly associated with the 
country’s political transition to democracy24. During the period of 1973-1989, General 
Augusto Pinochet’s government led a structural transformation of the Chilean state, which 
included political, economic, and administrative aspects. The dictatorship introduced 
radical reforms to public ownership and economic regulation that set Chile at the forefront 
among Latin America’s economies. Yet the reforms also had huge social and administrative 
impacts: inequality and poverty rose, and the government’s bureaucratic capacity 
diminished.  
According to a report by the Dirección de Presupuestos (DIPRES, or Budget Office; 
DIPRES, 2005f:7), these changes ‘strongly conditioned the reform options of the first 
democratic government that entered office in 1990’. President Patricio Aylwin and his 
governing coalition had to achieve several goals at the same time: to reinstate democratic 
                                                          
24
 For a detailed account of the state and administrative reforms during the Pinochet years, see 
Orellana, 1994; Boeninger, 1997, 2007; González, 2008i; Garretón and Espinoza, 1992; Garretón, 1993; 
Garretón and Cáceres, 2003; Waissbluth, 2006; Otano, 2006. 
 72 
 
 
rules surrounded by authoritarian enclaves; to confront social inequalities within the 
boundaries of an economic system which limited the state’s capacity to intervene; and to 
administer a bureaucratic system that had been systematically undermined in the course of 
previous decades.  
The Pinochet government sought to reverse former president Salvador Allende’s 
attempts to introduce a ‘democratic and pluralist’ socialist system in Chile (Orellana, 1994, 
2004; Araya and Cerpa, 2009)
25
. This was done first of all through a radical restructuring of 
the state. Pinochet implemented a wide privatisation process, which only spared the copper 
enterprises (and some others deemed strategic). The number of public entities controlled by 
the state thus went from 595 in 1973, to 33 in 1989 (Orrego, 1999:10; Bitrán et al., 1999; 
Waissbluth, 2006). Between 1977 and 1986, more than 150,000 public sector employment 
positions were eliminated (Garretón and Cáceres, 2003:140). Public sector salaries lost up 
to 47% of their real value between 1979 and 1990 (DIPRES, 2005f:8). Public sector 
investment in the education, housing, and health sectors was significantly reduced. The 
provision of some services (again mainly in the health and education sectors) was either 
transferred to municipal governments or the private sector (Garretón and Cáceres, 
2003:118).  
After these reforms, the Chilean central government became the smallest in Latin 
America. By the end of the dictatorship (1989), public sector expenditure had gone from 
45% of the GDP in 1973 to only 21.7% (Garretón and Cáceres, 2003:118). Central 
government positions represented only 2.8% out of the national workforce total (Marcel 
and Tohá, 1998:596)
26
. During the initial years of the democratic coalition, these conditions 
remained in place. In fact, the limited size of the state, in terms of public spending levels 
and personnel numbers, was considered beneficial for public finances (Marcel, 1998b:75, 
1997b) 
However, the changes to the size and structure of the state brought with them some 
negative effects. According to Marcel and Tohá (1998:592; Aninat et al., 2008:191), the 
processes of ‘deregulation, privatisation of public enterprises, externalisation of services 
                                                          
25
 According to Garretón and Cáceres (2003:117), during Allende’s government ‘[p]ublic services 
and companies expanded, and a massive operation of nationalizations, buyouts, and interventions in private 
companies of diverse sizes and quality in all sectors created was called the ‘Social Property Area’’.  
26
 Marcel and Tohá  (1998:596) note that in 1998, that is almost a decade after the transition to 
democracy, the total of Chile’s public sector employment remained at 7%, compared to 10% in Latin 
American countries, and 15%  among developed countries.  
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[...] redefined the administration’s responsibilities and tasks’. More importantly, these 
changes were carried out in the context of ‘a systematic attack on the public service’s 
prestige, to justify the military regime’s decisions’. Indeed, the public sector was regularly 
portrayed as ‘intrinsically inefficient’. Another observer similarly stated that ‘the military 
government sold the idea that it had modernised the state apparatus’ (Lima, 1997:224; 
Rivera, 2003; Waissbluth, 2006). Yet reforms had merely shrunk the state’s resources and 
functions. Furthermore, the structural transformations damaged the state’s prestige and 
administrative capacity. Thus, Marcel (2006:2) asserts that after the ‘reforms and 
privatisations, the only thing that remained was an impoverished and demoralised 
administration’27. 
 Despite the legacies of the Pinochet dictatorship, administrative modernisation was 
not a priority for president Aylwin, and his government did not draft plans on this subject 
(Marcel and Tohá, 1998; DIPRES, 2005f; Navarrete, 2008; Olavarría et al., 2011). This 
happened for a number of reasons. President Aylwin was already too busy trying to ensure 
a smooth political transition. According to a former DIPRES senior official, 
 
With the return to democracy, the members of the ‘Concertación’ faced the challenge of showing 
that they were capable of governing. Towards the end of the dictatorship, some kind of ‘politics of 
terror’ had anticipated the arrival of democracy. It was tacitly suggested that it had actually been the 
democratic regime which had caused the crisis of the early 1970s. The official policy from the 
Pinochet government was thus to discredit democracy. The incoming governing coalition had thus to 
demonstrate that a democratic government could be better than a dictatorship, and that the country 
could move forwards under the new regime (IC4)
28
.  
 
This was further complicated because the Pinochet government had introduced a number of 
legal reforms which constrained the new government’s room for manoeuvre. According to 
González (2008i:45), ‘unlike any other transition to democracy in Latin America, the 
Chilean one, spelled out in the country’s constitution, led to the creation of a ‘restricted’ 
and ‘tutelary’ democracy’’. Pinochet left the presidency but did not quit his position as 
                                                          
27
 According to the results obtained by an organisational climate survey conducted by the Pontificia 
Universidad Católica de Chile in 1996 at DIPRES’ request, ‘[while public servants recognise the 
modernisation of their institutions as a real and unavoidable process, they still face lack of knowledge, 
uncertainty and fear, associating the former to the traumatic episodes of arbitrariness and job firing of the 
previous regime’ (Marcel and Tohá, 1998:610-611).  
28
 Foxley and Sapelli (1999:394) similarly argue that President Aylwin’s government ‘had to produce 
quick results on three major issues. First, it had to show a change in how government operated by 
demonstrating a strong sense of political inclusiveness and participation. Second, it had to demonstrate 
effectiveness in managing the economy: economic stability had to be maintained. Third, the government had 
to prove to its constituency its commitment to social justice’.  
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chief of the armed forces, and thus remained a powerful actor (Garretón, 1993). The 
government then faced an opposition majority in the Senate because of the presence of 
‘appointed senators’, as well as ‘lifetime Pinochet appointees’ in the Supreme Court and the 
Constitutional tribunal (Boeninger, 2007). Therefore, president Aylwin had to thread 
carefully in order to avoid political conflicts and ensure the political feasibility of his 
policies (Silva, 1991; Foxley and Sapelli, 1999; Waissbluth, 2006)
29
. 
 Moreover, the new democratic government faced the task of reverting the economic 
and social inequalities which had been ‘dramatically exacerbated’ during the Pinochet era 
(Figueroa et al., 2011:71; Foxley and Sapelli, 1999; Garretón and Cáceres, 2003). The 
governing coalition decided to keep the main economic and financial policy frameworks 
established during the dictatorship. According to Edgardo Boeninger (1992:8), then head of 
the Ministerio Secretaría General de la Presidencia (MINSEGPRES, or Ministry for the 
Presidency’s General Secretariat), it was thought that ‘a Market Economy open and 
integrated to the world in which the private enterprise is the fundamental productive agent’ 
was the only viable option for economic development
30
. However, the new democratic 
government did introduce a policy called Crecimiento con Equidad (‘Growth with Equity’). 
This aimed to change social policies and reduce poverty levels
31
. A fiscal policy reform 
was also pursued to provide financial support to the former initiatives (Boeninger, 2007:36; 
Ffrench-Davis, 2003).  
Last but not least, senior politicians and policymakers within the governing coalition 
regarded ‘administrative modernisation’ topics with scepticism. According to Marcel 
(2006:2): 
 
At that time people still thought that the idea of reforming the state belonged to another political 
sector, and not the governing one. In fact, during those years some ministers were not interested in 
learning about other countries’ experiences on this subject […]. That was the view which prevailed at 
the time. 
 
                                                          
29
 Apart from these institutional restrictions, the Aylwin government also pursued what was labelled 
a ‘politics of agreement’. Thus, Foxley and Sapelli (1999:398) remark that ‘[e]very important piece of 
legislation or government program was broadly discussed with the parties of the government coalition and, 
more importantly, with the parties of the opposition and the relevant social organizations’.  
30
 Boeninger (2007:36) would further explain that this continuity in economic policy took place 
‘because of a political logic as much as because of our own conviction, acquired through the ideological 
mutations experienced by both political currents [within the government] through the long dictatorial 
interregnum’. See also Silva (1991:398-399).   
31
 Poverty levels reached about 45.1% of the population in 1987. At the end of the Pinochet 
dictatorship, the level was still high at 38.8% of the population (Olavarría, 2010:21). 
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Along these same lines, Waissbluth (2005:13) notes that a number of parliamentarians and 
politicians used phrases such as, ‘the modernisation of the state is a topic of the right’; or, ‘I 
will not dedicate myself to the state reform because that is where all politicians go to die’. 
Another observer remarks that a ‘mediocre polemic’ regarding the size of the state had 
dominated the debates of previous years (Orrego, 1999:9). This in turn blocked broader 
discussions about ‘the complex and concrete questions on ‘how’ a contemporary state can 
change its culture, improve its productivity, increase its internal and external coordination, 
and thus better serve citizens’. For some members of the governing coalition, the mere 
concept of ‘reform’ raised concerns about causing a ‘confrontation with bureaucrats and the 
institutions inherited from the dictatorship’ (Garretón and Cáceres, 2003:120; Waissbluth, 
2005; Navarrete, 2008).    
The Aylwin government did, of course, introduce some important reforms (Marcel 
and Tohá, 1998; Armijo, 2002; Garretón and Cáceres, 2003; Ramírez, 2004; Navarrete, 
2008; Araya and Cerpa, 2009). To increase central government coordination, the former 
Secretaría General de la Presidencia became the new MINSEGPRES (Drago, 2002; see 
below). A set of new agencies for policy issues neglected during the dictatorship, such as 
the rights of women and young people, the environment, and indigenous affairs, were 
established. There were efforts to improve public sector working conditions, particularly 
remunerations (Marcel and Tohá, 1998; Waissbluth, 2006)
32
. Between 1990 and 1996, 
public sector salaries increased 59% in average (central government 49.5%; the judiciary 
92.5%; municipal education sector 78.7%). Lastly, some reforms strengthened the 
administrative capacities, legal authorities, and accountability mechanisms across 
municipal governments (Rivera, 2003; Waissbluth, 2006).  
 The former reforms addressed some important issues, but also left many others 
unattended. From the point of view of those involved in modernisation tasks, a key 
limitation had been the lack of concern about public services provision, administrative 
capacities, and management more broadly (Marcel and Tohá, 1998). According to a former 
official, some people just ‘felt that there was a need to change how the public sector 
worked’ (IC5). In order to do so, some policymakers sought a different take on 
                                                          
32
 Throughout the nineties, public sector salaries constantly improved in real terms: 8.6% from 1990 
to 1991; 7.1% in 1991-1992; 9.0% in 1992-1993; and 8.8% in 1993-1994. In some cases salary increases 
reached two digits: 28.1% in the municipal health sector in 1990-1991; 29.9% in the Ministry of Health in 
1993-1994; 15.7% in the judiciary in 1992-1993. See Marcel and Tohá (1998).  
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administrative modernisation, based on ‘management for results’ principles. This is 
discussed in the following section. 
 
‘Winning the Hearts and Minds of Authorities and Political Executives’33: 
The (Slow) Emergence of MFR Ideas 
Despite the low profile of administrative modernisation topics, during the second half of 
Aylwin’s administration a concern about ‘performance’ and ‘management by results’ 
slowly emerged within two central government institutions (MINSEGPRES and DIPRES), 
as well as in a number of decentralised public agencies. Particularly important were the 
efforts led by Mario Marcel, then Deputy Director for Efficiency and Public Service at 
DIPRES. He led the efforts to show how and why a focus on ‘results’ (and the 
implementation of associated managerial tools) mattered for the Chilean public sector.  
The first area in which a ‘results’ orientation appeared was at MINSEGPRES. This 
ministry had been created to ‘provide to the government with coherence and efficiency in 
its actions’ (Drago, 2002:76; Muñoz, 2005). Apart from its role in providing advice to the 
president, the ministry was in charge of ensuring inter-ministerial coordination across the 
central government. In order to do so, it created a Sistema de Metas Ministeriales (SMM, or 
Ministerial Goals System) in 1990. According to Drago (2002:77), the system: 
 
focused on making explicit the main annual goals for each ministry, agency and public service, in 
order to evaluate their links with respect to the programmatic priorities of the government, as well as 
to strategically orient the work of ministries in accordance to those priorities, so that the Executive 
could be in a position to follow up and evaluate the degree of progress and accomplishment of these 
priorities, and could detect on time requirements and potential legal, budgetary, management, or 
coordination challenges.  
 
The idea behind the SMM was relatively simple: central ministries established specific 
ministerial goals, in line with the government’s programmatic priorities, which were then 
reported to MINSEGPRES. The information produced was used directly by the president 
and in cabinet meetings. As such, the SMM represented the first big effort in the Chilean 
government to introduce some kind of goal-setting and monitoring mechanism, with the 
aim of increasing ‘rationality in decision-making processes’ (Armijo, 2003:57; IC14). 
                                                          
33
 The phrase comes from Marcel (2006), referring to the state of things around 1996-1997, but in 
support of arguments similar to those he expressed in previous years (Marcel, 1993).     
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However, the implementation of the SMM was not without issues (Drago, 2002; 
Armijo, 2003). Ministries did not easily develop their goals, and sometimes reported 
activities instead of actual results. Most of the times goals were not based on quantitative 
indicators, nor were they linked to the budget. Thus, it was difficult to follow up or evaluate 
them properly. Moreover, ministries complained about the ‘bureaucratisation’ generated by 
the system, whose information demands only added to their daily tasks. The SMM remained 
in place until 2000, when it was reformed (Zaltsman, 2006; IC12; IC13). Yet towards the 
end of the Aylwin presidency, without Minister Boeninger’s support, it lost its political and 
administrative relevance (IC18).  
The need to improve public sector ‘performance’ became also important for some 
‘servicios públicos’ (e.g. government agencies; Navarrete, 2008; Olavarría, 2010; Olavarría 
et al., 2011)
34
. In this case, modernisation processes were led by individual agency leaders, 
who wanted to show that they were capable of doing ‘interesting things’ (IC7)35. These 
were senior officials who ‘thought that democracy implied the need to provide better public 
services, that citizens needed to feel democracy was capable of improving their welfare, 
and who tried to gain, in addition to electoral legitimacy, a legitimacy by performance’.  
Most of these senior executives had previous experience in private sector 
management positions. Many had also pursued postgraduate studies abroad (Figueroa et al., 
2011:72; Tello, 2011:258-259). They tried to improve the efficiency and quality of the 
services their agencies provided by introducing strategic planning and management 
concepts (e.g. ‘mission’, ‘clients’); by updating information technology systems; and by 
redesigning internal procedures and formats (Olavarría, 2010). Through these reforms, they 
reportedly improved service coverage and standards, waiting times, and citizens’ 
satisfaction (Armijo, 2002:288). More broadly, a former DIPRES senior official remarks 
they also contributed to ‘legitimising the modernisation agenda’, and a broader ‘concern 
about results’ (IC30). 
                                                          
34
 Agencies often mentioned in the literature are: Servicio de Impuestos Internos (SII, or Internal 
Revenue Service); Instituto de Normalización Previsional (INP, or National Institute for Pensions); Servicio 
del Registro Civil e Identidad (SRCeI, or General Register Office); and Fondo Nacional de la Salud 
(FONASA, or National Health Fund).    
35
  Waissbluth (2006:90) remarks these policy entrepreneurs were told they could ‘do whatever you 
want, but without making much noise’. Navarrete (2008:81) similarly states these changes happened ‘in a 
‘furtive’ manner and without a major support from the central government’.  
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The third and perhaps most important front in which the interest in ‘performance’ 
and ‘results’ emerged during Aylwin’s administration was the Ministry of Finance’s 
Budget Office. DIPRES officials became interested on this subject because of a lack of 
information about budgetary efficiency and the broader impacts of public spending. 
According to two former DIPRES officials:  
 
The Ministry of Finance observed with particular preoccupation the challenges faced in the 
implementation of public programmes and the lack of tangible results reported by government 
institutions and policy sectors which were receiving significant amounts of money. The experiences 
of the health sector and general initiatives for improving public administration salaries were 
particularly frustrating (Marcel and Tohá, 1998:601).  
 
Along very similar lines, a former middle-level official says that: 
 
We needed to have more information about the way resources were being spent. We also needed to 
introduce the topic of evaluation, because we required background information about the 
performance of public institutions. This had to be included in the analysis when we negotiated with 
public sector unions. Thus, we had to produce information about public spending and about which 
consequences this was having on the provision levels of public services (IC17).  
 
When Marcel and other DIPRES officials met with agencies to discuss budget 
allocations, no relevant/objective information on agency performance levels or programme 
results was available to inform decision-making processes (IC17). Furthermore, a middle 
official remarks that ‘inside the executive we needed to evaluate implementation results 
because resources were scarce. So we used to ask ourselves, “Is it worth maintaining the 
programmes? Could they be modified or eliminated?”’(IC9). From DIPRES’s perspective, 
it was necessary to have better information. In particular, about how well agencies were 
working; how they were spending public funds; and what consequences were being 
achieved in terms of the provision of public goods (IC9; IC30). This information could then 
be used for making budgetary decisions, as well as for reporting to Congress and society 
the way in which public resources were being used.  
While for DIPRES officials the modernisation of the state was related to producing 
(and using) information about public sector performance, not all politico-administrative 
actors thought the same. In fact, Rivera (2003:122) remarks that there were at least two 
opposing views: 
 
 79 
 
 
The first one located at the Ministry of Interior, put the emphasis on administrative reform; the 
second one, more influenced by the new schools of management modernisation, was located at the 
Ministry of the Presidency’s General Secretariat and the Ministry of Finance. The President, himself 
an specialist in administrative law, opted for the first one and convened a special commission of 
administrative law experts which would elaborate a set of projects presented to Congress in 1992.  
 
Indeed, president Aylwin flagged various administrative issues, albeit from a rather 
legalistic perspective: administrative deregulation, decentralisation, reforming the General 
Controllership Law, improving the public personnel statute, or creating administrative 
tribunals (Aylwin, 1994; Rivera, 2003).  
 In response to this, during the following years Marcel used his position at DIPRES 
to advocate a focus on ‘results’ and the use of ‘performance management’ tools. According 
to a former senior official, he did so both ‘behind the scenes’, in numerous discussions with 
government ministers, legislators, and fellow public servants, as well as in many other 
forums (e.g. weekly lunches with parliamentarians; IC20). For instance, in January 1993 he 
participated in a seminar sponsored by the governing coalition to discuss future political 
manifestos. In his participation, Marcel remarked that:  
 
a great number of controls are transformed into bureaucratic procedures and not appropriate controls 
as such; therefore, it is necessary to eliminate those which are not needed by implementing an 
appropriate management control scheme and the evaluation of results through relevant indicators 
(Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, 1993:58-59; bold in original).  
 
Furthermore, throughout the following years Marcel published several documents 
which detailed the rationale for introducing MFR practices in the Chilean public sector 
(Marcel 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1999, 2002a, 2006; Marcel 
and Tohá, 1998). In those publications, he argued that the Chilean modernisation process 
had left aside important problems of the administrative apparatus. As a result, the Chilean 
state was ‘old fashioned’ and ill-prepared to ‘face the big challenges of development and 
modernity’ (Marcel, 1993:89).  
Marcel (1993:90) criticised existing reform proposals for being rather ‘vague’. He 
said some were actually concealing ‘second intentions in favour of privatisation or the 
achievement of corporatist aspirations’. Marcel argued that modernising the Chilean state 
‘did not require big legal reforms, but a transformation of the organisational culture’ 
(Marcel, 1998a:90). More specifically, he referred to ‘the development of a management 
 80 
 
 
system focused on results’, which could better address Chile’s contemporary political 
conditions:  
 
The Chilean organisational culture is characterised by its focus on regulations, methods and 
procedures to do things, rather than results. That tradition, which could have made sense within a 
state focused in administrative and normative functions, is not consistent with the diversity of 
executive and oversight functions performed by public organisations. Similarly, the proliferation of 
controls and restrictions, characteristic of a public sector which was in the middle of great political 
conflicts and economic adjustments, is not suited for the climate of agreements and stability which 
currently characterises the country (Marcel, 1998a:104)
36
.  
 
In a later document, Marcel added that, ‘economic conditions in the following years will 
demand an increase in efficiency in the use of public resources’. This would happen 
because ‘the Government will be under pressure to solve a similar or higher volume of 
social and productive demands with resources that grow more slowly than in previous 
years’ (Marcel, 1994:16). A ‘results-oriented’ culture was thus necessary for 
administrative, political, and economic reasons.  
 
Box 3.1 
Mario Marcel’s ‘Results-based Public Management Model’  
  
‘A consistent model of public management based on results require the following components: 
a) A clear definition of the mission and objectives of the public organisations, including the 
identification of the client or final payee of the action of these organisations. 
b) An identification of the products and results associated with those objectives, susceptible to being 
periodically measured and evaluated, as far as possible through feedback from clients’. 
c) The allocation of individual responsibilities in the process of generating the management product or 
result, measurable and suitable to being evaluated. 
d) Flexibility and autonomy in administrative, financial and personnel administration matters in 
proportion to the organisational and individual responsibility for achieving objectives and goals. 
e) A systematic and periodic process of evaluation of results, of public and external character, and 
f) A system of incentives linked to the accomplishment and surpassing of goals associated with the 
results of management.’  
 
Source: Based on Marcel (1993:105; italics in original). 
                                                          
36
 Scholars have shared this view. For instance, Ramírez (2004:35-36) notes that ‘the challenge of 
consolidating the democracy […] found significant practical obstacles, such as a weak and rigid state 
apparatus, whose symptoms were: a bureaucratic work style, lack of administrative professionalisation, 
limited concerns about quality of attention paid to the users, a focus on procedures (and strict focus in 
complying with administrative norms) instead of results’. Similarly, Aninat et al. (2008:191) state that 
‘[d]uring the twentieth century [the Chilean bureaucracy] developed a reputation for low levels of corruption 
by Latin American standards, but also was marked by strong centralisation, an emphasis more on procedures 
than on outputs, and no participation of civil society or market mechanisms in the provision of public 
services, making it rigid and not very efficient’. 
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More specifically, Marcel proposed a number of ideas which could guide this 
modernisation process. As summarised in Box 3.1 above, he talked about defining 
organisational ‘mission’, ‘objectives’, and ‘goals’; clarifying ‘individual’ responsibilities 
and contributions to public services provision; and, above all, ‘measuring’ and ‘evaluating’ 
public management ‘results’37. In other writings, he advocated the use of ‘management 
control systems’ based on ‘indicators’, and a clearer association between performance 
information and budgetary policy-making. According to him, these tools would allow 
‘evaluating the various dimensions of management in these services, but also improving 
their internal administration and favour a more contractual and transactional relationship 
between central authorities and state organisations’ (Marcel, 1994:28). From a budgetary 
perspective, they would contribute to ‘a better allocation of public resources’; and the 
progressive alignment of budgetary controls with evaluations of institutional goals and 
objectives (Marcel, 1994:28; Marcel, 1998b).   
Marcel carefully stressed he was not for ‘administering the public sector with 
criteria and methods from the private sector, but for ensuring a management model for the 
public sector’ (Marcel, 1993:107). He noted that ‘abandoning’ existing administrative 
procedures and norms was not an option; yet it was possible to adapt them to a results-
oriented management approach: 
 
results and goals can be added to the budget process, in exchange for more financial autonomy; 
flexible pay options should complement basic remuneration schemes to account for each individual’s 
experience, qualifications and performance; administrative oversight can be oriented towards expost 
control systems or audits, etc. (Marcel, 1993:107).  
      
Marcel highlighted that changing the Chilean public sector culture was ‘a long and gradual 
process which requires years, if not decades to get accomplished’ (Marcel, 1993:107). Yet 
he also noted it would be ‘possible to produce substantial changes under current norms, 
without major legal reforms’ (Marcel, 1993:108). Whereas the former point stressed the 
need to adopt a long-term perspective, the latter hinted at the potential room for manoeuvre.  
                                                          
37
 Of course, Marcel was not the only actor that talked about these topics. At the time, other 
observers flagged that the Chilean public sector was characterised by an ‘absence of mission and objectives 
internalised in the organisations’; the ‘allocation of resources based on history rather than associated with 
results to be produced’; and the ‘lack of effective systems for evaluating management and personnel’ 
(Vignolo et al., 1993:53).  
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In the longer term, Marcel’s model/ideas and tactical insights would become central 
features of the Chilean modernisation process. Yet in the early 1990s, at the time in which 
he set forth his conceptualisation, the feasibility of MFR reforms was uncertain. In fact, 
much work remained to be done in terms of fleshing out and advocating these proposals. 
While Marcel’s early writings already show that he was well aware of contemporary 
international discussions and public sector reforms
38
, at this point (1993-1994) Chilean 
officials decided to engage in more explicit efforts to learn from policy developments 
abroad.  
 
A Copy of the British Modernisation Process? 
Initial MFR Changes 
Since 1993, Marcel and his team started to pay more detailed attention to what the so-called 
‘NPM’ countries, such as New Zealand, Australia, and particularly the UK, were doing on 
MFR reforms. These facts have long been mentioned in the academic and official 
literatures (Orrego, 1999; Armijo, 2003; Guzmán, 2005; Marcel, 2006; Araya and Cerpa, 
2008; Arenas and Berner, 2010; Olavarría et al., 2011; Figueroa et al., 2011). Nonetheless, 
accounts either exaggerate or misunderstand what was learned from these foreign 
experiences, or how knowledge about international MFR was used by Chilean 
policymakers. For instance, Patricio Orellana (2004) suggests that a ‘pro-British tradition 
and the critical juncture in which the strong man of the process was an anglophile, meant 
that the British modernisation process was completely copied in Chile’39. While there is 
some evidence to support these claims, the story was actually more complicated.  
In June of 1993, Marcel led a delegation of Chilean officials, who went on a study 
tour to the UK (DIPRES, 1993a). During their visit, officials met with representatives from 
the Civil Service College, the Civil Service Commission, the Efficiency Unit, the National 
Audit Office, the Office of Public Service and Science, the Office of Public Management, 
                                                          
38
 To be precise, Marcel does not cite NPM academic publications in these early works (e.g. no 
‘Hood, 1991’, or ‘Pollitt, 1993’). However, the language he uses and the passing references to ‘other 
countries’ clearly show he followed international debates very closely. His continued use of ‘public 
management’ as a key term, and the idea that ‘performance’ could be evaluated in terms of ‘effectiveness, 
efficiency and economy’ further prove this (Marcel, 1994:19). Instead of journal articles or books (most of 
which were actually produced later in the decade), he consulted official documents and government reports.   
39
 A number of interviewees mentioned that Marcel’s stay at Cambridge University, when 
completing his PhD in Economics in the 1980s, had generated his interest in using the British reforms as a 
model (IC5; IC9). Yet, it should be noted that the British reforms were among the most famous in the early 
nineties. 
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the Department of Environment, H.M. Treasury, and Harrow Council. The study tour was 
sponsored by the British Council and the Overseas Development Administration, per 
DIPRES’ request. The delegation attended presentations on ‘Value-For-Money Audits’; 
‘Financial Management Initiative’; ‘Next Steps’; ‘Efficiency Scrutinies’; ‘Market Testing’; 
and ‘Citizen’s Charter’. According to the report prepared by DIPRES, officials learned 
about the guiding principles of the British reforms. Among other things, they noted that 
‘value for money’ was a widely used concept; that ‘transparency’ and ‘openness’ were 
considered guiding principles for conducting ‘public business’; that agencies submitted 
public reports to Parliament; and that management was being ‘objectified’ through the 
quantification of institutional objectives and results.  
 The study tour report also remarks a number of features from the British experience 
(DIPRES, 1993a:2-6; bold font in original): ‘the Treasury is absolutely involved in the 
measurement of performance of Public Services’; ‘Efficiency Scrutinies’ reports did not 
‘only diagnose efficiency’, but also included ‘project proposals’ to improve services; and 
‘[a]ll Public Services have a framework paper in which their Mission, objectives, 
services, standards, operation mechanisms and channels of communication with clients are 
all specified’. It then concludes that, ‘the [British] experience under analysis and the 
reflection developed afterwards by the members of the mission offers a good basis for the 
development of these [Chilean modernisation] ideas’. Indeed, as noted below, the initial 
MFR practices of the Chilean government would certainly reflect the British experience.  
 The influence of the British ‘model’ has been acknowledged by officials involved in 
the first stages of the Chilean reforms. For instance, Armijo (2003:58) remarks that ‘a 
source of methodological inspiration was obtained from the experiences developed in the 
United Kingdom, such as the efficiency scrutinies and the Performance Indicators’. A 
former DIPRES official similarly said that, ‘first we went through a process of strategic 
planning, incorporating New Public Management concepts, and in those times what was 
happening in the UK was the most important reference’ (IC17). Another stated that in the 
mid-1990s, ‘when we began to think about measuring public programmes, the first thing 
we thought about were indicators, which were used in countries like the UK, thought to be 
fashionable at the time’ (IC4). 
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Indeed, Chilean policymakers travelled to the UK because they wanted to learn 
about that country’s specific experience in implementing performance management tools. 
According to one participant,  
 
The British case was probably the most appropriate in terms of what we wanted to know about 
feasibility and implementation. It did not represent something cumbersome, nor did it require many 
legal modifications. Otherwise, we would have needed to think about a broader time horizon. We 
wanted to know about practices which could be easily and quickly applied to Chile. There were other 
cases like France or Spain, which were different examples, but did not seem to be easy to use. For 
example, Spain had a system in which institutions were supposed to report information via an on-line 
system, something that would exist in Chile only a decade afterwards. In that sense, the British case 
seemed to be potentially easy to reproduce (IC26).  
 
Perhaps the strongest evidence about the British influence on the Chilean MFR 
reforms of the early nineties was the use of similar performance management tools. The 
same official adds that,   
 
After the study tour, we basically brought back with us two things. The idea that agencies had to 
work on their strategic planning, that they had to design a navigation chart. Based on that, then we 
said, ‘OK, let’s measure this’. And we asked ourselves, ‘how are we going to do that?’ Well, based 
on indicators: a formula, a process of information gathering, monitoring, etc. These were very basic 
things, but they did not exist in Chile (IC26). 
 
Another interviewee adds that, ‘the trip allowed us knowing the methodological/conceptual 
part of this topic. From that trip onwards, we started to write, and the methodology of our 
pilot plan comes precisely from what was observed in that trip’ (IC21). The use of 
performance indicators linked to public institutions’ mission and goals would certainly 
become a key component of the Chilean reforms. 
Using knowledge from the study tour (but also previous research, as detailed 
below), in 1993 DIPRES launched a Plan Piloto de Modernización en la Gestión de los 
Servicios Públicos (PPMGSP, or Pilot Plan for the Modernisation of Public Services; 
DIPRES, 1993b, 1993c; Armijo, 2003). The PPMGSP’s objective was to ‘promote a new 
vision about public management and change the focus from procedures (policies, 
instruments, and regulations), towards the results of those procedures’ (DIPRES, 1993c:1). 
It also suggested there was a ‘democratic imperative’ which called for ‘more transparency 
in public decisions’, and the ‘appropriate use of authority and public resources allocation’ 
(DIPRES, 1993b:1).  
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The PPMGSP argued that public organisations should ‘familiarise themselves with 
modern management techniques and incorporate in their administration the process of 
strategic planning, allocation of individual responsibilities and systems of management 
evaluation” (DIPRES, 1993c:1; underlined in original). The programme was built upon six 
areas described in Box 3.2. These aimed to guide agencies’ actions to determine ‘measures 
to improve their organisation and operation’; define ‘management indicators and 
productivity measures’; and introduce an ‘information system which could optimise the 
budget allocation mechanism’ on the basis of ‘goals and the evaluation of results’ 
(DIPRES, 1993b:3).   
 
Box 3.2  
Pilot Plan for the Modernisation of Public Services 
 
i. Strategic Planning 
- Definition of the institutional goals and mission 
- Analysis of the organisation (structure, inputs/outputs/clients, information systems)   
 
ii. Internal Scrutiny 
- Identification of modernisation projects (priority areas) 
- Classification of the agency’s functions/tasks (core vs. subject to outsourcing) 
 
iii. Development of Modernisation Projects 
- Definition of a specific work-plan 
- Identification of improvement projects 
  
iv. Design of a Management Control System 
- Development of evaluation indicators (both global agency performance and specific 
projects/activities)  
- Indicators for measuring effectiveness (quality, coverage, opportunity), efficiency, and 
financial performance (savings)   
 
v. Implementation of the Management Control System 
- Design of information gathering and monitoring systems 
 
vi. Establishment of Performance Agreements 
- Design of agreements for the allocation of institutional incentives 
 
Source: Author based on DIPRES (1993c). 
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The PPMGSP initially applied only to five public services (agencies)
40
. These 
institutions were chosen to increase the chances of success, as well as because of ‘the 
methodological relevance of each service in terms of its users, the policy sector to which it 
belongs and the potential benefit its management improvement would represent’ (DIPRES, 
1993c:7). However, the participation of these agencies was voluntarily. This would remain 
the rule until 1998, when a new MFR tool was introduced (IC9; see below).  
Participating agencies received external support to develop their modernisation and 
improvement plans. Consultants helped agency officials in the process of drafting strategic 
plans, and for designing relevant performance indicators. These consultancies were 
financed by DIPRES. This was both to support agency efforts, but also because of DIPRES’ 
limited human resources. Indeed, apart from Marcel, there were only four other public 
servants working on the coordination of the Pilot Plan.  
While the previous description shows that Chilean officials did use knowledge and 
specific tools from the British experience, it would be misleading to assume they simply 
‘copied’ the UK model. The use of strategic planning, performance indicators, and 
monitoring; the central role of the Finance Ministry; and a focus on ‘results’, all became 
features of the Chilean scheme. Yet the same study tour report states that, before travelling 
to the UK, DIPRES officials had already drafted some modernisation plans. The 
information gathered during the UK visit was thus used to ‘comparatively evaluate the 
criteria and methods of the Plan Piloto de Escrutinios de Eficiencia’ (or Pilot Plan of 
Efficiency Strutinies; DIPRES, 1993a:5). Furthermore, the report noted that this initial 
project represented ‘a more ambitious and integral effort than the efficiency scrutinies used 
in Great Britain’ (DIPRES, 1993a:5).  
Moreover, the study tour took place in June of 1993, but before that date DIPRES 
officials had already been looking for information about foreign MFR practices. According 
to one official,  
                                                          
40
 These were: Servicio Agrícola y Ganadero (Agrigulture and Cattle Service); Servicio Nacional de 
Capacitación y Empleo (National Service for Training and Employment); Junta Nacional de Auxilio Escolar 
y Becas (the National Board for Scholar Support and Scholarships); Dirección General de Deportes y 
Recreación  (General Direction for Sports and Leisure); and Dirección General de Bibliotecas, Archivos y 
Museos (General Direction for Libraries, Archives, and Museums). In a second round, five services associated 
with the Ministry of Finance were added: Tesorería General de la Nación (National Treasury); Servicio de 
Impuestos Internos (Internal Revenue Services); Casa de Moneda (the Mint); Servicio Nacional de Aduanas 
(National Customs Service); and Dirección de Aprovisionamiento del Estado (State Provisions Directorship). 
See Armijo (2003:59).      
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We were working on this in DIPRES since the second half of 1992, looking at information that was 
available about the British experience, some papers on France and Spain. The US reform experience 
was complicated, because there were different conditions at state and federal levels. Then, in terms 
of the role played by a Ministry of Finance, we could not find any relevant experience in the US. We 
started to think about how to advance these reforms. We thought about measuring the productivity of 
the public sector, but that was too complicated because you cannot measure costs. The trip thus 
allowed us to see the practical side of a specific experience. We had already studied papers and 
public information from other countries. This trip was mainly to learn about practical issues which 
could emerge on this subject (IC26).  
 
Indeed, from the beginning of the reform process, Chilean officials were keen to 
study other foreign examples. Marcel (2006:2) remarks that they ‘studied what was 
happening in Great Britain, the reforms in New Zealand, and the less known experience of 
Australia’. In a later document, Marcel (1998a) discussed those three national experiences 
and the US one, showing good and detailed knowledge of all cases
41
. Moreover, he noted 
that these countries aimed to link ‘the evaluation of performance and the economic 
processes in which public institutions participate, particularly in the budget process’ 
(Marcel, 1998a:56). Therefore, even if the British experience served him (and his team) as 
a departure point, it was not the only source of knowledge for developing the Chilean MFR 
tools.  
Other interviewees pointed at how, from the very beginning, the Chilean MFR tools 
did not just originate in the transfer of British ones. According to a former senior official,   
 
Our tools did not follow a model from abroad, they were all ‘home made’. Obviously they did pick 
up concepts developed abroad. But it would be inaccurate to say that we followed the Australian or 
the New Zealand model, or that this tool is the same to the one used by the British at the time (IC5)
42
. 
 
Another DIPRES official elaborates on the same point:  
 
                                                          
41
 On the British reforms, he said that ‘performance indicators have played a key role’, among other 
things, ‘as information or object of study in evaluations of the institutional management’ (p. 54). Regarding 
New Zealand, he remarked that the development of performance indicators had been part of ‘one of the most 
radical experiences of state reform’, in which there was a clear distinction between ‘results’ and ‘products’ (p. 
54). On Australia, he pointed out that reforms had been closely linked to the financial sector, and had been 
part of a broader process involving strategic planning, organisational restructuring, and the use of 
performance-based incentives. He further noted that ‘performance indicators and goals have become part of 
one of the most complete systems for presenting budgetary information’, and that ‘evaluation systems […] 
have had a rapid development’ (p. 55).  
42
 Armijo (2003:64) similarly notes that, ‘even though the initial sources of methodological 
inspiration came from the United Kingdom’s experiences, in general terms the methodological design and the 
implementation were done with the national budgetary resources and with national experts’.  
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We did not apply the methodologies other countries had as they were. We adapted them. For 
example, in the case of indicators, we were clear that this was an instrument which contributed to the 
decision-making process. But this could not happen in automatic, by linking directly remunerations 
and budgetary decisions. That had already been done and failed. Therefore, we followed a rather 
indirect path to produce more objective information through these instruments, so that they could 
contribute to decision-making. We did not introduce performance contracts, which existed in those 
countries, because our idiosyncrasy was not prepared for that (IC8). 
  
The former quotes further evidence that Marcel and his team did make an effort to analyse 
and assess the practical experience of other countries. According to a former senior official, 
‘we did not buy the New Public Management at face value. We took the kind of 
instruments and ideas that were emerging. Then we reviewed our problems, and discussed 
the extent to which different tools could help us’ (IC30).  
Summing up, the PPMSGP had certainly been associated with the British 
managerial experience. Yet a simple process of transfer/copying from London to Santiago, 
as suggested by Orellana, did not actually take place. Furthermore, the PPMGSP 
represented only the very first step in the process by which Chilean officials introduced 
MFR ideas and practices. As stated by the PPMSGP’s introductory document, ‘[t]he 
capacity to implement any innovation will depend on the capacity to attract the attention 
around the new idea, establish the legitimacy of the proposed innovation and being capable 
of going beyond the pilot phase towards its wider application’ (DIPRES, 1993b:5). In the 
following years, many factors would intervene before Chilean policymakers managed to 
build a more or less coherent set of MFR tools.  
 
‘A President That Would Let Us Do Things’: 
Advancing MFR in the Frei Administration 
In contrast to Aylwin’s government, president Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle’s term (1994-2000) 
is generally portrayed as a key turning point in the history of Chile’s administrative 
modernisation (Mardones, 2002; Garretón and Cáceres, 2003; Ramírez, 2004; Waissbluth, 
2006; Olavarría et al., 2011; Figueroa et al., 2011; Tello, 2011). One interviewee even 
remarked that ‘there could have not been administrative modernisation in Chile if it was not 
because of president Frei’ (IC7). Indeed, it was during Frei’s administration that a Comité 
Interministerial de Modernización de la Gestión Pública (CIMGP, or Inter-Ministerial 
Committee for the Modernization of Public Management) was created. It was also during 
his presidency that a first Plan Estratégico de Modernización de la Gestión Pública 
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(PEMGP, or Strategic Plan for the Modernisation of Public Management) would be enacted 
in 1997.  
Yet in terms of MFR, the Frei years were not completely positive. During the first 
half of the administration, Marcel and his team were capable of advancing MFR on various 
fronts. The Plan Piloto (PPMSGP) set the basis for the use of performance indicators in a 
much bigger number of government agencies. Three new performance management tools 
(programme evaluations, performance reports, and performance improvement programmes) 
were introduced. The MFR capacity of DIPRES and other government agencies was 
strengthened. And the jargon of MFR spread government-wide. On the other hand, much of 
this progress would be lost during the second half of the Frei administration (as described 
in the following section).  
 President Frei became interested in administrative modernisation for a variety of 
reasons. He entered office when the topic had already gained an important place in the 
governing coalition’s agenda. As the previous section showed, individual agencies and 
DIPRES had advanced some reform initiatives. Moreover, MFR had been discussed in 
meetings and documents sponsored by the ‘Concertación’ (Boeninger, 1992; Flisfisch et 
al., 1993). Then president Aylwin had remarked in his final presidential address (May 21, 
1993) that, ‘it is clear the administrative apparatus of the state requires a modernisation, to 
set it in tune with the needs and urgencies of the contemporary world and make it more 
agile, capable, and efficient’43. Thus, as a member of the same political coalition, president 
Frei could not simply ignore these precedents.  
There were also political and personal reasons behind president Frei’s interest on 
this subject. The ‘modernisation’ agenda was relevant for him because ‘he needed to find 
something to differentiate himself from President Aylwin’ (IC7). The latter had 
successfully carried out the transition to democracy. Therefore, Frei required something 
politically valuable and symbolic for his government. The label of a ‘moderniser’ thus 
seemed to be a rather useful one (Tello, 2011:249). Lastly, many authors have remarked 
that president Frei personally cared about this subject (Armijo, 2003; Ramírez, 2004; 
Olavarría et al., 2011; Figueroa et al., 2011). An interviewee suggested, for example, that 
Frei believed these topics were important because ‘he is an engineer, he had been an 
                                                          
43
 These words have been cited by various Chilean scholars. See Navarrete (2008:92); Olavarría 
(2010:20).  
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entrepreneur, and he had been a top executive of various businesses. For him management 
topics were very close to his heart’ (IC7). Another similarly said that, ‘as an engineer, he 
understood that it was necessary to implement government programmes correctly’ (IC9).  
President Frei supported administrative modernisation in at least three ways. The 
first one was by including the topic in his political manifesto, which stated that, 
‘modernising public management and adapting the organisation of the state to the 
challenges of the new times will be a priority of the next Concertación government’ 
(Ramírez, 2004:37). Then he established an inter-ministerial committee on the subject of 
modernisation (the CIMGP), with representatives from MINSGPRES, DIPRES, and the 
Ministry of the Interior. This committee sought to ‘promote and coordinate the 
administrative modernisation efforts of ministries and agencies, as well as to design and 
propose general policies on the subject and the instruments needed for implementing, 
monitoring and evaluating the programme’ (Armijo, 2003:49). The CIMGP was in charge 
of designing government-wide reform initiatives. It also provided a forum for government 
officials to discuss administrative modernisation topics, such as MFR. These were later 
disseminated across government (Armijo, 2002; Ramírez, 2004)
44
.   
The president also contributed to keeping the topic on the politico-administrative 
radar. The following quotes illustrate this point. In the first case, the citation comes from 
the presidential decree by which the CIMGP was created in December 1994. At that time, 
president Frei stated that: 
 
The country’s development requires the gradual perfecting of our administration, making it more 
efficient both in its organization and its management. […] It is indispensable for the achievement of 
this objective […] to move gradually toward a management style oriented by results and centred on 
the service to the citizenry, and […] that the mission, goals, and results of the public organisms be 
known by the citizens, so that they may evaluate their management in terms of relevance, 
effectiveness, and efficiency
45
.  
 
 
 
                                                          
44
 According to Armijo (2002:282-283), ‘The coordination, established as a working mechanism of 
the [Inter-Ministerial] Committee, was guided by permanent activities with participant institutions and those 
responsible for the various management topics, including workshops and seminars, meetings for the diffusion 
of relevant experiences of public services, international seminars, designation of people in charge of 
ministries’ modernisation commitments, creation of networks and task forces […] [and] a policy of open 
doors to support and/or reply to questions from institutions’.    
45
 As cited by Garretón and Cáceres (2003:127). 
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In July of 1995, President Frei similarly expressed that: 
 
The process of modernising public services requires developing an organisational culture with a 
focus on results. To achieve that it is necessary to have well-founded evaluations […]. Therefore, 
updating and improving the current systems of evaluation of the state is something deeply important 
for the government, Congress and the citizens. During the following years it will be necessary to 
improve and strengthen the public sector’s evaluation capacity, as an essential element for decision-
making. […] [W]e have committed ourselves to finding the evaluation methods which […] will 
allow us evaluating with simplicity and objectivity the effectiveness and efficiency of at least the 
main government programmes (Frei, 1995)
46
.   
 
The quotes are particularly interesting because they echo concepts and ideas first used by 
DIPRES officials in previous years. They also show that a ‘focus on results’ had achieved a 
central place in the country’s modernisation agenda. The second quote further hinted at the 
new MFR tools which DIPRES would introduce in 1996-1997.  
According to a former MINSEGPRES official, Frei was ‘a president that would let 
us do things. He was convinced that administrative modernisation was good and thus let 
ministers develop their own projects’ (IC5). This also created some room for manoeuvre for 
the groups of middle and senior level officials who, as Marcel, were part of the CIMGP. 
They found the opportunity to advance their ideas about administrative modernisation. In 
fact, it was these public servants, and not their ministers, who understood the subject and 
thus led the process of reform. According to the same official, modernisation plans and 
projects were carried out:  
 
leaving aside ministers’ intuition or goodwill. Sometimes ministers or deputy-ministers did not really 
know the subject which they were dealing with. It was their advisors who had a vision and suggested, 
when the time came, certain decision paths. For instance, when we were developing the 
modernisation plan in 1996, the minister did not know anything about this, but Mario Marcel did 
know. Thus, ministers usually accepted these ideas because they realised these were important topics 
(IC5).   
 
Another former DIPRES senior official similarly states:  
 
Mario [Marcel] would tell the minister what he wanted to do, which areas he wanted to strengthen, 
and the minister would agree. Ministers never assumed a protagonist role, but they understood these 
were things that needed to be done and thus they would say, ‘OK, go ahead and do this’ (IC20).   
 
                                                          
46
 Very similar words would be used by President Frei (1997:37) in his presentation during the 
second international seminar on administrative reforms described below.   
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An academic observer similarly notes that, ‘the modernisation process was strongly 
advanced by a group of “técnicos” [technocrats] within government’ (IC7; Figueroa et al., 
2011:84)
47
.  
However, the design and implementation of actual modernisation or MFR initiatives 
did not progress easily during 1994-1995 for various reasons. Whereas president Frei had 
shown some interest on the subject, this did not necessarily translate into institutional 
support or resources (Ramírez, 2004:88; Waissbluth, 2006:42). Furthermore, Armijo 
(2002:238) points out how during ‘the phase that goes from the promulgation of the decree 
which created the Inter-ministerial Committee until the definition of an explicit Program for 
Modernisation in 1997, there was an intermediate phase in which the role of this committee 
was barely visible and not very effective’48.  
In fact, the first Executive Secretary of the CIMGP, Rodrigo Egaña, was too busy 
dealing with other political responsibilities within his ministry (MINSEGPRES). He thus 
stepped down of his role, and Marcel took over the committee’s Secretariat in 1995 (IC23). 
DIPRES then assumed the formal leadership of the reform process, on top of the informal 
leadership it already had because of Marcel’s expertise and knowledge on these topics49. 
But in real terms that did not mean much, as he was still only a Subdirector at DIPRES.  
Furthermore, Marcel’s appointment as Executive Secretary of the CIMGP did not 
solve the main issue at the time: the lack of experience and capacity in modernisation 
topics, MFR in particular. Whereas in previous years Marcel and his team had studied other 
international experiences and had even travelled to the UK, they still faced several 
limitations. First of all, none of the public servants in Marcel’s team had formal academic 
background on topics such as performance measurement or management control systems. 
Nor did they have previous practical experience on this subject, other than that obtained in 
implementing the PPMGSP during previous years. In fact, as indicated by the citation at the 
                                                          
47
 Waissbluth (2005:13) suggests that during the Aylwin-Frei governments, there were about 10 
individuals who played a key role as policy entrepreneurs. He asserts that ‘[w]ithout doubt, if these 10 key 
people had not existed, without these ‘public managers’ self-defined as such before the term was formalised, 
the take-off of the [administrative] reform would have been much slower and with less results of what it had’.  
48
 Araya and Barría (2008:87) similarly state that, ‘[b]etween 1994 and 1996, [the Inter-ministerial 
Committee] lacked sufficient public visibility to lead a broader modernisation effort, leaving the 
responsibility of public management modernisation in the hands of the Budget Office’. 
49
 In discussing the main actors in these years (1994-2000), Figueroa et al. (2011:84) suggest that 
‘[w]ithout doubts, a fundamental actor in this team was the then Budget Director, Mario Marcel, whom 
various actors qualify as ‘the true promoter of the progress in the subject of modernisation’’. It should be 
mentioned that Marcel was temporary director only for a few months in 1996.   
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beginning of this chapter, they were more ‘like a poor circus’, in which a few people had to 
deal with ‘everything’ (IC21).  
These conditions were not much better in other government ministries and agencies.  
The concepts of ‘results’, ‘public management’, or ‘performance’ were almost completely 
unheard off at the time. According to Armijo (2002:286), ‘many of the executives who 
were in charge of leading [the administrative modernisation process], did not have previous 
public management experience’. The MFR ‘capacity’ of the Chilean government thus 
needed to be built before more substantial reforms could take place.  
Within the context of the CIMGP, Marcel and his team developed a number of 
actions to further support the introduction of MFR ideas and practices. They aimed to 
increase agencies’ awareness about this subject, and also tried to diminish their reluctance 
to use concepts which apparently applied to the private but not the public sector (Muñoz, 
2005). The use of foreign examples had a central role as a source of learning and capacity 
building, as well as a means to persuade other actors. According to a former DIPRES 
official:  
 
We basically read and learned about the international experiences. We took a document which had 
been prepared on the basis of the trip to the UK. The first thing we did was to develop a 
methodological guide on performance indicators. We downloaded documents and contacted people, 
but we did not travel abroad again. We wrote the guide on indicators for the public sector, with most 
of the examples coming from the British experience. Then we started to train people. This guide was 
distributed among public agencies. Then we also gave talks in the ministries and agencies about 
these concepts (IC21). 
 
The Guía para la Construcción de Indicadores de Desempeño en los Servicios Públicos 
(Guide for the Design of Performance Indicators in the Public Services; DIPRES, 1995; 
Bonnefoy, 2003:16; Armijo 2011) offered agencies an introduction to various MFR topics. 
It explained why indicators were important for measuring the ‘performance of public 
services. On the basis of international examples, the Guide also described the kind of 
indicators agencies could design. Box 3.3 below shows some examples included in the 
‘Guide’.  
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Box 3.3 
International Performance Indicators Examples Used by DIPRES 
 
Economy: 
 Percentage of increment in the costs of a project compared to the original budget (Transit New 
Zealand) 
 Social benefits recovered  (Benefits Agency, United Kingdom)  
 Import duties collected versus those budgeted  (Customs Service – Import-Export Control, Australia) 
 
Efficiency 
 Programme operation expenditure/programme total expenses (Social Security Department, Australia) 
 Costs associated with collecting import duties versus income collected  (Customs Service –Import-
Export Control, Australia) 
 
Effectiveness 
 Benefits recovered through fraud detection and prevention, amount and percentage (Benefits 
Agency, United Kingdom) 
 Percentage of roads in critical condition. Target 7-8% in a period of 5 years (Highways Agency, 
United Kingdom) 
 Percentage of time spent by inmates on out of cell activities. Target 25% (Scottish Prison Service, 
United Kingdom) 
 
Quality of Service 
 Waiting time in answering client calls (Tele-Service Centre, Social Security Department, Australia) 
 First benefit payment dispatched in less than 10 days. Target 75% (Employment Services, United 
Kingdom) 
 Average time in Airport Passenger Control (Customs Service, Passenger Processing, Australia)  
 
 Source: Author based on DIPRES (1995).   
 
A second activity led by DIPRES was the development of two international 
seminars on administrative modernisation (IC5; IC14; IC17; IC30; Armijo, 2002, 2003; 
Figueroa et al., 2011). These took place in Santiago in March 1995, and May 1996, under 
the formal sponsorship of the CIMGP. Hundreds of public servants from the Chilean 
central government reportedly took part in these activities (DIPRES, 1996, 1997). In the 
first seminar, the managerial reform experiences of the UK, New Zealand, Australia, and 
Sweden were discussed by experts from those countries. There were also representatives 
from the OECD (who discussed reform trends in the OECD region), and the WB (who 
spoke about their participation in reforms in developing countries). During the second 
seminar, the focus was on quality of customer service. There were presentations about 
reforms in specific agencies of New Zealand, the UK, Sweden, Catalonia, and Singapore, 
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and discussions about trends in quality of service across OECD countries. In both seminars, 
Chilean public servants and experts debated the applicability of international reforms to 
their country. They also analysed the reform initiatives which were taking place in Chile.  
According to some interviewees, information obtained through these seminars was 
useful in various respects. A former senior official states that, ‘the seminars were very 
important in terms of knowledge and information, and also of international contacts’ 
(IC20). Another suggests that, ‘people who came to those seminars learned a lot from them’ 
(IC21). These are, of course, claims difficult to assess. Yet they allow seeing how officials 
perceived the seminars and their contribution to the broader reform process. DIPRES 
produced two books and videos, and organised workshops and information ‘fairs’ to further 
spread the ideas discussed in the seminars. Moreover, the international experiences 
presented during the seminars became a useful source of empirical knowledge for DIPRES 
officials when they introduced programme evaluations and performance incentives in 1996-
1998 (IC21).  
These international seminars were not, however, only about ‘capacity building’. 
They were planned with the objective of persuading other actors, by showing them 
international MFR trends. According to a former DIPRES senior official:  
 
We brought foreign experts so that they could tell us what was happening abroad in terms of public 
management. That helped us because, what was a preoccupation of a rather small group of people, an 
elite which was aware of reforms taking place in the rest of the world, could become something 
relevant for the broader public sector and for politicians. We also always took care of inviting 
parliamentarians to these seminars (IC30). 
 
Along the same lines, a former MINSEGPRES official states that international 
experts helped them ‘raise awareness’ among participants, because the description of ‘how 
reforms had taken place in their countries served as a demonstration effect’ (IC5; Figueroa 
et al., 2011:79). Another former DIPRES official remarks that, ‘the seminars contributed to 
promote the concepts of efficiency, effectiveness, and quality of public expenditure’ 
(IC21). These seminars thus had both technical and political purposes. Indeed, in the 
introduction to the book containing the papers from the seminar, Marcel (1996:7) remarked 
that: 
 
We wanted to have first-hand knowledge of the experience of the countries which have made more 
progress in the field of reform and modernisation of the state to show that change is possible, that 
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there are ideas, methodologies and techniques in constant evolution, which are available to those who 
want to take advantage of them
50
.  
 
The idea of developing international seminars was thus aimed at enriching the intellectual 
debates, and contributing to building the Chilean government’s capacity on these subjects. 
But officials involved in the modernisation process (particularly those at DIPRES) also 
used the seminars, and specifically the foreign experiences presented then, to advocate 
administrative reforms.  
In close association to these activities, between 1994 and 1996 DIPRES officials 
worked on the design and introduction of three new performance management tools. First, 
they promoted the development of agency performance indicators, which built on work 
previously done through the PPMGSP. Marcel and Tohá (1998:602-603) remarked that the 
Pilot Plan ‘had remained easily exposed to the ups and downs of policy sector authorities, 
institutional pressures and urgencies’, as well as ‘too isolated and slow in order to produce 
a significant impact in the whole of the administration’. Therefore, DIPRES officials sought 
to develop a more ‘transversal’ (e.g. government-wide) effort (Marcel, 1998a:67). In 1994 
DIPRES asked ministries and agencies to prepare ‘performance indicators’.  
The ‘Guide’ mentioned in previous pages was used as a basis to help agencies 
design indicators of efficiency, effectiveness, economy, and quality of service (Marcel, 
1998a; Armijo, 2003). This exercise was initially carried out on a voluntary basis. This 
aimed to broaden the use of indicators without paying much attention to their technical 
quality. Thus, ‘with a few exceptions, all proposals submitted by agencies were accepted’ 
(Marcel 1998a:67)
51
. As a result, whereas the PPMGSP had only covered 5 (and later 10) 
agencies, a total of 26 agencies decided to join the use of performance indicators in the first 
round. Table 3.1 shows how the number of agencies and performance indicators increased 
until 1998, when numbers decreased slightly. For reasons to be discussed in the following 
section, performance indicators were discontinued in 1999 (Guzmán, 2002:7).   
                                                          
50
 In the introduction to the second seminar’s volume, Marcel (1997a:10) similarly stated that, ‘[t]he 
realisation of this Meeting and the publication of its main contents […] are embedded in an effort to 
disseminate the modernisation ideas and experiences in the public sector in order to facilitate the integration 
of a network of agents committed to the changes inside the state apparatus for the benefit of the citizenry’.  
51
 According to Marcel (1998a:59), ‘[g]iven that in many cases the first obstacle is to win over the 
scepticism of the public servants regarding the feasibility of the things, it might be convenient to set in motion 
an initial experience of identification of indicators and management goals without all the previous steps, in 
order to perfection the system as it involves the internal and external adherence to the organisation’.  
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Table 3.1 
Performance Indicators in the Chilean Government (1995-1998) 
Year 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 
Number of public agencies 
 
26 49 67 66 
Number of indicators produced 
 
107 197 291 285 
Source: Armijo (2003:89), with modifications.  
 
A particularly interesting feature of this effort was that, from the very beginning, 
DIPRES officials tried to introduce a stronger association between the new performance 
indicators and the budget. As discussed above, this was a practice that Marcel and his team 
had observed in leading NPM countries (Marcel, 1998a; Armijo, 2003:61). Therefore, 
agencies’ performance indicators were attached to their annual budget proposals to the 
Congress. From DIPRES’s perspective, the objective was to take advantage of budgetary 
policymaking as a cyclical event. Performance indicators could be thus employed to put 
pressure on agencies to make more efficient use of their resources. Similarly, DIPRES 
officials considered that by including performance indicators in the budget they would 
‘enrich the budgetary discussion, traditionally centred in an incremental analysis, steering it 
towards more fundamental aspects of government management’ (Marcel, 1998b:67). 
However, as it will be discussed below, none of these objectives were achieved until the 
mid-2000s. 
Programme evaluations were the second performance management tool introduced 
in these years. In 1996 the topic was included as a part of the protocolo presupuestario 
(‘budgetary agreement’) signed between the Executive and Congress for fiscal year 1997. 
According to various interviewees, the logic behind this agreement was the need to ‘change 
the rules of the game in terms of how budgetary policy discussions were taking place in 
Chile at the time’ (IC26; IC30). Despite the very limited authority Congress possess in 
terms of budgetary policymaking (Boeninger, 2007; Aninat et al., 2008; Zaltsman, 2009), 
parliamentarians from the opposition had found ways to put pressure on the Executive. 
Moreover, they had been able to cut 600 million dollars from the 1996 budget. In response 
to these pressures, a former senior DIPRES official explains that: 
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The following year people were afraid of ending up in a similar situation if things did not change. 
Marcel had temporarily taken over as Head of DIPRES two weeks before the presentation of the 
budget. Therefore, he had to devise a strategy to work with Congress. Given that there had been 
some previous work on indicators, and that the topic of evaluation seemed to be significant from 
practices DIPRES officials had observed in other countries, Marcel went to the Congress with the 
offer of reaching a political deal. The idea was to improve substantially the quality of information 
and the transparency regarding government activities. He was able to reach a deal with the Unión 
Demócrata Independiente [UDI, or Democratic Independent Union party], and the governing 
coalition. On the basis of this agreement, evaluations and general management reports were included 
in the budget (IC30).  
 
Thus, DIPRES took advantage of the political situation to introduce evaluations, while at 
the same time addressed a real congressional concern regarding access to information about 
public sector effectiveness52.   
Given the lack of experience on the subject of evaluations, Chilean officials looked 
at international practices. According to a former senior official, ‘we did look abroad, but at 
the time not many countries were conducting evaluations. Australia was doing lots of 
evaluations, but under a completely different design, because in their case it was the 
departments or ministries which were in charge of managing evaluations’ (IC30). 
Information gathered during the previous trip to the UK was not very helpful, because the 
focus there was on performance indicators rather than evaluations as in Australia (see 
Schick, 1990; Mackay, 2012).  
In the face of these limitations, another former DIPRES official says that, ‘we found 
the experience that the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank had in the 
use of “logical frameworks”. We thus contacted the IDB, and they came to train our team 
which was in charge of this topic’ (IC21; Marcel, 1998c). The Logical Framework 
Methodology (LFM) helps to map out the causal assumptions and conditions required for a 
given programme to achieve its objectives (Aldunate and Córdoba, 2011). An official notes 
the LFM provided them with ‘a tool which was easy to use, because it was didactic and 
very helpful for putting things in order’ (IC9). Between 1997 and 1999, the LFM was used 
in 80 evaluations (Marcel, 2002a:237).  
The Balances de Gestión Integral (BGIs, or General Management Reports) were the 
third performance management tool introduced in this period. The BGIs tried to offer a 
systematic account of how well public agencies/ministries had fulfilled their institutional 
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 Rivera (2003:136) states that ‘[t]he lack of satisfaction shown by parliamentarians from the 
Finance committees in the Chambers of Deputies and Senators, regarding the lack of information about social 
programmes [...] led to the proposal of conducting an annual programme of evaluations’.    
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commitments (Marcel, 1998a; Armijo, 2003). The BGIs included information about 
ministerial goals and performance indicators, as well as more general information about 
each institution. According to a DIPRES official,  
 
The idea was that institutions could get used to the topic of accountability, instead of remaining 
hidden behind the state apparatus. We wanted them to tell citizens things like, “We exist for this, we 
have this many public servants, we manage these resources, and during last year we did this” (IC26).  
 
At the time BGIs were introduced, president Frei (1997:36) expressed the latter 
would ‘enormously contribute’ to congressional works, and would ‘improve management 
information and transparency’. In terms of its links with international experiences, a former 
DIPRES senior official says that the BGIs ‘more or less took some ideas that we gathered 
from other countries’ (IC30). However, other interviewees also stated that the idea was that 
BGIs became something similar to the annual balance reports which are commonly 
produced by private sector organisations (IC14; IC26).   
Thus, throughout 1994-1996 DIPRES officials had once again used foreign 
examples and international practices. This was for two main purposes: first, to support the 
design and introduction of MFR tools; and second, to persuade other actors about the need 
to modernise the Chilean public sector with the use of MFR practices. With the support of 
international organisations, DIPRES and other officials received training on the LFM. 
Because reforms were mainly led by DIPRES, significant attention was always paid to how 
the new tools could strengthen the budgetary cycle.  
Nonetheless, DIPRES officials also cared about how MFR could make a direct 
contribution to changing the country’s political dynamics. According to a DIPRES official:  
 
We noticed that we could produce a budget with added-value. The world was changing, the relevant 
actors were changing, and thus we could not just continue presenting an itemised budget based on the 
traditional budget classification system. We noticed that a stronger discussion about the results which 
citizens expected from a given fiscal policy was growing. We also noticed that congressional debates 
about budgetary policymaking were changing, with more interest paid on whether the goals promised 
by the governing group were being accomplished or not (IC8). 
 
Indeed, soon after programme evaluations and BGIs were introduced, Marcel 
(1998a:80) stated along the same lines that:  
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a better integration of performance measurement and evaluation as part of the budgetary system 
provides an opportunity to adjust legislative discussions to Chile’s institutional conditions. In fact, 
the international experience shows that in those countries where the Executive has more control over 
decisions which commit fiscal resources, the political-institutional system might achieve more 
stability if Congress concentrates its efforts in better auditing the merits and results of public policies. 
In this way, strengthening these Congressional functions might not just address the frustrations of 
congressmen regarding budgetary discussion (and thus a source of stronger pressures over the quality 
of management in public institutions), but also be a contribution to the political system’s 
development.  
 
Given the predominance of the Executive in terms of budgetary policymaking, Marcel and 
his team saw in MFR reforms a means to increase the involvement of the Legislative, and 
thus rebalance the division of powers. 
However, 1996 was still too early to determine whether the new performance 
management tools had successfully increased the effectiveness of the Chilean public sector; 
whether they had changed its budgetary policymaking procedures; or whether they had 
contributed to developing the country’s political system. After the process of cross-national 
learning and internal deliberation started around 1992, the formal introduction of 
performance indicators, evaluations, and reports represented a considerable achievement. 
Moreover, Orrego remarks that (1999:21), ‘[t]owards the end of 1996 one could observe a 
new common language among public servants; […] the institutionalisation of management 
instruments; the consolidation of successful pilot experiences, and the establishment of a 
performance culture’. On the other hand, at the end of that same year, Marcel left his 
position in DIPRES. This and other factors discussed in the following section showed that 
the MFR agenda had not secured a place in Chile’s politico-administrative system just yet.  
 
‘Things That in the End Were Not Completed’:  
 The Decline of MFR in Frei’s Administrative Reform Agenda 
The second half of Frei’s presidency had contrasting effects on the administrative 
modernisation agenda, and particularly on its MFR dimension. In 1997 president Frei 
enacted the Plan Estratégico de Modernización de la Gestión Pública (PEMGP, or 
Strategic Plan for the Modernisation of Public Management). This represented the climax 
of discussions and reform initiatives dating back to 1992-1993 (CIMGP, 2000). 
Furthermore, in 1998 DIPRES created the Programas de Mejoramiento de la Gestión 
(PMGs, or Programmes for Management Improvement). These introduced a government-
wide mechanism to link institutional goals and annual remuneration increases. On the other 
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hand, between 1997 and 2000 the MFR agenda actually lost some ground. Furthermore, 
whereas the PMGs would later become a central feature of the Chilean MFR infrastructure, 
in the short term they negatively affected other tools. Thus, despite all the progress 
achieved during 1992-1996, as the Frei presidency came to its conclusion the future of 
MFR looked rather feeble.  
To some extent, 1997 was a very good year for administrative modernisation in 
Chile. President Frei enacted the PEMGP, which focused on six reform areas: strategic 
management; information technology and communications; transparency and integrity in 
public management; service quality and citizen participation; human resources; state 
institutions; and communications (MINSEGPRES, 2000; Ramírez, 2004). According to 
Armijo (2003:50), the PEMGP ‘provided stronger coherence to the various actions which 
had been developed up to that date, opened up new themes and added other elements 
related to managerial reforms’. Moreover, by including ‘strategic management’ as one of its 
lead subjects, the PEMPG seemed to guarantee the continuation of MFR topics.   
 The year 1997 was important for MFR also because a new line of performance-
based remunerations, the so-called PMGs, was then introduced. During the previous years, 
‘[t]he increasing attention in results and performance soon permeated to the topic of 
remunerations’ (Marcel and Tohá, 1998:603-604). This had led some agencies to develop 
instruments to link ‘remunerations, responsibilities and performance’. Some initiatives 
related to the use of ‘performance bonuses’ were implemented in various sectors: teachers, 
custom agents, municipal (health policy) public servants, and personnel of the Ministry of 
Public Works and Health Services (Marcel, 1997b; Marcel and Tohá, 1998).  
The changes introduced by the PMGs sought to be even more significant because of 
its government-wide coverage. Per agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the 
Asociación Nacional de Empleados Fiscales (ANEF, or National Association of Fiscal 
Employees; Mardones, 2002:7-9; IC1), the PMGs established that public servants could 
receive a salary increase for the following year if their institution achieved its annual goals 
(Guzmán, 2011). The creation of the PMGs responded to the unions’ permanent demands 
for higher salaries, but also to DIPRES’ interest in finding a way to put an end to the annual 
increases which had automatically taken place since the return to democracy. A DIPRES 
official further states that, ‘it was evident that if we really wanted to progress in the 
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question of building some kind of results-based budget, we needed to find a way to link 
remunerations with results. Otherwise the scheme would not work’ (IC26). 
 The PMGs also originated in some form of cross-national learning, but in this case 
in combination with knowledge about reforms previously implemented by DIPRES and 
other Chilean agencies. Based on his analysis of international trends, Marcel (1994:37) had 
already suggested that the Chilean government could eventually develop ‘a scheme of 
‘bonus by results’. This could be based on information about goals, institutional 
management, and performance agreements negotiated between ministries/agencies and 
central authorities. A former DIPRES official remarks that, ‘the example of New Zealand 
was an important input that helped us validate the idea of having a certain performance 
contract, even though we did not use something exactly as in New Zealand, Australia, or 
any other country’ (IC21). These international insights were complemented by lessons 
drawn from existing performance-based remuneration systems in Chile. According to the 
same official, ‘Marcel sent us to research the best practices available in the Chilean 
government, particularly the management agreements which at the time seemed to have 
given good results’ (IC21). The PMGs also built on the work previously done by Marcel 
and his team on the Pilot Plan and the performance indicators. 
In fact, the decision was to terminate the performance indicators as such, making 
them part of the PMGs. Instead of focusing on broad institutional goals, the latter aimed to 
measure topics which seemed to be of interest to public servants, such as training, hygiene, 
or workplace safety (IC26). According to a former DIPRES official: 
 
The idea was that institutions could listen to public servants unions in the making of the 
modernisation plan, following a certain methodology, and that then they could commit with certain 
goals. The first goals were not very high, nor were they backed with audit systems. In some sense, it 
was assumed that in the first years the majority of institutions would achieve performance levels high 
enough to obtain their remuneration increases. We created the conditions so that ANEF took part in 
the agreement, which in the end was very good for both parties. It was not like the PMGs would ask 
from them things which could not be achieved (IC21).  
 
 In practice, however, the introduction of the PMGs brought with it some negative 
effects. To begin with, the initiative cut short the learning process associated with 
developing performance indicators linked to institutional goals. This happened at a time in 
which the concept of indicators had not been consolidated yet (IC26; Marcel, 1998a:80). 
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Moreover, DIPRES’ limited institutional capacities for managing these topics further 
aggravated these issues (Guzmán, 2011). A former DIPRES senior official notes that:  
 
Institutions did not actually find a clear counterpart in DIPRES to talk about their PMGs. Ministries 
designed their PMGs on the basis of some indicators, but DIPRES did not review these. Therefore, 
the PMGs became just another administrative procedure, in which indicators mainly referred to 
routine activities. These were rather poor indicators, with goals set at very low levels. One could say 
there was an involution, with indicators losing the prestige they had already earned. That was very 
negative for the reform process (IC14). 
 
A high number of public servants received performance bonuses, but DIPRES did not have 
the capacity to determine whether institutions had actually obtained ‘real and substantive 
improvements’ (Marcel, 2002a:237; Costa, 2007:7; Guzmán, 2011). In other cases, the 
PMGs actually penalised institutions which were sincerely trying to strengthen the links 
between institutional performance and salary increases. According to a DIPRES official,    
 
Because the level of management capacities varied a lot among institutions, some of them used 
indicators which measured very simple things and with very low targets. Thus, their employees 
would get the monetary incentives. However, there were other institutions which developed very 
good indicators, with very demanding targets. Thus, they sometimes did not achieve these targets and 
their members did not receive the salary increases. Therefore, there was no real relationship between 
getting the incentives and management improvements. It was not a fair system (IC9). 
 
 DIPRES also faced difficulties with the implementation of programme evaluations. 
Although in theory they were associated to budgetary cycles, in practice the evaluations 
were not used for decision-making purposes. According to a former DIPRES official, ‘the 
number of people who was working on performance management was limited. While 
institutions had started to know us, inside DIPRES the budgetary specialists for each sector 
did not like us much’ (IC21; Filgueiras, 2000). Another former senior official similarly 
states that both groups ‘talked past each other’ (IC30). These internal issues were important 
because it was these so-called ‘sectorialistas’ (policy sector budget specialists) who 
decided agency/ministry budget allocations. Therefore, it was them who had to use the 
results of programme evaluations. Because they were not doing so, programme evaluations 
were not fulfilling their original rationale.  
Apart from these technical issues, the MFR agenda was significantly affected when 
Mario Marcel left DIPRES in 1997. While he had been interim Director during the last 
quarter of 1996, president Frei decided to appoint someone else in that position. Marcel 
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then took up a position at the IDB in Washington and remained there during 1997-2000. 
Some of his advisors, who had participated on the various MFR initiatives of previous 
years, also left DIPRES in the following months. The new Director did not have the same 
interest on MFR topics, and decided to focus on personnel management and industrial 
relations topics (IC21; Rivera, 2003:132). Therefore, the MFR capacity of DIPRES was 
severely affected, and the subject lost impetus within the agency.  
These problems were further aggravated by issues related to the broader 
administrative modernisation process. Although the PEMGP had included MFR as one of 
its main lines of reform (under the ‘strategic management’ heading), the programme also 
included many other topics. Some of these actually followed a completely different logic. 
According to Marcel and Tohá (1998:698), there was a:  
 
vast agenda of law projects guided by legalistic criteria [...] which not only introduce new sources of 
rigidness in the public administration, but also [...] generate a clear disorientation regarding the sense 
of the reforms. This explains the little clarity that still exists regarding modernisation’s objective, and 
the best instruments to achieve it.     
 
A former senior official adds that, ‘the Inter-Ministerial Committee promoted programmes, 
measures, many of them rather experimental, with lots of discontinuities, things that in the 
end were not completed’ (IC14). The subject of MFR thus seems to have lost ground in the 
middle of many other reform initiatives, particularly after Marcel’s departure.  
Moreover, the inter-ministerial committee never consolidated a strong institutional 
basis. According to Claudio Orrego (1999:15), who was the Committee’s last Executive 
Secretary during 1997-2000, the CIMGP was ‘far away from the president’; it was led by 
someone who was ‘a head of division, not a minister’; and it possessed limited ‘financial 
and human, as well as legal’ resources (Marshall and Waissbluth, 2007:4; Olavarría et al., 
2011:127). All of this in spite of the participation of representatives from the most 
important government ministries.   
 Thus, during the second half of the Frei administration, MFR reforms lost relevance 
and, above all, a sense of direction. The former happened because of a modernisation 
agenda which had been overloaded, with several topics but rather limited resources. The 
latter related to Marcel’s departure from DIPRES, as well as to problems faced in the use of 
programme evaluations and the implementation of the new PMGs.  
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Conclusions 
In summarising the foundations of the Chilean MFR system, a middle-level official 
remarked that the initiative had come: 
 
Directly from the vision of DIPRES about what could happen in the following 10 or 20 years. We 
were looking at what developed OECD countries were doing, and we then thought about how we 
could advance in that line. We also looked to what the IMF was requiring to those same countries in 
terms of budget information and statistics. Thus, our references were always the most developed 
countries. We were looking at the trends and instruments, how Chile was doing in comparison. Then 
we discussed how we could gradually use those methodologies in our own benefit (IC8). 
 
Indeed, as it will be described in Chapter 5, in hindsight that is more or less what happened. 
Chilean officials did make an effort to learn about other countries’ MFR reforms. They 
initially looked to the UK, but also to Australia, New Zealand, and to broader international 
evaluation practices. Furthermore, Marcel and his colleagues did use this information to 
design most of the MFR tools which were introduced in 1990-2000: performance indicators 
(and later the so-called ‘programmes for management improvement’), programme 
evaluations, and general management reports. All of these were mainly focused in 
increasing efficiency in public spending. But they were also aimed at rebalancing 
Executive-Legislative relationships.  
On the basis of this information from abroad, reformers developed some strategies 
to advance policy changes. Among other things, Marcel and his team focused on raising 
other actors’ awareness and understanding about MFR, and the potential benefits these 
practices could bring to the Chilean public sector. They sought to build the capacities of 
DIPRES and other agencies on the subject. They aimed to show other political actors that 
MFR reforms were taking place in many other countries as well. Through these strategies, 
and despite the involvement of MINSEGPRES and other agencies in the modernisation 
agenda, DIPRES assumed the leadership of the reforms during most of 1990-2000.  
Yet the official’s comments cited above are not completely representative of what 
really happened. The ‘gradualism’ which has come to characterise the Chilean MFR 
reforms was not completely deliberate. Marcel and his colleagues at DIPRES (and the 
CIMGP, which oversaw the reforms during Frei’s presidency) certainly pursued a ‘gradual’ 
take. They did so through the implementation of a Plan Piloto, and by accepting poorly 
defined performance indicators in the early years. However, this ‘gradualism’ was mostly a 
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result of several constraints. Among other things, these included the lack of knowledge and 
practical experience about MFR, as well as the rather limited administrative capacities and 
various resistances within (and beyond) DIPRES.  
Throughout the period covered in this chapter, reformers confronted a rather 
challenging environment. Political and administrative issues inherited from the Pinochet 
dictatorship; an Aylwin administration which did not care much about administrative 
modernisation, or gave priority to legalistic over managerial approaches to governing; a 
Frei presidency that did support MFR, but mainly from a rhetorical rather than a practical 
perspective; and an administrative reform agenda which grew in number of topics and 
political presence, but lacked the corresponding institutional support. Moreover, the 
departure of Marcel (and soon after of his advisors) affected the consolidation of the new 
MFR initiatives.  
Thus, between 1990 and 2000, Chilean policymakers introduced a number of MFR 
initiatives, many of which had been associated with ideas and examples from policies 
abroad. Yet despite the various ways in which Marcel and his colleagues used this 
information, and despite the strategies they set in motion to create favourable conditions for 
these policy changes, by the end of the decade Chile still lacked a well-functioning MFR 
infrastructure.   
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‘Things Could Not Remain the Same in a Democracy’: 
 The Emergence of ‘Management for Results’   
in the Mexican Public Sector  
(1994-2000)  
 
 
 
Congress did not influence the administrative reform plans.  
Zero. Congressmen did not care, nor were they involved on this. 
 They cared about political issues.  
 
Former Senior Official, Ministry of Public Administration  
 
 
There is an influence because as intelligent human beings 
 we try to learn from other experiences and formulate our own  
conclusions of what could be beneficial to our country;  
but that does not mean that the OECD tells its members what to do.  
 
Jorge Chávez-Presa, former Senior Official, Ministry of Finance
53
 
 
  
As in every process, things mature little by little.  
You think that the new idea will bloom immediately, but no… 
 
Middle-level official, Ministry of Finance  
 
 
 
 
The origins of MFR in Mexico, most observers would seem to agree, can be found in 
president Ernesto Zedillo’s administration of 1994-2000 (Pardo, 2003, 2009; Cejudo, 2003, 
2008; Aguilar, 2006; Sánchez, 2009b; Huerta, 2010). In those years, the story continues, 
Congress regained its long lost autonomy and influence. It was thus capable of forcing the 
Executive to introduce significant reforms to strengthen transparency and accountability, as 
well as the ‘results-orientation’ of public programmes. However, as this chapter will try to 
show, while the first assertion is mostly correct (but see below), the second is rather 
inaccurate. The initial MFR reforms advanced by the Zedillo government were undoubtedly 
                                                          
53
 The quote comes from and interview cited in Huerta (2006:132).  
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linked to the country’s process of political democratisation. Yet they were not a response to 
Congressional proposals or pressures.  
This chapter will analyse the various MFR initiatives which were introduced in the 
administrative modernisation, budgetary policy, and social policy sectors between 1994 and 
2000. In particular, the performance management, indicators, and evaluation principles 
introduced by the Programa de Modernización de la Administración Pública 1995-2000 
(PROMAP, or Programme for the Modernisation of Public Administration 1995-2000); the 
Nueva Estructura Programática (NEP, or new programmatic structure) and Sistema de 
Evaluación del Desempeño (SED, or performance evaluation system), used to reform the 
budgetary system; and the impact evaluation of the government’s main anti-poverty 
programme (PROGRESA), and Reglas de Operación de Programas Sociales (ROs, or 
Rules for Managing Social Programmes) for social programmes.   
In exploring the origins and development of these initiatives, the chapter will show 
how international MFR ideas were used by Mexican policymakers to react against 
budgetary opacity, administrative inefficiency, and the politicisation of social programmes. 
Through a variety of channels and sources, MFR reform principles and practices found 
their way into the government’s agenda. This happened even before the country’s first 
‘divided government’ of 1997-2000, as federal ministries drafted their reform initiatives 
mostly in 1994-1997. Thus, Mexican senior officials found in MFR a helpful means to 
address the country’s changing political conditions. They did so by their own initiative, and 
not in response to pressures from Congress or international organisations (Huerta, 2006; 
Culebro, 2008b; Vicher, 2009). 
 The chapter will also explore the strategies advanced by policymakers in the three 
MFR ‘strands’ (administrative, budgetary, and social policy), and their impacts on policy 
changes introduced in this period. More specifically, it will discuss how policymakers’ 
sought to explain what performance indicators and evaluation were about; to show how 
MFR was becoming an international trend; to build the capacity of federal ministries on the 
subject; and, in the case of PROGRESA, to strengthen the good image of the programme 
and the impact evaluation attached to it. Senior officials managed to introduce MFR policy 
changes with the support of some of these strategies; but only those working in the social 
policy sector secured to some extent the legitimacy and institutionalisation of their 
proposals. 
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 Indeed, towards the end of president Zedillo’s administration, neither performance 
management and indicators, nor budgetary reform initiatives had achieved significant 
results. This would be due to a number of political and administrative problems, including 
lack of experience on the subject, bureaucratic resistances, inter-ministerial conflicts 
regarding the use of methodologies, and a loss of relevance of MFR in the government 
agenda. Thus, as in the case of the Chilean experience, national factors heavily constrained 
both the origins and the fate of Mexican MFR reforms during the 1990s.  
 The remainder of the chapter will be divided into five sections. The first will 
describe the political background in which concerns about results, performance, 
transparency, and accountability came of age in Mexico. The second will discuss how and 
why MFR ideas were first introduced by senior officials at the new Secretaría de la 
Contraloría y Desarrollo Administrativo (SECODAM or Ministry for the Controllership 
and Administrative Development), and why the performance management agenda lost 
coherence and political relevance. The third section will analyse how MFR ideas became 
associated with budgetary reform discussions and why they did not achieve its expected 
results either. The fourth section will discuss how and why policy evaluations emerged as 
‘part and parcel’ of PROGRESA, and why this particular MFR strand did gain a higher 
level of institutionalization. The last section will wrap up the discussion.  
 
‘We Wanted to Stop the Absolute Discrecionalidad’: 
Transparency, Performance, and Results Come of Age 
Despite some previous attempts to introduce ‘evaluations’ in the Mexican public sector, it 
was during president Zedillo’s administration when ideas associated with MFR started to 
gain currency. As the process of political democratisation advanced throughout the 1990s, 
so did national discussions about transparency, accountability, and ‘results’. This would be 
particularly the case in 1997-2000, when the governing party lost its majority in Congress, 
and the president faced the first ‘divided government’ of the century. Yet for senior 
government officials inside the Zedillo administration, things started even earlier, and were 
not simply a response to congressional pressures. Reform proposals were a reaction against 
the alleged excesses of the Salinas administration (1994-2000). They were also a means to 
prepare the federal public sector to the changing political conditions of the country. Thus, it 
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was senior officials who drafted the reform initiatives, using information about 
contemporary debates and practices abroad.  
The rise of ‘performance management’ in the 1990s was unquestionably associated 
with the political changes taking place in Mexico. As noted by several authors, the 
legitimacy of the authoritarian regime originally established in the late-1920s had been 
severely affected by the various economic crises of the 1980s (Aguilar, 2000a, 2000b; 
Loaeza, 2008; Cejudo, 2008; Vega, 2008). On top of that, 1994 was a complicated year for 
several reasons (Méndez, 1994; Rousseau, 2001:411-424). Mexico became a member of the 
OECD and kicked-off the North American Free Trade Agreement (with the U.S. and 
Canada). This seemed to signal the country was finally returning to a path of economic 
development and modernisation. On the other hand, a ‘guerrilla’ group challenged the 
federal government’s authority. Later in the same year, the official party’s presidential 
candidate and its secretary-general were assassinated.  
Thus, by mid-1994 it was not clear whether the presidential elections would favour 
the governing party or not (Aguilar, 2000b:169). The substitute candidate (Zedillo) 
eventually won the presidency without facing fraud allegations as those confronted by 
Salinas in 1988. Yet he began his government with the burden of coming from the same 
‘revolutionary’ party that had governed the country for several decades. Then, on 
December 1994, less than a month after he had entered office, president Zedillo faced the 
biggest financial crisis in the country’s history (Rousseau, 2001:425-447; Cadena, 2005). 
This altered his original government priorities, and triggered strong criticisms against the 
government. It also increased social and congressional demands for a more transparent and 
accountable use of public resources.  
In 1997, Mexico’s political conditions further changed significantly. The governing 
party lost its majority in Congress for the first time in history. During the second half of his 
administration, president Zedillo would thus face a ‘divided government’. This is a fact 
commonly seen as a turning point in the country’s process of democratisation. For instance, 
Ugalde (2000:144; Casar, 2008) states that since then, ‘the logic and nature of relations 
between the executive and the legislative branches of the Mexican government were altered 
forever, and the relationship between both branches became more balanced’.  
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The ‘divided government’ is also said to have transformed administrative dynamics, 
particularly with regards to transparency, accountability, and MFR (Sour, 2007; Rubio, 
2012). For example, Cejudo (2008:121-123) remarks that, ‘the legislative branch became, 
at last, an effective oversight institution with the capacity to control and limit the executive 
branch’. He further argues that Congress ‘was able to push for changes aimed at reducing 
the discretionary powers of the president’, thus increasing its ‘oversight capacity’; and that 
it eliminated ‘the so-called ‘secret budget’’. Therefore, he suggests the various reforms of 
the Mexican public sector since 1997 were ‘a consequence of the process of political 
democratization, rather than the result of deliberate reforms inspired by NPM’. 
Yet the ‘divided government’ scenario does not really explain why officials from 
the Zedillo administration became interested about these topics in the first place. In fact, 
transparency, accountability, and MFR initiatives were a reaction against how government 
affairs had been usually managed. According to a former senior official:  
 
The way things used to work during the Salinas administration was no longer sustainable. The lack 
of constraints for using the partida secreta [secret budget] was just ridiculous. We knew that we had 
to increase transparency, to close down that partida secreta. It was clear for president Zedillo that 
things could not remain the same in a democracy. Thus, little by little in 1997, 1998, 1999, through 
the budget decrees, we sought to make some changes to these issues (IM26). 
 
Along very similar lines, another former official expressed that:  
 
We wanted to stop the absolute discrecionalidad [discretionary room for manoeuvre] that existed 
regarding public spending. Everything was a question of power at that time. Everything was about 
politics, about being close to the president or other powerful figures. That is how all public servants, 
from the senior to the lower levels, were able to get more resources, which they then employed for 
very ambiguous goals. Nothing was objective. No clear figures were used during the process of 
budget appropriation. Therefore, we knew we had to change things (IM17). 
 
Initiatives regarding a more transparent use of public resources, and better oversight 
mechanisms, were clearly supported by Congress. From 1997 onwards, the latter would 
also increase its demands for more accountability.  
Yet these comments illustrate that reforms originated within the Zedillo 
administration in response to ‘business as usual’, and particularly the legacies of the Salinas 
administration. Despite being part of the same group which had led the economic reforms 
since the early 1980s, president Zedillo and his collaborators actually wanted to distance 
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themselves from the previous Salinas administration
54
. Given the lack of transparency and 
accountability in the use of public funds, and the absence of systematic assessments 
regarding whether public and social programmes worked or not (Levy, 2006:102), senior 
officials deemed necessary to advance reforms in these areas. A former senior official 
remarked that, ‘the president himself strongly supported the reforms. He truly shared our 
concerns about the lack of transparency in the use of public resources’ (IM26). Another 
similarly stated that president Zedillo ‘deeply disliked corruption’, and favoured reforms 
which could eradicate it (IM17; Schefler, 2004:1-2).  
Senior government officials also considered transparency, accountability, and MFR 
reforms were necessary to prepare the country for what was coming. According to an 
academic observer, ‘in those years, there was a consensus among the political-
administrative elite of the country that they had to develop those reforms which could 
secure the viability of the country’ (IM2).  This was particularly after the economic crisis of 
1994-1995. Moreover, president Zedillo and other senior policymakers also knew that 
political alternation in the presidential elections of 2000 was a very likely outcome.  
There are additional reasons for reassessing what was the Congressional influence 
on accountability, transparency and ‘results-oriented’ reforms. According to a former 
SHCP senior official, ‘the legislators who arrived in 1997 were very excited because they 
knew they were the first “opposition congress”; but they were also quite inexperienced, 
particularly in budgetary matters’ (IM26). Indeed, Congress’ lack of policy expertise had 
been flagged by academics and legislators alike
55
. Therefore, even if congressmen 
participated in discussions about the transparency and accountability rules which were 
eventually attached to budget decrees, it is unlikely they had the necessary expert 
knowledge to make a huge impact on the Executive’s proposals.  
                                                          
54
 Teichman (2001:150) remarks there had been a number of disputes between the Salinas and 
Zedillo teams regarding the management of the economy, particularly about the timing of the ‘peso’ 
devaluation of 1994. She adds that ‘[t]he political assassinations, the lack of transparency, especially in the 
early privatizations, allegations of links between the political leadership, including top technocrats, and the 
drug cartels […] caused the Zedillo regime to attempt to distance itself from the previous regime’. See 
Cadena (2005:264-266).  
55
 Díaz and Magaloni (1998:526) concluded their study about the congressional influence on 
budgetary policymaking suggesting that,  ‘a higher professionalisation of Congress through technical corps 
and a career civil service in the legislative power’ would be required to ensure Congress became ‘a 
counterweight against federal bureaucracies in topics such as public spending oversight’ (see also Ugalde, 
2000:103-104). In legislative debates in the early 1990s, concerns had been similarly expressed about ‘the 
structural weakness of the Legislature because the committees for Finance and for Programming and Budget 
did not have independent research [capacity] and depended upon the Ministry of Finance’ (Hernández, 
1998:416).  
 113 
 
 
 Moreover, most policy changes concerning accountability, transparency and MFR 
(in relation to budgetary policymaking and other topics) were prepared before 1997. As the 
following three sections will detail, performance management initiatives were designed 
between 1994 and 1996. Budgetary reforms were introduced in 1998, but prepared since 
1996. And the social policy impact evaluations attached to PROGRESA’s launch in 1997 
were planned throughout 1995-1997 (Levy, 2006:118). Other changes that gained visibility 
during the divided government era had been similarly initiated in previous years. For 
instance, gradual changes to the amount of resources attributed to the ‘partida secreta’, 
which would be terminated in 2000, had begun in 1995 right after president Zedillo came to 
power (Levy, 2004:718).  
 Summing up, the coming of age of transparency, accountability and ‘results-
oriented’ initiatives certainly took place during the Zedillo administration. The emergence 
of these topics was unquestionably associated with Mexico’s broader process of 
democratisation. In this scenario, the growing political relevance of Congress contributed to 
affirm these topics in the political agenda. Yet the timing and specific contents of the 
various policy initiatives were actually determined by the Executive power. Indeed, senior 
government officials took into account the changing executive-legislative relationships, but 
did not act in response to congressional demands. In fact, they were reacting against the 
way in which government affairs had been previously conducted, particularly during the 
Salinas administration. They were also aiming to prepare the public administration for a 
future democratic environment. In devising these initiatives, senior officials took as a point 
of departure their assessment of Mexico’s political circumstances. However, as the 
following sections show, they used knowledge about foreign examples and practices in 
various ways to change public sector rules and practices.  
 
‘To Build Something That Did Not Exist Before’: 
Introducing Performance Management in the Mexican Public Sector 
The emergence of MFR ideas during the Zedillo administration happened through at least 
three different ‘strands’. The first and probably best known is that associated with the 
Programa de Modernización de la Administración Pública 1995-2000 (PROMAP, or 
Programme of Modernisation of the Public Administration 1995-2000). As other scholars 
have noted (Pardo, 2003, 2009; Cejudo, 2003; Huerta, 2006; Sánchez, 2009b), the 
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PROMAP for the first time structured a proposal for using performance indicators and 
evaluations government-wide. While previous administrations had discussed ‘evaluations’, 
none had been able to provide a clear conceptualisation of the subject, a detailed 
explanation of its importance, or a blueprint to guide its implementation.  
The PROMAP, however, did manage to address these issues. Furthermore, it also 
framed the reform of the Mexican public administration within a broader international 
context. As it will be discussed below, senior officials from the newly created Secretaría de 
la Contraloría y Desarrollo Administrativo (SECODAM, or Ministry of the Controllership 
and Administrative Development) actively looked at contemporary international 
modernisation trends. They then used some of these ideas, concepts, and practices in the 
making of the Mexican programme. Some authors have suggested the insertion of MFR 
and other administrative reform initiatives resulted from the activism or pressures of 
international organisations (e.g. the OECD or the World Bank; Huerta, 2006; Vicher, 
2009). Yet the process of learning from abroad was developed in a rather autonomous 
manner by Mexican policymakers.   
There had certainly been some government initiatives about ‘evaluation’ and 
‘results’ before the Zedillo administration (Mejía, 2005; Cardozo, 2009; Villalobos, 2010). 
For example, president José López-Portillo (1976-1982) developed an important 
administrative reform policy. Among other things, this sought to ‘[a]dopt programming as a 
fundamental government tool, to guarantee the congruence between the objectives and 
actions of the Federal Public Administration, clarify responsibilities and thus facilitate the 
timely evaluation of results achieved’ (Carrillo, 2006:245; Pardo, 2000a; 2009).  
President López-Portillo also introduced a new Budget, Accounting, and Public 
Expenditure Law. This tried to set up a programme-based budget, which could ‘state 
objectives, goals and responsible units for their execution and which allow a permanent 
evaluation of results’ (Carrillo, 2006:254, bold in original; Chávez-Presa, 2000:267-281; 
Caso, 2011). To support these changes, a new Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto 
(SPP, or Ministry of Programming and Budget) was created. It focused on the federal 
budget, aiming to link it with a planning process based on ‘programmes, targets, and, 
particularly, monitoring and evaluation of results’ (Hernández, 2000:264; Pardo, 2000a).  
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 However, evaluation and programme budgeting initiatives did not progress much. 
From a political perspective, SPP’s authority and activities were constantly affected by 
SHCP
56
. From an organisational perspective, SPP’s functions and structure changed 
constantly, and evaluation activities were never institutionalised. In fact, the SPP minister 
and future president, Miguel de la Madrid, eliminated an important evaluation unit
57
. From 
a conceptual point of view, government officials were never able to flesh out what 
evaluation actually meant. According to Bailey (1984:86), evaluation was something new 
which ‘lacked bureaucratic “pedigree”’, and could not easily find ‘a role for itself in a 
basically skeptical bureaucratic environment’. Similarly, Hernández (2000:273-274) argues 
policymakers ‘did not have a defined idea of what evaluation should be as a daily practice’. 
On the contrary, SPP’s under-secretary for evaluation was ‘a very imprecise hybrid in 
terms of its responsibilities’, which ‘became dedicated to produce partial studies with 
scarce impact in the economic process’.  
During de la Madrid’s administration (1982-1988) the subject of evaluation 
remained on the politico-administrative agenda. In response to a number of social criticisms 
against corruption levels the previous López-Portillo administration, president de la Madrid 
created a new Secretaría de la Contraloría General de la Federación (SECOGEF, or 
Ministry of the Federation’s General Controllership; Pardo, 2000b; Cejudo, 2003). The new 
SECOGEF was in charge of fighting corruption and establishing a National System of 
Control and Evaluation. Pardo (2000b:225) remarks that, ‘giving the rank of ministry to the 
new entity showed that the president had decided to give evaluation a significance it did not 
have before’.     
Yet as it had previously happened, various political, administrative, and conceptual 
issues impeded the consolidation of evaluation procedures. Despite its original mission 
(e.g. anticorruption and evaluation activities), SECOGEF was put in charge of privatisation 
processes and public employment cuts. These were carried out in response to the economic 
crisis (Rogozinski and Casas, 1993; Pardo, 2000b; Aguilar, 2000b). Furthermore, the 
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 According to Hernández (2000:274), SHCP ‘used its power to put obstacles to SPP’s task through 
a resource it never lost: the management, physically, of the money’. See also Bailey (1984).  
57
 This was the Dirección General para el Análisis de la Evaluación (Direction General for the 
Analysis of Evaluation). President López-Portillo also decided to create a Coordinación de Evaluación 
(Coordination Unit for Evaluation) attached to the presidential office, dedicated to monitor federal 
programmes. According to Pardo (2000a:204) this initiative ‘rested force to the Secretary for Programming 
and Budget, as it created a superior entity associated with the Executive, in reality useful only to validate 
rather than evaluate presidential decisions’.  
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‘evaluation machinery’ developed under SECOGEF’s leadership kept a focus on traditional 
activities, such as financial and budgetary controls (Pardo, 2000b:235; IM6). However, the 
main issue was that evaluation procedures were reduced to either ‘control’ (e.g. the drafting 
of additional norms, regulations, and procedures to fight corrupt practices); or ‘self-
evaluation’ (e.g. the development of internal meetings and the publication of institutional 
reports in which laudatory assessments prevailed)
58
.  
These issues were further aggravated during the presidency of Carlos Salinas (1982-
1988). The latter continued some reforms initiated by his predecessor (e.g. privatisation and 
deregulation of public utilities; Rogozinski and Casas, 1993). But he abandoned the limited 
anti-corruption and evaluation efforts developed so far (Méndez, 1994; Aguilar, 2000a, 
2000b; Pardo, 2000b, 2000c, 2009). Moreover, during these years the concept of ‘reform’ 
became strongly associated with the idea of ‘state reforms’ (Aguilar, 2000a). Thus, there 
was no room for thinking about ‘administrative reforms’ 
It would be during Zedillo’s administration that a more complex and workable 
understanding of evaluation procedures took place. For reasons discussed above, the 
president and senior officials wanted to pursue an alternative reform path. This included the 
development of an ‘administrative modernisation’ agenda, which could address a number 
of public sector issues previously ignored. Since the presidential campaign, some plans for 
modernising the public sector were drafted. According to a former senior official, ‘the 
SECOGEF had been criticised because of its police-type role. Thus, during the campaign 
there were some voices which suggested enriching its role, giving it a more ‘amiable face’’ 
(IM17; Culebro, 2008b:117). At the beginning of his presidential term, Zedillo introduced a 
legal reform to transform the SECOGEF into the new SECODAM. The latter was given an 
explicit modernisation mandate, on top of the institution’s original focus on corruption 
control. According to the same former official, ‘the idea was to build something that did not 
exist before, to start from scratch’ (IM17).  
The creation of SECODAM was followed by the drafting of an administrative 
modernisation programme. This task took place in 1994-1995, led by José Octavio López-
Presa as Head of the new Administrative Development Unit. In the decree which enacted 
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 According to Pardo (2000b:258), official evaluation reports ‘do not seem to have had the intention 
of being serious evaluation exercises to present an objective perspective of where to locate the results that had 
been planned, programmed and achieved, as well as those that had not been achieved, which could also allow 
knowing the unpredicted consequences that did not favour its accomplishment’.  
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the PROMAP, president Zedillo talked about the need to build a ‘Public Administration 
[which] responds with flexibility and timeliness to the changes required by society’. He 
also stressed the need to ‘developing a new approach and more relevant criteria for public 
management, and achieving from this perspective those components which might allow the 
measurement of its productivity and performance (Diario Oficial, 1996a).  
The PROMAP was structured into six main sections, some of which are only briefly 
discussed here. Its preface noted that the public sector had ‘an essential role to play in the 
change that the Mexican Government is proposing for the period 1995-2000’ (Diario 
Oficial, 1996b). It stressed that in the international level there had been ‘a permanent 
process of evolution and improvement in the mechanisms to administer and promote the 
development of various countries’ (Diario Oficial, 1996b). In this sense, the preface 
remarked that:  
 
In some nations of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) which 
Mexico joined in May 1994, significant transformations have been achieved in terms of market 
efficiency and production, as well as in satisfying the social expectations of their populations. The 
results achieved in the last decade by the governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, New 
Zealand, Australia, and more recently the United States, Portugal, and Spain, show that today, more 
than ever, government actions have a positive or negative incidence in the environment for the 
development of industrial and commercial activities, and their peoples’ life conditions.  
 
The preface further noted that, in parallel to these international changes, in Mexico there 
now existed ‘a more informed society, more participative and critical’.  Citizens asked for 
‘the permanent improvement of government services, more transparency and honesty in 
government actions and the use of public resources, and a more complete process of 
accountability’. The PROMAP thus stressed that, ‘a radical change in the way of 
administering and providing public services is required. It is necessary to refocus how to 
improve their coverage, quality and effectiveness’ (Diario Oficial, 1996b). 
After a review of previous reform initiatives, the PROMAP’s third section offered a 
general diagnosis of the Mexican public sector. This touched on four main topics: the 
limited infrastructure capacity to deal with increasing citizen demands; centralism; 
shortcomings in the measurement and evaluation of government performance; and the 
absence of mechanisms to guarantee public servants’ dignity and professionalisation. With 
regards to the third topic, evaluation and performance, the document remarked that:  
 
 118 
 
 
Traditionally, the actions and performance of public administration ministries and agencies has been 
evaluated on the basis of authorised levels of expenditure, as well as in terms of their association to 
programmes and budgetary items. However, the measurement of public spending’s contribution to its 
intended goals has been generally neglected (Diario Oficial, 1996b).  
 
It also suggested that: 
 
The accountability process has not been able to provide information required by the public to form 
objective judgements, since most of the time this is done by means of submitting documents to 
government bodies or higher administrative units, or these are of a relatively limited circulation 
(Diario Oficial, 1996b). 
 
These statements echoed the main preoccupations of senior SECODAM officials. 
According to a participant in the drafting process, ‘the main thing to deal with was how to 
measure, how to evaluate, how to ensure that the government was accountable. We had 
those concerns. We needed to measure the impact of what agencies were doing’ (IM17).  
 The PROMAP’s fourth section then described four sub-programmes, which 
addressed each one of the points included in the diagnosis. Regarding the ‘measurement 
and evaluation of public management’, it stressed that budgetary control should include ‘a 
thorough evaluation’ of results. This should focus on assessing service quality levels; an 
appropriate targeting of beneficiaries; and clear links between services provided and public 
needs/demands. The ‘development of modern schemes of performance measurement and 
evaluation’ should strengthen accountability mechanisms, increase flexibility, and 
guarantee an honest and transparent use of public resources.  
The PROMAP also stated that ministries would be required to define ‘clear 
objectives at the institutional and intermediate levels, linked to concrete programmes, 
actions or services, with significant and quantifiable goals in terms of results’. This was ‘to 
change the focus towards the expected impact of those programmes on society’ (Diario 
Oficial, 1996b). The following year (1997), agencies would then need to negotiate with 
SECODAM (and SHCP) a set of ‘performance indicators’. These would be used to 
‘evaluate results’ (quality, costs, relevance); ‘measure effects’ on society or beneficiaries; 
and ensure the ‘achievement of proposed institutional objectives’ (Diario Oficial, 1996b).  
The reference to international modernisation trends in the PROMAP’s preface, and 
the use of concepts such as ‘performance’, ‘results’, ‘indicators’, and ‘evaluation’, suggest 
that Mexican officials were drawing information from similar policies abroad. Indeed, 
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between 1994 and 1996 López-Presa and his team engaged in activities to learn about 
contemporary public management reforms (Philip, 2003; Huerta, 2006). According to a 
former official,  
 
We tried to find out what was that countries were doing on this subject. We realised there was a huge 
international concern about this, and that Mexico was not facing an exceptional situation. Thus we 
sought to use those experiences in Mexico. We looked at Portugal, which in the mid-1990s 
developed a very successful administrative modernisation programme. They focused on four topics, 
as we would later do with the PROMAP. We had many conversations with people from the UK, who 
were advancing the citizen’s charter. We developed a very good relationship with the person in 
charge of the reform agenda during the Thatcher administration. She came about 4 or 5 times to 
Mexico, to speak with many people including the president and secretaries of state. Her involvement 
was useful when we were drafting our programme, but particularly in helping us communicate the 
relevance of what we were doing (IM17)
59
. 
 
Lopez-Presa travelled to Lisbon, London, and Paris, and ‘spoke with many people’. Yet 
information about other countries’ experiences was mainly gathered through conversations 
and documents distributed at OECD meetings (IM17; Huerta, 2006). More focused study 
tours, such as the one developed by Chilean policymakers in the early 1990s, did not take 
place.  
Knowledge about modernisation policies abroad did influence the PROMAP’s 
structure and contents. As noted by the former official, the Portuguese experience served as 
a reference to determine the number of topics (four) to be included in the programme. The 
British experience provided ideas on topics such as service quality and performance 
management. Then, López-Presa and his team reportedly ‘studied the American case on 
reinventing government and re-engineering of processes’, in an attempt to use ‘a bit of 
everything’ (cited in Huerta, 2006:161; Roel, 1998).  
However, cross-national learning did not result in a copy of foreign programmes. 
The PROMAP and other official documents referred to concepts and terms which at the 
time were being similarly used elsewhere. For instance, SECODAM produced guidelines 
for defining an organisational mission/vision, and different kinds of performance indicators 
(SECODAM, 1999). While ‘the Mexican public administration did not offer any significant 
experience’ on this subject (Pardo, 2003:193-194), these official documents do not make 
further use of foreign examples, as it had been the case in Chile.  
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 Meetings with Kate Jenkins, former senior official in the British government during the Thatcher 
era, were mostly related to the subject of civil service reform (Philip, 2003). 
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Nor did Mexican officials engaged in this process as a result of international 
pressures. According to Huerta (2006:19), the PROMAP ‘epitomise[d] the adoption of 
discourse, ideology, policy goals, experience and recommendations on reforming public 
sector from the OECD and its core member countries’. He adds that the Mexican reforms 
had been ‘largely a product of processes of policy transfer in which the OECD is the prime 
agent of policy transfer’. There is some evidence that supports this interpretation. A report 
by SECODAM’s institutional successor states that, ‘[d]uring the administration of president 
Ernesto Zedillo there was a very strong pressure from the OECD to implement changes in 
the public management’ (Secretaría de la Función Pública, 2005:30; Zomosa, 2005:141-
154).  
Yet things were more complicated, as the OECD’s influence was slightly different 
from what has been suggested. According to a former senior official, ‘the OECD had an 
enormous influence in the administrative reforms’ (IM17). But this was in a cognitive 
rather than coercive way. The former official adds that, ‘I can tell you, categorically, there 
was no pressure from the OECD. We developed this because we thought this was necessary 
for the country. Someone can tell you “this would be good for the country”, but you can 
always say no’. In fact, Huerta (2006:104) concedes that it was the ‘Mexican bureaucratic 
and political elites’ who made ‘the final decision of what, how and when to engage in 
reform’. He says that:  
 
for Mexican officials learning means to get to know experiences from other nations, exchange 
information, give and obtain feedback and come to their own conclusions on what is best to be done 
in Mexico. The OECD does not prescribe policies or programmes but suggests courses of action on 
the basis of precious studies (peer reviews) and the discussions held at its committees. Learning does 
not mean to be told what to do in certain circumstances but having enough information to contrast 
Mexico’s experience with the advanced nations of the world (Huerta, 2006:132).  
 
Therefore, Mexican officials found in the OECD and its country members’ experiences an 
extraordinary source of reform ideas. In that sense, that organisation certainly performed an 
‘influential’ role in PROMAP’s design. Yet it was the Mexican officials’ decision to choose 
the ideas/approaches which better fitted their assessment about the politico-administrative 
conditions the country was facing.   
 Despite these efforts, by the end of the Zedillo administration SECODAM officials 
had achieved very limited success in introducing MFR practices and ideas. Several 
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academic experts suggest that the PROMAP did represent a breaking point in the history of 
administrative modernisation policies in Mexico (Pardo, 2003; Cejudo, 2003; Sánchez, 
2009b; IM2; IM3). Indeed, the programme talked about ‘results’ and ‘performance 
management’ in a more articulated and consistent manner than previous initiatives. It 
offered a clearer argumentation about why these modernisation tools were relevant for 
increasing management efficiency. It bridged administrative reforms with accountability 
and transparency in the use of public resources. Moreover, the rhetorical/conceptual 
contributions of the PROMAP paved the way for the budgetary reforms which were 
introduced soon after. In the longer term, the programme would become an important 
reference for future modernisation initiatives (Secretaría de la Función Pública, 2005, 2008; 
Rubio, 2012; SHCP, forthcoming).  
SECODAM officials also managed to kick off several performance management 
activities across the federal government. For instance, 1,294 management indicators were 
produced by government agencies in 1997. The number increased to 2,150 in 1998, and 
then decreased to 1,856 in 1999 (Pardo, 2003). In addition, SECODAM remarked that there 
had been significant progress in introducing evaluation practices. According to president 
Zedillo’s second state of the nation address, the efforts had ‘allowed to associate the 
achievement of institutional objectives with the satisfaction of the social demands, as well 
as systematically evaluate the cost, quality and relevance of public services’ (cited by 
Pardo, 2003:201). To support these activities, SECODAM produced a number of 
methodological guides, and provided several workshops for federal public servants 
(SECODAM, 1999). According to Cejudo (2008:116), ‘[d]espite adverse conditions, the 
UDA [Unit for Administrative Development] was actually able to implement some 
PROMAP proposals, which led to qualitative changes in the work of the government 
agencies’. 
However, the implementation of PROMAP’s sub-programmes, and specifically the 
one related to ‘management and evaluation’, faced a number of significant challenges. 
Despite the use of contemporary discussions on MFR, the lack of practical experience in 
performance management generated difficulties. A former senior official suggests that:  
 
I cannot say we were very successful in introducing indicators. We did want to introduce them. We 
tried in various occasions, particularly towards the end of the presidential term. But we did not have 
much experience, and even the international experience was not directly applicable. I think that is the 
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project which has to be seen with a longer term perspective, as it was the one which required the 
most profound transformation of the Mexican public administration. I was not satisfied with what we 
achieved, even though I do think we planted the seed, we introduced this concern in the public sector 
(IM17).  
 
These problems were further aggravated when SHCP decided to introduce an 
alternative system of indicators (Pardo, 2003:205; Culebro, 2008a:61; Sánchez, 2009b). As 
a result, federal agencies not only had to learn about new MFR ideas. They also were 
required to deal with two competing methodological approaches and guidelines. According 
to Pardo (2003:208):   
 
The management indicators, first, it was not clear what they were good for and then, when many 
agencies had already invested a good effort in defining them, almost at the end of the government, 
appears the proposal by SHCP to reform the making of the budget, in a sense that all ministries 
should formulate strategic indicators better linked with the use of resources. […] The result was, 
then, that indicators as a means to evaluate management could not be formulated in a way in which 
they could become useful for this. The ministries thought this had just been a waste of time and effort 
[…]. 
 
Furthermore, SECODAM and SHCP had a series of inter-organisational conflicts. 
For instance, a final draft of the PROMAP was ready by mid-2005, but the programme was 
not published until May, 2006. According to a former SECODAM senior official, ‘the big 
delay in the programme’s publication came from SHCP. They did not want to become part 
of it’ (IM17). During the following years, both ministries would continue arguing about the 
modernisation process (Sánchez, 2009b; Culebro, 2008b). The same former official 
remarks that, ‘we did have some rivalries regarding which ministry should control the 
reforms. Unfortunately these things are always about who is going to be in charge. We 
cared about getting things done, and thus we had to concede in many aspects’ (IM17).  
Other issues originated in SECODAM’s leadership changes. The Minister, Norma 
Samaniego, left her position at the end of 1995, before the publication of the PROMAP. In 
her place president Zedillo appointed Arsenio Farell, who ‘did not know anything about 
administrative modernisation’ (IM17), ‘was not interested on these topics’ (IM2), and was 
seen as an old-school politician (Pardo, 2003:197; Cejudo, 2003)
60
. López-Presa became 
undersecretary, but with new responsibilities which were not related to administrative 
modernisation (Pardo, 2003). His substitute, Santiago Roel, had been an active promoter of 
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 According to Pardo (2003:197), Farell’s appointment ‘undoubtedly influenced in the orientation of 
Secodam’s work, where more emphasis was put on control tasks than in modernisation aspects’. 
 123 
 
 
managerialism in subnational governments, and seemed to be well-qualified for taking over 
the PROMAP’s coordination. Yet Roel mainly cared about quality management, and less 
about ‘performance management and evaluation’61. Furthermore, because of personal 
conflicts with Farell, he was dismissed in 1998 (IM17; Pardo, 2003:197)
62
.  
Last but not least, the reform processes were significantly affected by president 
Zedillo’s limited attention towards this subject. As mentioned above, he had welcomed the 
idea of administrative modernisation. During the PROMAP’s public presentation, president 
Zedillo remarked the need ‘to change the orientation of public sector evaluation, in order to 
measure not only the use of inputs and norm compliance, but also the real achievement of 
objectives’ (Zedillo, 1996). On the other hand, the so-called ‘error de diciembre’ (mistake 
of December) of 1994 changed the president’s original plans. According to a former 
official,  
 
The crisis altered the government’s administrative modernisation plans. The emphasis was set on 
cuts. The ‘mistake of December’ forced the president to modify significantly his government plans. 
It also forced him to negotiate and agree on topics which he did not necessarily thought were 
appropriate. He then signed an agreement with the PAN [Partido Acción Nacional, or National 
Action Party]. This included the creation of a supreme audit institution and the investigation of 
corruption cases associated with the former president’s brother. SECODAM thus turned its focus on 
anti-corruption, which sidestepped the initial focus on modernisation (IM17).  
 
Thus, by the end of the presidential term, on the basis of ideas and practices learned 
from abroad, SECODAM officials had made some progress in conceptual and 
programmatic terms. Yet they had also encountered a number of technical issues, inter-
organisational conflicts, leadership changes, and the president’s limited involvement. A 
very similar story would take place in the second MFR ‘strand’, as described in the 
following section.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
61
 From Roel’s (1998) perspective, this Unit should have focused on ‘quality of service’. Therefore, it 
should be staffed with consultants on quality of service, and it should aim to develop indicators and standards 
for measuring customer satisfaction and quality concerns.  
62
 Roel’s successor was not enthusiast about ‘performance management and evaluation’ either. He 
chose to focus on process reengineering topics during 1998-2000.  
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‘The Budget Was a Complete Mess’: 
The New Budgetary Structure and Performance Evaluation System 
The second area in which MFR ideas and practices emerged during the Zedillo 
administration was that of budgetary policy management. As in the case of the performance 
management systems and indicators, it was a group of policymakers within SHCP (the 
Ministry of Finance) who proposed two closely related reforms. First, the development of 
budgetary indicators as part of a Nueva Estructura Programática (NEP, or New 
Programmatic Structure); and second, the creation of a Sistema de Evaluación del 
Desempeño (SED, or Performance Evaluation System). SHCP officials thought Mexico’s 
public administration lacked effective tools for measuring ‘results’, and for ensuring 
accountability and transparency in the use of public resources. They also considered the 
country’s new political conditions demanded such tools. On the basis of ideas about 
budgetary management trends mainly gathered at OECD meetings, SHCP developed their 
initiatives for the following years.  
There were many conditions which pointed at the need to reform the budgetary 
system. Given the economic crisis environment, SHCP were worried about improving the 
management and control of public finances (Cejudo, 2003:319). Indeed, according to a 
former SHCP senior official, the proposals of the NEP and the SED originated in concerns 
about ‘the public expenditure as an instrument of macroeconomic stability and healthy 
public finances’ (IM12). The former official further adds that, ‘we all look for the same 
thing. If you look at the programme-based budgeting reforms of the US Department of 
Defence, you can see we are all looking for better or more intelligent control mechanisms, 
instead of the rather primitive focus on inputs’ (IM12). 
The need to improve spending controls, however, was not the only concern. 
According to the same former official:  
 
We found out that everything [in the budget] was completely procedural, inertial, despite the fact that 
Mexico was supposed to be using a programme-based budgeting as approved by former president 
López Portillo. We thus had to start from defining what a programme was. There were no definitions. 
Just imagine that the most important public programme was called ‘AAA’. There were no mentions 
as to what originated the programme, what the main objective of the programme was, what the target 
population was, or how we wanted to produce goods and services. We lacked some kind of thinking 
about why and how we were spending (IM12).  
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Basic financial concepts (e.g. expenditure categories, data, measures) that should 
inform budget analysis and preparation, and parliamentary discussions on public spending 
were not well developed. Furthermore, another former senior official states that: 
 
The budget was a complete mess. There were very little robust quantitative elements to know what 
was going on within it. There was no evidence regarding the impact of public programmes, about 
what was being achieved. No institution was capable of demonstrating any sort of results. There was 
no accountability. There was very limited transparency and no clear links between expenditure and 
results. It was urgent to improve the quality of the public expenditure (IM26)
63
. 
 
Thus, reforming the budget was about controlling expenditure and increasing 
efficiency, but also about several other goals: improving measurement mechanisms to 
assess the effectiveness and results of public programmes; increasing budget transparency 
to reinforce external accountability to Congress and the public (Chávez-Presa, 2000:144); 
and developing a clearer ‘terminology’ and budget classification to adapt budgetary 
policymaking to the changing political dynamics. Regarding the latter point, a former 
senior official comments that, ‘all of this was also developed to prepare the public 
administration, so that it could have a language to communicate and negotiate with 
legislators. This was done thinking about when they would finally decide to discuss budget 
and programmes seriously’ (IM12; Chávez-Presa. 2000:153).  
The Head of the Unidad de Política y Control Presupuestario (UPCP, or Unit for 
Budget Policy and Control), Jorge Chávez-Presa, initially sought to address two different 
albeit strongly related issues. First, because the objective was to focus on ‘how to finally 
make real the so called programme budgeting’, his team decided to talk about developing a 
‘New Programmatic Structure’ (IM12)64. Given the ‘complexities’ of budgetary practices 
and the ‘obscurity’ of its jargon (Chávez-Presa, 2000:23), reformers started by ‘defining 
each one of the words used in the Unit by looking at the Spanish dictionary’. They then 
                                                          
63
 Chávez-Presa (2000:147) mentions that: ‘[i]f a ministry wanted more resources, then it proposed to 
create a new programme or sub-programme, or added targets to the programmes it already had as authorised. 
Its justification was to comply with an attribution established in the Law. […] Furthermore, this situation 
ensured budget resources in the future, thanks to the inertia of the budget process […]. Similarly, at the 
moment of asking for the creation of the new programme, sub-programme or when increasing the targets, 
there never was an analysis about the costs and benefits. As a consequence, each year the programmatic 
structure grew, and there was no way to see if results also augmented’.   
64
 It should be noted, however, that the objective was not to develop a ‘planning, programming, and 
budgeting system’ (PPBS) as it had been originally attempted in the 1970s. Chávez-Presa was well aware that 
the international and Mexican PPBS experiences had been rather poor. He also knew international discussions 
had moved away from that topic. However, the legal and budgetary frameworks were built around the concept 
of ‘programmes’, and thus reformers had to take this term as its basis (Chávez-Presa, 2000:136-137). 
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‘read the Constitution article by article, the legislation, and the regulations’, in order to 
‘define and develop the institutional activities and government functions’ (IM12).  
Second, they aimed to build a NEP that could link budgetary policymaking with the 
planning requirements established in the Mexican constitution. Although a Sistema 
Nacional de Planeación (SNP, or National Planning System) had been created in the 1980s, 
no mechanisms had been developed yet to associate plans/programmes with the budget 
(Chávez-Presa, 2000:145). According to what Chávez-Presa explained a few years later:  
 
the methodology of the NEP allows: a) linking public spending with results; b) linking the actions of 
the federal public sector with the policy sector programmes; c) facilitating the design and follow up 
of the multiannual plans and programmes, and d) aligning the Federal Expenditure Budget with the 
objectives of the NDP [National Development Plan] and with the objectives of the medium term 
programmes and the functions assigned to the government (Chávez-Presa, 2000:165). 
 
Despite the attention originally paid to national precedents, SHCP officials 
eventually added concepts clearly drawn from contemporary international debates. Indeed, 
both the NEP and the SED adopted concepts and ‘labels’ associated with the NPM-type 
reforms which were taking place in OECD countries. In the case of the NEP’s basic 
features, for instance, government officials started to use terms such as ‘mission’, 
‘indicators’, ‘strategic planning’, ‘clients’, ‘benchmarks’, and ‘flexibility’ (Chávez-Presa, 
2000:183). In his account of the reforms, Chávez-Presa (2000:165), explained that, ‘the 
core of the NEP is linking policy sector programmes with the mission and daily operation 
of the units in charge’. He also stated that, ‘[t]he NEP uses strategic planning to design a 
programme which is useful for the society, and therefore mandates to clearly establish the 
target population, its institutional purpose, the objectives and the indicators’ (p. 176).  
The contents of the proposed SED similarly echoed international discussions on 
performance management and evaluation. The objective was to create a mechanism in 
which ‘the focus of evaluation changes from one directed towards verifying the 
accomplishment of volumes, activities and product quantities, to another focused on the 
results obtained: effect, coverage, efficiency, and quality’ (Chávez-Presa, 2000:220). 
Evaluating public performance would thus be about measuring ‘continuously and 
periodically, the achievement of the mission and objectives of an organisation, a 
programme or a project’. Evaluations should be done ‘taking into account the quality of 
service and the satisfaction of the beneficiary (Chávez- Presa, 2000:203). 
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Another innovation was the idea of using ‘indicators’ as the core tool of the SED. 
Of course, indicators already existed in association to economic discussions (e.g. GDP). 
Moreover, SECODAM’s performance management initiative had contributed to a 
government-wide use of the term. Yet the NEP-SED sought to associate indicators with 
budgetary decision-making for the first time. It also did so in a variety of forms (‘strategic 
indicators’, ‘project indicators’, ‘management indicators’, ‘service indicators’) which 
sought to capture all administrative aspects deemed to be relevant for budgetary 
discussions: efficiency, coverage, effects, quality, equity, and resource alignment (Chávez-
Presa, 2000:212). The objective of the reformers was to use performance indicators to 
reduce paperwork, and eventually grant increased flexibility to budget managers (Chávez-
Presa, 2000:164). As a whole, these propositions represented a new take on budgetary 
policymaking and public spending evaluation. 
The international ideas which informed budgetary reform proposals seem to have 
entered debates through two complementary channels. First, the broader administrative 
modernisation efforts led by SECODAM clearly had a ‘spill-over effect’ in budgetary 
reform discussions. SHCP senior officials had known and commented on the PROMAP’s 
contents before its publication. Moreover, as in the case of other federal ministries, SHCP 
officials participated in government workshops and talks about performance management, 
management indicators, and evaluation procedures. This jargon was evidently picked up by 
SHCP as it fit their reform ideas well (IM17).  
Second, and perhaps more importantly, MFR concepts, practices, and examples 
entered budgetary reform initiatives through the participation of SHCP senior officials at 
the meetings of the OECD’s PUMA committee. Chávez- Presa even became Vice-Chair of 
PUMA for two years. He thus attended its meetings, had access to background papers and 
publications, and gathered relevant information about other countries’ experiences. 
According to a senior SHCP official, ‘our discussions about budget-by results came from 
the 1990s, from what we observed at OECD meetings and later at the Senior Budget 
Officials meetings’ (IM9). Indeed, in his account of the budgetary reform experience, 
Chávez-Presa (2000:21) thanks his colleagues at PUMA for ‘having given me the 
opportunity to present in that forum some of the ideas of the book’. He also remarks that 
when the NEP-SED was being developed, New Zealand, Australia and the UK represented 
the leading international cases on the subject (Chávez-Presa, 2000:156-160; Roel, 1998). 
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Yet the fact that SHCP officials were aware of, and even took part in, international 
discussions on MFR and budgetary practices does not imply they just ‘copied’ these 
ideas/practices. There is no evidence of study tours such as the one led by Marcel in the 
case of the Chilean reforms, or trips like those which López-Presa did to London or Lisbon. 
Moreover, Chávez-Presa (2000:158-159) actually stressed that: 
 
The Mexican reform coincided with those in other countries in the relevance of taking into account 
microeconomic aspects in spending and the role of institutions and performance incentives. 
However, the objectives and means by which these [reforms] were developed are different. In 
México, the trigger of this incipient budgetary reform was not to achieve fiscal equilibrium. What 
was a priority in the case of New Zealand and Australia, has been achieved in our country because of 
fiscal adjustments during the eighties […]. The Mexican reform coincided with those in the objective 
of incrementing the productivity of public spending, an objective related with a fundamental 
demand: to provide higher transparency about the public budget and to establish an accountability 
system.  
 
He also noted an ‘important difference’ between the New Zealand or British reforms, and 
the Mexican one. The former initiatives had resulted from a comprehensive public sector 
change strategy, and had been led from the highest levels of government. Yet the Mexican 
efforts, Chávez-Presa (2000:159-160) remarked, had originated within the public 
administration, with the aim of changing ‘the rules of the budgetary process’. The Mexican 
reform included elements present in other country systems (e.g. ‘indicators’, the need to 
‘evaluate performance’). But it also left aside others, such as New Zealand’s accrual-
budgeting, or Australia’s extensive benchmarking practices (OECD, 2007).     
Nor should the NEP-SED initiatives be seen as the Mexican government’s response 
to OECD directives or impositions. As mentioned above regarding the PROMAP initiative, 
the country’s recent accession to the OECD undoubtedly influenced the way in which 
Mexican policymakers approached the subject (Carroll and Kelow, 2011). According to a 
former SHCP senior official, ‘the big advantage of the OECD is that you go and with your 
own peers receive feedback, which is a forum that no consultancy will be able to provide 
you’ (IM12). But then the same former official also stated that:  
 
To all those who say that the OECD and the Fondo [IMF] influenced [the Mexican reforms], no, that 
is completely wrong! At that time, it was us, the public servants within the executive, who developed 
the reform proposals. Moreover, the OECD is a great organisation, it never seeks to impose, they 
provide principles, guidelines, etc. Then it is your problem to decide how you apply the guidelines. 
For example, the OECD might suggest that public spending should become more efficient, but then 
you ask yourself how to do so, how to do this real. With the NEP and the SED we aimed to 
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operationalise that idea. Furthermore, the IMF is for ‘banana republics’, countries which do not have 
the capacity to make proposals. And in Mexico we did have that capacity. 
 
Another former senior official similarly remarked that, ‘I was involved in the process of 
accession to the OECD, and I know this was not like they came and did our “homework”. 
That never happened’ (IM26).  
Despite the efforts to learn from international practices and use them for advancing 
national reforms, by the end of the Zedillo administration the NEP-SED initiative had fallen 
short from its original expectations. This was due to the number of significant political and 
administrative issues SHCP reformers faced throughout the reform process. First, there 
were strong resistances coming from both internal and external actors. Inside the SHCP, for 
instance, Chávez-Presa found ‘very difficult to persuade his own collaborators, that was the 
hardest part because people wanted to do things as usual’ (IM12; IM24). The NEP-SED 
proposals also encountered serious resistances from the contralorías internas (internal 
comptrollerships), and above all from the group of Director Generals for Programming and 
Budgeting in the various federal ministries. According to a former official:    
 
They did not like this because they felt they would lose power and control. Also, because it would 
require them to do much more work, as they had to get involved and learn about specific public 
policies. They also had to calculate costs associated with their policies. Either they did not like it, or 
they did not know how to deal with it, or they did not want to. But the fact is that they represented a 
very strong opposition. This was despite their permanent complaints about budget spending being all 
about budgeting and not about programming in any respect (IM12).  
 
Another senior official further noted that, ‘SHCP’s Budget Unit is very powerful, but not as 
powerful as all the various budget director generals across the federal government’ (IM13).  
Then in 1998, a few months after the proposals had been formally launched, 
Chávez-Presa left his position as head of SHCP’s Budget Office to take up a position at the 
Ministry of Energy. The NEP-SED reform had been supported since the beginning by the 
then Undersecretary for Public Spending, Santiago Levy. Yet Levy was already too busy 
with many other topics and interests, including those associated with the introduction of a 
new anti-poverty programme (see following section). Moreover, Chávez-Presa’s successor 
focused on regular budgetary aspects, and did not pay much attention to the NEP-SED 
reforms. Nor did he seek to keep the former’s group of advisors. Therefore, while the NEP-
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SED’s implementation continued until the end of the Zedillo administration in 2000, it lost 
its politico-administrative priority.  
 Last but not least, SHCP reformers also faced important difficulties of a more 
‘technical’ (administrative) nature. According to a senior SHCP official, the reform had 
been ‘too ambitious’ and ‘highly theoretical’, and activities such as ‘costing’ programmes 
in the process of developing results indicators had been too complicated (IM9). Another 
former senior official suggests that, ‘we overwhelmed the public administration with 
indicators. There was ‘indicatoritis’. We got lost in finding out which were the indicators 
we really needed. Some people wanted management indicators, but others wanted results or 
impact-orientated indicators’ (IM12). Thus, while SHCP kept the upper hand vis-à-vis 
SECODAM’s indicators proposal, the NEP-SED proposals were not successfully 
implemented either. 
 
‘It Was Irresponsible Not to Develop an Evaluation’: 
Measuring the Results of ‘PROGRESA’ (and Other Social Programmes) 
There was a third ‘strand’ through which MFR principles and practices entered the 
Mexican public sector in the 1990s: the creation of PROGRESA (the government’s main 
antipoverty programme), and the introduction of the so-called Reglas de Operación de 
Programas Sociales (ROPS, or Rules for Managing Social Programmes). While embedded 
in the social policy area, these innovations would later have significant ‘spill-over’ effects 
government-wide. As in the case of the performance management and budgetary reform 
initiatives, both PROGRESA’s impact evaluations and the ROPS sought to strengthen 
transparency and accountability; increase efficiency in the use of public resources; and 
measure policy ‘results’. Furthermore, in this case the process of learning from 
international practices also took place without pressures from international actors.  
However, developments in this MFR ‘strand’ showed significant differences with 
regards those described in previous sections. While the initiatives were drafted by senior 
SHCP officials, their ideas did not originate in OECD debates or NPM countries’ 
experiences, but in broader international evaluation practices. Moreover, in contrast to the 
PROMAP and NEP-SED reforms, PROGRESA’s evaluation did produce clearly positive 
results. This provided a certain aura of ‘legitimacy’ for the regular and systematic use of 
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evaluation exercises. It also contributed to the survival of PROGRESA (and impact 
evaluations in general) during president Vicente Fox’s administration (2000-2012; see 
Chapter 6 below).   
The Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación (PROGRESA, or Programme of 
Education, Health, and Nutrition) was created in 1997 to transform the logic of previous 
antipoverty programmes
65
. According to Teichman (2007:561; Bate, 2004), PROGRESA 
emerged ‘from the musings of a small number of enthusiastic market reform technocrats’. 
These were led by Santiago Levy (Undersecretary for the Budget at SHCP), and José 
Antonio Gómez de León (presidential advisor). They were ‘preoccupied with the 
inefficiencies of state subsidies because they did not benefit the poorest’, and thus they 
‘sought ways to reduce state spending’. An interviewee similarly stated that,  
 
The team surrounding president Zedillo knew that poverty represented the absence of human and 
social capital. Thus, Mexico was not going anywhere as a country of poor people. But they did not 
want to repeat the experience of the Salinas administration, which had been neither economically 
efficient, nor socially effective’ (IM2)66.  
 
While previous federal programmes had usually focused on distributing food 
subsidies (e.g. tortilla or milk vouchers), the logic behind PROGRESA was to design a 
conditional cash transfer programme (Székely, 2004). Target families would receive money 
as long as they complied with certain conditions. These included, for instance, securing 
children’s attendance to school; or ensuring that mothers-to-be did not miss their medical 
appointments. PROGRESA thus sought the double objective of reducing poverty (and 
particularly extreme poverty) levels, while at the same time enhancing the poor’s health and 
education capital (Levy and Rodriguez, 2004; Levy, 2006; Niño-Zarazúa, 2010). Designers 
took as a basis contemporary research developments in ‘antipoverty policy’. These had 
shown the relevance of taking into account the various ‘interactions, spillover effects, or 
externalities between food consumption, nutrition, health, and education’ (Levy, 2006:10).   
Yet PROGRESA also sought to change the political dynamics which had 
traditionally surrounded anti-poverty programmes, particularly the Salinas administration’s 
                                                          
65
 There is an extensive literature on PROGRESA and its successor, Oportunidades. The following 
pages only include a limited discussion of the programme’s features, but see Levy and Rodriguez (2004); 
Levy (2006); Teichman (2007); Hevia (2008, 2009); and Niño-Zarazúa (2010).  
66
 Levy (2006:8) notes that, ‘[t]he challenge therefore was not to eliminate [the existing] programs, 
but to replace them with another instrument that would be more effective and efficient in transferring income 
to the poor and have greater impacts on their health and nutritional status’. 
 132 
 
 
Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL, or National Solidarity Programme). 
PRONASOL had been established to compensate for the effects of the economic crises of 
the 1980s, but the way it worked had been strongly criticised. For instance, Hevia 
(2008:66) remarks that PRONASOL:  
 
became symbolic of the Salinas administration and was then stigmatised as an instrument employed 
for political gains. Without making any remarkable progress against poverty, it was thought it 
reproduced the same clientelistic and corporatist practices of the worst times of the post-
revolutionary period –by means of a secondary, abusive political network set up throughout the 
whole country (namely, the Solidarity Committees) and a presidential system with no 
counterbalances.   
 
In response to this, a number of innovations were introduced in PROGRESA’s 
design. These included the use of more objective statistical methods to identify and select 
beneficiaries
67
; a decentralised management structure, which acted almost independently 
from the Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL, or Ministry of Social Development) 
in coordinating the various public programmes involved (Bate, 2004); the use of cash 
transfers through bank accounts purposefully set up for beneficiaries; and pre-emptive de-
politicisation strategies, such as the temporal suspension of money transfers and 
programme enrolment during election dates (Bate, 2004; Levy, 2006).   
Furthermore, from the beginning policy designers decided that PROGRESA should 
use systematic ‘impact’ evaluations68. From a purely ‘technical’ point of view, the 
introduction of evaluation as part and parcel of PROGRESA was due to the fact that:  
 
The evaluation of whether the hypotheses of the [programme] design were correct, as well as 
quantifying the level and direction of the impacts of the actions integrated in education, health and 
food areas, were deemed to be essential activities. Evaluation would allow having objective elements 
to propose, if needed, modifications to improve the functionality of the processes and, in general, to 
increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the actions (Levy and Rodríguez, 2004:305).  
 
                                                          
67
 For example, ‘the geographic selection of poor areas using census-based marginality index, 
categorical criteria to identify poor households, using socioeconomic survey and census data, and proxy-
means tests to select beneficiaries’ (Niño-Zarazúa, 2010:9). 
68
 In strict sense, PROGRESA’s impact evaluation was not the first one in Mexico. A few years 
before, for example, the Ministry of Labour, with the support of the WB, had evaluated the impact of  its 
Programa de Becas de Capacitacion para Trabajadores (PROBECAT, or Programme of Scholarships for 
Training Workers). However, this evaluation did not have any significant consequences on Mexico’s MFR 
policy. See Baker (2000:134-139).  
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A WB official similarly remarked that policymakers assumed evaluations would ‘generate 
information of quality, and evidence to influence policy formulation and decision-making’ 
(IIO1). 
While programmatic considerations were undoubtedly important, Levy and his 
colleagues were well aware that a ‘new emphasis on evaluation and measurement of 
program results’ had very important political implications (Levy, 2006:15; Székely, 
2004)
69
. First of all, the topic of evaluation was included in the cabinet discussions when 
PROGRESA was being designed. It was thus employed as an additional means to persuade 
reluctant cabinet members that the programme was worth implementing. Moreover, for 
Levy and his colleagues it was clear that, ‘in a context of rapid democratization’, they 
needed to reassure Congress ‘that the new effort would not be manipulated by the executive 
branch to obtain short-run political advantage’ (Levy, 2006:17; Hernández, 2006:48). The 
use of ‘credible impact and operational evaluations’, as well as the establishment of ‘clear 
and strict rules of operation’ (see below) were thus seen as helpful mechanisms to secure 
the programmes’ funding, as well as to avoid political conflicts.  
In addition, evaluations were thought to be relevant for two other reasons. While 
PROGRESA was informed by the most recent academic research and previous national 
experiences, it was also full of innovative features. Thus no one could be really sure 
whether it would actually work. Therefore, a former senior official remarks that, ‘in the 
face of so many changes, so many resources that were being used for the new programme, 
it was just irresponsible not to develop an evaluation’ (IM26; see also Bate, 2004). Then, 
policymakers were concerned about the programme’s future. The same former official 
states that,  
 
We asked ourselves, “What can we do so that the next president, whoever he is, guarantees its 
continuation?” We thought about evaluation as a way of securing the legitimacy of the programme, 
showing with numbers that the programme was really working (IM26)
70
.  
                                                          
69
 Because Levy and his colleagues were worried about the ‘credibility of results’, they also put in 
place other measures: ‘making the databases available to many researchers, so that results could, in principle, 
be replicated; relying on a mix of national and international academic researchers and domestic and foreign 
institutions to perform evaluations; and placing no restrictions on researchers with regard to divulging their 
results’ (Levy, 2006:43)  
70
 Along very similar lines, Bate (2004) suggests that ‘[p]erhaps the most important aspect of Levy 
and Gómez de Léon’s vision was the importance of rigorous evaluation. The two men believed evaluations 
were a crucial tool, not only for fine-tuning the program’s operations, but also for generating credible 
information and empirical proof of its achievements. […] Levy and Gómez de León thought that if 
PROGRESA were to be evaluated by world-class experts, it could improve its chances for survival’. 
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As discussed at the end of this section and Chapter 6, PROGRESA’s evaluations would 
certainly accomplish this.  
 Levy’s interest in developing evaluations emerged at the same time in which the 
other two MFR ‘strands’ were being developed, but his sources of knowledge on the 
subject were quite different. As an academic expert and former professor of economics at 
Boston University, as well as consultant to the WB and the IDB, Levy was aware of 
evaluation methodologies regularly used to assess public policy results. Therefore, whereas 
both López-Presa and Chávez-Presa had mainly drawn inspiration from contemporary 
discussions and experiences within OECD countries, Levy did not look at any specific 
countries or cases. Nor did he develop any kind of study tour in this regard. In fact, 
evaluation examples and techniques were simply obtained ‘off the shelf’, by revising the 
relevant literature on the subject (IM26).  
 PROGRESA’s evaluation had another international aspect. In order to guarantee the 
independence, legitimacy, and future visibility of the evaluations to the programme, the 
Mexican government hired the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI; 
Teichman, 2007; Niño-Zarazúa, 2010:4). The IFPRI evaluated the impacts of PROGRESA 
‘on education, nutrition, health and rural poverty, as well as the program's overall 
operation’. This was done on the basis of ‘repeated surveys of individuals from 24,000 
households in 506 localities in randomly assigned PROGRESA and non-PROGRESA 
areas’ (IFPRI, 2002:2). The Mexican government also hired other national evaluators, such 
as the Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública (National Institute of Public Health, or INSP), 
and the Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social (Centre of 
Research and Postgraduate Studies in Social Anthropology, CIESAS). However, these 
institutions mainly focused on other programmatic features (Levy and Rodríguez, 
2004:306; Cardozo, 2006).  
 While IFPRI is based in Washington, DC, and the whole evaluation exercise was 
followed closely by the IDB and the WB (Teichman, 2007), the Mexican government 
developed these tasks without international intervention or pressures. According to a World 
Bank official, ‘this was an effort basically directed by the Mexican “technocracy”. The 
Bank was not formally involved, although it did offer some informal technical advice at 
some stages’ (IIO1). The official further adds that the main role of the WB was 
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‘contributing to give PROGRESA’s evaluation results international visibility, which would 
later become in a higher domestic visibility’71. Levy (2006:114) similarly remarks that:  
 
During 1995 and 1996 both the IDB and the World Bank generously provided technical advice on 
different aspects of the program. Nevertheless, at that time and during the initial years of program 
operation, it was not deemed convenient to obtain international financing for the program. In 1996–
97 such financing would have added yet one more controversial aspect to what was already a fairly 
significant change in poverty policy, perhaps giving the impression that the program was the result of 
a mandate of or an adjustment program agreed upon with international financial institutions. 
 
In fact, international funding only reached the programme when PROGRESA became 
Oportunidades in the early 2000s. At that point, the IDB did provide a loan with certain 
conditions attached. But even then, that was less a mechanism of international coercion 
than a product of ‘[a] parallel strategy pursued by the program’s originators’. In the middle 
of a government transition, they wanted to ensure ‘that important aspects of the program 
could not be changed without the agreement of the lending institution’ (Teichman, 
2007:563). 
 The evaluation results produced by IFPRI undoubtedly served to accomplish the 
original objectives of Levy and his colleagues. From a programmatic perspective, IFPRI’s 
evaluation demonstrated, among other things, the following: ‘PROGRESA’s targeting is 
relatively accurate’; ‘interventions reduced the number of people with income levels below 
the poverty level by about 10 percent’; there was ‘a positive enrollment effect for both boys 
and girls in primary and secondary schools’; ‘PROGRESA students are entering school at 
earlier ages, experiencing less grade repetition, and better grade progression’; there had 
been ‘reduced labor-market participation of PROGRESA children for both boys and girls, 
in both salaried and non-salaried activities’; and ‘improved nutrition and preventative care 
in PROGRESA areas have made younger children more robust against illness’ (IFPRI, 
2002; Wodon et al., 2003; Levy and Rodríguez, 2004; Teichman, 2007).  
From a broader political perspective, and despite the fact the then governing party 
(PRI) lost the presidential elections of 2000, the evaluation results secured the programme’s 
                                                          
71
 In an international seminar on M&E, a WB expert expressed that, ‘[t]he World Bank’s chief 
economist in my area of human development and social services is someone who was earned his fame in the 
area of evaluation and Oportunidades. He is now distributing methodologies and promoting M&E in many 
other countries. So we at the Bank should thank Oportunidades and SEDESOL for this’ (Haggerston, 
2006:54).  
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continuity. According to the original plans of PROGRESA coordinators, evaluation results 
were made available in mid-2000, so that ‘the federal administration entering in December 
2000 could have at its disposal more judgement elements about the former’ (Levy and 
Rodríguez, 2004:337). Indeed, on the basis of the evidence and positive opinions that the 
IDB and the WB would also offer about PROGRESA, the incoming president Fox and his 
team decided to keep the programme in place (Levy, 2006; Teichman, 2007). Although 
they eventually introduced some changes and a different label (Oportunidades), 
PROGRESA’s basic features were preserved. These included the need to carry out 
evaluations in a systematic, objective, and impartial way.   
Around the same time PROGRESA was being implemented, Levy and his team at 
SHCP were also working on the introduction of the so-called Reglas de Operación de 
Programas Sociales (ROPS, or Rules for Managing Social Programmes). PROGRESA was 
the government’s main anti-poverty programme, but there were other social programmes 
that distributed resources to the poor. According to Levy (2006:14): 
 
At least among some policymakers there was a sense that these programs had generated corruption; 
that there were large deviations of benefits for unintended purposes (for example, subsidized maize 
flour intended for tortilla consumption would be exported or used for animal feed instead); and that 
the roster of beneficiaries of targeted programs in urban areas had been manipulated for political 
gain. 
 
In response to this, the budget decree of December 1997 established for the first time that 
all programmes in the Ramo 26 would be subject to a new set of rules (Diario Oficial, 1997; 
Fuentes, 2009:8-9)
72
. The Ramo 26 (or budget category 26) included social development 
and antipoverty programmes. According to the budget decree, the ROPS: 
 
should be clear and transparent, and their mechanism for operation and administration should 
facilitate the regular evaluation of [the programmes’] economic and social benefits in their 
assignation and application, and ensure the coordination of actions with other ministries and agencies 
to avoid duplications in the use of resources […] (Diario Oficial, 1997).   
  
As in the case of PROGRESA’s evaluation component, the ROPS aimed to increase 
transparency and accountability in the use of public resources, which was the main concern 
                                                          
72
 The ROPS are usually built around the following components (Fuentes, 2009:12-13):  presentation 
and background; objectives; general guidelines (such as target population, kind of aid, beneficiaries, and 
selection criteria); specific guidelines (institutional coordination); reporting schedule; monitoring and 
evaluation requirements; and complaints procedure. 
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for SHCP officials. Furthermore, by introducing the practice of evaluation and 
measurement of results in other social programmes, officials tried to show Congress they 
were really committed to the efficient and legal use of public subsidies. According to Levy 
(2006:103), the ROPS ‘substantially reduce the discretion of program operators in the 
process of beneficiary selection, which had been subject to strong criticism in the past’. 
Lastly, SHCP officials also sought to provide ‘additional judgement elements for the 
debate’ regarding how public resources were addressing ‘social and rural development 
demands’ (Levy, 2004:711).   
The ROPS had not been inspired in similar initiatives abroad. They responded to 
concerns about the inefficient and politicised use of social programme resources. As part of 
this effort, by the end of the Zedillo administration the ROPS of 135 federal programmes 
had been published (Levy, 2004). As it will be further discussed in Chapter 6, the 
introduction of the ROPS as a regular component of the budget decree would certainly have 
very important implications for development of MFR in Mexico. Jointly with 
PROGRESA’s evaluation component, the ROPS eventually led Mexican officials to engage 
in further cross-national learning activities during the 2000s.  
 
Conclusions 
Performance, results, transparency, and accountability were all terms which gained 
currency during the Zedillo administration (1994-2000). In many respects, their coming of 
age was a product of the country’s political democratisation process, including the ‘divided 
government’ of 1997. The federal Congress’ regained autonomy and increased power 
would certainly contribute to put these topics in the centre of executive-legislative 
exchanges. However, the reform initiatives advanced by the Zedillo government did not 
represent a response to congressional pressures. Senior officials, and the president himself, 
understood that the country’s political conditions were changing in a radical way. Past 
policymaking patterns, particularly those associated with the Salinas administration, were 
no longer appropriate. The use of public resources and social programmes in a democratic 
environment required different administrative principles and routines. Indeed, president 
Zedillo and his senior officials addressed these topics since 1994, not 1997. 
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 Moreover, while the country’s political legacies and democratisation process 
pointed at the need to change how government worked, it was international MFR 
developments which provided senior officials with ideas on how to design those changes. 
Of course, not all initiatives (e.g. the NEP and the rules for social programmes inserted in 
the annual budget decrees) originated in cross-national learning. However, most did to 
some extent. Thus, administrative modernisation, budgetary reform, and impact evaluation 
proposals were heavily informed by experiences which had taken place abroad. 
Policymakers used concepts and techniques associated with contemporary NPM reforms, as 
well as more general evaluation principles employed internationally. Senior officials took 
part in OECD meetings and were often in touch with international organisations 
representatives. Yet they did not face external pressures to follow specific models or tools.  
 Mexican policymakers also developed some strategies to advance MFR policy 
changes. José Octavio López-Presa, Jorge Chávez-Presa, and Santiago Levy were relatively 
effective ‘policy entrepreneurs’. All of them managed to introduce their respective MFR-
related initiatives in the government’s agenda. Furthermore, they were able to provide a 
more or less coherent ‘conceptualisation’ on each of these topics. Yet not all of them were 
equally capable to secure the future of the tools they so eagerly promoted. Both López-
Presa and Chávez-Presa left their original government positions barely a few months after 
their reform initiatives were enacted. The only different story was that of PROGRESA’s 
impact evaluation. This was supervised by Santiago Levy and other SHCP officials from 
start to finish, and achieved a high level of legitimacy and consolidation. 
 Therefore, while MFR ideas came of age during the Zedillo administration, by the 
end of the presidential term not all MFR tools were working as expected. Because there 
was no previous experience on the subject, ‘performance indicators’ ended up being ‘either 
too rudimentary, or too favourable, so that agencies could justify how they were doing 
things (IM2). Evaluation practices remained as rather unhelpful ‘self-praising’ exercises 
(Pardo, 2003:198). Furthermore, SECODAM and SHCP frequently clashed over 
methodological, logistical, and other aspects. Thus, as it had happened in Chile, after an 
initial round of reforms, MFR had had a rather limited impact on Mexico’s public sector. 
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To be successful, a policy transfer must pass several hurdles.  
It must be capable of adoption through the political system.  
Once adopted, it must be effective (that is, it must 
 successfully address the problem it is expected to solve  
in the recipient country), and it must be capable of survival  
(that is of sustained support to enable it to continue  
to exist and to operate effectively). 
 
Harold Wolman, ‘Understanding Cross National Policy Transfers’ 
 
 
 
 The adoption of a lesson is not the end of the learning process. 
Once introduced, a lesson will evolve.  
It generates feedback that can signal the need  
to adapt it to deal with problems that were not initially anticipated.  
If the response generates political satisfaction,  
then as time goes by what was once a lesson from abroad  
will become an established commitment of your national government. 
 
Richard Rose, Learning From Comparative Public Policy 
 
 
  
And when there are no endorsed or endorsable models 
there is no other thing that utopia or cynicism,   
sometimes disguised of historical effectiveness 
 pragmatism disguised of the virtue of prudence. 
 
Manuel Vázquez Montalbán,  Asesinato en el Comité Central 
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5 
 
 
 
 
‘A Success Story’: 
 The Making and Dissemination of the Chilean  
‘Management for Results’ System  
(2000-2010) 
 
 
 
DIPRES: Acronym that identifies the Dirección de Presupuestos  
[Budget Office] […]. Through the expansion 
of its faculties and the powerful management      
control instruments it currently possess,  
as well as its highly qualified technical personnel, 
Dipres has slowly acquired a political relevance bigger  
to what could be expected from a simple accounting  
function. It is said that the director of Dipres is a wise man  
or know-it-all guy, and, in any case, a powerful actor  
within government, and also that other Ministries 
are scared when they need to face their [Dipres] counterpart.  
It is of traditional use the expression  
‘I will have to go on a pilgrimage to Dipres’.  
 
Alfredo Joignant, Francisco Javier Díaz, and Patricio Navia,  
Diccionario de la Política Chilena 
 
 
I have always said that Chile could do  
more for the Bank than the Bank for Chile. 
 
Senior Official, Inter-American Development Bank  
 
 
Now with the new government it is being said that  
our interest lies in ‘results’, and therefore that the key is to make  
institutions focus on their strategic objectives, their indicators, 
and then we will measure those. But… we already used to do that! 
 
Middle-level Official, Ministry Secretary General of the Presidency 
 
 
 
 
In a 2003 report on Chile’s budgetary system, the OECD remarked that the country’s MFR 
scheme could be seen as ‘a success story’ (Blöndal and Curristine, 2004:44). This 
represented a striking contrast to how things stood at the end of the 1990s (see Chapter 3). 
During 2000-2010, Chilean government officials were capable of institutionalising a more 
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or less coherent MFR ‘system’, which could provide DIPRES with valuable performance 
information for the making of budgetary decisions (Guzmán, 2005, 2011; Zaltsman, 2009; 
Arenas and Berner, 2010). Moreover, the Chilean system could be considered a ‘success’ 
because it was the most developed in the Latin American region (Cunill and Ospina, 2003; 
Zaltsman, 2006; García and García, 2011). However, the OECD’s assessment was a bit of 
an overstatement. It was offered at a very early stage, at a time in which evidence about the 
system’s effectiveness was limited, and information regarding its shortcomings was still 
sparse. 
This chapter will analyse the Chilean MFR reforms between 2000 and 2010, 
particularly the new Sistema de Evaluación y Control de Gestión (SECG, or Evaluation and 
Management Control System) assessed by the OECD. It will discuss the foundations of the 
system, how it related to previous initiatives, and the tools it added to the Chilean MFR 
policy. The chapter will briefly touch on other changes introduced in 2010, such as the 
creation of the so-called ‘Delivery Unit’, and the unit for social policy evaluations within 
the new Ministry of Social Development. As in previous chapters, the discussion will 
explore the extent to which these changes were associated with cross-national learning and 
how. 
The chapter will show that in this period Chilean policymakers continued to use 
knowledge about MFR practices abroad. Yet they did so in a slightly different way than in 
the 1990s. International examples from countries like the UK continued providing useful 
ideas about how to design new MFR tools (e.g. the Comprehensive Spending Evaluations, 
or the Delivery Unit). Yet for most of the decade, learning about MFR abroad would be 
mainly related to policymakers’ efforts to redesign existing tools on the basis of 
international ‘benchmarks’.  
The chapter also explores the strategies developed by Chilean officials to support 
MFR policy changes. Again, these showed both continuities and interesting changes with 
regards to the previous decade. Under the leadership of Mario Marcel, DIPRES launched an 
overhaul of the performance management tools introduced in the 1990s. These were 
reconceptualised under a new SECG, coordinated by a similarly new División de Control 
de Gestión (DCG, or Division for Management Control). In addition, Marcel and his 
colleagues developed other strategies to ensure the visibility and longer term survival of the 
SECG. These included participating in international seminars; publishing several 
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institutional reports on the SECG’s features; and asking international organisations, such as 
the OECD, to evaluate the system.  
Throughout this second decade of reforms, national factors continued to influence 
MFR policy changes, but in a different way and not as heavily as other factors. That Marcel 
could use DIPRES institutional authority and power to further advance MFR government-
wide was undoubtedly very important. But of equal or even more relevance were two 
further factors. International organisations provided Chilean policymakers with a ‘stamp of 
approval’, both through their positive evaluations on the state of the SECG, and the regional 
dissemination of the ‘Chilean MFR model’. Furthermore, the continued presence of Marcel 
and members of his team throughout 2000-2010 ensured that learning from previous reform 
experiences would be taken into account when developing this new round of MFR reforms.  
The following pages will be divided into five sections. The first one will describe 
how DIPRES officials redesigned the performance management tools implemented in 
previous years, and how they sought to create a ‘system’ more closely associated with the 
process of budgetary policymaking. The second section will then show how and why 
DIPRES officials tried to ‘spread the word’ about the newly created SECG; and how they 
secured the endorsement of international organisations. The third section will analyse how 
and why the latter became increasingly interested in the Chilean ‘model’; it will then 
present the channels used for its international diffusion. The fifth section will briefly 
explore what happened to the SECG after Marcel’s departure from DIPRES in 2006, 
including references to president Sebastián Piñera’s initiatives on MFR at the beginning of 
his administration in 2010. The chapter will close with some concluding points.  
    
‘Something That Was Like Loose Pieces’: 
Institutional Changes, Conceptual Refinements, and the new SECG 
Despite the efforts made throughout the 1990s, at the beginning of president Ricardo 
Lagos’ administration the Chilean government did not possess a set of well-working 
performance management tools. However, in 2000 the situation started to change 
significantly. Officials within DIPRES set in motion a number of initiatives to establish a 
new MFR ‘system’: the Sistema de Evaluación y Control de Gestión (SECG, or Evaluation 
and Management Control System). Between 2000 and 2002, the existing performance 
management tools were revamped, and new evaluation tools were added. All under a 
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framework which also sought to strengthen the use of performance information in the 
making of budgetary policy. The creation of the SECG was supported by two important 
factors. From a politico-institutional perspective, the process was backed up by Mario 
Marcel’s ‘triumphal return’ as Head of DIPRES (IC21)73, one of Chile’s most powerful 
institutions
74
. From an intellectual perspective, the introduction of the SECG had as a 
background the lessons previously learned by Marcel. These were further complemented by 
analyses of recent international MFR experiences with the aim of ‘fine-tuning’ the new 
system.   
 The design of the new SECG, and the weight its MFR components slowly gained 
during the Lagos administration, were partly associated with the economic-political 
environment of the times. Whereas, the Aylwin and Frei administrations had enjoyed 
economic prosperity, president Lagos faced an economic recession which had been 
triggered by the Asian crisis of the late 1990s. Furthermore, because of the rather erratic 
way in which the Ministry of Finance and the Budget Office had managed the economy 
during those years, they ‘had lost authority with the Executive and the Legislative’ 
(Guzmán, 2008:32). These institutions thus needed to reposition themselves to ‘meet 
pressures from other ministries and sectors’75.  
More importantly, Lagos was a well-known and widely respected politician, but 
also the first president from the Socialist Party (e.g. the party of the formerly deposed 
president Allende). Therefore, his government needed to send clear signals about his 
commitment to a responsible management of the state’s finances (Guzmán and Marcel, 
2008:310). During the following years, Marcel would thus lead a number of significant 
policy changes. These included the creation of a ‘structural surplus rule’. This established 
the budget should have an annual 1% GDP surplus to counter ‘the strong volatility that had 
                                                          
73
 As mentioned in Chapter 3, Marcel had already been Head of DIPRES for a few months in 1996 in 
an interim capacity.  
74
 According to Aninat et al. (2008:180), ‘perhaps the constitutional provisions that best reflect the 
strong powers vested in the presidency are those governing the budget process. The formal rules governing 
the budget process give strong powers to the executive, making Chile one of the countries with the most 
hierarchical budget institutions in Latin America. The constitutional responsibility for the financial 
administration of the state belongs to the president via the finance minister, assisted by the budget director’.  
75
 Guzmán and Marcel (2008:309) note that, in the late nineties, ‘fiscal accounts finished a surplus 
trend which had existed since the middle of the 80s decade in order to incur in a deficit which in 1999 grew 
up to 2.5% of the GDP. The absence of measurements which could allow an estimation of how much of that 
damage was associated with the effects of the Asian crisis and how much to policy decisions paved the way to 
questions about the management of fiscal policy and doubts about the strength of Chile’s public finances’. 
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historically characterised public finances in Chile’ (Guzmán and Marcel, 2008:309; Marcel 
and Tokman, 2002; Blöndal and Curristine, 2004).   
DIPRES also needed to improve the efficiency of public spending. According to a 
former senior official, ‘there was an important difference with respect to the nineties 
decade, simply because the Lagos administration began with a significantly lower amount 
of public resources to those which had been available before’ (IC28; Marcel, 2006:4). From 
Marcel’s perspective, MFR initiatives seemed to be an appropriate means to achieve those 
purposes. As discussed in Chapter 3, he had championed the use of MFR tools. Moreover, 
he had always been convinced that performance/results information should be used in the 
making of budgetary decisions.  
As Head of DIPRES, Marcel enjoyed the authority to lead an internal reorganisation 
to strengthen the links between performance information and the budget cycle. According 
to a former DIPRES senior official:    
 
What we did was to review the way we were discussing the budget, the key points and people who 
participated, and the contents and inputs used in these discussions. We started to change the internal 
procedures of DIPRES. Then we started to change the way in which we worked with the ministries 
and with Congress. The interesting thing is that, as opposed to what other countries had done, we 
started from asking ourselves how to take advantage of performance information (IC30). 
 
After consulting the Finance Minister and obtaining his approval, Marcel created a 
new División de Control de Gestión (DCG, or Division for Management Control) inside 
DIPRES (IC28). This provided a means to underline the regained relevance of MFR as an 
important topic. But above all, it represented a functional response to internal issues which 
had previously affected the functioning of performance management tools
76
. One official 
remarks, for example, that:   
 
Before 2000, DIPRES did not use the information from indicators or evaluations. Each budgetary 
sector was ‘a true feud’, with its own practices and routines. It was just very difficult to have access 
to those groups. It is in that respect that we started to change things. We managed to make budgetary 
sector experts use the information produced by the other unit of DIPRES, which related to the 
performance and evaluations of central government institutions (IC26). 
 
                                                          
76
 ‘There is a significant institutional strengthening [of MFR aspects] through the creation of a 
special unit in the Budget Office of the Ministry of Finance’ (Guzmán and Marcel, 2008:319). 
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The new unit was in charge of designing and implementing a new framework to strengthen 
the links between performance information and budgetary decisions. As head of the new 
DCG, Marcel appointed Marcela Guzmán. She had managed the Education Ministry’s 
performance management system during the late 1990s, and joined DIPRES with a ‘very 
critical vision’ and the desire to introduce ‘big technical, conceptual, and operational 
changes’ (IC14).  
The new SECG resulted from the combination of a revised version of MFR tools 
used in the 1990s, and some new evaluation instruments
77
. Marcel and Guzmán decided to 
separate the performance indicators from the PMGs. As mentioned in Chapter 3, since 1998 
the indicators had become part of the PMGs. Yet the merger of these two instruments had 
not been successful. Thus, performance indicators became once again a self-standing tool, 
and were attached to DIPRES’s budget proposals as it had originally been the case 
(Guzmán, 2005:19). The DCG also revamped the formats and procedures of the Balances 
de Gestión Integral (BGIs, or General Management Reports; Guzmán and Marcel, 
2008:319). Thereafter, the BGIs included information about agency performance levels and 
results, in an effort to increase their usefulness for accountability purposes
78
.  
In addition, Marcel and Guzmán introduced significant changes to the PMGs. 
Despite serious limitations faced during its initial implementation in 1998-2000
79
, these 
programmes could not be easily terminated because they had been established by law. 
Therefore, they tried to turn ‘a mechanism of goals self-setting and self-evaluation into a 
system of benchmarking for the public sector’ (Marcel, 2006:4; italics in original). The 
DCG thus changed the PMGs’ measurement focus from products to management systems, 
emphasising those which could be applied government-wide. According to a former 
DIPRES senior official:  
 
                                                          
77
 For a detailed perspective of the various tools that integrate the SECG see Guzmán (2005, 2011); 
Castro et al. (2009i); Arenas and Berner (2010); and Dussauge-Laguna (2012d).   
78
 Arenas and Berner (2010:24) remark that ‘[t]he BGIs that institutions prepared annually towards 
the end of the 90s generally did not include information about institutional management and analysis of 
results, which limited the usefulness and use of these informs’. 
79
 Guzmán (2005:77) remarked that during those years the PMGs mainly focused on ‘management 
objectives’, which nonetheless mostly ‘referred to routine activities of the institutions, centred in processes 
and little demanding goals’. This resulted in ‘commitments that could not be compared in terms of 
institutional relevance and exigency of its goals, causing that dissimilar effort levels would obtain the same 
compensation’. 
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Marcel said, ‘Let’s review the existing modernisation initiatives, those which have been 
implemented in previous years’. Some of these had been enacted through legal changes, some 
through presidential decrees. But no one really knew whether they were being actually followed or 
not. So he said, ‘Let’s structure something in a way that institutions will really join the programme’. 
And then we started to revise what had been previously done. We could not modify the law, because 
there was no time for that (IC14). 
 
As a result, the focus of the PMGs turned to administrative capacities, and particularly 
areas such as human resources (e.g. training and performance evaluation); quality of service 
(e.g. procedures for public complaints); and financial administration (e.g. tendering 
processes and financial systems; Guzmán, 2005, 2011; Arenas and Berner, 2010). For each 
of these topics, DIPRES and individual agencies would negotiate a set of institutional 
targets. Then, according to the degree in which these annual targets were achieved, public 
servants would receive (or not) salary increases during the following fiscal year. 
Marcel and Guzmán also introduced new MFR tools. The Definiciones Estratégicas 
(strategic definitions) focused on the institutional mission and objectives of ministries and 
agencies. This tool sought to reinforce the use of performance indicators. Then, in addition 
to the programme evaluations introduced in the second half of the 1990s (which were 
revised but kept in place), two new tools were added: Evaluaciones de Impacto (impact 
evaluations), and Evaluaciones Comprehensivas del Gasto (comprehensive spending 
evaluations). According to interviewees, these tools originated in DIPRES officials’ 
awareness that programme evaluations did not produce enough information about final 
programme effects, nor about the overall institutional performance of ministries (IC20; 
IC29). A former senior official remarks, for instance, that ‘along the way, we faced the 
need to address different questions, and therefore we needed to plan different types of 
evaluation procedures’ (IC25). Another remarked that:  
 
There are always questions which cannot be fully answered because one would need to evaluate the 
whole organisation. It is a limitation of programme evaluations. It does not matter which 
methodology is being used. Therefore, we wanted a line of evaluation which could give us a broader 
perspective on the organisation, particularly in terms of its strategic coherence (IC20). 
 
The new impact evaluations tried to address ‘the lack of reliable information about final 
results or impacts on beneficiaries’ (Arenas and Berner, 2010:30). The so-called 
comprehensive spending evaluations focused in the set of programmes and policies which 
fall under the responsibility of a given ministry. Then, the objective was that DIPRES 
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evaluated ‘the strategic coherence between institutional and sector objectives, institutional 
design (institutional structure and distribution of functions among different work units), 
production and management processes, use of financial resources and results obtained from 
the provision of goods and services’ (Arenas and Berner, 2010:32). Table 5.1 below 
summarises the tools part of the new SECG:  
 
Table 5.1 
The Chilean SECG  
(2000-2006) 
Name of the tool 
 
Objective 
 
Strategic Definitions Provide information about the guiding axes of an organisation’s workload. Derived 
from strategic planning exercises, or collectively produced analyses. Information 
includes agency’s mission, strategic objectives, strategic products (goods and/or 
services), and clients, users, or beneficiaries (Arenas and Berner, 2010:18). 
 
Performance 
Indicators 
Provide quantitative information regarding levels of institutional achievement/results 
in the delivery of products (goods or services). They involve quantitative or 
qualitative aspects. They establish a relationship between two or more variables, 
which in comparison to previous periods, similar products, or goals allows evaluating 
performance (Guzmán, 2005:19). 
 
Programmes for 
Management 
Improvement  
They set the basis for linking levels of annual achievement in institutional goals, and 
increases in remuneration for public servants within a given agency for the following 
year. The PMGs are embedded in a set of areas of management improvement, which 
are common to all public sector institutions (Guzmán, 2005:77-78). 
 
General 
Management 
Reports 
It is a management report mainly structured around: a brief presentation of the 
institutional performance during the previous year; relevant information about the 
institution, so that public opinion, analysts, other public services, and Congress can 
identify it; challenges for the current year (Guzmán, 2005:113). 
 
Programme 
Evaluations 
Identify programmes’ objectives and analyse the consistency between the latter and 
the same programmes’ design and results. Evaluations initiate with the elaboration of 
a logical framework, which covers the different levels of objectives, through the 
identification of final goals (general objectives), specific objectives for each 
programme component, main activities, and corresponding performance indicators  
(Guzmán, 2005:45). 
 
Impact Evaluations Measure a programme’s impact on beneficiaries. This usually implies developing 
surveys on beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. These allow evaluating intermediate 
and final results, through the use of quasi-experimental methodologies, control groups 
and baselines (Arenas and Berner, 2010:30). 
 
Comprehensive 
Spending 
Evaluations  
These are evaluations of institutional coverage, which aim to evaluate the institution’s 
design, key management processes, results, and use of resources in the provision of 
strategic products (goods and services). It uses information on government priorities, 
strategic definitions, data about beneficiaries/users/clients, and costs associated with 
the provision of institutional products (Guzmán, 2005:49). 
Source: Author based on Guzmán (2005); and Arenas and Berner (2010). 
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Apart from all these changes, two important additions were the introduction of the 
term ‘system’, and a closer association between MFR tools and budgetary policymaking. 
While Marcel’s writings had already referred to this topic, during the 1990s the emphasis 
had been set on modernisation, results, and indicators. However, since 2000 DIPRES 
officials started to talk about the SECG as the basis of a ‘performance-based budgeting 
system’. According to a former senior official:     
 
In the nineties things were mostly about indicators, evaluations, and improving the budget. But no 
label was attached to those tools yet. In 2000, we started to talk about a ‘system’, I think because we 
were reading some literature which was linking everything in a more holistic way. But also because 
when these things started it was all rather an experiment. When we began this, the topic was already 
referred to as ‘performance-based budgeting’ around the world, but for us it was more partial. We 
did not have the security that the system (which actually was not a system yet!) could have a name, 
because it was all loose pieces. Therefore no one had the descaro (‘cheekiness’), the courage to put 
such a label to something that was like loose pieces, which kind of evolved, but then would get 
stalled, and which did not have the character it would later acquire. The differences between the 
period before 2000 and after 2000 are abysmal in every sense, technically, conceptually, 
institutionally. What existed before was not enough to be called a ‘system’ (IC20). 
 
From a technical perspective, there certainly were significant differences in the design and 
number of MFR tools employed. But in terms of policy ‘labelling’, the modifications were 
equally important. By talking about a ‘performance-based system’, Marcel and Guzmán 
made an effort to stress the coherence of their reform efforts. Furthermore, as it is discussed 
below, they also contributed to facilitate its future international dissemination. 
The impetus for creating the new MFR ‘system’ came from two main sources. As it 
has been suggested, most of the changes were a result of the experience accumulated during 
the previous years. Marcel (but Guzmán and other officials at the new DCG as well) had 
participated in the design and implementation of the first round of MFR tools. They thus 
had a good understanding of their potential uses and, above all, their practical limitations. 
Therefore, in many ways the new SECG was a product of ‘learning by doing’. Indeed, in 
the following years practical experience would become an important source of information 
for adjusting the system and its various tools. According to the same former official: 
 
In each cycle, one would see what worked and what did not, because the thing about these systems is 
that they are repetitive. Therefore, in one cycle one could detect problems which one could change 
for the other cycle. This can always be done better. In every cycle one learns something, reading on 
one’s own, talking to the team members, who also identify problems. Then you decide to change, to 
redact things differently. Furthermore, we used to carry out surveys among actors. In some processes, 
we would ask things to evaluators, and people coordinating the programmes. Every year we would 
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analyse this information and we would improve these processes, in order to homogenise concepts. 
We conducted lots of revisions and self-evaluations, and incorporated changes (IC20). 
 
 But if learning from experience acquired a prominent place in the process of 
(re)designing the SECG, learning from abroad still played a significant role even if not as 
clearly or directly as in previous years. During this period one cannot find an equivalent to 
the trip to the UK which Marcel and his advisors made in the 1990s. Nor were there many 
explicit country mentions among interviewees who were directly involved in the reforms of 
those years. In fact, one interviewee said that, ‘what I obtained from my visits to the OECD 
was the impression that what we were doing was in agreement with international 
developments on the subject’ (IC28).  
On the other hand, the documents that DIPRES produced since 2000 to describe the 
SECG and performance-based budgetary practices in Chile do show that officials continued 
looking at international trends in these subjects. For instance, in comparing two papers on 
the SECG prepared by Guzmán in 2002 and 2005, one can notice that the latter explicitly 
mentions the experiences of leading NPM countries. It also includes several bibliographical 
references on international reforms; elaborates on conceptual issues related to performance 
information in budgetary policy-making based on the international literature; and explicitly 
frames the Chilean experience in wider international debates on the subject. For example, 
Guzmán (2005:16) remarks that, ‘[t]he process initiated in Chile contains much of the 
elements and features of other important processes which have been experienced by 
different countries, particularly regarding the role of budgetary institutions, and the 
evaluation and control instruments which are used’. 
Furthermore, knowledge about international MFR practices was gathered from other 
sources. In the early 2000s, Professor Allen Schick visited Chile. An expert in international 
performance management and budgetary reform discussions, Schick participated in 
seminars and meetings with Marcel, Guzmán, and the members of the DCG (IC28). Then, 
between October 2002 and September 2003, Guzmán was seconded to the Budget and 
Management División, at the OECD in Paris. She participated in various research activities, 
including the drafting of the ‘Performance Information in the Budget Process 
Questionnaire’, which was later applied to OECD countries (Curristine, 2005).  
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Thus, during 2000-2006 DIPRES officials used knowledge about international MFR 
developments in at least two other ways: as inspiration, in the case of the comprehensive 
spending evaluations; and as a ‘benchmark’ to which Chilean performance tools could be 
compared, with the aim of fine-tuning them afterwards. In the first case, a former senior 
official states that, ‘we have heard that the British government was developing 
comprehensive spending reviews. I remember we tried to even contact them to know the 
methodology before starting our own’ (IC20). In the end, Chilean officials were not able to 
get in touch with British officials. However, they still looked online for the formats and 
questions asked as part of the spending reviews. DCG officials then combined this 
information with their own ideas, and developed the comprehensive spending evaluations 
eventually implemented (IC25).  
Because of their participation in numerous international forums, Chilean officials 
were also able to compare their MFR tools with those used elsewhere. On the basis of these 
comparisons, they made adjustments, even if sometimes of a rather marginal nature. A 
good example is provided by a former DIPRES senior official:         
 
From time to time there would be international meetings about, say, how to face methodological 
issues. But this is very much a matter of very marginal improvements. I mean, it is not like you 
triggered a revolution. In practice, what you did was to look at other experiences, to validate that 
whatever you were doing was done properly. In some occasions what happened is that you would go 
and say, ‘oh, look, there is a PART [Program Assessment Rating Tool]’, because I went to a meeting 
in which the OMB [US Office of Management and Budget] presented the PART. Then I went back 
to Chile and told the staff, ‘hey, there is something called PART, please have a look at it, check the 
questions, and see if there is anything we could add to our programme evaluations’. And then they 
would tell me, ‘well, we are missing the questions about participation’, and I would say, ‘OK, let’s 
include those’, and that’s it. As I tell you, this is a matter of small improvements. That is kind of the 
logic we followed (IC25).    
 
Therefore, since 2000 learning from abroad did not necessarily have the same central place 
or purposes it previously had. Yet it still seems to have been a relevant source of inspiration 
and information for DIPRES officials.  
 Learning (from experience and from abroad) was essential for (re)designing and 
consolidating the new SECG, but the reform process was not free from political conflicts. 
On the contrary, during the first half of the Lagos administration Marcel and his team 
frequently clashed with other institutions, particularly MINSEGPRES. In providing an 
assessment of the reforms, Waissbluth (2005:12) remarks that in those years ‘the permanent 
anecdote has been one of conflicts and lack of coordination between both institutions’. 
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Inter-institutional conflicts came from two main sources. Despite the limitations that 
MINSEGPRES’s Sistema de Metas Ministeriales had faced (see Chapter 3), the monitoring 
system remained in place. In fact, it had been re-launched in 2000 as a new Sistema de 
Seguimiento de la Programación Gubernamental (SSPG, or System for Monitoring 
Government Programming; Zaltsman, 2006).  
However, in introducing the new SECG, DIPRES automatically created a competing 
mechanism to MINSEGPRES’s system. Agencies would need to agree performance targets 
and goals with both central ministries. The underlying logic and focus of both instruments 
were different (e.g. one focused on political strategy, the other on budgetary policymaking). 
Yet agencies eventually paid more attention to DIPRES’ requirements, which were tied to 
budget allocations (IC12; IC18). A former MINSEGPRES senior official remarked that the 
implementation of the SECG tools seemed to have gradually led towards ‘la dictadura de 
Hacienda’ (‘Finance’s dictatorship’; IC19). Another interviewee similarly spoke of ‘la 
Dipresiación del Estado’ (‘the process of Dipresiation of the state’, playing with the terms 
DIPRES and depreciation; IC15).  
 Further inter-ministerial conflicts originated in the attempts of both institutions to 
control the wider administrative modernisation agenda. Given the relevance this subject 
acquired during the Frei administration, president Lagos established a Programa de 
Reforma y Modernización del Estado (PRYME, or Programme for the Reform and 
Modernisation of the State). The PRYME included topics such as electronic government, 
public participation, regionalisation, and transparency (Ramírez, 2004; DIPRES, 2005f; 
Araya and Barría, 2008; Figueroa et al., 2011). It thus emphasised a focus on ‘state’ rather 
than ‘managerial’ reforms (IC6; IC19).  
President Lagos had considered it would better to leave the leadership of the 
modernisation agenda to MINSEGPRES. According to a former senior official, ‘president 
Lagos thought DIPRES was always going to privilege its own corporate interests (that is 
the financial, budgetary ones). Therefore, he liked the idea of introducing a counterweight’. 
However, Marcel and his team were keen on consolidating the SECG. They also wanted to 
lead changes in other areas beyond MFR (e.g. civil service reform). In fact, through the 
new PMGs, Marcel and Guzmán were de facto promoting a number of modernisation lines 
(e.g. human resources, strategic planning, financial administration, quality of service). They 
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thus were reluctant to accept MINSEGPRES’ formal leadership. According to a former 
MINSEGPRES senior official:  
 
In 2002, there were changes in MINSEGPRES’ senior leadership positions. The new appointees said, 
‘we are not going to keep arguing about this issue with DIPRES’. And then the PRYME was 
dismembered. The topic of decentralisation went to SUBDERE
80
, the topic of participation to 
SEGEGOB
81
, and in MINSEGPRES remained some things such as administrative procedures, 
electronic government, and transparency. The label PRYME was kept formally. But in fact the 
responsibility over reform topics was reallocated (IC23).  
 
The same former official adds that, ‘Mario Marcel had much more power in the Lagos 
government than with Frei, when he already was rather powerful. And in the end he was the 
winner on these disputes’ (IC23). Thus, although not without problems, DIPRES was able 
to keep control over the main modernisation topics of the Lagos administration. These 
included the MFR agenda and the civil service reforms which took place in the mid-2000s 
(Marcel, 2002a; Valdés, 2002) 
 The political dimension of MFR also related to the role that Congress should play 
regarding the reforms. Marcel and his team sought to ensure DIPRES’ control over MFR 
reforms, as much as they tried to secure broader political support to guarantee the SECG’s 
long-term sustainability. According to a former senior official:  
  
Our approach with Congress was to go two steps ahead of Congress. We did not want to let Congress 
take us by surprise. We wanted to ensure it was us who set the agenda to work with Congress. And 
then we would seek to bring them on board. The first step was when we adopted the OECD code on 
budgetary transparency. And why was that necessary? Because the huge disequilibrium that existed 
in Chile between the Executive and Congress was something which could not be sustained for a long 
time. We also thought that we needed to build certain alliances, to gain trust, to obtain more political 
support through Congress in order to guarantee the sustainability of the reforms [the SECG] in the 
longer term (IC30).  
 
Therefore, for Marcel and his team, the institutionalisation of the SECG was not only 
necessary to establish modern results-based budgetary practices in the Chilean public 
sector. In addition, it was a means to involve Congressmen in the task of monitoring public 
sector performance and promoting accountability (IC9).  
                                                          
80
 Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional y Administrativo, or Undersecretariat for Regional and 
Administrative Development, Ministry of Interior.  
81
 Ministerio Secretaría General de Gobierno, or Ministry Government’s General Secretariat.   
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The MFR agenda thus regained prominence during the early 2000s. Previous reform 
initiatives provided Marcel and his team with very valuable experience, and became the 
foundation of a more ambitious set of MFR tools, more explicitly linked with budgetary 
policy-making. Cross-national learning played different but still significant roles. It 
provided officials with ideas for pursuing a more ‘systemic’ approach; inspired some of the 
MFR innovations (e.g. comprehensive spending evaluations); informed adjustments in 
some tools (e.g. programme evaluations); and overall served as a ‘benchmark’ to which 
Marcel, Guzmán, and the new DCG’s team compared the new MFR scheme. The result 
would be a more coherent ‘system’, which replaced the ‘loose pieces’ of the 1990s. 
Marcel’s powerful and skilful leadership allowed DIPRES to maintain government-wide 
control over MFR and other reform topics. This was further possible because Marcel and 
Guzmán were able to ‘show’ that the SECG’s was working well. Yet, for so doing, they had 
to develop other strategies, as described in the following section.  
 
‘To Show the Things We Were Doing in Chile’:  
The Search for SECG’s International Legitimacy 
Beyond institutional and operational improvements, Marcel and Guzmán were aware that 
the consolidation of the SECG depended upon guaranteeing its legitimacy. In order to 
contribute to that goal, they actively promoted the new system in numerous international 
meetings and through several DIPRES publications which described it in detail. 
Furethermore, they asked international organisations to evaluate the system and/or some of 
its components. As a result, by mid-2000s the Chilean SECG was well-known at the 
international level, and it was regularly featured in publications on MFR and related topics 
(Curristine, 2005; May et al., 2005; Zaltsman, 2006; Mackay, 2007; López-Acevedo et al., 
2012). 
 The first strategy followed by DIPRES officials was to spread the word about the 
new Chilean system. This was done along two broad lines. First, Marcel and Guzmán (but 
also other officials) presented the SECG in several international meetings. According to a 
former DIPRES senior official,    
 
At the beginning, in the 1990s, the point of going abroad was to obtain a broad perspective on these 
topics. But in the 2000s we started to travel in order to share experiences and listen to what other 
countries were doing. And we also travelled a lot to show the things we were doing in Chile. The 
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idea came from Mario Marcel, who had in mind that we needed to go out and talk about our 
progress. This was part of a communicational strategy, which I think was valid (IC20).   
 
It is certainly possible to trace papers and presentations by Marcel, Guzmán, and other 
DIPRES officials (or at least their names on the agendas) in seminars and conferences 
during the period 2000-2006. In various occasions Marcel presented the Chilean experience 
at the OECD’s Senior Budget Officials meetings in Paris (IC30; Marcel, 2002b). Both 
Guzmán and Marcel delivered papers in international meetings sponsored by the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), and the Centro 
Latinoamericano de Administración para el Desarrollo (CLAD, or Latin American Centre 
for the Administration of Development) (Guzmán, 2001, 2005b; Marcel, 2006). Guzmán 
participated in regional conferences on monitoring and evaluation organised by the WB and 
the IDB (May et al., 2006; López-Acevedo et al., 2010). Lastly, since 2003 the Chilean 
MFR system was regularly presented at the ‘Regional Budget Directors Meetings’ in 
Santiago, co-sponsored by ECLAC and OECD.  
 DIPRES officials also published many institutional documents to detail the features, 
objectives, partial achievements, and continuous adaptations of the SECG. According to the 
same former senior official, these publications aimed to:  
 
Provide the SECG with legitimacy. We thought that if more and more people knew about it, we 
would secure it more. This was independently of anything you could do to make it better, update it, 
etc. Because obviously times change and there might be new things that are relevant. But the idea 
was that we needed to consolidate it. Thus, I understood it in this way: the more it was known, the 
more we wrote about it, the better. Therefore, every year we wrote a document about the progress we 
had achieved with the system. If delegations from other countries came to see us, we would hand 
them these documents. We also had, from early on, many things uploaded in DIPRES’ website, so 
that people could know about it. It was a question of transparency, of course, but also to legitimise 
the system (IC20).  
 
Indeed, there are a number of articles by Marcel and Guzmán (or both), telling the story of 
the SECG
82
. Furthermore, up to this date DIPRES’ website dedicates a section to ‘Studies 
and Documents on the Control of Public Management’, where it is still possible to find 
papers about the SECG (Guzmán, 2002, 2003, 2005a; Arenas and Berner, 2010). From 
these documents, one can get an image of how the SECG has evolved across time, but also 
                                                          
82
 In addition to those already cited, Marcel (2002); Guzmán and Marcel (2008); and Guzmán 
(2008). 
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of how DIPRES officials have sought to frame Chilean developments in broader 
international trends. For instance, Guzmán (2003:8) remarked that:  
 
Clearly, the process that is taking place in Chile is following the direction taken in other countries. 
Though Budget Offices are responsible for drawing up and executing budgets, in recent years their 
role in public administration has changed substantially. One example has been the major and 
complex transformations in OECD countries, where new institutional arrangements have linked the 
budget with other management procedures, either encouraging or forcing public agencies to measure 
performance and evaluate results. 
 
In a similar report two years later, Guzmán (2005:14) remarked there were ‘countries like 
England, New Zealand, Australia and Canada, which have introduced tools for improving 
budgetary processes and orient them towards results’. Moreover, she suggested the Chilean 
scheme ‘contains many of the elements and features of other important processes 
experimented by different countries, in particular those regarding the role of the budgetary 
institution, and the performance evaluation and control tools which are used’ (p. 17).  
Another strategy followed by Marcel and Guzmán was to gain the support of 
international organisations. For that, they asked the latter to conduct evaluations of the 
various MFR tools DIPRES had set in place. A former senior official remarks that ‘we 
involved in as many international evaluation exercises as we could think of’ (IC20). 
Another former senior official notes that, ‘we asked international organisations specific 
things, but on the basis of our agenda, and in many cases using them as a sort of 
intermediary for what we wanted to achieve’ (IC30). Although DIPRES officials wanted to 
have a ‘sounding board’, in order to know whether they were making progress in the 
correct way, it seems as though they were mainly interested in legitimising their actions83. 
According to another former official: 
 
It was important for us to have an external view. And it was also important that DIPRES was 
evaluated just as the other agencies had been evaluated. Then we could have the moral authority to 
tell other agencies, ‘look, here we are all being evaluated’. That would then help us to legitimise our 
initiatives (IC5). 
 
                                                          
83
 Mackay (2007:60) notes that ‘[t]he Chilean finance ministry’s careful stewardship of that 
country’s M&E system is exemplified by the review it commissioned the World Bank to conduct into the two 
principal evaluation components of the system […]. It commissioned this review partly to support the 
ongoing management and improvement of the M&E system and partly to apply the same standards of 
performance accountability to itself as it applies to sector ministries and the programs they manage [...]’. 
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Similar comments were offered by another former official, in this case regarding the WB’s 
evaluation of the PMGs (Banco Mundial, 2008):  
 
I would say it was linked to two things. First, we wanted to see if we were doing this well, and given 
the busy daily routine one does not have time to see whether there is something better in the world in 
comparison to what one is doing. Then we thought that it was not completely fair that if all 
programmes were being evaluated, why DIPRES should not be evaluated as well? And we thought 
that setting the example was something good (IC25).  
 
A first international evaluation took place in 2003. DIPRES ‘requested the OECD to 
carry out a review of the Chilean budgeting system in a similar fashion as it does for its 
member countries’ (Blöndal and Curristine, 2004:8). The OECD team analysed a number 
of topics. These included the budget formulation process; the features of the ‘structural 
budget surplus rule’; the annual budget cycle; the role of the legislature in budgetary 
policymaking; and recent public sector management reforms. Moreover, roughly a third of 
the report was dedicated to discussing the main characteristics, advantages and limitations 
of the Chilean MFR system established in 2000. The OECD review noted that the ‘Ministry 
of Finance has a highly developed albeit complex system for obtaining information on the 
performance of agencies’ (p. 32); that there were ‘concerns about the technical capacities of 
individual ministries to develop performance indicators’ (p. 42); and that ‘Congress has 
proven largely uninterested in examining performance information and using it in decision 
making’ (p. 43).  
On the other hand, the review suggested that ‘[t]he Chilean approach to 
performance budgeting is a sensible one’ (p. 40). More importantly, it closed in a rather 
favourable note:  
 
The Chilean Ministry of Finance has a highly advanced system for obtaining information on agency 
and programme performance. Over a ten-year period, this system has been developed and adjusted to 
take account of lessons learned and changing demands. The Ministry has adapted performance 
systems to address problems, many of which are common within OECD member countries and do 
not have easy or obvious solutions. Most importantly, the Ministry has proven willing to take a long-
term approach and to persist with performance programmes.  
 
Overall the Chilean performance system compares favourably with OECD member countries, 
especially in terms of the attention and priority given to performance information in the budget 
process. This system has combined the integration of performance information in the budget process 
with the sensible use of this information in decision making.  
 
If there is a weakness in the Chilean system, compared with the best of OECD member country 
systems, it is that the performance system is so heavily centralised. As a long-term aim, it would be 
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desirable for agencies’ capacity to be built up so that they are a more equal partner in the decisions 
on indicators and measures (Blöndal and Curristine, 2004:43-44). 
 
Despite its criticisms, the report concluded that, ‘to date this is a success story’ (p. 44).  
 A similar evaluation exercise was conducted in 2004. DIPRES officials asked the 
WB to review the SECG’s ‘Evaluation Programme’ component (Rojas et al., 2005). This 
included both the ‘Government Programme Evaluations’ in place since 1997; and the 
‘Impact Evaluations’ introduced in 2001. The WB consultants assessed the structure and 
methodologies used by the Evaluation Programme; its daily functioning; the quality of its 
evaluation exercises; and the impacts they had had on decision-making processes within the 
Chilean government.  
The report suggested that, ‘the use of evaluation on the part of the Congress seemed 
to have been limited in practice’ (p. 8). Similarly, it noted ‘a weak ownership of the EP 
[Evaluation Programme] on the side of senior executives in Agencies and Ministries’ (p. 
16). Moreover, it stated that the quality of some evaluation reports was not up to 
international standards (p. 9); that some programmes’ logical frameworks had been 
designed only during the evaluation processes, but not before these as required; and that the 
Evaluation Programme ‘has yet to show the specific manner or degree in which it 
contributes to elevating the effectiveness and efficiency of public spending’ (p. 16). 
 However, as in the case of the OECD review, the WB’s evaluation was rather 
enthusiastic about the design and broader impacts of the Chilean evaluation mechanisms. 
The report noted that Chile had created an ‘evaluation factory’ (p. 19), and that the 
Evaluation Program was ‘robust and has achieved and continues to achieve impressive 
results’ (p. 18). Overall, the report concluded that: 
 
DIPRES’ EP is already a notorious achievement. The experience of other countries, [sic.] indicates 
that systematic practices of evaluation have not been easy to implement and only in some cases have 
made an important (demonstrable) contribution to improving government. The experience of Chile’s 
DIPRES […] suggests that it has been possible to establish, in a relatively short time when compared 
to developed countries with a longer trajectory in evaluation oriented to improving the quality of 
spending, a complex and effective program which, according to the perceptions of its participants, 
the number and quality of the evaluations and, above all, its practical uses, produces good results and 
makes sure they are applied. As an international demonstration of a successful development, which is 
systematic and sustained, in a sea of lots of failures, interrupted experiences, or successes that are 
only partially so, the international community, and specially the countries of a similar level of 
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development, are looking with hope and are hoping to learn from the continuity and deepening of 
DIPRES’ EP (Rojas et al., 2005:18)84.  
 
A third international review took place in 2007. In that occasion, DIPRES officials 
requested the WB evaluated the Programas de Mejoramiento de Gestión (PMGs; Banco 
Mundial, 2008). By that time Marcel and Guzmán were no longer at DIPRES, but some of 
their former colleagues were in charge of the SECG
85
. Overall, this review was less 
enthusiastic than the previous ones. In fact, the WB pointed at several limitations in the 
PMGs’ design and operation: the complexity of the programme increased ‘transaction 
costs’, and forced agencies to merely comply with procedures and requirements (p. 10); 
that PMGs followed an ‘homogeneous logic of implementation for heterogeneous needs 
and systems’ (p. 11); the various systems included in the PMGs did not interact properly 
(pp. 11-12); and that the participation of agencies/ministries could be more active (pp. 12-
13). The report offered a number of recommendations to improve the PMGs’ design. 
But even if this review was more critical and less enthusiastic than the previous two, 
WB consultants still remarked that the PMG was: 
  
a multi-purpose programme that innovatively develops synergies between the policies and tools for 
human resources, management control and results-informed budgeting and administrative 
modernisation. Seen in the regional Latin American context, it is Chile’s merit to have found a path 
that ensures basic management capacity for its administration as a whole and makes real the 
alignment between written regulations and daily practices in ministries and agencies (Banco 
Mundial, 2008:5).  
 
The report also stressed that the way in which control mechanisms, management 
improvement tools, and budgetary decisions were linked in the PMGs ‘distinguished Chile, 
with excellence, from the Latin American countries and most OECD countries’ (p. 7). 
These highly favourable reviews from international organisations were helpful for 
DIPRES officials in at least two ways. First, they offered valuable recommendations, most 
of which were taken into account for adjusting the SECG (IC20). Second, they contributed 
                                                          
84
 A similar assessment was later provided by the WB’s consultant Keith Mackay (2007:28-29). He 
underlined that, ‘[t]his high utilization of M&E information is very impressive, and this alone makes Chile’s 
M&E system the strongest in Latin America and one of the strongest in the world. Chile has demonstrated 
that a whole-of-government M&E system can be built and operated at a relatively low cost’.  
85
 Alberto Arenas was Head of DIPRES, and had been Sub-Director for Efficiency and Public 
Service. Heidi Berner was the Head of the Management Control Division, and had previously been in charge 
of Impact Evaluations.  
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to increasing the system’s legitimacy in various fronts. According to a former official, 
‘when you think that something that is working well should be maintained in place, one 
form of ensuring that is to use international organisations to support you’ (IC25). The 
OECD and WB evaluations showed that the MFR initiatives introduced by DIPRES since 
the mid-1990s were in tune with broader international trends. They also showed that the 
specific tools and methodologies included in the SECG were both appropriate and 
effectively implemented by DIPRES. Moreover, the reviews signalled DIPRES officials’ 
openness and disposition to be evaluated by external actors, just as they were using the 
SECG to evaluate ministries and agencies. Lastly, in combination with developments 
described in the following section, these reviews helped trigger the international prestige of 
the Chilean MFR reforms, and their positioning as a ‘model’ worthy of imitation.  
  
‘Everyone Uses Everyone Else’: 
The International Dissemination of the Chilean MFR Reforms 
The international visibility of the Chilean SECG further increased during the second half of 
the 2000s. This was mainly (but not only) thanks to the Inter-American Development 
Bank’s (IDB) support. Indeed, from 2005 onwards the dissemination of the Chilean system 
became something of a joint enterprise between DIPRES and IDB officials, as the latter 
were interested in promoting results-based budgeting practices in Latin America. The 
process followed several channels: from capacity building (training) activities with 
government officials from other countries, to the active participation of Chilean experts as 
consultants. The starting point of this collaboration could be traced back to May 16-17 
2005. That date was considered important by some interviewees because it was then that 
the Chilean Ministry of Finance and several international organisations co-sponsored a 
seminar on the ‘Modernisation of Public Management in Chile’ (IIO3; IC28). 
The main objective of the seminar was to discuss the findings produced by various 
studies on the Chilean government’s performance. These included the OECD budgetary 
review and the WB review of SECG’s Evaluation Programme discussed above. Also, other 
assessments which similarly praised Chile’s reformist efforts: a 2003 study of 
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decentralisation and fiscal federalism policies prepared by IDB staff (Wiesner, 2003)
86
; a 
2003 ‘Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC)’ (International Monetary 
Fund, 2003)
87; a 2004 ‘Country Financial Accountability Assessment’, jointly prepared by 
the WB and the IDB (World Bank-IDB, 2004)
88
; and a study on the Chilean civil service 
system prepared by the IDB. The seminar showcased the country’s successful path to 
reform in various fronts, and underlined its potential to serve as regional ‘model’. As cited 
at the beginning of this chapter, a senior IDB official even thought that ‘Chile could do 
more for the Bank than the Bank for Chile’ (IIO3).    
 Indeed, during 2005 the IDB asked DIPRES to collaborate in a project for building 
MFR capacity in countries of the region (IC5). The IDB wanted that DIPRES trained 
officials from financial ministries on MFR tools, particularly those associated with 
budgetary policy-making (IC14). The IDB financed two rounds of training for officials 
from these countries, who then met with Guzmán and her team
89
. DIPRES also provided 
participants with a number of publications on the SECG. These were prepared in advance 
with financial support from the IDB. A brief note included (with slight variations) at the 
front page of these publications said: 
       
This book contains a set of technical and procedural documents that the Budget Office (DIPRES) of 
the Ministry of Finance of Chile has used in the past years to implement its system of evaluations of 
public programmes and institutions. Prepared by DIPRES, the documents are made available to the 
Program of Capacity Building for the Formulation and Management of Budget by Results, developed 
as part of the agreement on Regional Technical Cooperation of the Republic of Chile, through the 
Budget Office of the Ministry of Finance and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 
 
This program benefits the national governments of Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil [sic.], Chile, Paraguay 
and Uruguay.  
                                                          
86
 The study suggested that ‘[n]otwithstanding the unique characteristics of Chile’s decentralization 
policies, the country in its distinctive way is probably making more stable and effective decentralization 
progress than many others in Latin America’ (Wiesner, 2003:100). 
87
 The IMF document stated that ‘Chile has achieved a high level of fiscal transparency in many 
areas, and has recently made rapid process in closing remaining gaps. The authorities’ responsiveness to new 
demands—both from within Chile and from international markets—has been a particular facet of strength. / 
Chile’s main achievements include the government’s success in constructing and disseminating an unusually 
clear view of its objectives and targets, both at the macro level and for individual budget programs’ 
(International Monetary Fund, 2003:1). 
88
 The assessment stated that, ‘Chile scores high on financial management outputs in fiscal discipline, 
transparency and supporting efficiency in operations because underlying all financial management operations  
are clear rules, strict adherence to the rules, dedicated and qualified staff and management which rewards 
ethical and efficient behavior and there is a matching of responsibility with accountability given the 
decentralization of financial management to the service agencies’ (World Bank-IDB, 2004:ix). 
89
 As it will be discussed in Chapter 6, there were also some Mexican officials from SEDESOL. A 
former DIPRES senior official remarked, ‘I do not know how, but they heard about the meetings and asked 
the IDB to invite them’ (IC5).  
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Its objective is to develop among participant countries, the institutional capacity to generate and use 
in the budgetary process information related to the results of government actions, through the 
knowledge, analysis and diffusion of the Chilean experience in the implementation of its 
management control system under the concept of budget by results (DIPRES, 2005a:1).  
 
The publications included a 500+ pages long document describing the Evaluation 
Programme (DIPRES, 2005a); a guide on the BGIs (DIPRES, 2005b); a paper on 
performance evaluation tools (DIPRES, 2005c); a guide to ‘performance indicators’ 
(DIPRES, 2005d); one about the stages, key actors, and institutional framework of the 
Chilean budgetary process (DIPRES, 2005e); an overview of administrative reform 
measures since the early 1990s (DIPRES, 2005f); a guide on the presentation of financial 
programmes (DIPRES, 2005g); and two case studies on the use of the management control 
and evaluation instruments in the telecommunications sector (DIPRES, 2005h), and in the 
oral health sector (DIPRES, 2005i).  
 Apart from these training sessions and the distribution of policy documents, 
DIPRES officials received a number of country delegations on a regular basis (IC20). These 
were usually led by representatives from the IDB or the WB, who wanted to show 
government officials how the Chilean experience worked in practice. The frequency of 
these meetings seems to have been considerable. According to a former DIPRES senior 
official, ‘every country wanted to learn about the Chilean experience. Sometimes it was 
boring, and I could not help but thinking about how much time I was spending with them’ 
(IC20). In some cases DIPRES officials would even meet with representatives from 
international organisations in consecutive weeks. According to the same former official, 
‘we would ask them, “But did not we meet last week?”, and they would reply, “No, that 
was with our colleagues from another unit”’ (IC20)90.  
 The IDB also disseminated information about the Chilean MFR through other 
channels. According to an IDB senior official:  
 
In some cases we were working on a project with a country and we would point at them the Chilean 
case as something relevant to be analysed, and the country would then go to Santiago. In other cases, 
the country already knew about the Chilean experience. They would then call us asking to go and see 
it directly. There were also cases in which the topic was mentioned during the meetings the IDB 
organises with the incoming government’s ministers, in which we discuss the most important topics 
for the development of their countries. And, in that context, I remember the case of Chile was 
presented in various occasions during the meetings (IIO3). 
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 There are at least two units within the World Bank which actively produce documents on Chile: 
the ‘Latin America and Caribbean’ unit; and the ‘Poverty Reduction and Equity’ unit.  
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Then, information was further disseminated through the IDB’s ‘Program to Implement the 
External Pillar of the Medium Term Action Plan for Development Effectiveness’ (also 
known as PRODEV). This was established in 2005 ‘to enhance the effectiveness of the 
governments of the region and allow them to achieve better results in their development 
interventions’91. Among other activities, PRODEV supports training, seminars, publications 
and regional meetings, in which the Chilean experience is usually portrayed as a ‘model’ to 
be known and studied (IIO4).  
Last but not least, the dissemination of the Chilean MFR practices happened 
through the participation of former DIPRES officials in consultancy projects for Latin 
American governments. These consultancies have often been associated with PRODEV’s 
activities, and have thus been paid for by the IDB. Yet the involvement of Chilean experts 
in other nations’ modernisation activities actually preceded PRODEV. A former middle-
level official referred to these consultancies as follows:     
 
Since I left DIPRES, I have been doing lots of consultancies for the IDB. I did one for Uruguay, I 
was there one year. Basically our guide for performance indicators was included as part of the budget 
of Uruguay. Then most of the team members I met while in DIPRES had also worked on these topics 
for the Uruguayan government. Mario Marcel had previously travelled to advise them. I have also 
worked in Costa Rica, I have written some documents. All this usually financed by the IDB, but 
sometimes by the CLAD, the UNDP [United Nations Development Program]. In the particular case 
of the IDB, they were interested in people that had knowledge about the topic, but mainly from the 
perspective of the Chilean Ministry of Finance (IC21).    
 
Other interviewees similarly stated that at some point they had been involved in 
consultancies or training activities in other Latin American countries, for which they had 
used knowledge and examples learned through their involvement in the Chilean reforms. 
According to a former senior official:  
 
I will be going soon to advise the Ministry of Finance of [name of country]. But I think [name of 
other former DIPRES official] is also going at the same time to this country by invitation of another 
ministry. Therefore, I think we will be kind of competing against each other (IC25).  
 
A relevant question is, of course, that related to why these organisations became 
interested about the Chilean experience in the first place. While the answer is not 
straightforward, there are some factors which contribute to explaining this. According to a 
                                                          
91
 Information retrieved from http://www.IDB.org/es/temas/prodev/prodev,1230.html, July 7, 2012. 
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senior IDB official, Chile seemed to be relevant because other Latin American countries 
could learn from its experience in a relatively easy way:  
 
For the Bank, the Chilean is a very useful experience for the countries of the region, because it is 
easier for them to recognise that experience than those of European countries, or from other 
continent, and even that of the United States. It is a country towards which they feel more 
comfortable, they understand their features, and it is a more transferable knowledge, easier to 
assimilate. Even if Chile is a very particular country, with specific political and institutional features 
that do not easily appear in the region (IIO4).  
 
As Chapter 6 will describe, this comment is certainly supported by the way in which the 
Chilean system became an important reference for Mexican policymakers during the 
second half of the 2000s.  
Another related reason has to do with the agenda that the IDB was pursuing at the 
time. As mentioned above, the PRODEV had been launched in 2005 with the aim of 
advancing MFR in the region. In particular, reforms with a focus on performance-based 
budgeting. Given the SECG’s internal coherence and alleged success with regards to those 
aspects, the Chilean reforms were clearly useful for showing how MFR systems were 
feasible in Latin American countries. Indeed, less than a year after quitting the Chilean 
government, Marcel took up a senior position at the IDB, in the unit in charge of PRODEV.  
Furthermore, at the time in which the Chilean MFR system was becoming 
institutionalised and was gaining international visibility, there were not many regional 
examples which could be seen as equally ‘successful’. Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, Brazil, 
Costa Rica, among others, had all introduced performance-based initiatives since the early 
nineties (Cunill and Ospina, 2003; Zaltsman, 2006; García and García, 2011). Yet at that 
point none of those countries had consolidated a MFR government-wide ‘system’, which 
generated and used performance information on a regular basis
92
.  
Lastly, it should be noted that DIPRES’ MFR system was commonly viewed in the 
light of the political and economic reforms implemented in Chile during previous years. For 
example, Aninat et al. (2008:160) remark that the country enjoyed ‘a stable and very low 
level of price inflation, and its fiscal and monetary institutions have earned praise from 
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 According to Zaltsman (2006:vi), ‘[m]ost of the [Latin American] systems have had the objective 
of promoting the use of M&E information and performance improvements by establishing budgetary or other 
institutional incentive mechanisms, but few have succeeded. The system that has accomplished most in this 
regard is Chile’s MCS [Management and Control System], which has set up a variety of incentives targeted 
both at the evaluated programs and agencies and at the budget decision-makers at the Ministry of Finance’  
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multilateral institutions, credit rating agencies, and international investors’. A similarly 
positive image could be obtained by looking at Chile’s place in Transparency 
International’s rankings; The Economist’s quality of life index; or OECD assessments  
about the country’s ‘governance institutions’ (Waissbluth, 2005; Marcel, 2002a; OECD, 
2011). Thus, MFR reforms benefited from the environment in which they were embedded. 
According to a former official:  
 
We produced documents which increased the visibility of the system. At the time, it was the only 
thing available, in writing, about how to translate management principles to the public sector, 
translated and written in easy steps, with a strong pedigree. This was combined with Chile’s 
trajectory of fiscal growth and transparency, as the country had been growing for many years, had a 
surplus, a small public sector, etc. Therefore, Chile was successful from any perspective. And then 
there was not much competition in Latin America, while we had done things properly (IC21). 
 
Indeed, the senior IDB official similarly remarks that when the IDB’s The Politics of Public 
Policies (Stein et al., 2006) was published
93
, it looked like ‘the report had been designed to 
showcase Chile’s performance. But that was not our intention; the report was based on 
abstract theories. Only the Chilean reality closely resembled the theory’ (IIO4).  
 Thus, while in the first half of the decade the Chilean MFR system that had been 
redesigned and promoted by DIPRES officials, and had been favourably assessed by the 
OECD and the WB, by the second half of the same decade it had become a regional 
‘model’. To strengthen the SECG’s legitimacy, Marcel and Guzmán carefully sought the 
support of international organisations. The latter then turned to Chilean officials for 
developing consultancy projects and advancing an agenda of results-based practices among 
Latin American countries. As a former DIPRES senior official would remark, in the 
international dissemination of MFR ideas and practices ‘everyone uses everyone else’ 
(IC25).     
 
‘A Cultural Change with a View on Results’: 
The Search for ‘Delivery’ Under a New Governing Coalition 
After Marcel and Guzmán left DIPRES in early 2006, the question of whether the Chilean 
SECG was a truly ‘successful’ became particularly relevant. On the one hand, there seemed 
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 The report discussed how a number of institutional and policy features worked across Latin 
American countries (e.g. executive-legislative relationships; political party systems; bureaucratic structures; 
civil society actors; the policy process).  
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to be enough evidence to support claims about the system’s effectiveness and its 
contributions to improving policy and budgetary decisions (Dussauge-Laguna, 2012d). 
Furthermore, between 2006 and 2010, the general structure of the SECG barely changed. 
Even during the initial years of president Sebastián Piñera’s administration (2010-2014)94, 
the SECG remained in place with only minor programmatic modifications, which pointed at 
its high degree of institutionalisation. On the other hand, observers flagged a number of 
significant criticisms about way the system worked. Moreover, the Piñera administration 
did introduce other initiatives, which might eventually affect the relative place of the SECG 
within the Chilean government’s MFR policy.    
 A number of scholarly assessments and documentary evidence provide support for 
the SECG’s positive aspects. For example, Castro et al. (2009i:593) remark the latter ‘is 
deeply embedded in the [public] institutions’, and has ‘created a common language 
regarding the control instruments and the evaluation criteria’. Similarly, Pliscoff (2008:17) 
states that, ‘PMGs have gradually, but effectively become part of the Chilean public 
management’s jargon and practices’. In a detailed assessment of the links between the 
SECG and budgetary decisions, Zaltsman (2009:460-461; italics in original) concluded that 
‘while compared to the impact of other factors, the effects of performance-related 
considerations on the agencies’ funding levels may be small, M&E [monitoring and 
evaluation] assessments do often affect resource allocations’.  
Reports produced by DIPRES and the WB provide further examples of how 
information from performance indicators and evaluation reports was used for redesigning, 
reallocating, or terminating public programmes (Guzmán, 2005; Rojas et al., 2005; Berner, 
2009:170). A recent analysis by Olavarría (2012) suggests that the institutionalisation of 
evaluation practices has contributed to engaging public servants in the task of following up 
on their programmes’ functioning, results, and impacts. He notes that evaluations have 
created ‘spaces for reflection’ about the programmes’ performance, in which all relevant 
actors are involved. Lastly, several interviewees stressed that the introduction in Chile of 
MFR tools had certainly contributed to creating a ‘results-oriented’ culture among public 
servants. 
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 The Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, a centre-left coalition, governed continuously 
from 1990 to 2010. However, in 2010 the Coalición por el Cambio, a coalition of parties from the right, won 
the elections.  
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With regards to the SECG’s institutionalisation, the efforts led during 2000-2006 by 
Marcel and Guzmán seem to have certainly contributed to successfully consolidate the 
system and its various tools. For instance, during the government of president Michelle 
Bachelet (2006-2010) the only change introduced to the system was the addition of 
Evaluaciones de Programas Nuevos (EPN, or ‘Evaluations for New Programmes’). This 
tool sought to establish a ‘base line’ for the future evaluation of new public programmes’ 
impacts (Arenas and Berner, 2010:47). As with some of the changes in previous years, the 
new tool was partly a response to lessons learned by DIPRES officials about the SECG’s 
daily functioning. At the same time, while no specific country experience was used as a 
reference, the EPN reflected Heidi Berner’s (Guzmán’s former collaborator and successor) 
detailed knowledge about evaluation techniques commonly applied internationally (IC25; 
IC29).  
 
Table 5.2 
Performance Indicators in the Chilean Public Sector  
(2001-2013)  
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Number 
of 
agencies 
72 109 111 132 133 136 139 142 150 150 153 154 154 
Number 
of 
indicators  
275 537 1039 1684 1588 1552 1445 1443 1504 1274 1197 1221 1035 
 Source: Darville (2012) with modifications.  
 
Moreover, as Table 5.2 above shows, the SECG’s consolidation seems to have 
resisted the changes in governing coalitions in 2010. Taking as a basis information 
compiled by Paula Darville (2012), head of DIPRES’ DCG since 2010, throughout the 
Piñera administration the use of performance indicators has roughly remained at previous 
levels. Indeed, a similar picture might be obtained when looking at the evolution of the 
various evaluation tools which are part of the SECG. Table 5.3 below shows that the 
number of evaluations conducted in recent years has mostly remained at pre-2010 levels.   
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Table 5.3  
Evaluations in the Chilean Public Sector  
(1997-2012) 
Types of 
Evaluation  
1997-
1999 
2000-
2005 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total  
Evaluation of 
Public 
Programmes  
80 94 13 14 16 20 18 10 19 284 
Comprehensive 
Spending 
Evaluations  
 19 2 4 7 5 2 (3) (6)  48 
Impact 
Evaluations 
 30 7 14 12 8 12 (2) (9) (11) 105 
Evaluation of 
New 
Programmes 
     4 (1) 4 (5)  14 
Total  80 143 143 22 35 38 41 30 30 451 
 Source: Darville (2012) with modifications. Those numbers in ‘( )’ refer to evaluations in progress.  
  
Notwithstanding the above, the merits and relative ‘success’ of the SECG have been 
strongly criticised. For instance, Waissbluth (2006:61) remarks the number of MFR tools 
established by DIPRES is ‘perhaps excessive’, and has resulted in the loss ‘of real capacity 
of public policy formulation by other government organisations, in an excessive micro-
management of budgetary allocations, and in general in an environment of tension and 
confrontation with the rest of the state apparatus’. In a paper written before she became the 
current head of DIPRES in 2010, Rosanna Costa (2007:7; Castro et al., 2009i) flagged that 
the various instruments of the SECG ‘have been structured on the basis of institutional 
goals barely coordinated, and the attempt to feedback these results with remuneration 
bonuses has translated into goals that are barely challenging’.  
Other important criticisms have been produced regarding the number of evaluations 
and the amount of resources spent on them each year (Rojas et al., 2005); the lack of 
Congressional involvement in the analysis and use of performance information (OECD, 
2011:120); and the high degree of control, centralisation, and ‘excessive power’ (IC7) that 
DIPRES exerts over the SECG’s regular operation and information use (Dussauge-Laguna, 
2012d:192-193). Moreover, Olavarría and Figueroa (2010:55) recently reported that some 
public servants consider ‘evaluations are strongly focused in programmes […] but one 
cannot observe an approach towards a broader take on how different programmes and 
institutions interact towards [achieving] higher public policy objectives’. In relation to these 
criticisms, a DIPRES official remarks that:  
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It might be the case that at some point we faced the problem that our tools became and end in 
themselves. We were not capable of avoiding the issue of ‘bureaucratisation’, of introducing tools 
which generate more problems than benefits for other institutions. And that is something which some 
external experts have seen as a problem, and that the incoming government thought as well. At some 
point we stopped looking outside DIPRES, and we focused too much on ourselves (IC26). 
  
Partly in response to these limitations, the Piñera administration introduced some 
changes to the SECG and the government’s MFR policy more broadly. There have been 
efforts to simplify the structure of the PMG, and make it ‘less invasive’ for the agencies 
and ministries (IC26). For instance, the use of ISO-9001 procedures as part of the PMGs 
has been reduced (Guzmán, 2011). Also, as noted in Table 5.3 above, DIPRES apparently 
suspended the use of Comprehensive Spending Evaluations and those of New Programmes 
(which had been created a couple of years before).  
The Piñera administration also advanced two other significant innovations. The first 
was the creation of the Unidad Presidencial de Gestión de Cumplimiento (UPGC, or 
Presidential Unit for Delivery Management) in 2010, which was designed along the lines of 
Tony Blair’s Delivery Unit. The latter’s founder, Michael Barber, has even advised the 
Chilean government on this subject, ‘travelling in various occasions [to Santiago], via 
video conferences, doing some coaching, and suggesting how we could replicate the model’ 
(IC27). As in the case of the British unit, the UGC was created to follow up on a set of 
strategic goals, such as economic growth, employment, education, health, security, and 
poverty.  
The original idea was to set up an independent entity. However, a senior official 
remarks, ‘that would have required a change in structures, in personnel, in the law, and thus 
exchanges with the congress and a series of processes to institutionalise it’ (IC27). 
Therefore, it was decided the unit would be located in MINSEGPRES, and specifically in its 
Unidad de Coordinación Ministerial (UCM, or Ministerial Coordination Unit). This is the 
unit which had previously managed the System of Ministerial Goals (1990-2000) and the 
System for Monitoring Government Programming (up to 2010).  
According to a senior MINSEGPRES official, the task of the UPGC is not to 
perform traditional monitoring activities: 
 
This is not just about monitoring. The challenge of this kind of units is not only management control, 
it is delivery management. It implies that if you see that this goal has deviated from the expected 
trajectory, you have to do everything possible to ensure the indicator improves and the result gets 
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closer to what you had planned. It is a new take on how public organisations face their daily 
management. The idea is to introduce a cultural change with a view on results which have an impact 
on citizens (IC27). 
 
According to Minister Cristián Larroulet, who advocated the unit’s creation, ‘we are 
focused in generating an accountability culture towards citizens in the country and in the 
public service’95. However, for some interviewees it remains unclear whether the UGC 
actually represents a new approach. A former MINSEGPRES senior official remarks that, 
‘in 1994-1995 we already had a traffic light such as the one included in Barber’s unit, and 
which is now been applied in Chile’ (IC23). Along the same lines, a middle-level 
MINSEGPRES official says the unit ‘is seen as something different, although it is not as 
different in comparison to the way we were working already. The focus is now on the 
product, the result for the citizen. They assume we previously cared only about procedures, 
but that was not the case’ (IC28).  
 The second addition to Chile’s MFR policy was the creation of the Subsecretaría 
de Evaluación Social (Undersecretary for Social Evaluation). Established in October 2011 
within the new Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (Ministry for Social Development), the new 
unit is supposed to take up the ‘ex ante evaluations’ of public investment projects, 
previously coordinated by the former Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 
(MIDEPLAN, or Ministry for Planning and Cooperation). Moreover, the new unit’s main 
task will be to ‘improve the impact of social policies, by taking the task of evaluating and 
controlling existing social programmes’96. Some interviewees suggested that, in preparation 
for this ministerial change, Chilean officials had been in contact with the Mexican 
government (IM27; IC22). Indeed, according to a senior Mexican official,    
 
I recently [first half of 2011] travelled to Chile and spoke with Chilean policymakers, and it is 
amazing what is happening. They are doing something like our evaluaciones específicas del 
desempeño, although in a shorter version. But if you see the presentation, the front page is exactly 
the same. Then they also asked us how to evaluate impact. They are taking some things from 
Mexico, which they might find interesting or useful (IM21).  
 
                                                          
95
 Information retrieved from: http://www.minsegpres.gob.cl/2012/06/ministro-larroulet-a-dos-anos-
de-creacion-de-la-delivery-unit-este-gobierno-esta-comprometido-con-cu/, July 13, 2012.  
96
 Information retrieved from http://www.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/conocenos/historia/, April 
17, 2013.   
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The former comment cannot fully prove Chilean officials have borrowed certain elements 
of the Mexican social policy evaluation scheme (see Chapter 6). Yet it does seem to point 
to at least some deliberate effort to gather information about the Mexican experience
97
.   
As a whole, the previous paragraphs offer an image of continuity and some changes 
in the Chilean MFR policy post-2010. The SECG has remained in place, and available 
evidence would seem to show that it has now become institutionalised as part of the 
Chilean politico-administrative system. Furthermore, the Piñera administration has not 
launched an overhaul of the SECG, and has mainly introduced some programmatic 
adjustments. On the other hand, the creation of the so-called ‘Delivery Unit’ and a new 
under-ministry in charge of conducting social policy evaluations do point towards some 
changes in the country’s MFR policy. It is interesting to note that information about other 
national experiences seem to have played an important role during the preparation of both 
changes.  
 
Conclusions 
The 2000s were crucial for the Chilean MFR system. During those years, and particularly 
2000-2006, DIPRES officials were able to introduce a new SECG. This was above all a 
heavily revised version of previous MFR reforms, with the addition of some further 
evaluation tools. As in the 1990s, information from other countries and broader 
international discussions was used to develop some new MFR initiatives. Yet in contrast to 
that period, knowledge from policies abroad was mainly used to compare and adjust 
existing tools. Moreover, in addition to cross-national learning, Chilean policymakers took 
advantage of their own experiences. They thus informed the processes of policy change 
with learning from previous reform episodes. Similarly, they also learned from the annual 
implementation cycles of their MFR programmes.  
Furthermore, throughout the decade Marcel and his colleagues (and later his 
successors) devised a set of strategies to ensuring the appropriate functioning of the SECG, 
and its longer term survival. They created a new División de Control de Gestión within 
DIPRES; revised and redesigned existing MFR tools, and added some new ones; and 
strengthened the links of these tools with budgetary policymaking. Moreover, Marcel and 
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 It was not possible to interview officials from this Ministry, which had just been created at the time 
in which a final round of interviews for this thesis took place in Santiago, during November 2011.  
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Guzmán actively promoted the SECG in many international forums, and published several 
documents narrating the Chilean experience. They also asked international organisations to 
evaluate the SECG. These external assessments contributed to secure the SECG beyond the 
Lagos administration, and turned it into an international ‘model’ worthy of dissemination 
by the IDB across the Latin American region.   
The mostly ‘technical’ nature of the reform process was not, however, free from the 
influence of national factors. Marcel and Guzmán took advantage of DIPRES’ position as 
one of the most powerful institutions of the Chilean government. There were conflicts 
between the latter institution and MINSEGPRES, but by 2002 the SECG had become a 
defining feature of the Chilean politico-administrative system. Then, the arrival of a new 
governing coalition in 2010 brought with it a revision of the PMGs. The Piñera 
administration also introduced some policy innovations: a new ‘Delivery Unit’ at 
MINSEGPRES; and a social policy evaluation unit in the new Ministry for Social 
Development. While this opened the door for reassessing the role the SECG should play in 
Chile’s MFR policy, it did not affect the status of MFR as topic of interest. Nor did it end 
Chilean policymakers’ attempts to inform MFR policy changes with knowledge from 
policies abroad.   
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‘From a Sectoral to a Government-Wide M&E System’: 
The Making (and Early Dissemination) of Mexico’s  
‘Management for Results’ System(s)  
(2000-2010) 
 
 
 
It was then clear that in order to  
have successful evaluations of social programmes  
or of any other government  programme,  
this was more of a public policy task,  
of transforming institutions and rules of the game,  
than just a merely technical issue.  
 
Gonzalo Hernández, Executive Secretary of CONEVAL
98
 
 
 
   So for many years there was the bureaucratic custom of defining  
more than 3,000 indicators in the Budget, in very broad terms 
 and with goals that were usually generated by the budget managers.  
Basically it was a dialogue about numbers but not about goals,  
and it was also reviewed in this light by the Congress, 
 with kilos and kilos of paper produced but not used.  
 
Guillermo Bernal, former Head of the Budget Policy Control Unit
99
  
 
 
I think that what Mexico is doing is richer than what Chile did.  
I think they looked at the Chilean model and they improved it.  
 
International Expert from ECLAC  
 
 
 
 
A recent WB document reported on ‘Mexico’s progressive movement from a sectoral to a 
government-wide M&E [Monitoring & Evaluation] system’ (Castro et al., 2009ii:vi)100. 
The assessment is based on the various MFR innovations which have taken place within the 
social policy sector during the past decade. However, this view is perhaps inaccurate in at 
                                                          
98
 The quote comes from Hernández (2010:119).  
99
 The quote comes from Bernal (2006:52).  
100
 There are many publications which detail the various components, institutions, and norms which 
form part of the Mexican MFR system(s). See González (2008ii); González (2008iii); Rosenzweig and 
Lozano (2010); Arellano and Purón (2010); Ramos et al. (2011); and Rubio (2012).  
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least two respects. First, developments in this sector only make sense when looking at how 
the administrative, budgetary, and social policy MFR ‘strands’ have interacted throughout 
these years. Second, the idea of a ‘government-wide M&E system’ is problematic because, 
despite several attempts to increase coordination, these three MFR ‘strands’ have not been 
fully joined under an overarching and coherent scheme. 
 This chapter will analyse the MFR policy changes which took place in Mexico 
during the 2000s, and will explore the extent to which these were related to cross-national 
learning. It will specifically review the Sistema de Metas Presidenciales (SIMEP, or 
Presidential Goals System); the creation of a new ‘Monitoring and Evaluation’ (M&E) unit 
in SEDESOL, and later of a Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo 
Social (CONEVAL, or National Council for the Evaluation of the Social Development 
Policy); the new Sistema de Evaluación del Desempeño (SED, or Performance Evaluation 
System), later associated with a Presupuesto basado en Resultados (PbR, or Budget by 
Results); and the Programa Especial de Mejora de la Gestión (PEMG, or Special 
Programme for Management Improvement).  
 This chapter will also look at how Mexican officials used knowledge from foreign 
MFR experiences. As in the previous decade, policymakers continued gathering insights 
from other international experiences. Yet, for reasons to be discussed below, they 
particularly focused on the Chilean SECG. This information was used in several ways, 
including the introduction of evaluation methodologies very similar to those used in Chile; 
the development of a new performance-budgeting approach; and the redesign of evaluation 
units at the Secretaría de la Función Pública (SFP, or Ministry of Public Administration, 
which substituted SECODAM in 2003). 
The chapter will further discuss the strategies advanced by Mexican policymakers to 
support MFR policy changes. SEDESOL-CONEVAL officials were able to persuade 
politicians and officials at other ministries about the need to establish a variety of M&E 
practices. Similarly, after the challenges they faced during the Fox administration (2000-
2006), SHCP officials managed to persuade the incoming Calderón administration (2006-
2012) that a budget-by-results system was necessary. They were also able to implement a 
number of legal and constitutional reforms to protect the latter. Therefore, by the end of the 
decade Mexican officials had established significant institutional conditions to support the 
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effective functioning and the longer term durability of most of the MFR tools introduced in 
this period.   
Lastly, the chapter will show how the process of learning from MFR ideas and 
practices abroad was partly shaped by national factors, but even more importantly by 
cognitive and international factors. For instance, political conditions both constrained MFR 
reforms in the budgetary strand, and opened up opportunities for policymakers in the social 
policy strand. Yet, throughout the decade, Mexican officials combined learning from MFR 
practices abroad with what they had learned from previous evaluation and budgetary reform 
developments. Furthermore, Mexican policymakers received important technical and 
financial support from international organisations, which endorsed the Mexican reform 
efforts, and disseminated information about the country’s MFR tools.  
  The rest of the chapter is subdivided into six sections. The first briefly describes the 
SIMEP and explains why this was the only MFR initiative which mattered to president Fox. 
The second details how the social policy MFR initiatives mentioned above evolved 
throughout the Fox administration. The third focuses on developments in the budgetary 
area, and elaborates on how and why an important partnership between SHCP and 
CONEVAL officials took place. The fourth discusses MFR initiatives advanced by the SFP, 
and its allegedly ‘reactive’ role in the design of government-wide MFR tools. The fifth 
briefly comments on how Mexican MFR practices have been disseminated by international 
organisations. The chapter closes with some conclusions.   
 
‘Targets That Matter To Me’: 
Administrative Reforms in a Democracy  
The presidential triumph of the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN, or National Action Party) 
in 2000 represented the first change of governing parties in Mexico in more than seven 
decades. It thus opened up a ‘window of opportunity’ for the introduction of administrative 
reforms. Indeed, president Fox’s administration was very active in this policy area (Cejudo, 
2008; Dusauge-Laguna, 2008; Pardo, 2009; Sánchez, 2009a; Vicher, 2009). It even 
sponsored the adoption of the country’s first Freedom of Information Law; the creation of a 
government-wide merit-based system; and the transformation of the former Secretaría de la 
Contraloría y Desarrollo Administrativo (SECODAM, or Ministry of the Controllership 
and Administrative Development) into the Secretaría de la Función Pública (SFP, or 
 176 
 
 
Ministry of Public Administration; see SFP, 2005). Many of these reform efforts were 
informed by contemporary international developments, and involved several international 
organisations and development agencies. Paradoxically, MFR received only limited 
attention through the implementation of a Sistema de Metas Presidenciales (SIMEP, or 
System of Presidential Goals; Mejía, 2005; Sosa, 2011). Despite its high political status, the 
SIMEP was not truly significant from a government-wide or longer term perspective.  
 The Fox administration years were very active in terms of administrative reforms, 
but they were also marked by changing and sometimes contradictory priorities. At the 
beginning of his term, president Fox established the Oficina de la Presidencia para la 
Innovación Gubernamental (OPIG, or Presidential Office of Government Innovation). This 
unit was led by Ramón Muñoz, a very close advisor of Fox since he was governor of the 
state of Guanajuato. Muñoz was very interested in ‘management’ topics, albeit from a 
private sector management perspective (IM15). This was clearly reflected in the Modelo 
Estratégico para la Innovación y la Calidad Gubernamental (Strategic Model for 
Government Innovation and Quality), which his unit published in January 2001. This aimed 
to ‘regain citizens’ trust in government, as well as transform it into ‘a world class 
institution’ (Oficina de la Presidencia para la Innovación Gubernamental, 2001:2; Muñoz, 
2004). Some of its ideas and ‘entrepreneurial’ jargon permeated reform efforts throughout 
the following years (Mejía, 2005; Pardo, 2007, 2009).  
Yet the Modelo Estratégico was only used for a few months. In April of 2002, in 
accordance to the national planning system, SECODAM published the Programa Nacional 
de Combate a la Corrupción y Fomento a la Transparencia y el Desarrollo Administrativo 
2001-2006 (PNCCTDA, or National Programme for Corruption Control and Support for 
Transparency and Administrative Development 2001-2006; Diario Oficial, 2002c). The 
PNCCTDA proposed five strategic lines, 4 of which were focused on anti-corruption. Other 
topics such as evaluation and control, human resources, transparency, or regulatory reform 
were all linked to anti-corruption.  
While the PNCCTDA remained formally in place until the end of the Fox 
administration, yet another modernisation initiative was introduced in November 2002: the 
Agenda de Buen Gobierno (ABG, or ‘Good Government Agenda’; Oficina de la Presidencia 
para la Innovación Gubernamental, 2002; Muñoz, 2004). The ABG was based on six lines: 
honest and transparent government; professional government; government of quality; 
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digital government; government with regulatory improvement; and government that costs 
less. Most of the topics and even labels of the ABG were drawn from international 
discussions (IM7; Pardo, 2007:920; SFP, 2005:40). According to a senior SFP official, 
‘both the design of the ABG and the way SECODAM was restructured when it became SFP 
represented the alignment of the Fox government with the OECD’s governance topics’ 
(IM4). During the following years, the implementation of the ABG was supported, in 
financial and technical terms, by international development agencies from the US, Canada, 
Sweden, the UK, and Spain (IM3; IM7).  
However, despite extensive exchanges between Mexican officials and international 
agents, and the prominent place administrative modernisation had reached in the 
government agenda, the topic of MFR received only limited attention. There are various 
factors which contribute to explaining this situation. First, the reform agenda was already 
quite full, and the implementation of the various administrative changes already too 
complicated. Indeed, throughout the presidential term, the reform topics often competed 
against each other in terms of institutional priority and resources availability (Dussauge-
Laguna, 2008; Sosa, 2011:112; Villalobos, 2010:107-108). Second, because president 
Fox’s government was seen as the beginning of a new political era in Mexico (e.g. that of 
democracy after several decades of authoritarianism), strong emphasis was set on reforms 
which could signal ‘innovation’ and a break with the past (IM15; IM25). Therefore, anti-
corruption measures, as well as transparency and civil service reforms, received both 
significant political and administrative attention and resources (IIO1).  
Yet a third and perhaps more important reason related to president Fox’s 
understanding of management control. According to the ‘entrepreneurial’ vision of the 
president and his closest advisors (Pardo, 2007), the task of achieving results was mainly a 
responsibility of appointed ministers. Thus, monitoring and target setting activities were not 
seen in the light of comprehensive or systemic schemes, which could cover all government 
programmes or activities. It was more a question of following up on a selected number of 
topics of particular interest to the president.   
Therefore, the SIMEP was the only tool president Fox used for monitoring the 
performance of federal institutions. Created by SECODAM officials who were close to the 
incoming governing group, the SIMEP originally sought to introduce a different approach 
to evaluation. According to a senior SFP official, evaluation and control activities were 
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merely about ‘following up every three months whether ministries complied with their 
budget targets or not’ (IM6). When officials from the president’s innovation unit were 
shown the proposed scheme, they decided to scale up its use for monitoring the progress of 
presidential priorities. According to the same official:  
 
The system’s centre of gravity laid in the targets that mattered to the president. He used to say, 
‘SHCP has its targets and the institutions have their own targets. But these are the things that matter 
to me. I do not care about the ministers’ targets, and whatever they decide to include as part of 
budgetary negotiations. These are the targets that matter to me. I want two or three targets per 
ministry and per each agency I select, and I will directly negotiate with them’. And this was done in 
line with the National Development Plan’s priorities (IM6). 
 
The SIMEP was neither inspired nor informed by international MFR developments. 
The officials who designed it have not previously worked in the federal government. Yet 
they relied on their private sector experience; insights from the strategic planning literature 
they used for teaching university courses; and practices they had employed when working 
in subnational governments (IM6). Then, as implementation of both the ABG and SIMEP 
progressed throughout the following years, other elements were added to the original 
monitoring scheme.  
The SIMEP eventually included four main components (Mejía, 2005; Diener, 2007; 
Pardo, 2007): a set of targets (generally three) which had been negotiated by the president 
and the secretaries of state; a set of targets negotiated between undersecretaries of state, the 
president’s office, and SECODAM-SFP; some targets associated with the administrative 
modernisation agenda; and the results of customer/citizens evaluations surveys collected 
periodically. Results were not made public, but presented in small meetings with the 
president and some of his close advisors. A ‘traffic light’ system with three levels of 
achievement (outstanding, satisfactory, and minimum) was used. It was assumed that 
agencies would comply with the system. According to a senior SFP official, ‘we considered 
the president’s participation should ensure that the system worked, and thus there were no 
sanctions’ (IM6).  
 While both president Fox and the officials in charge of the SIMEP knew about 
SHCP’s scheme of budget indicators and targets (derived from the NEP-SED reforms of the 
1990s), no measures were taken for linking both systems. This seems to have been a 
deliberate decision, which might be explained by two complementary reasons. According 
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to a senior official, the president’s view was: ‘why should I enter negotiations about targets 
which have been already established in the budget, and for things for which there is no 
extra money available?’ For president Fox and the SIMEP’s coordinators, the system’s 
purpose was to ‘challenge institutional leaders to do more with the same, to obtain an extra 
from them’ (IM6).  
Furthermore, the SIMEP’s targets were negotiated at the beginning of the year, once 
the Expenditure Budget had been agreed upon, and had been published in the Diario 
Oficial (official journal). According to the same official, only when a topic was really 
important to the president would he instruct SHCP to do budget transfers (IM6). Lastly, the 
separation of both schemes seems to have been related to the reluctance of president Fox 
(as well as that of his advisors and some appointees in SECODAM-SFP) to further engage 
SHCP officials in this project. According to a former senior official,  
 
Fox had a different conception of SHCP. He did not understand the budget and thought that it was 
simply a matter of adding and substracting. It was a different situation from the previous four 
presidents, who had worked at the [former] Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto [Budget 
Ministry], and thus knew about its importance. On top of this, whatever came from the previous 
administration by default was a bit suspicious for him (IM26). 
 
Among SHCP senior officials there was not an interest in pursuing the integration of these 
schemes either. According to an interviewee, ‘what mattered to SHCP senior officials 
during the Fox government was not to break the budgetary limits” (IM2). Therefore, both 
initiatives advanced along their own paths.  
 Assessments about SIMEP’s contributions to monitoring government performance 
have been mixed, but mostly of a negative nature. A senior SFP official remarks that, ‘the 
SIMEP did work. In fact, it was the only system which never failed throughout the 
administration. The president could access it anytime to see the degree of achievement of 
the targets whenever he wanted to’ (IM6). Along these lines, Mejía (2005:23) notes that the 
SIMEP was ‘considered by president Fox’s administration as timely, trustworthy, and 
sufficient’. On the other hand, Pardo (2007:900) argues the system was ‘excessively broad, 
without an appropriate or sufficient standardisation’. González (2010:158) has similarly 
criticised the ‘poor quality of many of its indicators, as well as the mechanism established 
to modify the targets and a weak system of sanctions’. Some interviewees also pointed at 
other limitations. According to a senior SHCP official, there was significant confusion 
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regarding the different objectives pursued by budget indicators and the targets associated 
with the SIMEP (IM9). Another senior official stated that: 
 
The SIMEP just did not work. I was in charge of the targets of a policy sector, and after four months 
of using it, I noticed that there was a big mistake in a formula, which the coordinators had not 
noticed. What does that mean? That the system was not really used to making decisions (IM15). 
 
Indeed, an OECD (2009:100) report remarked that, ‘by 2005, there was no regular or 
systematic evaluation of performance in the [Mexican] federal administration’101. That 
situation, however, would change towards the end of the Fox administration, albeit 
paradoxically without the president’s (or his staff’s) direct involvement.   
 
‘First World Evaluations in a Third World Country’102: 
Institutionalising Programme Evaluations beyond PROGRESA 
Although MFR was not a central topic for the Fox administration, a number of highly 
significant developments in this area did take place during this term. In many ways, these 
represented a follow up to the changes introduced during the Zedillo administration as part 
of the social policy ‘strand’ (e.g. PROGRESA’s impact evaluation and the ROPS). Since 
2002, senior officials at SEDESOL sought to establish a Sistema de Monitoreo y 
Evaluación (M&E or Monitoring and Evaluation System). While the initiative was not 
related to the administrative modernisation efforts led by SECODAM-SFP and the 
presidential innovation unit, it would eventually have significant repercussions on the 
government’s approach to MFR (Castro et al., 2009; Rubio, 2012). Moreover, in the 
process of designing a ‘M&E system’, SEDESOL officials engaged in various cross-
national learning activities. These would later influence the way in which SHCP and SFP 
officials approached MFR topics, as well as the contents of the policy changes they 
introduced in following years.   
SEDESOL’s attempts to build an ‘M&E system’ related to the positive reception 
that PROGRESA’s impact evaluation and the social programmes’ ROs had had among 
congressmen and government officials alike. Given the change in political conditions (e.g. 
political alternation and a second ‘divided government’ for the period of 2000-2003), both 
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 According to a senior SFP official, during the Calderón administration ‘the topic of the SIMEP 
and the presidential targets was never discussed. It became a taboo, as if it had never existed’ (IM6). 
102
 Phrase attributed by Schlefer (2004:8) to Gonzalo Hernández, Director of CONEVAL.  
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set of actors were interested in maintaining the principle that the use of public funds in 
social programmes should follow clear rules, and should be subject to evaluation 
exercises
103
. Thus, for fiscal year 2002, the SHCP and Congress agreed upon introducing 
two additional innovations (Diario Oficial, 2002a). According to article 63, section b) of the 
budget decree, for 2002 all ministries and agencies in charge of social programmes (listed 
in the same decree) would need to:   
 
Present the evaluation of results for each programme to the Chamber’s [of Deputies] Commission of 
Budget and Public Accounts, no later than October 15 [of 2002], so that the results might be 
considered in the process of analysis and approval of the Federal Expenditure Budget for the next 
fiscal exercise. The aforementioned evaluation should be paid with charge to the respective 
[programmes’] budgets and be developed by academic and research institutions or specialised 
bodies, either national or international, with recognition and experience in the subject matter of the 
programmes. 
 
In the case of programmes which will start working during the current fiscal exercise, a partial 
evaluation might be developed as long as it is feasible to report results, on the assumption that this 
situation can be justified to the aforementioned Commission.   
 
The budget decree thus introduced the idea that the ‘results’ of all social 
programmes, and not only PROGRESA, had to be evaluated. Moreover, that those 
evaluation findings should be made available to inform Congressional decisions on 
budgetary policy-making matters. The same article established that SHCP and SECODAM 
(with the National Council of Science and Technology’s support) ‘should publish no later 
than February 15, the minimum requirements to be fulfilled by the academic and research 
institutions or specialised organisations’ (Diario Oficial, 2002a). While the deadline was 
not met, on April 30 of the same year SHCP and SECODAM published the Acuerdo 
(guidelines), which detailed the principles to be followed government-wide during 2002 
(Diario Oficial, 2002b; Conde, 2007)
104
. 
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 Castro et al. (2009ii:26) remark that ‘[e]valuation in Mexico was an answer to, and a consequence 
of the political transition to democracy, specifically, to the increasing calls for accountability in government. 
But it was also a technically planned effort in response to Congress’ political decisions to demand 
performance evaluations of all government programs’.  
104
 The complete name of the document was: Acuerdo por el que se expiden los requisitos mínimos 
que las dependencias y entidades de la administración pública federal deberán considerar para seleccionar a 
las instituciones académicas y de investigación u organismos especializados, de carácter nacional o 
internacional, interesados en realizar la evaluación de resultados de los programas gubernamentales sujetos 
a Reglas de Operación en el ejercicio fiscal 2002 (Agreement which establishes the minimum requirements 
that ministries and agencies of the Federal Public Administration will need to consider for selecting the 
academic and research institutions or specialized entities, of national or international character, interested in 
developing the evaluation of results of the government programmes subject to the Operation Rules in the 
fiscal exercise of 2002). 
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If the idea that all social programmes should be evaluated before October of 2002 
was already challenging, the Acuerdo did not make things much easier (IM16; Medina, 
2007). The guidelines were introduced so that, ‘ministries and agencies of the federal 
Public Administration have homogeneous criteria to select the ideal institutions and 
organisations to conduct the evaluation of results of government programmes, through the 
methodologies and procedures that guarantee the trustworthiness of the works’ (Diario 
Oficial, 2002b). Yet the guidelines required that external evaluation reports should include 
at least the following components: percentage of accomplishment of the programme’s 
general and specific objectives; level of satisfaction by the target population; levels of 
coverage (national, state level, specific populations) of the programme; economic and 
social impacts of the programmes; a benefit-cost analysis of the resources originally 
attributed to the programme; a verification of the achievement of the programme’s physical 
and financial goals; a prospective scenario and opinion about the programme’s 
continuation, adjustment, or termination; general conclusions and recommendations; and a 
discussion about the programme’s limitations and the measures needed to solve them.  
Given the country’s conditions in terms of evaluation capacity, these requirements 
were basically impossible to fulfil. The guidelines asked for an enormous amount of 
information regarding several aspects of each programme’s performance (e.g. general 
operation, cost-efficiency, impact, customer satisfaction). Then external evaluators and the 
institutions in charge of the programmes to be evaluated only had about 5 months (May to 
September) to complete evaluations. Moreover, the ‘evaluation market’ was rather poor: on 
the supply side, there were not many evaluation experts either in academia or among 
private consultants; on the demand side, there were neither specialists nor evaluation units 
within the federal ministries/agencies (Medina, 2007; Castro et al., 2009ii; SHCP, 
forthcoming). All in all, it certainly looked like this was an attempt to introduce ‘first world 
evaluations in a third world country’105. 
In response to these requirements, between 2002 and 2005 officials at SEDESOL’s 
newly created Dirección General de Monitoreo y Evaluación de Programas Sociales 
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 As Schlefer (2004:7) notes, ‘[p]olitical and technical problems built on each other. For one thing, 
the October 15 deadline established in the Federal budget, so the Chamber could consider evaluations in 
making next year’s appropriations, was essentially impossible to meet. The Mexican fiscal year coincided 
with the calendar year, so programs did not complete – or fail to complete – their objectives until December. 
The Accord only required this initial evaluation to consider progress through August, but even that 
requirement was harder than it sounded’ 
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(DGME, or General Directorate for Monitoring and Evaluation of Social Programmes) 
sought to redefine the ministry’s approach to evaluation (World Bank, 2009b)106. The 
DGME was part of the similarly new Subsecretaría de Prospectiva, Planeación y 
Evaluación (Undersecretariat for Prospective, Planning, and Evaluation). The latter was led 
by Miguel Székely, an economist and expert in antipoverty studies, with significant 
experience as an international consultant, who had evaluated PRONASOL’s performance in 
the early 1990s (Cardozo, 2006:179-181). According to former officials, Székely was 
strongly convinced that SEDESOL had to strengthen its evaluation capacities for ensuring 
the appropriate functioning of social policies, as well as increasing accountability (IM16; 
IM27; Székely, 2004).     
To develop SEDESOL’s new M&E approach, the DGME’s Director General 
Gonzalo Hernández and his team engaged in two complementary activities. First, they 
analysed in detail those evaluations which had been developed since PROGRESA’s. DGME 
officials diagnosed a number of issues which negatively affected evaluation exercises. 
According to a former official, it was clear for them that the new guidelines were ‘a little 
like a letter to Santa Claus’. It was simply ‘not realistic’ to expect that every social 
programme could be evaluated on a yearly basis, and with regards to so many aspects, 
‘from its operation to its impacts’ (IM27). The same former official remarks that:  
 
Two things that we saw as a challenge were, first, to have homogenous terms of reference, because 
everyone used to evaluate whatever they wanted and however they understood things. Therefore, you 
could not have an analysis of the performance of SEDESOL’s programmes as a whole because there 
were different methodologies and things behind the evaluations. Then, it was hard to disaggregate 
what you asked from the evaluation because it is not the same to evaluate the ‘procedure’ than to 
evaluate the ‘impact’. And it is not the same to use a quantitative approach than a qualitative one. Yet 
at that point everything was mixed in the same ‘bag’, in the same year (IM27).   
 
A third related issue that DGME officials diagnosed was the lack of consistency regarding 
how programmes were evaluated in different rounds. The same former official remarks:   
 
Year after year evaluators could completely change the approach or focus of the evaluation exercise. 
So we asked ourselves what was going on, because there were differences not only across 
programmes, but also within the same programme across time. There was no consistency. We 
realised that was because we lacked a document which actually said what the programme was, what 
was its purpose, what it was supposed to achieve, what was its target population. So you would talk 
with the programme director and he/she would tell you something about the conceptualisation of the 
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 For SEDESOL’s activities in this area beyond that year, see Hernández (2006, 2010); Medina 
(2007); World Bank (2009b); Franco and Ordóñez (2010); and Cordero (2010).  
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programme. Then you would speak with the people in charge of implementing the programme, and 
they would say, ‘well the programme is for this or that’. And sometimes both groups would tell the 
same thing, but sometimes they did not (IM27).   
 
On the basis of this diagnosis, DGME officials sought to increase their own 
evaluation capacities. They revisited ‘the best texts on evaluation methodologies’, and 
‘organised a three weeks-seminar on the best techniques for evaluating impact’ (Hernández, 
2010:117). Perhaps more importantly, they started to gather information about international 
experiences on M&E. In order to do so, Hernández and his team developed a number of 
different activities. For example, they participated in regional meetings, which were co-
sponsored by the WB and the IDB. According to a former senior official, in those meetings 
‘we were one of the main actors at that time, because some of the most famous examples 
were those related to Oportunidades’ (IM16). Apart from ‘obtaining lots of feedback’ from 
international experts regarding the evaluation activities conducted by SEDESOL, at these 
meetings DGME officials learned about the ‘positive and negative experiences of Latin 
American countries on this subject’ (IM16).  
DGME officials also started to study some specific national cases. According to a 
former official:  
 
We did look at various examples, we looked at Chile, we looked at PART [US Program Assessment 
Rating Tool], we looked at Canada, and those were the three main cases we revised. In fact, we made 
some trips. We went to Chile, to Canada, and the US. In the US we went to speak with legislators, 
with people in the Department of Labor. In Canada we went to federal ministries to talk about the 
coordination of evaluation practices, and to discuss what kind of evaluations they carried out. I really 
don’t remember how we decided to focus on those three examples, but it was revising documents, 
talking to people in the field, with people from the WB, IDB, with a consultant that taught a seminar 
about M&E and why it was important, etc. I recall that we also revised the experiences of New 
Zealand, the UK, and Colombia’s SINERGIA [Sistema Nacional de Evaluación de Resultados de la 
Gestión Pública]. But it was the first three which served us as the main reference (IM27).  
 
PROGRESA’s impact evaluation had been the original reference for DGME officials 
(Hernández, 2010:118). Yet learning about these other international experiences offered 
them a rich set of ideas about different M&E instruments and methodologies, as well as 
their practical applications. Another former official remarked, for instance, that ‘we took a 
lot from Chile, but this was complemented with many other cases, and in reality 
SEDESOL’s system was a combination of all these cases’ (IM16).  
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During the following years SEDESOL redefined its approach to evaluation and used 
some of these international practices. In particular, there are two changes which deserve to 
be mentioned. The first relates to the so-called términos de referencia (‘terms of 
reference’). This is a document which establishes the formal requirements that independent 
evaluators should follow when conducting evaluations. As part of their on-going 
relationships with the WB (Cardozo, 2006:201-202), DGME officials worked with experts 
from this organisation on ‘how to develop better, more homogenous terms of reference, 
which could help us evaluate high priority programmes’ (IM27). The objectives were to 
introduce a certain level of homogeneity for hiring evaluation consultants; to define the 
activities they should perform; and to establish the products they should hand in at the end 
of their consultancies.  
The second change was the introduction of the ‘Logical Framework Methodology’ 
(LFM) as the main tool for guiding evaluation practices. According to a former middle-
level official: 
 
We realised we lacked a tool which could help us identify the objectives of a given programme, and 
the indicators that could help us identify its success or failure. Then we started to revise experiences, 
we revised the case of Chile, and we thought that we needed something like the logical framework, a 
table that could tell everyone ‘this is the programme’, and that could help us avoid someone coming 
and giving you their own version of the programme. Also, we thought this table was something we 
could give to each evaluator. She could then introduce some additional points, but she would need to 
evaluate what the programme really was, and not what she thought the programme was (IM27). 
 
With the sponsorship of the IDB, DGME officials gathered detailed information about the 
Chilean MFR system. They attended a seminar in Santiago de Chile, in which DIPRES 
officials explained their MFR tools, including the LFM for programme evaluations (IC4; 
IM16). Throughout 2004-2005, with the financial and technical support of the WB, the 
DGME launched a pilot project to develop the logical frameworks of five social 
programmes. In various meetings with programme staff, the DGME officials and a WB 
consultant advised the former to define the logic and objectives of their programme; a set of 
relevant indicators; and expected impacts (IM16; Medina, 2007:37). 
 Around the same time, in January of 2004 president Fox enacted a new Ley General 
de Desarrollo Social (LGDS, or General Law for Social Development) (Diario Oficial, 
2004). Among its various goals, the LGDS aimed to ‘establish evaluation and monitoring 
mechanisms of the programmes and actions of the National Social Development Policy 
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(article 1, section VIII; Medina, 2007:25; Cardozo, 2006). The law created a Consejo 
Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL, or National 
Council for the Evaluation of the Social Development Policy). According to the LGDS, 
CONEVAL would be in charge of ‘revising periodically the achievement of the social 
objective of the programmes, targets and actions of the Social Development Policy, to 
correct, modify, add, reorient or terminate them totally or partially’ (article 72)107.  
The LGDS established that evaluations could be developed either by CONEVAL or 
by external academic or consultancy institutions. Furthermore, it determined that ‘the 
evaluation of results’ should include ‘indicators of results, management and services’, so 
that the ‘coverage, quality and impact’ of the programmes could be measured (article 73); 
that indicators should reflect ‘the programmes, targets and actions of the Social 
Development National Policy’ (articles 74 and 75); and that evaluations should be annual, 
but could also be multi-annual in some cases (article 78). Last but not least, the LGDS 
established that CONEVAL would be a semi-independent entity, formally attached to 
SEDESOL, but with an innovative institutional design that sought to secure its 
administrative autonomy and technical capacity. Therefore, the Minister of SEDESOL, six 
academic researchers, and an Executive Secretary (in charge of the agency’s day-to-day 
management) were all part of CONEVAL’s leadership board (articles 81-85).  
 The creation of CONEVAL was strongly related to SEDESOL officials’ capacity to 
to advocate the professionalisation of social programme evaluations. According to a WB 
expert,  
 
Praise for the reforms introduced on the subject of M&E in the social policy field should be given to 
the Mexican technocracy. They possessed impeccable technical credentials, they knew the topic very 
well, and they also understood that the democratisation process, with the arrival of president Fox, 
had opened the door for this type of changes. They were pursuing the reforms mainly because of 
technical considerations, but of course also taking into account the political conditions and needs 
(IIO1).    
 
As mentioned above, since he was appointed undersecretary in 2002, Székely had pushed 
for the institutionalisation of evaluation practices within the ministry, as well as for the 
regular use of evaluation results in policymaking (IM17; Rubio, 2012). For instance, 
Székely used to provide Secretary Josefina Vázquez with executive memos ‘detailing the 
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strengths and weaknesses of social programmes, as found in evaluations’, so that she could 
use that information in the course of her budget reviews with programme operators. The 
Secretary would then tell programme managers, ‘OK, the evaluation says you have got 
these problems, how are you planning to solve them? Please answer that to me, and then we 
will see about the resources’ (IM16; IM27). The legislative changes were also undoubtedly 
associated with PROGRESA’s still recent (and internationally famous) evaluation 
experience. Moreover, both government officials and congressmen were keen to further 
limiting the politicisation of social policy resources and decisions.  
While CONEVAL’s creation represented a crucial point in the development of 
Mexico’s MFR policy, it was first of all a continuation of the reform process described in 
previous pages. In November of 2005 Hernández was appointed CONEVAL’s first 
Executive Secretary. In developing the organisation’s M&E scheme, Hernández and his 
team (mainly former DGME officials) took advantage of what they had already learned 
from MFR practices abroad. For example, they kept the LFM as the centrepiece of 
CONEVAL’s strategy for evaluating social programmes (IM11). They also maintained 
communications with Marcel and Guzmán, who would advise them as reforms progressed.  
Similarly, on the basis of their experience in SEDESOL and what they had observed 
in foreign examples, CONEVAL officials realised that ‘one kind of evaluation was not 
going to be sufficient’ (IM22). They thought different kinds of evaluations were required to 
assess the various phases or programme components. Indeed, the 2002-2005 experience 
had shown them that, ‘evaluations were too broad, too expensive, and too general, as they 
were the same for all the programmes’ (IM16). Drawing on this and their exchanges with 
Chilean policymakers during 2005-2006, CONEVAL officials abandoned the focus on a 
‘one-size-fits-all’ methodology. Instead, they embraced the idea of having ‘a more flexible 
model with different methodologies, which could answer different questions’ (IC30). The 
result would be a ‘menu of evaluations’ that remains up to this date (see next section). 
In addition, previous cross-national learning exercises allowed CONEVAL officials 
to combine insights from foreign experiences in the design of new evaluation tools. An 
example is that of the so-called Evaluación de Consistencia y Resultados (Evaluation of 
Consistency and Results). This was the product of knowledge gathered from three 
jurisdictions: the Chilean programme evaluations mentioned above (IM27); 
recommendations from Canadian public servants, who told them ‘it is very good to have 
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evaluations, but you also have to present them in a very clear format, otherwise they will 
not “sell”’ (IM22); and insights from the US PART, which was ‘focused on the short term, 
could be replicated for a huge number of programmes, and was based on very specific 
criteria, with a clearly structured ‘manual’ explaining the procedure’ (IM22). 
Continuities between the SEDESOL and CONEVAL phases also existed in terms of 
relationships with international organisations. Mexican officials had engaged in learning 
from international M&E practices on their own initiative, and had always made their own 
decisions regarding what to use in the Mexican scheme (IM21). However, since 2002 the 
IDB and the WB played a significant role in the making of SEDESOL/CONEVAL’s 
evaluation approach in various respects. The WB, for instance, supported both technically 
and financially the development and institutionalisation of SEDESOL’s DGME (Cordero, 
2010; Franco and Ordóñez, 2010). It also ‘accompanied the drafting of the Social 
Development Law, and particularly its evaluation component’; and participated in several 
internal workshops on the relevance of M&E practices ‘a bit like a facilitator’ (IIO1). 
Furthermore, both organisations sponsored the study tours developed by DGME (later 
CONEVAL) officials to Canada, the US, Colombia and, most importantly, Chile. According 
to a former official:   
 
The IDB and the WB provided great support in helping us identify the challenges of these 
approaches, why it was important to have evaluations and monitoring systems, and what differences 
existed between those two concepts. They were also important in getting us closer to the topic in 
technical terms, in learning about what was being done elsewhere. It was not like the IDB or the WB 
came to us and said, ‘you have to do some evaluations’. That was already mandatory by law. They 
helped us finding the best evaluation methodologies; training public servants; and designing specific 
evaluations. They also got us closer to international experts (IM27).  
 
The support of these international organisations continued to be relevant in following years 
(Rubio, 2012:179). For example, in 2006 CONEVAL officials implemented an ambitious 
capacity building exercise which sought two objectives: to persuade senior social 
programme officials that the LFM was a useful tool; and to provide training for 
middle/lower-level public officials involved in daily operations (IM22). Some additional 
seminars were directed to potential evaluators (e.g. consultants), in order to build their 
evaluation capacities (IM27). With financial resources from the IDB, CONEVAL hired a 
group of experts from ECLAC, who had already worked with Hernández and his team 
while at SEDESOL’s DGME. According to an international expert,  
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We trained more or less 1,000 senior managers of social programmes during a couple of weeks. 
About two hundred of them would enter the room for a talk of one hour and a half, in which we 
explained the logical framework methodology, how it was used, and what it was good for. We would 
then get a coffee and then another 100 people. And that is how we spent the days (IIO5). 
 
The ECLAC experts had extensive experience in using the LFM for evaluation purposes. 
More importantly, they possessed a detailed knowledge of how the Chilean public sector 
used it.  
 Thus, by the final year of the Fox administration some significant progress had been 
made in terms of developing an M&E system for SEDESOL, which was later expanded for 
the broader social policy sector. The experience had not been easy for various reasons. 
Social programme coordinators had faced several challenges for complying with the 
evaluation guidelines established in 2002. There was not a well-functioning ‘evaluation 
market’ in the country. Moreover, Hernández and his team had struggled, first at the 
DGME and later at CONEVAL, to ‘persuade people to develop logical frameworks’ as part 
of the new evaluation approach they were advocating (IM27).  
On the other hand, SEDESOL/CONEVAL officials managed to broaden and reshape 
the nature of MFR practices in the social policy field. They did so by building on the 
success of PROGRESA’s impact evaluation; by taking into account the government’s 
accumulated experience in implementing the evaluation guidelines during 2002-2005; and 
by using international examples and knowledge of evaluation techniques. Furthermore, the 
progress achieved in advancing M&E ideas and practices in the social policy sector would 
have ripple effects on the other two MFR ‘strands’ which had developed in the 1990s.   
 
‘As thick as thieves’: 
SHCP, CONEVAL, and the Ripple Effects of the Chilean MFR System 
In the final years of the Fox administration, SHCP officials started working on how to 
reform the country’s public finances scheme. This included aspects related to the 
management of the budgetary system. The first product of this effort was the Ley Federal 
de Presupuesto y Responsabilidad Hacendaria (LFPRH, or Budget and Financial 
Responsibility Law) of March 30, 2006 (Diario Oficial, 2006a). Among its various 
objectives, the LFPRH sought to reintroduce the design of budget indicators associated 
with a Sistema de Evaluación del Desempeño (SED, or Performance Evaluation System) as 
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the one attempted in the 1990s (OECD, 2009). The reform took place in the middle of a 
presidential transition, but it eventually gained political support from the incoming 
administration of president Felipe Calderón (2006-2012). SHCP officials even managed to 
set the basis for a broader and more ambitious Presupuesto basado en Resultados (PbR, or 
Results-based Budget). The reform built on SHCP’s previous experience in implementing 
the NEP-SED (see Chapter 4), and was further supported by the recent experience of 
CONEVAL officials in developing the social sector’s M&E system.  
According to a middle-level official, during these years SHCP and CONEVAL 
officials became ‘as thick as thieves’ (IM23). They formed a mutually beneficial 
relationship. SHCP acquired much needed technical expertise (e.g. about evaluation 
methodologies, specific international examples, and contacts with international experts). 
CONEVAL protected its own M&E system and influenced the federal government’s 
broader approach to evaluation of public policies and programmes. Although officials from 
SFP eventually joined discussions about the new PbR-SED, the partnership formed by 
SHCP-CONEVAL became the leading force behind the reforms. As a result, the Chilean 
SECG experience remained as the principal source of inspiration throughout the process.  
Since 2005, SHCP officials started preparing some ideas to reform the budgetary 
system. A major reason for doing this was to regain a central place in the process of 
defining government-wide objectives. As mentioned above, during the Fox administration 
SHCP had been relegated from those decisions, and its efforts to produce budget indicators 
had been ‘bypassed’ through the SIMEP. According to a SHCP official, ‘president Fox had 
another vision; he developed his own “war rooms”, his indicators and control boards, and 
supported much more SFP, whereas at SHCP we did not get much attention’ (IM24). 
Furthermore, SHCP officials realised that some federal ministries were developing systems 
for monitoring their own programmes, but were not really sharing that information with 
them (IC30). Under these circumstances, the revival of the NEP-SED introduced back in 
the 1990s seemed a helpful way to improve expenditure control, and to increase SHCP’s 
participation in the making of government-wide decisions. 
With the presidential transition of 2006 in mind, SHCP officials engaged in two 
complementary activities for reintroducing MFR ideas into the budgetary policymaking 
cycle. First, they included in the LFRPH the necessary legal principles to provide a basis 
for a new SED. The law mainly focused in improving fiscal responsibility and establishing 
 191 
 
 
a set of criteria to guarantee healthy public finances (OCDE, 2009:35-36; SHCP, 
forthcoming). Yet it also included a formal definition of the SED as ‘the set of 
methodological elements which allow developing an objective assessment of programmes, 
along the principles of verifying the degree in which goals and objectives are achieved, on 
the basis of strategic and management indicators which might allow knowing the social 
impact of programmes and projects’ (article 2, section LI). 
 The LFPRH also stated that annual programming and budgeting processes would 
take into account, among other inputs, the SED’s reports regarding the progress achieved 
on fulfilling the National Development Plan’s (NDP) objectives and goals (article 24). 
Then, the law established that the SED would be ‘mandatory for budget executors’ (article 
111); indicators included in the SED would become part of the annual Expenditure Budget 
(article 111); and the SED should be fully implemented by fiscal year 2008. The LFPRH 
also stated the budget structure would include ‘performance indicators’ to link the NDP and 
each institution’s annual goals (article 27). The same article mentioned that ‘performance 
indicators’ could be about ‘coverage, efficiency, economic and social impact, quality and 
equity’ aspects. Moreover, the law remarked that, ‘the evaluation of performance should be 
developed through the verification of the degree of accomplishment of objectives and 
goals, on the basis of strategic and management indicators which allow knowing the results 
of federal public resources use’ (article 110).  
At the same time the congressional approval of the LFPRH was being negotiated, 
SHCP officials started to look for advice and information from abroad. Carlos Hurtado, 
then Undersecretary for Expenditure at SHCP, contacted Mario Marcel. They knew each 
other because of their joint participation in different forums, such as the OECD Senior 
Budget Officials meetings in Paris, and the Latin American Budget Officials meetings in 
Santiago (sponsored by ECLAC, OECD, WB, and IDB). According to a former senior 
official at DIPRES, Hurtado and his team ‘needed to better align indicators. They had too 
many indicators, and it was not clear how these related to the budget structure. They 
wanted to rationalise the whole indicators system’ (IC30).  
 The relevance of looking at the Chilean MFR experience was further reinforced by 
contacts established between SHCP officials and SEDESOL (later CONEVAL) officials in 
June 2005. This happened during a seminar on M&E practices in Latin America, co-
sponsored by the WB and the IDB in Washington DC. In that meeting, the Head of SHCP’s 
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Unidad de Política y Control Presupuestal (UPCP, or Unit of Budget Policy and Control), 
Guillermo Bernal (2006:52), expressed he had been ‘very fortunate to have had the 
opportunity to speak with Gonzalo Hernández’. Bernal also noted they ‘had never been able 
to personally speak about these matters in the past’, which gave him ‘an idea of the 
problems we have in Mexico today’. After this meeting, they started to exchange 
information, particularly once Hernández became CONEVAL’s Executive Secretary. From 
the beginning of their exchanges, Hernández suggested Bernal to look at the Chilean SECG 
(IM10). 
 During 2006 SHCP officials travelled to Santiago to study the Chilean MFR system. 
The delegation included Bernal, his advisors, a representative from the IDB (which was 
funding the trip), and Max Diener. The latter was SHCP’s General Attorney and had 
participated in the NEP-SED reforms of the 1990s in Chávez-Presa’s team. Diener was a 
lawyer and thus neither a public management expert, nor strictly involved in budget policy 
operations. Yet throughout the 2000s he had actively participated in international forums on 
these topics. Furthermore, he was in charge of ‘translating’ to legal language the various 
MFR principles underpinning the LFPRH and the supplementary regulations which later 
accompanied the implementation of the new SED. The SHCP delegation met with DIPRES 
officials and with Marcel and Guzmán. While they had recently quit their government 
positions, their newly established consulting firm was hired by the IDB to coordinate the 
Mexican delegation’s visit (IM18; IC30).   
 The trip to Santiago was very useful for SHCP officials in various respects. From a 
purely technical point of view, it provided them with detailed information about the Chilean 
SECG and its specific tools (e.g. programme evaluations, programmes for management 
improvement), and the links between performance management information and budgetary 
policymaking. In addition, the meetings held with Marcel and Guzmán made SHCP 
officials reconsider the way in which they were approaching the new performance-based 
system (IC30; IC20). According to a former SHCP official, ‘they discussed with us their 
vision about the budget system, and from them we tried to learn how to advance the project 
and how to approach it’ (IM18). This led SHCP officials away from their initial focus on 
‘performance indicators’ and a ‘performance evaluation system’. The SED described in the 
LFPRH basically reproduced the reform initiative of the 1990s. However, after their visit to 
Chile, Bernal and his team started to approach the SED’s design and implementation from a 
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different perspective. The SED remained as the central component of the reforms, but not 
the only one. Evaluations were added to performance indicators, and everything was 
framed within a broader results-based budgetary system.  
The study tour was further helpful because it provided SHCP officials with insights 
about the broader politico-institutional aspects of the reform. Some of them, like Diener, 
had followed international budgetary reform developments for more than a decade. They 
thus had gathered a good amount of information about leading foreign models during the 
OECD-SBO meetings and other international forums (e.g. about the UK, Australia, 
Sweden, and New Zealand; IM9; Pérez-Jácome, 2010:39). But SHCP officials had usually 
thought the cultural and institutional gaps between those countries and Mexico were too 
significant (IM9).  
While the Chilean experience was also different, SHCP officials thought it would be 
easier to learn from it. On the one hand, the role of Congress in budgetary policymaking 
was weak in Chile, but very strong in Mexico. Similarly, the size of the Mexican budget 
was much bigger, and the system more complex than the Chilean one (IM13). However, in 
the Chilean experience they also found a ‘more realist’ system (IM9), and one ‘which was 
easier to copy’ (IM13). According to a former SHCP middle-level official:   
 
There were very simple things. For example, that everything was written in Spanish; that SHCP 
could see itself mirrored in DIPRES; that there were similar professional experiences among those 
involved in the reform process and their Chilean counterparts. Then, the Chilean case was being used 
as an example by CONEVAL and other countries. All in all, the Chilean experience represented 
something that was doable. It was a simple, efficient example, which fit well the logic of a 
developing country such as Mexico. It also seemed to be culturally closer for those who would be 
involved in implementing the programme. It thus seemed trustworthy, feasible, and coherent (IM18).  
 
Moreover, the Chilean MFR system was controlled by DIPRES, the equivalent of Bernal’s 
unit. As it was described in Chapter 4, in the past SHCP officials had struggled to build a 
performance-oriented budget. This had been partly due to Mexico’s institutional context, 
which forced them to coordinate efforts and negotiate with SECODAM-SFP. However, the 
SECG offered the blueprint of a system which could be managed without the latter’s 
involvement. This was an interesting and appealing attribute of the Chilean experience 
(IM13).  
SHCP officials ‘decided to take Chile as the main reference’ (IM18), but they also 
looked at other foreign examples: New Zealand, Australia, South Korea, Colombia, and 
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Minas Gerais (Brazil). They particularly liked ‘the analytical and methodological rigour of 
the American system’, and the way in which the US government provided public 
information about federal spending. This would later influence the design of SHCP’s 
website on budgetary transparency (IM24). In addition, SHCP officials appreciated the 
‘Canadian’s sector-wide view’ (IM13), and how the Treasury developed communication 
channels with other federal agencies to coordinate annual evaluation exercises. These 
insights did not have an immediate influence on the reforms, but would be helpful at a later 
point. In fact, during 2010-2012 SHCP officials would engage in a ‘peer-to-peer’ 
programme with the Canadian government sponsored by the WB, aimed at refining the 
PbR-SED (Hill and Caso, 2011).  
Thus, Bernal and his team had prepared well to face the government transition of 
December 2006. They then found an incoming governing group quite supportive of their 
reform plans. While the incoming president Calderón was not an enthusiastic supporter of 
administrative modernisation topics in general (IM25), he and his team did welcome 
SHCP’s ideas about reforming the budgetary system. Because his election had taken place 
under highly polarised political circumstances (including electoral fraud allegations and an 
electoral triumph by a vote difference of 0.58%), president Calderón was interested in 
implementing actions which could reduce the popularity of the losing candidate. One of the 
main issues the latter had successfully flagged during the presidential campaign was that of 
reducing government salaries and administrative costs. Therefore, president Calderón 
supported SHCP’s idea of introducing an ‘austerity’ decree (Diario Oficial, 2006b). Among 
other measures, this suggested to cut down salary levels, and to introduce a Chilean 
inspired programa de mejoramiento de la gestión (programme for management 
improvement) to promote administrative efficiency (IM5; Dussauge-Laguna, 2013; see 
below).  
In 2007-2008, when SHCP officials suggested developing further regulations to 
create a government-wide PbR, and advancing a constitutional reform to extend MFR 
practices to subnational governments, they also obtained a favourable response from 
president Calderón. A former senior official notes that president Calderón had been a 
member of the Chamber of Deputies (2000-2003), and thus he ‘understood well the 
political relevance of the budget’ (IM26). A senior presidential advisor further says that, 
‘the idea of introducing a budget by results perfectly fit with the president’s ideas and the 
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things he was already promoting for obtaining results’ (IM15). A senior WB expert 
similarly remarks that, ‘at the beginning of the Calderón administration, the topic had a 
high political support, because the president wanted to improve his office’s coordination 
and strategic planning capacities’ (IIO1).  
The design and subsequent refinement of the PbR-SED regulations was also 
supported by Ernesto Cordero, then Undersecretary for Public Expenditure (2006-2008). A 
close advisor to Calderón during the presidential campaign, Cordero had been in charge of 
drafting proposals on economic policy and public finances (IM18). Once in office, he 
became ‘an active promoter’ of the PbR-SED and similar initiatives (IM19). For instance, 
he presented to Congress the legislative and constitutional reforms which UPCP officials 
had prepared, and actively lobbied for getting the changes approved (IM20). Later on, when 
he became Secretary of SEDESOL in 2008, he also supported the consolidation of the 
institution’s M&E system (Cordero, 2010; Franco and Ordóñez, 2010) 
The fact that MFR gained the attention of the incoming governing group was at 
least partly due to persuasion efforts led by CONEVAL and SHCP. A senior CONEVAL 
official recalls that between August and December of 2006, they made significant efforts to 
explain and ‘sell the product’ of evaluation to the presidential transition team, in which 
Cordero played a leading role (IM10). Similarly, a senior SHCP official remarks that: 
 
Since the beginning of the Calderón administration, we have repeatedly told our various 
undersecretaries, first to Ernesto Cordero, and later to Dionisio Pérez-Jácome, that the country needs 
a system which links the budget with indicators and evaluations. This is necessary both to increase 
efficiency and to better control public spending (IM9).  
 
Indeed, Pérez-Jácome (2008-2010) also provided continuous support to the UPCP’s 
activities related to development of the PbR (Pérez-Jácome, 2010; Arizti et al., 2010).     
 These favourable political conditions provided SHCP officials with room to further 
refine the SED initiative during 2007-2008. According to the LFRPH, implementation 
should be completed no later than 2008, and draft regulations should be submitted for 
congressional comments in March 2007. The LFPRH had given evaluation and 
performance indicators a legal basis. This was a big difference regarding the NEP-SED of 
the 1990s, which ‘could never gain normative support’ (IM24). However, from a 
conceptual/methodological perspective, this still reflected SHCP’s old approach towards 
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performance-budgeting. As indicated above, after their communications with CONEVAL 
officials and the trip to Chile in 2006, SHCP officials had realised they required a different 
approach to this subject. 
 Thus, throughout 2007-2008 a very complex policy design process developed in at 
least three intertwined areas. First, SHCP officials engaged in several internal discussions 
about how to reform the budgetary structure, in order to better assess the quality of public 
expenditure, and reinforce its performance orientation. According to an SHCP official: 
 
We decided to reform the programmatic structure and the budgetary programmes. I think that was 
the big decision, because before that we only had a concept of priority activities (subsidy 
programmes, projects, something called priority activities, and other activities). The 60% of the 
money was under the latter concept, which who knows what it meant. So if we wanted to evaluate 
the quality of expenditure, then we first needed to know where this expenditure was heading to. The 
creation of budget programmes allowed us to define and delineate the destiny of public resources 
(IM23). 
 
Although the NEP-SED reforms had produced a clearer budgetary structure, they had not 
eliminated all budget-classification ambiguities (IM13). By introducing the ‘budgetary 
programme’ concept, SHCP officials found a way to better link public expenditure with the 
specific objectives of each federal institution, as well as with the general objectives of the 
NDP (IM14; SHCP, forthcoming). Moreover, because these discussions took place in 
parallel to the analysis of the Chilean experience, they thought the ‘budgetary programme’ 
concept would provide them with a useful tool to introduce the LFM as a basis for the new 
PbR-SED system.   
 Insights from the Chilean experience represented a second important contribution to 
the SED design. After his departure from DIPRES in 2006, Marcel was hired by the IDB to 
advice the Mexican government. Apart from holding various meetings with Mexican 
officials, Marcel prepared a Plan de Acción (Action Plan)
108
. In this he set out the 
conditions required to build a performance-oriented budget in Mexico, and a detailed list of 
recommendations that the government and SHCP in particular should follow (Alvarado, 
2008). Marcel’s involvement in the process was also important because, according to 
another official, ‘he obviously suggested what he knew, the Chilean system’ (IM19). 
                                                          
108
 The name of the project was Plan de Acción: Modelo de Fortalecimiento del Sistema de 
Presupuesto Basado en Resultados en la Administración Pública Federal de México, or Action Plan: Model 
for the Strengthening of the Budget for Results System in the Federal Public Administration of Mexico’ 
(Alvarado, 2008). 
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Another middle level-official noted, ‘Marcel would not say, “you should use the logical 
framework matrix”, he would just say, “you have to do this”. But when he explained his 
examples, he would certainly mention the logical framework matrix’ (IM23). The IDB also 
funded a second trip of SHCP officials to Santiago in 2007, during which they held a 
number of meetings with Guzmán (IM14). This allowed them to further focus their 
attention on building the links between performance information and budgetary decisions.  
 The third and perhaps most influential factor in the process of designing the PbR-
SED was the partnership created between CONEVAL and SHCP
109
. As mentioned above, 
contacts between Hernández and Bernal dated back to 2005. Once in CONEVAL, 
Hernández wanted to ensure the regulatory and methodological work he and his team were 
developing would not be affected by initiatives or actions from other institutions, 
particularly SHCP. According to a former CONEVAL official,   
 
We started to lobby once we realised that there were many institutions with legal authorities in the 
field of evaluation, like the SFP, the Ministry of Education which also had its own evaluation unit, 
and CONEVAL. Then the SHCP was about to publish its law on fiscal responsibility. We were afraid 
that we were going to come and say to the ministries responsible of social programmes, ‘You have to 
evaluate this, in this way, under this schedule’. Then SHCP would come and ask, luckily, the same 
thing. But they could also come and ask for something completely different. And with SFP it could 
be the same story: maybe they will ask the same thing, maybe they won’t. Thus, Gonzalo Hernández 
thought, ‘Why don’t we get together with them and build together certain regulations for everyone?’ 
(IM27).  
 
Therefore, CONEVAL officials went to see Bernal and his team and explained them, ‘this is 
my project, this is what I want to do, this is my methodology’ (IM16). More specifically, 
they detailed how and why they were planning to use the LFM for programme evaluations, 
a tool they had already employed in SEDESOL. On the basis of their previous experience, 
CONEVAL officials also tried to stress that, ‘it did not make sense to evaluate just for the 
sake of evaluating’ (IM27; World Bank, 2009a:3). Hernández and his team thus argued for 
an approach which used different kinds of evaluation. They also stressed the need to better 
define which programmes should employ, for instance, an impact evaluation, and which 
should be evaluated through other techniques.   
                                                          
109
 Rubio (2012:169) similarly states that, ‘[a] key factor leading to the second phase of the M&E 
system implementation (2007 to present) has been the strategic partnership between SHCP and CONEVAL. 
The former had the mandate to implement a performance-based budget, but its experience in M&E was 
limited, while the latter had substantial M&E technical expertise, but no ‘stick’ to ensure that ministries 
outside the social sector participated in the system’.  
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On SHCP’s side, SEDESOL-CONEVAL’s participation in the design process was 
welcomed because of time constraints, technical needs, and political reasons. Because of 
the tight deadlines established in the law, SHCP officials faced a scenario in which they 
simply ‘had to execute the changes related to the PbR-SED somehow’ (IM16). 
Furthermore, when they started looking for relevant experiences, Bernal and his team 
‘really liked the case of SEDESOL because as an institutional example it was the most 
coherent and complete’ (IM27). Moreover, SEDESOL’s previous experience showed them 
that the LFM borrowed from the Chilean SECG could be ‘Mexicanised’ and work well. A 
former SEDESOL official remarks that Bernal and his team said, ‘OK, you already have a 
methodology, which has already been proved, and which is actually being properly 
implemented, why don’t we take this as a basis?’ (IM16).  
Along these lines, a SHCP official states that, ‘SHCP’s wise move was that, instead 
of trying to design something completely new, we decided to build on what CONEVAL had 
learned and done’ (IM23). Furthermore, CONEVAL’s participation was seen as a ‘life-
saving element’ by Bernal and his team (IM13). Given the traditionally difficult 
relationships between SHCP and SFP on the subject of MFR reforms, SHCP officials 
thought CONEVAL could play a neutral role, a bit like a guarantor of independent decisions 
(IM24). This was something that actually fit perfectly with Hernández and his team’s 
intentions, as they saw themselves as the ‘little’ member between the two ‘big monsters’ 
represented by SHCP and SFP (IMéxico 10).    
This partnership between CONEVAL and SHCP became the leading force during the 
drafting of supplementary regulations and the PbR-SED’s implementation. According to a 
former SHCP official, ‘relationships with CONEVAL had been wonderful’, and ‘their 
expertise has been most helpful’ (IM19). SFP officials joined the SHCP-CONEVAL 
working group in early 2007, but (as discussed in the following section) their overall 
influence on the system’s structure and operation was rather limited. A former SHCP 
official remarks that:  
 
CONEVAL knew more in technical terms, and thus they led the preparation of guides, concepts, and 
methodologies. In institutional terms they were smaller, and therefore did not get involved in the 
tiring process of making the big decisions about the system. SFP did want to lead the project, but 
they had previously had poor results, and possessed a rather poor technical capacity. In SHCP, 
people had more expertise.We were more used to doing things (IM18).  
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Indeed, during the following years SHCP and SFP assigned CONEVAL the leadership role 
in drafting the terms of reference that federal institutions should employ for hiring external 
evaluators.  
On March 2007, CONEVAL, SHCP and SFP published the Lineamientos Generales 
para la Evaluación de los Programas Federales de la Administración Pública Federal 
(Lineamientos, or General Guidelines for the Evaluation of the Federal Programmes of the 
Federal Public Administration; Diario Oficial, 2007). These Lineamientos sought to 
‘regulate the evaluation of federal programmes, the elaboration of the matrixes of indicators 
and the monitoring systems, as well as the elaboration of the strategic objectives of the 
ministries and agencies of the Federal Public Administration’ (article 1). In order to do so, 
the Lineamientos provided a definition of ‘strategic objectives’; stated that institutions 
should align the latter with the NDP’s broader objectives; and that they should be ‘oriented 
towards promoting effectiveness, efficiency, economy and quality in the Federal Public 
Administration, and the social impact in the exercise of social spending’ (article 5).  
The Lineamientos introduced the so-called ‘matrixes of indicators’, which should be 
prepared on the basis of the LFM (article 3, Section VII). Whereas SEDESOL-CONEVAL 
had been using the term ‘logical framework’, neither SFP nor SHCP officials thought it 
apropriate. The former thought it sounded too much like the Chilean system (IM27). For 
the latter, the reasons were of a legal nature: the LFPRH required ministries/agencies to 
report ‘indicators’, but it did not mention the concept of ‘logical frameworks’. Therefore, 
an international expert remarks that, ‘SHCP astutely said, “OK, the regulations say you 
should report indicators, and thus you will report those to me in this format, which will be 
labeled matrix of indicators for results”’ (IIO5).  
Lastly, the Lineamientos stated that evaluation results and those from the 
programme for management improvement should be ‘systematically articulated with 
planning and budgetary processes’. This was ‘to guarantee a performance oriented 
evaluation and provide feedback to the Performance Evaluation System’ (article 16). The 
same article introduced a variety of evaluation options described in Box 6.1 below. These 
clearly reflected the lessons Hernández and his team had drawn from their previous 
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experiences (IM16; Medina, 2007:37), their understanding of the subject, and their capacity 
to persuade SHCP-SFP to avoid a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach110.   
 
Box 6.1  
Types of Evaluation in the Mexican PbR-SED system 
  
a) Evaluation of Consistency and Results: systematically analyses the design and global performance 
of the federal programmes, in order to improve their management and measure the achievement of 
results on the basis of a matrix of indicators  
 
b) Evaluation of Indicators: analyses through field work the relevance and reach of the indicators of a 
federal programme for the achievement of results 
 
c) Evaluation of Procedures: analyses through field work whether a programme is implementing its 
operative procedures in an effective and efficient way and whether it contributes to improving 
management 
 
d) Impact Evaluation: identifies with rigorous methodologies the change in indicators at the level of 
results which can be attributed to the implementation of the federal programme 
 
e) Specific Evaluation: those evaluations not included in the Guidelines [Lineamientos] which might 
be done through desk and/or field work  
 
f) Strategic Evaluations: evaluations which are applied to a programme or set of programmes around 
the strategies, policies and institutions 
 
g) Evaluation of New Programmes: a diagnosis that justifies the creation of new federal programmes 
which are to be included in the annual budget project or, if that is the case, which justifies the 
broadening or substantive modification of existing federal programmes, detailing its budgetary 
impact and its financing sources 
 
 Source: Author based on Diario Oficial (2007). 
 
Once the Lineamientos were published, SHCP, CONEVAL, and SFP coordinated the 
development of ‘matrixes of indicators for results’ (OECD, 2009:106-108; Pérez-Jácome, 
2010; SHCP, forthcoming). CONEVAL officials expressed concerns regarding the use of 
the LFM for all public programmes. Yet, a former official notes that, ‘Bernal and his team 
really liked it and wanted to apply it to every federal programme’ (IM27). While SHCP 
officials knew that in Chile the LFM was only used for programme evaluations, they 
decided to push for a wider use of the methodology. An official says this was ‘to reorder 
                                                          
110
 A WB document states that, ‘significant accomplishments brought about by the General 
Guidelines in Mexico’s public sector included: having specific steps for the application of logic frameworks 
to all budget programs; adopting a single, results-based, M&E language in the federal government; providing 
standardized M&E methodologies; and initiating a government-wide, learning-by-doing M&E process among 
federal agencies and officials’ (Castro et al., 2009ii:8). 
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and systematise programmes, as well as to allow us entering a process of redesign of those 
same programmes’ (IM23).  
The elaboration of the so-called ‘matrixes of indicators for results’ was further 
supported by an ambitious capacity building programme. Since 2007, a group of ECLAC 
and other Chilean experts led several training sessions on how to design performance 
indicators and logical frameworks (IIO5; SHCP, forthcoming). These were later 
complemented with online workshops and diploma courses. The ECLAC experts were also 
asked to revise and comment on the quality of the ‘matrixes’ prepared by the federal 
institutions. On that basis, programme coordinators were then asked to make adjustments. 
As a whole, these various actions for the government-wide introduction of the LFM 
responded to SHCP’s ‘big bang’ approach, which sought to take advantage of the political 
momentum (IC30; IIO1). 
The design of the new evaluation scheme was completed with the publication of 
further regulations in 2008 (Diario Oficial, 2008a; SHCP, forthcoming). SHCP and SFP 
jointly published the Acuerdo por el que se establecen las disposiciones generales del 
Sistema de Evaluación del Desempeño (Acuerdo SED, or ‘Rule by which the general 
requirements for the Performance Evaluation System are established’). This Acuerdo SED 
introduced some conceptual and programmatic additions. For instance, it introduced the 
first formal definition of the Presupuesto basado en Resultados (PbR, or results-based 
budget): ‘the process which integrates in a systematic form, in the corresponding decisions, 
considerations about the results and impact of budgetary programme execution and the use 
of resources allocated to them’.  
Although the term ‘PbR’ was first introduced in the National Development Plan 
back in 2007, the LFPRH and subsequent regulations had focused on the SED and its 
indicators. The definition provided by the Acuerdo SED thus formalised, in conceptual and 
legal terms, the transition to a broader approach. Budgetary decisions ought to be informed 
by an assessment of the effects of government programmes and spending, a feature of the 
Chilean and many other international systems. The Acuerdo SED also established that, ‘an 
annual evaluation programme will be published, which should consider, at least, the 
budgetary programmes and the types of evaluation which will be introduced’. This clearly 
reflected that SHCP officials had listened to CONEVAL’s concerns about ‘not evaluating 
for the sake of evaluation’; and about the need to plan ahead the number and type of 
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evaluations to be developed each year, taking into account time and resources constraints, 
as well as each programme features and needs.  
A final component of the reforms was the modification of the federal Constitution’s 
article 134 (Diario Oficial, 2008b). This established that MFR principles and practices were 
mandatory for all government levels (e.g. federal, state, and municipal). It also stated that 
public resources should be administered ‘with efficiency, effectiveness, economy, 
transparency and honesty to satisfy the objectives for which they are destined’. 
Furthermore, it indicated that in each government level ‘the results obtained from the use of 
those resources will be evaluated by the technical areas’ created for that specific purpose. 
By introducing this change, SHCP officials were addressing a longstanding preoccupation 
regarding the misuse of public resources by state and local governments (IM12). But in 
‘uploading’ the PbR-SED principles to the Mexican constitution, they were also aiming to 
secure the long-term institutionalisation of the reforms. According to a former SHCP senior 
official, ‘we promoted the constitutional changes because we know our country, and in 
order to get things done, we knew that we had to put this in the law and the constitution’ 
(IM19).  
 While the constitutional and legal MFR reforms received congressional support, it 
would be misleading to then assume legislators either strongly influenced or deeply cared 
about PbR-SED. According to a SHCP official, ‘Congress has participated pushing forth 
the normative part of the reforms, and has contributed to setting up the requirements and 
guidelines to build all of this’ (IM23). Other interviewees also reported that some 
congressmen were increasingly supportive of evaluations, and many of them were happy to 
get additional information about the performance and results of public programmes. Yet the 
same official remarks that:  
 
What I have seen is that, after the big legal reform of 2006, it has been CONEVAL, SHCP, and SFP 
which have been involved in advocating evaluations, advancing requirements for indicators, etc. 
When we presented the SED proposal [in March of 2007], congressmen did comment on it. But their 
opinion did not have any substance. Without Congress legal changes would not have taken place. But 
all of this has been mainly a result of what those three organisations have proposed and organised 
(IM23). 
 
A former SHCP official similarly said that ‘Congress has followed this closely, but not in 
terms of saying, “here, you need to add this tool”’ (IM18). Yet another said that:   
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Congressmen ask for more information the whole time. Then we go and hand them dozens of 
reports, but they do not read anything. They ask for information as a way to say that Congress is 
checking on the Executive, pushing it to increase transparency in public spending, to explain how 
public resources are being managed. But that is just a political discourse. They do not do that because 
they use that information, study it, and then make decisions or promote reforms or laws to improve 
things. This is a political discourse with political intentions (IM19)
111
. 
 
In fact, in order to increase the congressional interest, Bernal and his team had to 
make additional efforts to persuade deputies about why MFR reforms mattered. With the 
support of international organisations, SHCP officials asked congressmen to join them in 
study tours. These were less focused on drawing technical insights about the international 
practices, than in showing deputies how performance budgeting worked in practice (IM13). 
According to a former SHCP official:  
 
The OECD invited us to go on a study tour to Paris and London, and we invited some deputies so 
that they could get more technical knowledge. But mainly to show them why the executive power 
was advancing these legal reforms, because they did not understand much of what we were hoping to 
achieve. Something similar was done with a visit to Canada. So more than for us, this has been done 
for the deputies, to persuade them to approve a set of reforms which had been proposed. They were 
reluctant to do so because they did not really understand where the executive was heading with all 
this. We thus explained them that what we wanted was more transparency and spending efficiency. 
What they saw is what other countries do in this sense, and what kind of legislation has been 
produced in this sense (IM19). 
 
Another activity focused in persuading political and bureaucratic actors was a 
widely publicised international conference on PbR-SED reforms. The latter took place in 
Mexico City in June 2008 (SHCP, 2009; OECD, 2009:112-113; Arizti et al., 2010). 
Coordinated by Bernal and his team, and co-sponsored by the IDB, OECD, and the WB, 
the conference hosted experts such as Graham Scott, Nick Manning, Mario Marcel, and 
Marc Robinson, who discussed the theoretical foundations of results-based reforms. Other 
international specialists discussed the experiences of Chile, Canada, the UK, the US, 
Sweden, South Korea, Colombia, Brazil, Australia, France, and the Netherlands. There 
were other discussions about the use of performance information; the role of Congress in 
MFR systems; and the implementation of similar reforms at the subnational level. Officials 
from SEDESOL, SHCP, and SFP presented their recent reform experiences.  
                                                          
111
 The OECD (2009:114-115) notes that, on the one hand, ‘in comparison with OECD countries, 
there is a fairly high awareness of the various monitoring systems’ among congressmen in Mexico. Yet on the 
other hand, ‘[t]his general engagement has not been translated into a system in which performance 
information would regularly be used to inform budgetary decisions’. Furthermore, the report notes that, ‘while 
selected congressmen agree on the importance of developing performance information, the role that Congress 
will play in this initiative was yet to be fully realised’.  
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The design and implementation of the PbR-SED during 2006-2010 were not 
processes without problems. A senior SHCP official, notes that the institutionalisation of 
these tools ‘has been achieved due to the obligatory nature of the legal framework’, and that 
neither participating institutions nor public servants have ‘yet taken ownership of the entire 
system’ (Caso, 2010:74). A former senior official adds that, ‘we faced lots of resistance 
from other areas inside the ministry’ (IM13). Another official similarly suggests that, ‘there 
has not always been enough support or trust among participants. Public servants have only 
slowly convinced themselves, particularly top public servants’ (IM24). Indeed, an 
international expert further says that initially budget analysts in the UPCP ‘neither cared 
about the PbR-SED, nor understood the subject’ (IIO5).  
The reforms have encountered other important issues. Throughout the Calderón 
administration, SHCP officials tried but failed to find ways for linking evaluation results 
and budget allocations (Conde, 2007; IM19; IM24). Then, a senior SFP official flags that 
‘nowadays we generate lots of information and interesting findings, but we have not got 
much time to actually follow up on them. In fact, some programmes are over-evaluated, 
with evaluation reports telling you one year basically the same thing than in the previous 
exercise’ (IM20). Lastly, as the following section will detail, the introduction of the new 
PbR-SED was surrounded by inter-bureaucratic conflicts between SHCP and SFP (Pardo, 
2009; González, 2010).  
However, despite these complications, SHCP officials were able to make significant 
progress in the introduction of a new MFR scheme. Given the short time which has passed 
since the introduction of the reforms, it is difficult to offer a fair assessment. Yet some 
tentative comments might be offered. According to a recent government document, the 
coverage of ‘matrix of indicators for results’ has gone from 41.7% of the federal budget 
(e.g. public programmes to which the budget has been allocated) in 2008, to 59.2% in 2012 
(SHCP, forthcoming). The same document notes that by 2012 about 40,000 public servants 
(including federal government and some state/municipal governments) had received some 
kind of training on MFR topics. More importantly, Table 6.1 below shows the number and 
variety of evaluations which have been jointly supervised by SHCP, SFP, and CONEVAL 
since 2007.  
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Table 6.1 
Evaluations of Federal Programmes  
(2007-2012) 
Types of evaluations 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* Total per type 
of evaluation 
Consistency and results 125 20 39 18 162 11 375 
Specific  5 133 138 137 4 154 571 
Impact 4 8 5 2 0 0 19 
Strategic 2 1 2 1 1 0 7 
Processes  0 0 5 8 3 8 24 
Complementary (e.g. not 
originally included in 
the annual plan of 
evaluations)  
0 9 9 4 8 0 30 
Total per year  136 171 198 170 178 173 1026 
Source: SHCP (forthcoming). *Includes evaluations not yet finished.  
 
Along these lines, a former SEDESOL senior official remarks that:  
 
Everything on this subject has been institutionalised, which has meant the evaluation culture has 
been strengthened enormously. It has been generalised. SEDESOL is no longer the only ministry 
around doing these things. There are now many federal agencies using evaluation, with their own 
priorities, nuances, but they are already there. You can find excellent practices in many places 
(IM16). 
 
Within SHCP, a specialised Unidad de Evaluación de Desempeño (UED, or Performance 
Evaluation Unit) would be eventually established in October of 2012. 
The PbR-SED was also built on the basis of a comprehensive and rather complex set 
of legal, regulatory, and constitutional principles. As some interviewees noted, the reforms 
of 2006-2008 were not something completely new. Indeed, their origins could be traced 
back to the 1990s (IM19; IM23; Pérez-Jácome, 2010). Yet Bernal, Diener, and their 
colleagues were capable of taking advantage of the lessons learned since then. They also 
profited from SEDESOL-CONEVAL’s reform experience, and took into account relevant 
recommendations provided by Hernández and his team. Moreover, through their visits to 
Santiago and their extensive exchanges with Marcel and Guzmán (sponsored by the IDB), 
Bernal and his team gathered significant insights from the Chilean approach on evaluation 
and performance-based budgeting. These significant changes in the MFR budgetary 
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‘strand’ mirrored developments in the social policy one, but also offered a striking contrast 
with what happened in the administrative modernisation one.  
 
‘A Rather Passive Actor’: 
The role of SFP in the making of the Mexican MFR system 
The previous section showed that SHCP led the design and legal institutionalisation of the 
new PbR-SED, but it also hinted at SFP’s (SECODAM’s successor) rather marginal role in 
the process. According to a former CONEVAL official, ‘SFP was a rather passive actor’ 
(IM27)
112
. In fact, a more accurate image is that of SFP as an institution ‘reacting’ against a 
number of challenges to its authority over performance management and evaluation in the 
federal government. First, to SHCP’s initiative to create a Chilean inspired programa de 
mejoramiento de la gestión in association to the austerity measures of 2006. Second, to 
SHCP’s broader efforts to control the leadership over the making of the federal 
government’s MFR policy. Third, to negative opinions regarding its evaluation focus, and a 
presidential initiative which sought its termination. In the end, despite its longstanding 
experience on MFR, and a series of internal changes precisely focused in enhancing its 
MFR capacity, SFP’s contributions to the Mexican government’s MFR policy were rather 
limited.    
 The first challenge SFP officials faced took place right at the beginning of the 
Calderón administration
113
. As mentioned above, the incoming government backed SHCP’s 
proposal to introduce austerity measures. The presidential decree on the subject stated that 
those measures would be ‘oriented towards generating savings in the medium term and will 
be linked to the Programme for Management Improvement, with the aim of promoting the 
modernisation of the public management’ (Diario Oficial, 2006b). The idea of introducing a 
Mexican PMG had originated in SHCP officials’ visit to Chile in 2006. The Chilean PMG’s 
focus laid on building management capacities, and linking salary adjustments to 
institutional targets. But it also provided DIPRES with performance information which 
could be used in the process of allocating budgetary resources (Zaltsman, 2009). This 
seemed interesting for SHCP officials, who were precisely looking for a means to associate 
budgetary control and institutional performance. According to a senior official, ‘the PMG 
                                                          
112
 Sosa (2001:117) similarly suggests that SFP’s ‘role has been limited to ratifying the instruments 
and proposals that emerge, either from SHCP, or from CONEVAL’.  
113
 The contents of this and the following page are based on Dussauge-Laguna (2013).   
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could become a tool for saving’ (IM9). A former official adds that it ‘allowed structuring 
the austerity decree in a better way’ (IM13).   
However, by including the PMG in the austerity decree, SHCP officials were 
entering SFP’s turf. Several of the decree’s provisions (e.g. those related to public 
personnel management; the buying and letting of office spaces; information technology 
management; public tendering) were actually associated with SFP’s legal mandate. Despite 
this, SFP officials had not been asked to participate in the process of drafting the decree. 
They only learned about its contents once it was published in the Diario Oficial (Official 
Journal). SFP officials then contacted SHCP in order to become involved in the drafting of 
supplementary regulations. Furthermore, SFP officials argued that if a so-called ‘PMG’ 
was to be developed, they should be in charge of leading policy its design and any further 
cross-national learning activities (IM5).  
In March 2007, SFP’s Salvador Vega (then Undersecretary for Public 
Administration) and his team travelled to Santiago to study the PMG’s structure. They held 
meetings with DIPRES officials, but also with representatives from other ministries and 
agencies, and some academic experts (IM1; IM4). This was done with the aim of gathering 
a broader and more balanced impression of the PMG. A few months later, another SFP 
representative travelled to Santiago to meet with DIPRES officials and Marcela Guzmán 
(IC4; IM5). The information gathered during the meetings in those two trips was later 
complemented with the analysis of the reports that DIPRES had produced about the SECG 
and the PMG in particular. SFP officials took this as a basis to flesh out the Mexican 
version of the PMG (IM1). 
While in the first half of 2007 SFP and SHCP maintained productive discussions 
related to the PMG and other MFR topics, their relationships deteriorated towards July of 
the same year. There were disagreements regarding the PMG’s general objectives and 
programmatic contents. According to a senior SFP official, this happened once ‘it was clear 
for SHCP that we had assumed ownership of the programme’ (IM4). The official adds that, 
‘the PMG they had imagined to be part of the austerity decree was definitely not the one 
eventually published. This had a focus on modernisation, improvement, and less on 
budgetary control’ (IM4).  
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Indeed, many things changed between December of 2006 and September of 2008, 
when the Programa Especial de Mejora de la Gestión (PEMG, or Special Programme for 
Management Improvement; SFP, 2008) was finally published. The name of the programme 
was different because Vega felt that ‘mejora’ sounded better in Mexican Spanish than the 
Chilean term ‘mejoramiento’ (IM4). Furthermore, SFP officials decided to use the PMG 
not as a tool focused on ‘cost-containment’/austerity, as SHCP had originally planned. In 
fact, they used it as an ‘umbrella’-like term, which could allow them to tag the federal 
government’s administrative modernisation policy of the Calderón administration. SFP 
officials did take the Chilean PMG’s focus on measuring management capacity 
improvements, and its ‘system-based’ approach to monitoring reform topics (González, 
2008). However, they left aside both the programme’s focus on linking salary increases 
with institutional goals, and its association with budgetary policymaking (SFP, 2008; 
Dussauge-Laguna, 2013).  
The design of the PEMG was further complicated by the actions SFP pursued to 
confront SHCP’s attempts to lead the federal government’s MFR reforms. The LFPRH 
included several articles regarding performance indicators and evaluation, but SFP had 
been neither involved in the drafting process, nor in lobbying for its congressional approval 
(IM20). After the presidential transition of 2006, SFP officials realised they were lagging 
behind SHCP on this subject. According to a SFP senior official, ‘when SHCP introduced 
the budgetary emphasis on evaluation, through the budget programmes, there certainly was 
some kind of institutional jealousy. Undersecretary Vega said, “we really need to be 
working on that”’ (IM20).  
Partly as a result of this, SFP officials engaged in an internal restructuring process. 
This led to the creation, in April 2009, of the Unidad de Políticas de Mejora de la Gestión 
Pública (UPMGP, or Unit of Policies for Improving Public Management); and the Unidad 
de Evaluación de la Gestión y el Desempeño Gubernamental (UEGDG, or Unit for the 
Evaluation of Government Management and Performance). The former was put in charge 
of all things related to the PMG, and the latter of developing broader evaluation 
approaches. The new UEGDG was both a reaction to the challenges faced by the SFP, and 
a response to its historical limitations. According to a senior official, ‘the authority of the 
SFP to establish a government control and evaluation system is 30 years old. But if an 
auditor were to ask you, “please show me how the system works”, there is no document 
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which describes it’ (IM20; Vega, 2008; IM1; IM6). Senior SFP officials were aiming to 
develop a new evaluation approach. They wanted to ‘separate control from evaluation, as it 
had usually been the case, because that had led us to a very audit-oriented focus’ (IM20; 
Vega, 2010).  
The reorganisation process was partly informed by knowledge about international 
evaluation practices. Some information had been gathered through the officials’ 
participation in meetings of the OECD Public Governance Committee. Additional insights 
were obtained from WB experts in 2007, when a possible (but not completed) consultancy 
project to support the PMG’s design was being discussed (IM5; IM20). In terms of specific 
national models, SFP officials only revised the Chilean and Spanish cases. The former 
country’s evaluation approach was studied during the trips related to the original PMG’s 
borrowing process, and mainly because CONEVAL and SHCP had already used it as a 
reference. Yet, according to a senior official, ‘Undersecretary Vega did not like Chile’s 
extremely budget-oriented approach’ (IM20; Vega, 2008). Thus, the Chilean SECG was 
used only as a vague reference for the making of the PEMG (Dussauge-Laguna, 2013). 
The Spanish experience was deemed more interesting, although that did not 
necessarily mean it was much more influential. According to a senior official, ‘we always 
liked the Spanish model because they separate the controllership functions from the 
ministry of public administration. They have even created an independent evaluation 
agency’ (IM20). SFP officials approached the Agencia Española de Cooperación 
Internacional (AECI, or Spanish Agency for International Cooperation). They also 
commissioned a study from a middle-level SFP official who at the time was completing a 
training course in Spain. However, SFP officials only had this detailed information about 
the Spanish evaluation agency and general evaluation approach once the UEGDG’s design 
had been completed.   
The UEGDG was supposed to provide a means to face SHCP’s influence in the 
design of the government’s MFR system, but in the end its contributions were rather 
limited. It allegedly created a forum in which representatives from federal ministries got 
together to discuss and develop their indicators and logical frameworks. Furthermore, it 
worked with ministries/agencies to adapt CONEVAL’s evaluation methodologies to public 
programmes which did not have a social policy focus. The UEGDG also developed follow-
up mechanisms to ensure programme coordinators took into account the recommendations 
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offered by external evaluators (Cejudo and Maldonado, 2011). On the other hand, a senior 
official notes that the new internal regulations ended up ‘a bit like Frankenstein’ (IM20). 
The UEGDG had to share evaluation tasks with other SFP units. Moreover, it was hugely 
dependent upon the government-wide network of SFP’s ‘internal controllers’, whose main 
responsibility is to ‘audit and control’.  
The third challenge SFP faced throughout the Calderón administration was that 
related to negative opinions about its institutional performance. Current and former SHCP 
officials, for instance, expressed their concern about the ‘audit’ bias that SFP introduced in 
evaluation activities (IM9; IM13; IM19). Similar opinions were expressed by interviewees 
in CONEVAL: ‘they give it more an audit approach’ (IM21); or ‘when SFP checks the 
matrixes of indicators, they do it through their controllers, so even if it is not an audit 
process, it is the internal controller who is checking the performance tools’ (IM22). 
International experts suggested that SFP’s involvement in developing the programme 
logical frameworks ‘was not good because they biased the process’ (IIO5; IIO1).  
In addition to these negative perceptions, in 2009 president Calderón presented a 
legal initiative to eliminate the SFP (Fócil, 2009; Dussauge-Laguna, 2009a; Alcalde, 2010). 
The measure was aimed to reduce public spending and improve government efficiency, 
which clearly reflected SHCP’s priorities. Indeed, according to a senior SHCP official, ‘all 
these years SFP has been a burden, completely useless; but the good thing is that we will 
soon get rid of them’ (IM9). While the initiative did not eventually obtain Congressional 
support, its mere discussion damaged SFP’s stance and room for influencing MFR policy 
developments.  
 Thus, despite its longstanding association with the subject of evaluation, and its 
protagonist role in previous reform initiatives, between 2006 and 2010 SFP did not exert 
much influence on MFR. SFP officials gained control over the PMG, but they spent a long 
time deciding the programme’s institutional features, and did not achieve any substantial 
results in the short term. Similarly, SFP officials spent more than two years in an internal 
restructuring process which led to the creation of a new UEGDG with a focus on evaluation 
different from control. This represented a valuable step in transforming the institution’s 
‘audit bias’. Yet it did little to change the negative perceptions about SFP’s involvement in 
MFR activities which existed among SHCP, CONEVAL, and other actors. Moreover, SFP’s 
standing was further damaged by the presidential initiative to eliminate it. As a result of all 
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this, SFP remained in a rather reactive position, mostly following the lead of CONEVAL-
SHCP’s partnership.  
 
‘A “Win-Win” Situation’: 
The Early Dissemination of the Mexican MFR System(s) 
Partly echoing the experience of the Chilean SECG discussed in Chapter 5, the emerging 
‘Mexican model’(s) also started to gain some international attention. Its features and 
‘achievements’ were disseminated through the joint efforts of Mexican officials and 
international organisations. The former tried to gain an external opinion about their 
initiatives, but also sought to gain international support and legitimation, which could then 
serve to consolidate their initiatives. On the basis of their analytical and comparative 
experience, the latter provided assessments and recommendations. At the same time, they 
used the Mexican developments to enrich their ‘portfolio’ for future reform projects in the 
region and beyond. According to a senior CONEVAL official, ‘at the end of the day, well, 
they are banks. They want to sell what they know best, what might help them in their 
practices’ (IM22).  
 International organisations were invited by Mexican officials to conduct studies and 
evaluate the country’s progress on MFR. According to a former CONEVAL middle-level 
official: 
 
Gonzalo [Hernández] thought that, since we were asking others to be evaluated, we needed to set the 
example. Therefore, we ought to be evaluated and find out how others were seeing our work. We 
could not do an impact evaluation, but we could try to find out what other agencies were thinking 
about our work, and we could do that through an international organisation which could develop the 
interviews (IM27).  
 
Because most of the international funding CONEVAL was receiving at the time came from 
the IDB, Hernández and his team asked the WB to carry out a set of studies in 2007. Apart 
from various technical notes (World Bank, 2009a), the WB team published a paper in 
which they offered a highly positive assessment about CONEVAL and the emerging 
Mexican MFR. For instance, the paper suggested that CONEVAL’s specific role in the 
development of M&E practices could be seen as ‘an innovative development’ (Castro et al., 
2009ii:vi). Moreover, it asserted that ‘the CONEVAL model has become a benchmark for 
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other developing countries undertaking M&E reforms’ (p. 19). Regarding the broader MFR 
reforms, the document said that ‘full institutionalization is not yet complete’ (p. vi), but:   
 
after the 2005 reforms, Mexico entered into an advanced stage of performance-based management 
that is grounded on strong institutional foundations: legislation has provided a modern budget 
framework, sound M&E tools and arrangements have been developed, and accountability and 
transparency conditions have been created to make most of the changes operational (Castro et al., 
2009ii:vi). 
 
Along the same lines, an IDB official has remarked that ‘without doubt, CONEVAL is a 
model of how to push forwards the evaluation agenda, which is the agenda of the 
responsibility in the use of public resources’ (Ibarrarán, 2012).  
 Something similar happened in the case of SHCP. According to an official, ‘the 
OECD has helped us publishing a book which tells good things about us’, and added SHCP 
was trying to have a second report published soon (IM24). Indeed, a recent OECD 
(2009:14) review on budgeting in Mexico stated that:  
 
The government’s reforms [of 2006-2008] have significantly improved the overall fiscal and budget 
framework and are in an important step in seeking to address the underlying structural challenges. 
These reforms are also important in terms of bringing the Mexican budget process and fiscal 
framework more in line with the new political reality that has evolved since the 1990s. 
 
More specifically, with regards to the results-based budgetary reforms under development 
at the time, the report noted that ‘[i]n its first year of operation, it has made important 
progress at the national level and has high-level political support’ (p. 14).  
 The international dissemination of the Mexican MFR practices has also followed 
channels supported by the IDB and the WB. Perhaps the most notorious one is the 
participation of Mexican officials in the Latin American network of M&E specialists, 
which has been co-sponsored by the IDB-WB since 2005-2006 (May et al., 2006). 
According to a former CONEVAL official,    
 
I think CONEVAL has started to become a model like the Chilean one, and it is widely used by the 
IDB. It has many limitations, but in the region it is one of the few examples based on a clear scheme 
of monitoring and evaluation. Therefore, they often ask us to present it in seminars of M&E 
practices. I remember we went to Peru, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. So yes, it is becoming an 
example of M&E schemes in the LA region, but also in others. It is also being taken as a model by 
the WB (IM27). 
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On SHCP’s side, officials had presented their reforms experience in IDB-WB sponsored 
forums in Colombia, Peru, Canada, Dominican Republic, and Washington, DC (IM19; 
IM24). A SHCP official even remarked that, ‘in Latin America we are already famous’ 
(IM24).  
International organisations also promoted the dissemination of the Mexican MFR 
practices by funding the study trips of government officials from other countries to Mexico. 
These included officials from Peru, El Salvador, South Africa, and Zambia, who came ‘to 
know what we have been doing, generally because of IDB’s or WB’s initiative’ (IM24). 
Along these same lines, a senior CONEVAL official says they had received visitors from 
Colombia, Uruguay, Argentina, Peru, Ghana, Guatemala, El Salvador, Brazil, and South 
Africa (IM21). The official also adds that, ‘as any seller, you want to sell. If they come and 
we have time, we talk to them. And if we are invited to go somewhere and they pay, we 
certainly go’ (IM21).  
From the perspective of a senior WB official, the interest in disseminating the 
Mexican MFR experience is simply one of the various activities international organisations 
routinely perform: 
 
What the Bank partly does in the region is to help find and disseminate best practices. In fact, the 
Bank has been a catalyser of the evaluation practices in Mexico, because it identified good practices 
and contributed not only technically, e.g. providing advice, technical support provided by evaluation 
experts from the WB, but also because it identified an evaluation process which had been well 
defined, technically solid, planned and implemented appropriately, and which contributed to give it 
international visibility that later translated into higher internal visibility (IIO1).  
 
The fact that the IDB and the WB have begun to disseminate the Mexican MFR practices 
has led a senior CONEVAL official to suggest that international organisations merely act as 
‘resonance boxes’: ‘they are aware of interesting things which are happening across the 
world; they are in contact with many countries, and everyone takes whatever they want 
from them’ (IM21). While partly accurate, the former assertion is also misleading with 
regards to how relationships between both Mexican officials and international organisations 
work. The comment from a SHCP official provides what is a more nuanced view of this 
process: 
 
This is a ‘win-win’ situation. This is a topic [MFR] which is booming, particularly in Latin America. 
Therefore, when international organisations come and work with us, they help us a lot by saying that 
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Mexico is doing very well. And the idea is that both parties gain something. That they might be able 
to say: ‘my project (whether it is the IDB or the WB) of budget by results is working’. Or, ‘this is my 
policy’ (again no matter whether it is the IDB or the WB which is doing the talking), ‘and look here 
is Mexico which is working well’. And thus they brag about us with other countries. And for us in 
Mexico, well of course that is beneficial. And on top of that, I do hope that we are improving the 
quality of expenditure (IM24). 
 
The extent to which the quality of Mexico’s federal spending has improved remains, of 
course, an open question. Yet the progress so far achieved by Mexican officials in the 
design and implementation of MFR practices, in a region where the topic is still very much 
‘under construction’, has sufficed to put the Mexican experience in the category of regional 
experiences which are worth talking about.  
 
Conclusions 
By the end of the 2000s, Mexican policymakers had been able to develop an elaborate set 
of MFR tools. At the time of closing this research, policy changes could not be labelled as 
fully ‘successful’ for various reasons, particularly in the case of those related to the 
administrative modernisation ‘strand’. However, developments in the social policy and 
budgetary MFR strands had been hugely significant, in terms of both policy design and 
degree of institutionalisation (e.g. routine application of evaluations, and formalisation of 
the reforms in the country’s legal framework). As a whole, the policy outcomes of the 
2000s offered a considerable contrast to those obtained in the 1990s.  
The making of Mexico’s MFR policy in the period covered in these pages was 
significantly informed by other countries’ experiences and international debates on MFR. 
According to a senior SHCP official, after many years of following MFR policy 
developments, they had understood that ‘no country has got something that works 
absolutely well’ (IM9). Yet they were still able to obtain useful ideas, examples, and 
methodologies from other national MFR schemes. Both CONEVAL and SHCP officials 
studied the Chilean SECG. They used it as a reference for various purposes including the 
design of evaluation methodologies and training activities. They also gathered some 
insights from the Canadian and US models. For their part, SFP officials drew some 
inspiration from the Spanish evaluation agency model.  
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Furthermore, the chapter has shown how knowledge about international MFR ideas 
and practices was timely and effectively embedded into broader strategies developed by 
senior government officials at SEDESOL and SHCP. In the case of the former, this was first 
done with regards to the institutionalisation of M&E practices; then to avoid conflicts in the 
formulation and implementation of MFR policy changes. In the case of the latter, 
policymakers managed to persuade the Calderón administration about the relevance of 
creating a performance-based budget system. Then officials also guided successfully a 
number of important legal and constitutional reforms on the subject.  
Other factors contributed to the institutionalisation of MFR tools in the social policy 
and budgetary sectors. First, international organisations played important roles throughout 
the decade. They provided advice and financial support for study tours and training 
activities. Perhaps more importantly, they expressed positive comments and published 
favourable reports about the Mexican experience. Second, Mexican policymakers were able 
to draw lessons from their cumulative experience on the subject of MFR, both in terms of 
social programmes evaluations and budgetary reforms. They were thus in a better position 
to use knowledge from policies abroad. National factors influenced the specific details and 
timing of the reforms. Yet, in contrast to the 1990s, neither institutional constraints and 
inertias, nor politico-electoral cycles impeded progress in the making of MFR tools.   
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Part Four  
 
 
 
 
Drawing Lessons from  
Cross-National Policy Learning  
in Chile and Mexico  
 
(1990-2010) 
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First, in administrative reform as in most other things in life,  
one size will not fit all. Each nation will extract the components  
it likes best and fashion them into something that fits.  
Second, too many commonalities and too much  
rapid policy diffusion exist for policy designers  
and leaders not to pay attention to what is happening in other nations. 
 The fit may not be perfect, but the lessons,  
if they are carefully drawn, can still be applied and the dissonance lessened. 
 
Patricia W. Ingraham, ‘Play it again Sam, It’s Still Not Right:  
Searching for the Right Notes in Administrative Reform’ 
 
 
In the emulation of selected elements of foreign  
organizational patterns, as in the creation of  
new organizations on foreign models, cross-societal emulation 
 simultaneously involves pulls toward and away from the chosen models.  
The effect is both convergence that does not produce uniformity 
 and divergence and variation that is neither random nor infinite.  
 
D. Eleanor Westney, Imitation and Innovation:  
The Transfer of Western Organizational Patterns to Meiji Japan 
 
 
[Commissioner] – ‘You certainly had me fascinated.  
What you’ve told me is an exercise of the highest intelligence;  
at moments you seemed like an acrobat on a tightrope,  
with no net underneath. Because, to be brutally frank,  
underneath your argument, there’s nothing.  
You have no proof of anything you’ve said.  
It could all be interpreted in another way,  
and any good lawyer could pick apart  
your deductions without breaking sweat’  
 
[Inspector Montalbano] – ‘I know.’ 
 
[Commissioner] – ‘What do you intend to do?’ 
 
[Inspector Montalbano] – ‘Tomorrow morning I’m going to tell  
Lo Bianco that I’ve no objection if he wants to close the case.’   
 
Andrea Camilleri, The Shape of the Water 
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Comparing Cross-National Policy Learning Processes     
in Chile and Mexico  
 
 
 
 
The previous four chapters have detailed how the Chilean and Mexican governments 
developed some kind of policy (e.g. a set of decisions, actions, and programmes) on the 
subject of Management for Results throughout 1990-2010. Chapters 3 to 6 also showed that 
the making of these MFR policies was significantly informed by knowledge from other 
countries’ policies and broader international practices in the same subject. This chapter will 
now move on to a comparative analysis of these reform experiences. It will take as a basis 
the central questions posed at the beginning of this thesis, which aim to explore the 
relationship between learning from abroad and policy changes: What policy outcomes 
resulted from cross-national learning? How did policymakers use knowledge from abroad 
in making national policies? What strategies did they pursue to advance policy changes? 
How did cognitive, national and international factors influence cross-national learning 
processes?  
 The chapter will show that learning from abroad mattered significantly for the 
making of MFR policies in Chile and Mexico. Moreover, MFR policy developments in 
both countries have converged in various respects. However, the chapter will further show 
that the processes by which cross-national policy learning led to policy changes did not 
follow the conventional accounts offered in the policy transfer and policy diffusion 
literatures. These were not cases in which policymakers studied a given policy abroad, 
transferred it to their jurisdiction in a more or less modified version, and then engaged in a 
long process of institutional fitting, adaptation, or translation (Westney, 1987; Rose, 1991, 
1993; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, 2000; Stone, 2012). Nor were these experiences in which 
policymakers learned about the success of a policy elsewhere, updated their beliefs, and 
then simply adopted it in toto (Meseguer, 2009; Gilardi et al., 2009; Gilardi, 2010).  
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 In fact, the chapter will illustrate how cross-national policy learning differed 
significantly from these accounts in at least four respects. First, Chilean and Mexican 
policymakers gathered information about MFR policies abroad from many sources at 
various points in time, and then used that knowledge for a variety of purposes throughout 
the policymaking process. Second, Chilean and Mexican policymakers embedded what 
they learned in a set of strategies, aimed to build appropriate politico-administrative 
conditions for the new programmes, and consolidate their longer term durability and 
legitimacy. Third, cross-national policy learning was not a one-off experience. It was a 
protracted process during which policymakers continued following international 
developments, took advantage of ‘experiential learning’, and on that basis introduced 
policy adjustments or new MFR initiatives. Lastly, the influence of national and 
international factors on cross-national learning processes was not the same throughout the 
whole period. On the contrary, the way national factors and international organisations 
shaped policy developments varied across time.  
The following pages are divided into four main sections. The first briefly 
summarises the empirical findings of Chapters 3 to 6 with regards to policy outcomes. It 
discusses the policy changes which took place during 1990-2010, and the degree of policy 
convergence which resulted from them. The second section discusses how policymakers 
used knowledge from abroad and the third section looks at the strategies they developed to 
advance policy changes. The fourth section analyses the influence that cognitive, national, 
and international factors exerted on these processes. The chapter closes with some general 
conclusions.  
 
Cross-National Learning and Policy Outcomes  
What policy outcomes resulted from cross-national learning? In order to answer this 
question, one might think about two aspects. First, about those MFR reforms in the Chilean 
and Mexican experience which we might confidently say were related to learning from 
abroad. Second, the extent to which some degree of cross-national policy convergence 
(between these countries, but also with regards to broader international developments) 
might be observed. This section addresses these two points by briefly summarising the 
central empirical findings of Chapters 3 to 6.  
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Table 7.1 above presents the main MFR initiatives introduced during 1990-2010. It 
is difficult to clearly differentiate in which cases learning from abroad represented (or not) 
the most important motivation and/or source of knowledge for introducing policy 
initiatives/changes. However, the empirical discussion does allow pointing at those 
situations in which it did. On the basis of those instances, it is also possible to argue that 
cross-national policy learning played a very important role in the making of MFR policies 
in both countries.   
We can talk first about those initiatives for which knowledge from foreign MFR 
practices and ideas did not seem to matter. In the case of Chile, the only case is that of the 
System of Ministerial Goals, established at the beginning of president Aylwin’s 
administration, and its successor the System for Monitoring Government Programming 
(2000). Neither of these initiatives was developed on the basis of ideas gathered from 
abroad (Muñoz, 2005).  
In the Mexican experience, there were at least two initiatives that involved the use 
of ‘performance indicators’, ‘measurement’, or ‘evaluations’, which nonetheless did not 
take into account foreign experiences. These were the Presidential Goals System of the Fox 
administration, which was designed by SFP officials to follow up targets of presidential 
interest; and the ROSP of 1997-1998, introduced by SHCP for monitoring social 
programmes (later complemented with the evaluation guidelines of 2002). These changes 
responded to perceived needs, either to introduce new evaluation tools (the first initiative), 
or social demands about the need to curtail politicisation in the use of public programmes 
and resources (the others).   
However, for the rest of the programmes and initiatives which have been part of the 
Chilean and Mexican MFR policies during 1990-2010 the story is different. For those 
cases, Chapters 3 to 6 showed it is possible to find a more or less direct relation between 
national developments and learning from MFR practices and ideas abroad. In the Chilean 
experience, for instance, the management reforms introduced in some agencies during the 
1990s were advocated by policymakers following topics they knew were gaining currency 
elsewhere. The reforms of the 1990s, including the so-called Plan Piloto, the performance 
indicators, the programme evaluations, and the PMGs were all heavily influenced by 
knowledge about the British, Australian, and New Zealand experiences.  
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The Chilean reforms of the 2000s were similarly associated with international MFR 
developments. This was the case of impact and comprehensive spending evaluations, 
introduced as part of the new SECG of 2000 (which was also reformed taking into account 
international performance-budgeting trends). The more recent creation of monitoring and 
evaluation areas outside DIPRES, such as the ‘Delivery Unit’ at MINSEGPRES, and the 
social policy evaluation unit at the Ministry for Social Development, were informed by 
experiences in the UK and Mexico respectively.  
MFR policy developments in Mexico during the 1990s were also associated with 
broader international trends. For example, the introduction of performance management, 
measurement, and evaluation practices in SECODAM’s PROMAP; and of budget indicators 
and performance evaluation in SHCP’s new budgetary structure were both informed by 
NPM trends which Mexican officials gathered at the OECD meetings. The introduction of 
impact evaluations in PROGRESA in the 1990s, and the consolidation of evaluation 
practices in SEDESOL during the 2000s were similarly related to international evaluation 
practices. In all these cases, senior policymakers were aware of contemporary MFR 
developments abroad.  
Lastly, the Mexican reforms of the 2000s in social policy evaluations and 
performance budgeting were strongly associated with cross-national policy learning 
activities led by CONEVAL and SHCP officials. The Mexican PEMG originated in ideas 
gathered from the Chilean PMG model, even if it later followed a rather different path to 
performance management and measurement.  
Summing up, apart from a few exceptions, most MFR policy initiatives in Chile and 
Mexico during 1990-2010 were clearly associated with some form of cross-national 
learning. As it will be further discussed below, some of these initiatives originated in 
particular foreign cases. Yet the links between learning from abroad and policy changes 
was not generally one of ‘transfer’/‘adoption’ of policy models across jurisdictions.  
 
MFR Policy Changes and Policy Convergence 
Another way to explore whether and how cross-national learning mattered for policy 
changes in Chile and Mexico relates to an assessment of how much policy convergence has 
taken place between the two countries, and how much with regards to the international 
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experience. While both countries started from very different points, and while they have 
maintained important differences in terms of policy styles and implementation pathways, by 
2010 they shared a number of significant policy similarities. Taking as a point of departure 
the empirical information of Chapters 3 to 6, and the criteria discussed in Chapter 2 (e.g. 
Bennett, 1991b; Pollitt, 2001, 2002; Nutley et al., 2012), Table 7.2 details the degree of 
policy convergence between these two countries by year 2010.  
 
Table 7.2 
Degree of MFR Policy Convergence between Chile and Mexico 
Criterion CHILE MEXICO 
Degree of 
convergence 
Policy goals 
 
- Budgetary efficiency, programme 
effectiveness, budgetary transparency, 
accountability, quality of expenditure, 
delivery 
 
 
- Budgetary efficiency, administrative 
effectiveness, budgetary and 
administrative transparency, social 
accountability, quality of expenditure  
 
 
Medium/High 
Policy 
decisions 
 
- Explicit aim to develop MFR tools 
- Explicit interest in linking performance 
management and budgetary decisions 
- Proposed use of evaluations for the social 
policy sector 
 
 
- Explicit aim to develop MFR tools 
- Explicit aim to develop social policy 
sector evaluations 
- Proposed interest in linking performance 
management and budgetary decisions 
(albeit work remained in progress) 
 
Medium/High  
Policy 
instruments 
 
- Use of several types of evaluation tools  
- Use of performance indicators 
- Logical framework methodology  
- Budget by results as an overarching 
framework 
 
 
- Use of several types of evaluation tools 
- Use of performance indicators 
- Logical framework methodology  
- Budget by results as an overarching 
framework (in first stages) 
 
Medium/High  
Policy 
direction  
 
- From performance indicators to increased 
use of policy evaluations 
- Towards increased combination of M&E 
mixes 
 
 
- From performance indicators to increased 
use of policy evaluations 
- Towards increased combination of M&E 
mixes 
 
High  
Policy styles 
 
- Mainly backed by administrative decisions  
- Main (and most) MFR tools controlled by 
DIPRES  
 
 
 
- Mainly backed by legal criteria 
- Various agencies (CONEVAL, SHCP, 
SFP) involved in design and management 
of MFR tools 
 
Low 
Source: Author. 
 
In terms of policy goals, it is possible to find very similar wording, statements, and 
conceptualisations about results, budgetary quality, and effectiveness in both countries. The 
main difference relates to how these various goals have been interpreted. In Chile, DIPRES 
exerted an important influence over the reform process, including how guiding goals such 
as transparency or accountability were associated with budgetary aspects. In the Mexican 
experience SECODAM-SFP, SEDESOL-CONEVAL, and SHCP all took part in the process. 
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Thus, in comparison with Chile, goals such as effectiveness, accountability and 
transparency had slightly different connotations (e.g. administrative or social). Moreover, 
they were as important as budgetary goals such as efficiency or quality of expenditure.  
In terms of policy decisions, government documents and legislation from both 
countries offer similar statements about the need to measure performance and evaluate 
programmes. These documents further remarked the relevance of linking performance 
information with budgetary decisions (compare for instance Guzmán, 2005, and Arenas and 
Berner, 2010; with SFP, 2008, and SHCP, 2009). More recently, the Chilean government 
has stated its decision to evaluate social policy programmes, something which has long 
characterised the Mexican experience. 
Both countries also used similar policy instruments and approaches to MFR. 
Although with their own specific labels and technical specificities, both Chile and Mexico 
developed some sort of ‘menu of evaluations’ to review different aspects of governmental 
activity (e.g. programme operations, programme design, policy impacts). Performance 
indicators and the logical framework methodology were part of both countries’ MFR 
schemes, even if they were employed in different ways. The overarching concept of 
‘budget by results’ was used by the Chilean and (more recently) Mexican budget offices, to 
stress the inter-connections between the various MFR policy components (Arenas and 
Berner, 2010; SHCP, 2009, forthcoming).  
A relatively high degree of policy convergence could be further noted in the overall 
policy direction that the Chilean and Mexican MFR policies followed during the past two 
decades. As Chapters 3 to 6 noted, the specific timing of introduction of the various MFR 
tools varied between the two countries significantly. On the other hand, in both countries it 
is possible to observe two important similarities. First, in the 1990s both countries stressed 
the relevance of measuring results (e.g. efficiency) mainly through the use of performance 
indicators. Yet in the 2000s they emphasised the relevance of evaluating results (e.g. 
impacts). Second, MFR policies in both countries have increasingly favoured a combined 
use of ‘monitoring’ and ‘evaluation’ tools. 
Perhaps the only aspect in which policy convergence seemed to be rather low is that 
of policy styles. The Chilean MFR tools have been established mainly through 
administrative decisions and regulations. But in the Mexican experience MFR initiatives 
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have been associated with legal reforms, particularly during the 2000s. Another difference 
relates to the central government organisations involved in the making of the MFR policies. 
In Chile, it was DIPRES which dominated the process most of the time. Thus, MFR tools 
were strongly guided by an interest in ensuring efficient budget allocations (Guzmán, 2005; 
Zaltsman, 2009; Arenas and Berner, 2010). Only recently (e.g. after the presidential 
transition of 2010) Chilean officials looked abroad for ideas on how to develop MFR tools 
not related to the budget. In the Mexican experience, SHCP, SFP, and CONEVAL all took 
part in the reform processes. Therefore, MFR reforms were not limited to budgetary 
policymaking. On the contrary, knowledge from policies abroad was employed to design 
MFR tools for administrative modernisation, budget management, and social policy.   
Differences could also be found in how policy changes were implemented. This 
relates to how policy tools were combined in each country (e.g. various ‘mixes’ of 
evaluations and indicators); how each one of these MFR tools followed different technical 
specifications (e.g. information included, reporting formats and periods, percentage of 
budget covered); how each country emphasised different aspects (e.g. more frequent and 
sustained use of information from performance indicators in Chile); or how tools emerged 
and were revised at different points in time in each country (with Mexico almost always 
being ‘one step behind’).  
Thus, apart from significant differences in the policy styles dimension, the Chilean 
and Mexican MFR policies do seem to have reached a relatively high degree of policy 
convergence after two decades of reforms. This outcome might be due, of course, to many 
reasons, including that both countries may have faced similar functional needs. Then, it is 
obviously related to the fact that Mexican officials studied the Chilean experience, and used 
knowledge from it in the making of their own MFR policy since 2005. This would already 
point at the relevance of cross-national learning as a variable which affects policy changes, 
which might further lead to some degree of convergence. 
Yet beyond their mutual exchanges, it also seems as though MFR policies in both 
countries were heavily influenced by how government officials in Chile and Mexico 
followed developments abroad. This becomes clearer once the empirical findings 
summarised above are contrasted with broader international practices. For instance, an 
OECD questionnaire of 2005 found that, ‘efforts to assess the performance of programmes 
and ministries are now an accepted normal part of government’ (Curristine, 2005:89; 
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OECD, 2007). It also remarked that the main goals in using MFR policies were ‘[t]o 
improve efficiency and effectiveness of government organisations and programmes’; and 
‘[t]o provide more concrete information to the government and the legislature on 
performance’ (p. 96). These are features present in both the Chilean and Mexican 
experiences.  
In terms of policy instruments, the same study pointed that 26 out of 28 countries 
used performance measures and evaluations (p. 89). As for the general approaches, the 
questionnaire remarked that the ‘introduction of performance measures into budgeting and 
management processes is not only a widespread trend, it is also a long-term one’ (p. 90). 
Although problems remained with regards to performance data quality and the frequency 
with which it was used, the study noted that countries were trying to better link this 
performance information with budgetary and other policy decisions (p. 124-125). Once 
again, these are features which can be clearly recognised in the Chilean and Mexican MFR 
experiences.  
Summing up, this analysis shows that in spite of important differences, similarities 
between the two countries were in many ways even more significant. Leaving aside 
alternative paths of development and policy styles, many general features of the Chilean 
and Mexican MFR policies became increasingly alike across time. These included the kind 
of policy instruments used; the way monitoring and evaluation tools were combined; and 
the attempts made to strengthen links between MFR and budgetary/policy management 
decisions. All of these similarities reflected exchanges between officials from both 
countries, and broader processes of learning from other international experiences on this 
subject.  
 
The Uses of Knowledge from MFR Policies Abroad  
How did policymakers use knowledge from abroad in making national policies? While the 
previous section showed that cross-national learning strongly mattered for MFR policy 
developments, this section will now turn the attention towards how that information 
actually entered the Chilean and Mexican policymaking processes. Drawing on the 
empirical material and building on previous works on research utilisation (see Chapter 2), 
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this section will offer a conceptualisation of the uses of knowledge from policies abroad by 
policymakers.  
As it has been mentioned already, traditional transfer and diffusion accounts stress 
that learning occurs when a more or less modified version of a policy, decision, idea, or 
model travels across jurisdictions, either because it is perceived as successful or as 
potentially relevant for solving a problem back home (Rose, 1991, 1993; Dolowitz, 1997; 
Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, 2000; Weyland, 2004a, 2004b; Gilardi, 2010). By focusing in 
the uses of knowledge, it will become clear that cross-national learning does not really 
happen like that. In fact, with the partial exception of those instances in which foreign 
examples were used as templates (see below), officials did not transfer a specific foreign 
practice or idea. On the contrary, they learned from many sources in a variety of ways and 
at different points during the policymaking process. 
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Table 7.3  
Uses of Knowledge from MFR Policies Abroad (1990-2000) 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 
Knowledge 
used as… 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
C
H
IL
E
 
Compass 
 General international discussions:  
- Need to provide better public services 
- Modernisation of government 
- Focus on results 
General international discussions: 
- Budgetary reforms 
- The roles of Congress in auditing the Executive    
  
Inspiration 
  British reforms:  
- Performance management 
and measurement; Treasury’s 
involvement 
- Links between budget and 
performance 
- Performance-pay schemes 
Australian reforms: 
- Evaluation practices 
- Links between budget and performance 
 
New Zealand reforms: 
- Performance-pay schemes 
- Accountability reports  
- Links between budget and performance 
  
Templates 
  British reforms:  
- Efficiency scrutinies  
- Performance indicators  
(strategic planning and indicators used in 
Plan Piloto 1993-1994, and in 
performance indicators, 1995-1998 ) 
IDB evaluation 
practices: 
- Use of Logical 
Framework 
Methodology for 
programme evaluation  
   
General  
information 
  French, Spanish, and US 
(federal and state)  reforms: 
- Experiences reviewed, but 
not used 
      
Training  
examples 
     British, Australian, and New Zealand 
experiences: 
- Methodological guides (performance indicators 
and strategic planning) 
  
Evidence 
 
     UK, US, New Zealand, Australia, 
Sweden: 
- Performance management  
 
General international discussions: 
- WB/OECD assessment of global 
reforms  
 
Australian and New Zealand 
reforms: 
- Contrast Chilean path to reform 
   
M
E
X
IC
O
 
Compass 
    General international discussions:  
- Relationships between Executive power and Legislature on budgetary 
decisions 
- Relevance of ‘performance’, ‘evaluation’, ‘transparency’, 
‘accountability’, and ‘results’ 
 
Inspiration 
     British reforms: 
- Performance management, measurement and indicators  
- Quality of service 
 
OECD countries: 
- Performance management and indicators 
- Evaluation of programmes and budgets 
Templates 
     Portuguese reforms: 
- Structure of the modernisation programme (used 
for drafting PROMAP)  
 
International practices: 
- Impact evaluations for PROGRESA 
  
Evidence  
      Reforms in the UK, 
Canada, New Zealand, 
Australia, Portugal, 
and Spain: 
- Included in 
PROMAP’s 
presentation 
Australia, New Zealand, UK 
reforms: 
- Contrasts Mexico’s path to 
budgetary reform 
General 
information 
       Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands: 
- Budget reforms followed, but not used 
 Source: Author. 
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Tables 7.3 above and 7.4 (towards the end of the section) provide a summary of 
how officials from both governments used knowledge from MFR policy developments 
abroad. Each table covers a decade, in line with the way in which the previous chapters told 
the story of the reforms. As illustrated by these tables, there were at least seven different 
ways in which Chilean and Mexican officials used knowledge from MFR policies abroad. 
These are explained in the following pages.   
 
Using Knowledge from Policy Developments Abroad as a ‘Compass’ 
A first important way in which Chilean and Mexican officials used knowledge from policy 
developments abroad was one which could be associated with the idea of a compass: a 
means to learn about the general direction, the range of appropriate changes, or an 
understanding of modernity officials wanted to get in tune with given contemporary trends. 
The idea of a compass also contributes to understand how policymakers learn from policy 
developments abroad on an on-going manner, and not just in relation to specific transfer 
experiences. 
This concept builds on Weiss’ (1979:429) ‘enlightenment’ idea mentioned in 
Chapter 2. According to her, while policymakers might ‘have a sense that social science 
research has given them a backdrop of ideas and orientations’, they cannot cite specific 
studies. Therefore, in this form of knowledge utilisation one cannot talk about how Chilean 
and Mexican policymakers learned about the British NPM reforms, or the American 
executive-legislative relations. It is about how they interpreted international policy 
developments and emerging governance patterns. Then, taking into account their own 
countries’ changing politico-administrative conditions, policymakers introduced changes 
similar to those happening elsewhere. 
This compass-related learning strongly influenced various public management 
areas, as well as other aspects of the Chilean and Mexican political systems. Government 
officials learned about the relevance of reforming government structures and procedures in 
order to provide better public services; about measuring and MFR as a means to increasing 
government effectiveness and efficiency; and about how budgetary transparency could help 
them regain public trust. During 2000-2010 in particular, they also learned about the need 
to better link performance management measures and budgetary resource allocation.  
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In following international discussions and trends, Chilean and Mexican officials 
further learned that increasing and improving the Legislature’s engagement in budgetary 
discussions was an essential feature of presidential democracies. This could contribute to 
reducing the monopoly traditionally exerted by the Executive power on budgetary topics. 
Of course, this is an area in which policy developments were heavily related to the political 
democratisation dynamics taking place in both countries. However, the international 
experience provided Chilean and Mexican officials with a clearer understanding about why 
the longer term stability and durability of their new democratic regimes required more 
balanced relationships between the Executive and the Legislative.  
This use of knowledge from abroad was evident at several points in the Chilean and 
Mexican reform processes. For example, when Chilean policymakers referred to how 
DIPRES had been ‘visionary’, and had anticipated the public management/political 
developments the country could face in ‘10-20 years’ time’. Or when Marcel (1998a) 
remarked that the international experience clearly showed how important it was for the 
Chilean Congress to strengthen its auditing role, in order to increase accountability in the 
use of public resources.  
In the Mexican case, this kind of compass-like use of knowledge from policies 
abroad was present when officials stressed ‘things could not remain the same in a 
democracy’. The implication being that politico-administrative arrangements in Mexico had 
to be adjusted to how things worked in other democratic regimes. More recently, it 
appeared when CONEVAL and SHCP sought to generate more performance information, 
trying to make it available to Congress and the public, as it is the norm across OECD 
countries (OECD, 2007; Arizti et al., 2010; SHCP, forthcoming).  
 The idea that knowledge from policy developments abroad was employed as a 
compass to guide policy changes should not be confused with a simplistic or cynical desire 
by government officials to be perceived as modern. This might well have happened among 
some of them. Yet the broader picture obtained from the interviews, and from the several 
publications authored by key government officials, is rather different. If anything, it is 
closer to Westney’s (1987) depiction of how Japanese reformers in the 19th century wanted 
to modernise their country. Indeed, Chilean and Mexican officials introduced policy 
initiatives and ideas related to MFR in order to modernise, and thus get their politico-
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administrative systems in tune with contemporary democratic governance. But they did not 
necessarily seek to be perceived as modernisers for the sake of it.  
  
Using Knowledge from Policies Abroad as ‘Inspiration’ 
A second way in which Chilean and Mexican officials used knowledge from policies 
abroad is related to inspiration, or how a specific foreign practice, design principle, or label 
which they have heard about stimulated them to introduce similar policy changes in their 
own jurisdiction (Rose, 1993:31; Mossberger, 2000; Page and Mark-Lawson, 2010:57). 
This contrasts with the concept of a compass, which flags that policymakers learn from 
international changes or trends without necessarily identifying the source of learning. Yet it 
is also different from the idea of a template to be discussed below, as inspiration does not 
involve a detailed analysis of the specific practice or design principle.  
 There are a number of examples of how knowledge from abroad inspired policy 
developments in both countries. In the case of Chilean reforms of the 1990s, government 
officials referred to the Australian experience when talking about the origins of their 
programme evaluations tools. Pay for performance arrangements in New Zealand and the 
UK seem to have inspired officials when they were designing the PMGs, which introduced 
variable remuneration principles for the public sector. In none of these cases, however, 
foreign experiences were used as a basis to develop a Chilean version. They simple served 
as a general reference on the subject.  
Similarly, the UK Comprehensive Spending Reviews inspired the Chilean 
Comprehensive Spending Evaluations of the early 2000s. Because of problems faced when 
trying to contact British officials, a detailed exchange between the two countries did not 
take place. But Chilean officials still used a similar policy label and the broad idea from the 
British experience. More recently, officials from the Ministry of Social Development 
allegedly drew inspiration from Mexico’s social policy evaluation practices and institutions 
(SEDESOL and CONEVAL).  
In the Mexican experience, the performance management and measurement reforms 
of the 1990s were clearly inspired in reforms taking place across OECD countries. The 
British experience with performance indicators and service standards served as an 
inspiration for SECODAM officials, and general OECD trends influenced the introduction 
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of budget indicators. Yet in none of these cases Mexican officials took specific models as 
the basis for their programmes. Mexican policymakers similarly drew inspiration from US, 
Canadian, Colombian, and Chilean evaluation practices in the 2000s, in the course of 
designing a more ambitious M&E scheme for the social policy sector. The experience of 
the Spanish government, in which evaluation and control activities are clearly 
differentiated, served as inspiration for SFP officials when they designed their ministry’s 
new evaluation approach.  
 
Using Knowledge from Policies Abroad as ‘Templates’ 
A third way in which Chilean and Mexican government officials used knowledge from 
policies abroad is in the form of a template, or a more detailed blueprint of reference about 
how to design (or redesign) a certain programme or practice (Jacoby, 2001, 2004; Weyland, 
2004b). The use of templates assumes that government officials had information about the 
specific features of a given programme or practice, and then decided to use it as a basis for 
their own version. The idea of templates certainly echoes transfer/diffusion discussions 
about copying or emulation (Bennett, 1991a; Rose, 1991). However, the new programmes 
did not necessarily result in an exact copy of the original model.   
Perhaps the most significant example of a template being used by both Chilean and 
Mexican officials is the one related to the Logical Framework Methodology (LFM). This 
has long been employed by international organisations for analysing/evaluating 
programmes (Aldunate and Córdoba, 2011). In the case of Chile, the LFM was introduced 
for conducting evaluation programmes in the mid-1990s because DIPRES officials thought 
it was ‘easy to use’. Since the mid-2000s, Mexican officials from SEDESOL’s DGME also 
used the LFM as a template for the design of social policy programme evaluations. 
Although they had some knowledge about how the IDB and WB used this methodology, 
DGME officials actually took the Chilean version as a point of departure. During the 
second half of the 2000s, the LFM was used as a template by SHCP to design the 
methodology for evaluating budgetary programmes.  
There are other cases in which government officials used knowledge from practices 
abroad as a template. In the Chilean experience, the most famous example was the use of 
the British efficiency scrutinies and performance management reforms. These were used to 
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design the Plan Piloto of 1993 and the performance indicators, which would become a self-
standing initiative in 1995. Standard international evaluation practices and techniques were 
also used as a template in the design of both impact evaluations (early 2000s) and 
evaluations of new programmes (late 2000s). After the presidential transition of 2010, the 
British Delivery Unit example was also used as a template to create a new Unidad 
Presidencial de Gestión del Cumplimiento.  
In the Mexican experience there are some additional examples of foreign practices 
which were used as a template. For instance, this was the case of the Portuguese 
administrative reform plan, which SECODAM officials took as a reference when they 
prepared the PROMAP’s overall structure. Mexican officials also employed knowledge 
‘off-the-shelf’ about international evaluation practices in order to design the famous impact 
evaluation of PROGRESA in the late 1990s.  
 
Using Knowledge from Policies Abroad as ‘General Information’ 
A fourth way in which knowledge from policies abroad was used is as general information. 
In some cases officials gathered data, examples, and details about other countries’ MFR 
experiences either at international forums, or while searching for ideas on how to formulate 
a specific programme. This general information might have been useful to better 
understand how MFR worked in other national contexts, to provide policymakers with a 
clearer idea of the topic as a whole, or simply to broaden the sample of experiences under 
analysis (Mossberger and Wolman, 2002). However, this general information remained as 
such because of a number of reasons, including time constraints; that other cases were 
deemed more helpful; or that information was not as useful/relevant as initially thought.   
In the case of Chile, the example that can be provided is that of the French, Spanish, 
and US administrative reforms of the early 1990s. DIPRES officials initially gathered 
information about these experiences, but eventually thought these cases did not really fit 
their MFR plans. It was decided the British case was more useful. In the Mexican 
experience, SHCP officials also mentioned that throughout the years they had looked at 
reforms in South Korea, Denmark, Colombia, New Zealand, and Brazil. Yet they did not 
directly use information from any of these countries. During the 1990s, this was because 
they thought cultural differences between Mexico and those countries were substantial. In 
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the 2000s, the situation was more related to the fact they had already chosen another 
national experience (e.g. Chile) to be the main source of information for developing the 
PbR-SED.   
 
Using Knowledge from Policies Abroad as ‘Training Examples’ 
A fifth way in which government officials used knowledge from abroad was as training 
examples. In this case information about other countries’ experiences was inserted in 
various materials, such as booklets, methodological guides, or Power Point presentations. 
The information was used during internal seminars or training sessions to explain relevant 
officials (e.g. programme administrators) how a certain concept, programme, or practice 
actually worked in the public sector of other jurisdiction.  
 Thus, Chilean officials made extensive use of performance indicators examples 
from the UK, Australian, and New Zealand in the mid-1990s. The examples were part of 
the methodological guides distributed across government ministries and agencies, and were 
also used during training workshops. In the same sense, Mexican officials used examples 
from the Chilean experience in the development of performance indicators and logical 
frameworks. This was done in workshops for senior and middle-level officials in charge of 
coordinating social programmes. More recently, similar examples were used in training 
sessions for budget programme coordinators, as part of the process of introducing the new 
PbR-SED.  
 It should be noted that the use of foreign examples in training materials and 
workshops evolved across time. Thus, in documents prepared by DIPRES throughout the 
2000s the foreign (e.g. British or Australian) examples were substituted with others 
gathered from specific Chilean ministries. In the case of Mexico, the first talks prepared by 
ECLAC advisors in 2006-2010 did include several examples from the Chilean experience. 
Yet more recent guides on the subject, detailing how to prepare performance indicators and 
logical frameworks, have illustrated this with examples from the Mexican public sector 
(SHCP-SFP-CONEVAL, 2011).   
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Using Knowledge from Policies Abroad as ‘Evidence’ 
A sixth way in which Chilean and Mexican officials used knowledge about policies abroad 
is as evidence. In this case, the aim was to demonstrate that a similar initiative existed in 
other jurisdiction (Bennett, 1991a; Page and Mark-Lawson, 2010:58). Evidence was thus 
used by policymakers to make a case about the need to develop a similar policy, to justify 
and explain to the broader public the rationale behind certain policy changes, and ultimately 
to persuade other actors.  
Examples of how policymakers used knowledge from abroad as evidence can be 
found in some of the publications prepared by Marcel during the 1990s, in which reforms in 
Australia, UK, US, and New Zealand were frequently mentioned to illustrate broader 
international trends. Evidence was also used to underline the specificities of the Chilean 
reforms, and to explain how they did not focus on solving an economic crisis but responded 
to budgetary efficiency/effectiveness concerns. The UK, US, New Zealand, Australian, and 
Swedish reforms were similarly showcased in widely publicised conferences in Santiago 
(1995 and 1996). The international evidence presented in those occasions was further 
distributed among ministries and agencies through the publication of books and other 
products (e.g. videos; brochures).  
The series of publications prepared by DIPRES officials throughout the 2000s also 
referred to performance-budgeting trends in countries such as the UK, New Zealand, 
Canada, Australia, and more recently Portugal and Finland (Guzmán, 2005; Arenas and 
Berner, 2010). The publications then explained the specific features of the Chilean SECG-
budget by results vis-à-vis these international experiences. More recently, officials 
presented the experience of the British Delivery Unit in various public forums to justify the 
creation of similar unit in Chile. 
 In the Mexican experience, the PROMAP’s official presentation mentioned how 
performance management had become a central concern in countries like the UK, Canada, 
New Zealand, Australia, Spain, and Portugal (SFP, 2010). Chávez-Presa’s (2000) book on 
the NEP-SED reforms of the 1990s discussed contemporary reforms in New Zealand and 
the UK. He did so to frame the Mexican reforms in the broader context of international 
trends, but also to stress how they had originated in different concerns. 
 236 
 
 
Furthermore, in the second half of the 2000s, Mexican officials frequently used 
information about international practices as evidence in at least two ways. First, relevant 
experiences were included in legislative reform proposals, to show how evaluation 
procedures or performance-based budgeting worked in other countries (Diener, 2009). 
Second, the experiences of other jurisdictions were showcased in international conferences, 
like the one sponsored by SHCP in 2008, with performance-budgeting experts from Chile, 
Canada, UK, US, Sweden, South Korea, Colombia, Brazil, Australia, France, and the 
Netherlands (Pérez-Jácome, 2010; SHCP, 2009).  
 
Using Knowledge from Policies Abroad as ‘Benchmarks’ 
A last way in which Chilean and Mexican officials used knowledge from MFR policies 
abroad was as benchmarks, or specific examples of practices which at a given time 
deserved to be used for comparison, in order to assess the progress of policy changes 
already enacted. This allowed officials to contextualise their own policy developments 
within broader international trends. They also provided them with information about how to 
make specific policy adjustments. 
 For instance, DIPRES senior officials remarked that they permanently followed 
MFR developments across OECD countries, particularly in the early 2000s. This 
monitoring exercise in most cases did not result in specific changes. But it did provide 
senior officials with a means to know whether the SECG’s design and implementation 
processes were being carried out properly. In some instances, however, benchmarking 
activities did result in some kind of policy adjustments. This was the case of programme 
evaluations, which at some point were modified to include ideas from, for example, the US 
Program Assessment Rating Tool.  
 Mexican officials at SEDESOL’s DGME, and later at CONEVAL, also dedicated 
significant amounts of time to follow up on M&E developments in other countries. This 
was initially related to concerns about how to design their own M&E system; and later a 
government-wide evaluation scheme in partnership with SHCP and SFP. Yet in a later 
stage CONEVAL officials actively participated in international forums with the idea of 
continuously adapting their performance tools. As mentioned at the beginning of this 
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section, Table 7.4 summarises the various uses of knowledge from abroad for the period of 
2000-2010. 
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Table 7.4  
Uses of Knowledge from MFR Policies Abroad (2000-2010) 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 
Knowledge 
Use 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
C
H
IL
E
 
Compass 
General International Discussions:  
- Increased links between performance management information and budget 
allocation 
    
Inspiration 
 British comprehensive spending reviews: 
- Design of comprehensive spending evaluations  
 
 
   Mexican 
reforms: 
- Design of 
social policy 
evaluations 
Templates 
International evaluation practices: 
- Design of Impact Evaluations  
 
 
 
    International 
evaluation 
practices: 
- Design of 
Evaluations for 
New Programmes 
 
British 
Delivery 
Unit: 
- New 
Delivery Unit 
at MIN-
SEGPRES 
Evidence 
 UK, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Portugal: 
- Mentioned in DIPRES documents about the SECG 
British 
Delivery 
Unit: 
-  Creation of 
Delivery Unit 
Benchmark 
OECD countries: 
- Permanent ‘benchmarking’ of Chilean MFR tools against international tools  
- Fine-tuning of specific MFR tools on certain models (e.g. US PART) 
 
    
M
E
X
IC
O
 
Compass 
General International Discussions:  
- Managerial trends 
- Increased links between performance management information and budget allocation 
 
  
Inspiration 
  International practices and 
specific national cases: 
- Design of M&E scheme in 
the Ministry of Social 
Development 
- US PART 
- Canadian, Colombian, and  
Chilean evaluation practices 
  Spanish Evaluation 
Agency: 
- Design of SFP’s 
new evaluation  
scheme 
 
US and Canada: 
- Budgetary 
transparency   
   
Templates 
   Chilean programme evaluations 
- Use of logical frameworks for 
social policy evaluations  
 Chilean programme evaluations 
- Use of logical frameworks for evaluation of 
budgetary programmes 
 
Chilean Programme for Management 
Improvement: 
- Mexican version of the programme 
 
General 
information  
     Brazil, Colombia, South 
Korea, New Zealand  
- MFR systems 
 
Evidence 
      OECD countries:  
- Examples of 
performance-based 
budgetary practices 
during study tours 
with legislators 
 
Australia, Canada, 
Chile, Denmark, UK, 
New Zealand, Japan, 
Sweden, Netherlands   
- Examples included 
in legislative 
proposals 
Chile, Canada, UK,  US, 
Sweden, South Korea, Colombia, 
Brazil, Australia, France, and 
Netherlands: 
-  Performance-based budgetary 
reforms 
 
General international 
discussions: 
- WB/IDB/OECD, and expert  
assessments of performance-
based reform trends 
Training  
Examples  
      Chilean experience: 
- Logical frameworks and performance indicators examples 
Benchmark  
    International M&E trends: 
- Followed by CONEVAL experts to revise M&E scheme 
 Source: Author.  
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Summary on the uses of knowledge from policies abroad 
By looking at the uses of knowledge from policies abroad, one can better understand how 
officials actually associated international MFR experiences with national policymaking 
processes. With the partial exception of those instances in which foreign examples were 
used as templates, the picture provided is not one of transfer or diffusion, of policies or 
models travelling from jurisdictions A or B to Chile or Mexico. On the contrary, the image 
is one of ideas and insights from several sources being employed by policymakers as they 
made their own MFR policies.  
The discussion further indicates that knowledge from policies abroad was not only 
used at the agenda-setting or policy formulation stages (Bennett, 1991a; Robertson, 1991). 
On the one hand, inspiration, templates, and general information were certainly uses of 
knowledge associated with how Chilean and Mexican officials pushed a topic into the 
government agenda, or how they formulated policy options. But evidence about 
international experiences did not only enter the policymaking process at the agenda-setting 
stage. It was used to keep MFR topics on the government’s radar and to legitimate them.   
Furthermore, other uses of knowledge from policies abroad took place at other 
stages of the policymaking cycle. Training examples, for instance, were used at the start of 
the implementation process. With the policies already on-going, international benchmarks 
allowed policymakers to keep the reforms on track, either by indicating them that things 
were being done properly; or by providing them with examples of how to make 
adjustments. Last but not least, the idea that knowledge from abroad was used as a compass 
by Chilean and Mexican officials relates to the fact that international experience flagged to 
them changes which might need to be pursued (agenda-setting); general ideas about how to 
develop them (policy formulation); and sometimes insights about how to redirect the policy 
course (policy adjustments).  
 Summing up, the uses of knowledge provide us with a means to better understand 
how cross-national learning informed the making of MFR policies in Mexico and Chile 
during 1990-2010. They show that learning from abroad is not just about transferring or 
disseminating policy models across jurisdictions. In fact, cross-national policy learning is 
mainly about rethinking national policies; imagining new programmes and courses of 
action; assessing existing practices; planning policy modifications; arguing about topics; 
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and informing and guiding policy changes. All in the light of developments which might be 
either taking place in other jurisdictions in the same policy field, or might be perceived by 
policymakers as representative of contemporary trends and conventions.   
 
Policymakers’ Strategies for Advancing Policy Changes 
What strategies did Chilean and Mexican policymakers pursue to advance policy changes? 
As discussed in Chapter 2, some authors have remarked that policy actors might develop 
certain strategies when using knowledge from abroad for introducing new policies, or for 
redirecting those already in place. But apart from flagging the key role of policy 
entrepreneurs and offering some limited conceptualisations (Roberts, 1996; Mintrom, 1997; 
Gutiérrez, 2010), transfer/diffusion scholarly debates have remained rather silent on this 
subject.   
The analysis of the Chilean and Mexican MFR reform experiences, however, does 
shed some light on the kind of strategies (e.g. actions planned to achieve a certain goal) that 
policymakers set in motion. Policymakers did not necessarily develop complicated 
calculations about potential gains and losses. Yet they did continuously reflect upon which 
actions and channels would be more conducive to turn knowledge from MFR policies 
abroad into actual changes in their own jurisdictions.  
In specific terms, Chilean and Mexican officials devised two different albeit 
strongly related sets of policy strategies. First, they used policy building strategies. These 
aimed to establish the basic administrative and political conditions for an appropriate 
design and functioning of the new MFR tools and practices. As it will be further detailed 
below, knowledge from policies abroad served as a key point of departure for this type of 
strategies.  
Moreover, Chilean and Mexican officials assumed (or learned from previous reform 
experiences) that a good policy design and favourable initial conditions would only take 
them so far. Therefore, they complemented policy building with policy consolidation 
strategies. These were aimed at ensuring the continued use, as well as the longer term 
legitimacy and durability of MFR tools, regardless of political or administrative cycles. 
Figure 7.1 below illustrates these strategies. The following paragraphs will elaborate on 
how they worked in practice. 
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Figure 7.1 
Strategies Policymakers Use for Linking   
Knowledge from Abroad and Policy Changes 
 
Source: Author.  
 
Policy Building Strategies 
In terms of policy building, both Chilean and Mexican officials engaged in four main 
strategies. The first one was a conceptualisation strategy. This strategy was focused in 
developing a clear understanding of what MFR (and its various tools) were about. Across 
time, this strategy took as a point of departure the uses of knowledge described above as 
compass, inspiration, templates, and general information. In these various fashions, 
knowledge from policies abroad served officials to delineate the main principles, 
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components, and technicalities that formed the basis of MFR tools. It also helped them 
produce clear definitions and illustrations of indicators, performance, and evaluation.  
There are various examples of how this conceptualisation strategy worked in 
practice. One is that of Marcel’s attempts throughout the 1990s to propose a ‘model of 
public management’ for the Chilean public sector. In the Mexican case, an example is 
provided by the efforts led by Hernández and his team at SEDESOL to build a so-called 
‘M&E system’ for the social policy sector. Another example is represented by the 
publications prepared by SHCP officials in the second half of the 2000s, focused in 
explaining the PbR-SED and its components to other ministries, Congress, and the public in 
general.   
This strategy of conceptualisation, however, did not take place once and for all. On 
the contrary, government officials in both countries were involved in processes of 
reconceptualisation. This was done in response to both new MFR international 
developments, as well as lessons policymakers learned from their own practical experience. 
Perhaps the clearest example of how this reconceptualisation took place was when Marcel 
and Guzmán introduced a new MFR ‘system’ (the SECG) in the early 2000s. In the case of 
Mexico, a good example is SHCP’s transition in 2006-2007 from budget indicators to 
logical frameworks (associated with the so-called ‘matrixes of indicators’), as the new 
conceptual basis of the PbR-SED. 
 The second policy building strategy developed by Chilean and Mexican officials 
was one which could be called professionalisation. This was focused in increasing the pool 
of available knowledge and skills on MFR topics among officials involved in designing and 
implementing the reforms. Thus, this strategy was partly based on foreign training 
examples, but also with the use of templates and evidence. For instance, when IDB experts 
provided training to DIPRES officials on the subject of programme evaluations in the mid-
1990s, they used the LFM template as a reference. Another example of this 
professionalisation strategy was when SEDESOL’s DGME officials looked at the academic 
literature, and attended courses about evaluation topics during the first half of the 2000s.  
Furthermore, this professionalisation strategy was related to how reformers 
supported broader capacity building activities. In the 1990s, DIPRES paid for external 
consultants to advice ministries and agencies in their efforts to develop strategic plans and 
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performance indicators. Similarly, CONEVAL funded some training courses on evaluation 
for officials in charge of coordinating social programmes, and others for external 
consultants to strengthen the evaluation market in the country. A more recent example was 
the ambitious programme of seminars and online training activities jointly coordinated by 
SHCP, SFP, and CONEVAL, with the support of ECLAC experts. These courses sought to 
disseminate knowledge about programme evaluation, performance indicators, and 
performance-budgeting among government officials. Sessions dedicated to showcase 
international evidence were added to explain participants why MFR was relevant for their 
organisations.     
The third policy building strategy employed by Chilean and Mexican officials was 
fine-tuning. This focused on adjusting continuously the components of the MFR tools 
introduced. This strategy was mainly associated with international benchmarks and a 
compass-like use of knowledge from abroad. It was also nurtured by practical experience in 
the implementation of MFR tools. In contrast to the conceptualisation strategy, fine-tuning 
was not focused on defining the overall components of the policies, but in more specific 
design details and day-to-day operational aspects.  
With regards to international developments, the strategy of fine-tuning was closely 
related to how officials monitored experiences and cases on a semi-permanent basis. This 
was particularly (but not solely) focused on those considered best practices. Thus, 
throughout the 2000s Chilean officials introduced some minor adjustments to the SECG 
components on the basis of what they saw among OECD countries. Similarly, after looking 
at the American and Canadian experiences, Mexican SHCP officials sought to refine the 
way performance information is shared/communicated to the public and other agencies.  
The strategy of fine-tuning was also related to experiential learning. As 
implementation of MFR tools evolved, policymakers introduced some refinements in their 
design and operation. For instance, DIPRES officials took advantage of the cyclical nature 
of MFR schemes, and tried to improve the SECG at the end of every annual exercise. 
Similarly officials from SEDESOL-CONEVAL regularly introduced modifications to their 
evaluation tools as they tried and tested them.  
The fourth policy building strategy that Chilean and Mexican officials followed was 
one of persuasion. This focused in convincing other actors about the benefits of the 
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reforms, in order to gain their support for making administrative or legal changes; to 
facilitate reform implementation; or, once a legal change had been enacted, to keep the 
topic on the agenda. This strategy required from policymakers arguments about why MFR 
reforms were necessary and/or beneficial for their countries; and why, despite their origins 
in advanced countries, MFR tools could suit well the politico-administrative conditions of 
Chile and Mexico. Therefore, this strategy was mainly related to the use of evidence about 
specific cases, but also with the broader compass-like knowledge from international trends.   
 Indeed, much of the initial activities performed by Marcel and his team in the mid-
1990s were precisely focused in persuading other actors that MFR was relevant for Chile. 
Hence his writings on how and why it was possible to develop performance management 
practices in the public sector. Also on how the Chilean approach to the subject did not have 
to be a copy of the British or the Australian reforms. The international conferences that 
DIPRES sponsored in 1995 and 1996, as well as the series of publications and workshops 
that followed, similarly sought to persuade government officials that a results-orientation 
was taking hold across the world.  
In Mexico, attempts to develop this persuasion strategy can be found, for instance, 
in the publications of Santiago Levy (2004, 2006; Levy and Rodríguez, 2004) and Jorge 
Chávez-Presa (2000). Apart from detailing the contents of the specific MFR initiatives they 
had sponsored, their publications explained how and why evaluations/budget indicators 
were essential to improve efficiency and transparency in public programmes and public 
expenditure. There are other examples of how Mexican officials sought to persuade key 
actors about the importance of MFR reforms. First, the various conversations that 
CONEVAL and SHCP officials had with president Calderón’s advisors during the 
government transition of 2006. Second, the study tour to Paris (OECD) and Canada that 
SHCP officials organised for Congressmen, so that they could obtain detailed information 
on how performance-budgeting worked in practice in other countries.  
 
Policy Consolidation Strategies  
In addition to the strategies described above, policymakers also set in motion a set of policy 
consolidation strategies. The first one was institutionalisation. This was focused in 
introducing changes to the administrative or legal frameworks of the Chilean and Mexican 
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governments to provide safer conditions for the evolution of MFR initiatives, and thus to 
support their longer term duration. In other words, with this strategy officials sought to 
reduce the chances of policy reversals. The strategy of institutionalisation, however, did not 
always take place once a programme or initiative had existed for some time. In certain 
occasions, it happened at the very beginning, partly depending upon the opportunities 
officials had, and partly on the experience they had gained because of previous reform 
attempts (see below section on the influence of cognitive factors).   
 The following two examples show how this strategy was used in the Chilean 
experience. Despite the lack of practical experience, programme evaluations were included 
as part of the budget decree of 1997 (and later as part of the Budget Law in 2006). This was 
done to formalise this MFR tool as much as to secure that it would be taken into account as 
part of annual budgetary cycles. Institutionalisation was also sought with the creation of the 
División de Control de Gestión within DIPRES in 2000, the unit dedicated to design, 
coordinate, and implement the new SECG. This was very important because it allowed 
DIPRES to have a group of policy experts, who could advocate a sustained use of 
performance information in association to the budgetary decisions.  
 In the Mexican experience, similar institutionalisation efforts were developed by 
policymakers in the social policy sector. This was first done through the creation of the 
DGME within SEDESOL, dedicated to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) tasks. Later on, 
by including evaluation principles and creating CONEVAL in the General Law for Social 
Development. With regards to the performance-based budgetary reforms of the 2000s, 
SHCP officials also sought to secure the durability of the new PbR-SED by sponsoring and 
lobbying the approval of several legal and constitutional reforms in 2006-2008.   
The second policy consolidation strategy was one that might be called political 
deactivation. In contrast to the persuasion strategy described above, this was focused in 
developing actions to anticipate, eliminate, or at least minimise potential political conflicts 
surrounding the implementation of MFR tools. This strategy was thus mainly related to 
negotiating and reaching agreements about the boundaries of various MFR tools, and the 
roles each actor should play.   
In the Chilean experience, the clearest illustration is offered by the various 
exchanges between DIPRES and MINSEGPRES. During the 1990s, both agencies 
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collaborated in the making of administrative modernisation tools, and made sure their 
respective MFR programmes would not overlap. In the early 2000s, after both agencies 
entered a series of inter-organisational conflicts, a tacit agreement was reached to allow for 
the continuation of MINSEGPRES’ SMGP despite the introduction of DIPRES’ SECG. In 
2010, with the introduction of the Delivery Unit in MINSEGPRES, officials from the latter 
ministry seemed to be taking measures so that their new scheme did not compete against 
the MFR tools managed by DIPRES.  
An illustration in the Mexican experience of how this political deactivation strategy 
worked is that represented by the series of meetings CONEVAL’s Hernández held with 
SHCP officials during 2005-2007. CONEVAL officials knew that the various legal changes 
that were about to take place on the subject of evaluation would increase the number of 
actors in the evaluation field. It could also lead to the design of evaluation tools which 
overlapped with CONEVAL’s. Therefore, Hernández approached SHCP and SFP. He made 
the case for introducing inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms, and shared with them 
what CONEVAL was doing regarding evaluation methodologies and capacity building. As a 
result, Hernández built a partnership with SHCP officials; managed to avoid (or at least 
minimise) conflicts with SFP (and between the latter and SHCP); and ensured the work he 
and his team had previously conducted would not be wasted.  
The third policy consolidation strategy used by Chilean and Mexican policymakers 
alike was marketing. This was focused on producing and disseminating packaged 
information about one or more of their MFR tools in national and international forums. The 
participation of officials in international expert networks is, of course, associated with their 
governments’ formal links with international organisations (e.g. the OECD SBOs 
Committee). Yet the empirical chapters provided evidence indicating how this participation 
related to deliberate efforts by senior officials to publicise their reform experiences.   
Marcel’s and Guzmán’s active participation in several conferences throughout the 
2000s was precisely related to this. As mentioned in Chapter 5, they assumed that the 
higher the number of people knew about the SECG’s existence and objectives, the higher 
the chances of legitimising and consolidating the system. This same reason was behind the 
publication of several institutional reports, describing the structure and evolution of the 
SECG. A similar dynamics could be observed in the case of CONEVAL officials, who 
participated in as many forums as possible to market their evaluation approach.  
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The fourth policy consolidation strategy used by officials was international 
legitimation. This relates to the various efforts made by national governments to become 
‘certified’, or at least commended for their reform initiatives and efforts by international 
organisations. International legitimation was thus pursued to show other national actors 
that MFR reforms were appropriate and necessary. Also to demonstrate policy changes 
should be strengthened and/or kept as part of the politico-administrative system.   
 Once again, perhaps the clearest example of this strategy is represented by Marcel’s 
and Guzmán’s efforts to get the Chilean SECG externally evaluated many times. These 
evaluations were useful to improve the design and implementation of MFR tools. Yet they 
were deliberately sought after because of broader political objectives. In being praised by 
the OECD, WB, and also by the IDB through the active dissemination of the ‘Chilean 
model’ since 2005, DIPRES officials gained two benefits. In the short term, they increased 
DIPRES’ credibility and prestige within the central government. In the longer term, they 
secured the permanence of the system; or at least contributed to it by increasing the 
political costs of a policy reversal.  
 There were similar examples in the Mexican case. During the 1990s, it was clear 
that Levy was looking for the international legitimation of both PROGRESA and the 
impact evaluation performed to it. That is why he asked IFPRIS (an international 
institution) to lead the exercise. More recently, both CONEVAL and SHCP officials had 
their respective MFR tools assessed by the WB and the OECD, respectively. As in the 
Chilean case, apart from seeking technical advice, officials tried to get a stamp of approval, 
in order to secure a place for their MFR initiatives in the political and government agendas.     
 
Summary of policy strategies 
By looking at the strategies policymakers devise we can better understand how learning 
from abroad actually leads to policy changes. Moreover, a review of these policy strategies 
offers a strong contrast against the traditional assumptions of the transfer/diffusion and 
cognate literatures. The image that results from the comparison of the Chilean and Mexican 
experiences is not one of policymakers who are just busy fitting, adapting, or translating a 
policy or an idea from abroad (Rose, 1993, 2005; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Mossberger, 
2000; Stone, 2012; Prince, 2010; Heilmann and Schulte-Kulkmann, 2011; Marsh and 
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Evans, 2012a, 2012b; McCann and Ward, 2012, 2013). Nor is it one of policy 
entrepreneurs merely concerned about policy adoption (Mintrom, 1997).  
Of course, Chilean and Mexican officials did invest significant time and effort in 
making sure the new MFR principles and programmes learned from similar policies abroad 
were in tune with their own national conditions. Taking as a point of departure the various 
uses of knowledge previously described, policymakers developed a set of policy building 
strategies. Their conceptualisation, professionalisation, fine-tuning, and persuasion 
strategies were all aimed at establishing the politico-administrative conditions that might 
secure a good policy design, as well as the future effectiveness of the MFR initiatives.  
However, Chilean and Mexican officials knew (or learned from experience) that 
policy changes required from them to ‘power’ and not just ‘puzzle’. Furthermore, they also 
understood this ‘powering’ needed to go beyond the policy adoption stage. Therefore, 
policymakers complemented the former strategies with a set of policy consolidation 
strategies. Institutionalisation, political deactivation, marketing, and international 
legitimation were all focused in guaranteeing the longer-term survival and legitimacy of 
MFR reforms. These various strategies generally took place once the policy changes had 
been enacted, and were thus mostly focused in securing their future. 
 
The Influence of Cognitive, National, and International Factors on  
Cross-National Policy Learning Processes 
Chilean and Mexican policymakers were able to introduce a number of significant MFR 
policy changes by using knowledge from policies abroad in various ways and by devising 
several policy strategies. Yet how did cognitive, national and international factors actually 
influence cross-national learning processes? As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature has 
produced a number of hypotheses about the ways in which these three sets of variables 
might shape these processes, either by introducing significant biases, or by constraining the 
margins for policy changes, or both.  
While specific points are flagged in each of the three subsections below, it is worth 
noting that the comparison of the Chilean and Mexican experiences provide a more 
nuanced image than the one traditionally offered by the transfer/diffusion literatures. Thus, 
the influence of cognitive factors is considerable, but less so because of possible decision-
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making biases than of how experiential learning might be a key supporting element of 
cross-national learning. National factors are relevant, but more in terms of defining the 
general contours and timing of the policies, than as permanent barriers to policy change or 
cross-national convergence. Lastly, the influence of international organisations is highly 
significant, yet punctuated by national interests and agendas, and not related to coercion. 
Moreover, across time the influence of all these factors varied significantly.  
 
The Influence of Cognitive Factors  
The first set of relevant variables highlighted in Chapter 2 is that of what has been called 
here cognitive factors. These include rationality limitations which might bias cross-national 
policy learning, and the occurrence of other types of learning (e.g. learning by doing) which 
might take place during these processes. The findings from the two country experiences 
provide some interesting insights on this subject.  
 In line with previous scholarship, none of the Chilean and Mexican cross-national 
learning episodes could be considered to have followed patterns of comprehensive 
rationality. In terms of information gathering, policymakers did not have the time or 
resources to study all relevant experiences. For instance, Chilean policymakers focused in 
examples perceived as best practices (e.g. New Zealand, Australia, UK). But they did not 
study developments in countries like Colombia or Brazil, and only looked at Mexico in the 
late 2000s. Similarly, during the 1990s, Mexican officials mainly followed OECD 
experiences. They only turned their attention to Chile and other Latin American countries 
in the mid-2000s.  
Nor did Chilean or Mexican officials have the capacity to gather and analyse all 
relevant information (e.g. reports, studies, criticisms, interactions with national settings, 
evaluations) about the specific country experiences they wanted to learn from. As Chapters 
3 to 6 described, policymakers conducted just a couple of study tours. These lasted a few 
days and probably did not allow them to learn about all the specificities of original MFR 
practices. Only in the case of SFP officials’ visit to Chile in 2007 did officials make an 
effort to hear critical accounts from actors not directly involved in the management of MFR 
programmes. Moreover, because both the Chilean and Mexican reforms evolved almost in 
 250 
 
 
parallel to the so-called best practices, officials did not really have the chance to access 
detailed evaluations about the performance of leading MFR reforms.   
 However, the biasing effects of the former limitations of cross-national learning 
exercises were partly minimised by other means. Across time, Chilean and Mexican 
officials did broaden the number of sources and country examples used. Through their 
active participation in international forums, they could frequently access reports, 
documents, and country presentations about other national experiences and contemporary 
international trends. They also established communications with academic specialists (e.g. 
Allen Shick), and maintained frequent contacts with other national experts, particularly in 
the 2000s. In cases where MFR practices had been initially anchored in a foreign model 
(e.g. the Chilean reforms of the 1990s and the British experience; CONEVAL’s evaluations 
and the Chilean experience), policymakers later aimed to add insights from other 
experiences. Lastly, as years passed policymakers became increasingly aware of the main 
limitations faced by MFR tools both abroad and at home, and reacted accordingly (see 
below).  
The empirical chapters further showed that cross-national learning was not the only 
type of learning taking place in Chile and Mexico during the two decades under study. On 
the contrary, policymakers from both countries were able to learn from their own previous 
MFR experiences. They then sought to bridge this experiential learning with processes of 
learning from abroad, in what became broader sequences of learning and change. Thus, 
while differentiating conceptually between these two types of learning is useful for 
analytical purposes, the Chilean and Mexican experiences also show that they do not 
necessarily take place in an ‘either/or’ manner. This is particularly the case as time goes by. 
 These sequences of learning and change seem to have occurred under two broad 
varieties. The first one, following Hood’s idea (1996) of ‘second-chance learning’ (e.g. the 
adaptation of behaviours in the light of experience after surviving a ‘shocking’ episode), 
happened when policymakers faced the opportunity to use knowledge from policies abroad 
in time
2
, and did so taking into account lessons learned from time
1
. In the Chilean 
experience, a clear example of this was Marcel’s participation as leader of the MFR reform 
process. As detailed in Chapter 3, he was the main advocate and designer of the first round 
of MFR initiatives in the mid-1990s, but left the Chilean government in 1997. 
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 Marcel had a ‘second chance’ when president Lagos appointed him as Director of 
DIPRES in 2000. In that capacity, Marcel was in a position of authority to lead MFR 
reforms. Taking into account the experience gained in the 1990s, he established in DIPRES 
a unit exclusively dedicated to MFR topics, and appointed someone (Marcela Guzmán) 
with practical experience on the subject as its leader. Marcel also led an internal 
restructuring process to make sure that, in contrast to what had happened in the 1990s, 
performance information would be regularly used in the budgetary policymaking cycle. 
With the support of Guzmán, Marcel carried out an assessment of the main limitations that 
the original MFR tools had encountered. This review, in combination with knowledge 
gathered from abroad about how to better link performance information and budgetary 
decisions, led to the introduction of a new set of tools embedded in the SECG.     
 In the mid-2000s, Mexican SHCP officials similarly faced a ‘second chance’. 
Taking advantage of discussions about a new Financial Responsibility and Budget Law, 
officials from SHCP’s Budget Unit reintroduced the objective of creating a performance 
evaluation system linked to the budget. These efforts were led by Guillermo Bernal and 
Max Diener, Head (since 2001) and General Counsel of the Budget Unit, respectively. 
Diener in particular had participated in the budgetary reforms of the 1990s. He was well 
aware of the reasons why the NEP-SED had been unsuccessful. These included the 
inexistence of strong legal foundations (it had been supported by administrative regulations, 
not legislation); its incremental approach to reform; and the lack of a clear methodology for 
building performance indicators. 
Once the topic of a performance evaluation system had been included in the new 
Budget Law, Bernal, Diener, and their colleagues at SHCP aimed to secure the longer term 
durability of the reform. With the support of Undersecretary Carlos Hurtado, they contacted 
DIPRES officials (Marcel and Guzmán). They also established a working partnership with 
CONEVAL. As a result, they were able to refine and improve their initial approach to 
budget by results (as discussed in Chapter 6). In the logical frameworks for programme 
evaluations, SHCP officials found a useful methodology. This allowed them to pursue a 
‘big bang’, government-wide implementation process. They then persuaded the incoming 
Calderón administration (2006) about the need to institutionalise the reform through a 
series of legal and constitutional changes. Thus, in contrast with the NEP-SED of the 
1990s, by 2008 the new PbR-SED was fully backed by a legal framework.  
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 Beyond these ‘second chances’ (which by definition are rare), Chilean and Mexican 
officials do seem to have drawn lessons from their previous experiences in other occasions. 
Two examples should suffice to illustrate this point. For instance, the introduction of the 
Chilean performance indicators of 1995 was grounded in what DIPRES officials had 
learned while implementing the Pilot Plan in 1993-1994. As mentioned above, the PMGs, 
programme evaluations, and general management reports of 2000 were revised versions of 
tools implemented in the 1990s. Evaluation tools added throughout the 2000s were also a 
response to how DIPRES officials learned from the practical limitations of programme 
evaluations. Changes were then informed by knowledge about international practices.  
 A similar example can be offered in the Mexican experience. By looking at how 
social programme evaluations had worked in practice during 2002-2004, officials from 
SEDESOL’s newly created DGME drew important lessons. On this basis, and supported by 
the technical advice provided by WB experts, Hernández and his team decided to have 
different types of evaluations with clear terms of reference to guide the work of external 
evaluators. When Hernández and his team moved to CONEVAL, this experiential learning 
was further combined with detailed knowledge about other international M&E experiences 
to produce CONEVAL’s approach to evaluation. Later on, through their partnership with 
CONEVAL, SHCP officials also took advantage of this pool of experiential learning in the 
design of the new PbR-SED.  
 Summing up, cognitive factors do seem to have influenced cross-national policy 
learning processes, albeit in a rather complex way. On the one hand, bounded rationality 
and other learning biases did affect how policymakers learned from international MFR 
examples. Chilean and Mexican policymakers introduced MFR practices in their national 
environments on the basis of experiences pointed as best practices. This happened without 
them necessarily possessing a thorough knowledge of how such practices worked; or about 
what their real benefits/limitations were. On the other hand, throughout the years 
policymakers did make an effort to broaden the variety of information sources, and the 
number of foreign experiences under analysis. Furthermore, they learned from their own 
experience in implementing MFR policy reforms, and sometimes even took advantage of 
the ‘second chances’ they had. Thus, ‘learning by doing’ complemented the process of 
‘learning from abroad’, and across time produced broader and more complex sequences of 
learning and change in both countries.  
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The Influence of National Factors  
The second set of variables which might influence cross-national policy learning processes 
is that of national factors. Discussing these is particularly relevant because, as noted in 
Chapter 2, several studies have pointed at how they might constrain learning from abroad 
and the changes that potentially result from it. On the other hand, the first section of this 
chapter remarked the number of MFR policy changes that have taken place in Chile and 
Mexico. It also noted that both countries seemed to be converging in some ways with 
respect to broader international trends. How, then, did national factors influence cross-
national policy learning experiences? 
 At first instance, one could argue that national factors did not matter that much. 
Chilean and Mexican policymakers did not automatically turn for ideas and lessons about 
MFR policies to other countries of their cultural/geographic region, as the literature would 
have predicted. In fact, they looked at countries which were leading international trends, 
and were thus labelled as ‘best’ or at least important practices. While this was partly due to 
the lack of relevant regional examples, countries such as Brazil and Colombia have long 
experimented with MFR practices (Cunill and Ospina, 2012). During the 2000s, Mexican 
officials did intensively study the Chilean experience, and Chilean officials eventually 
looked at the Mexican social policy evaluation reforms. However, this seems to have been 
more a result of the WB and IDB’s efforts to disseminate and better connect regional 
experiences, than out of policymakers’ acknowledgement that cultural proximity was 
important for cross-national learning purposes.   
Nor did national factors block policy changes derived from cross-national learning 
in the longer term. On the one hand, MFR principles and ideas did not have an easy arrival 
to either country. On the contrary, as described in Chapters 3 and 4, the 1990s were very 
much a trial-and-error period. Policymakers struggled to make the case for introducing 
reforms which had originated in other jurisdictions with different levels of economic 
development and legal/administrative systems. Indeed, both countries encountered a 
number of practical limitations; implementation faced strong resistance from political and 
bureaucratic actors; and the performance of MFR programmes and tools was not fully 
successful. In this sense, national institutions (e.g. bureaucratic conditions and conflicts) 
certainly complicated the reform processes, particularly during their first decade. 
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On the other hand, learning from abroad did help policymakers to significantly 
transform some national features. The administrative tradition of Chile and Mexico had 
long been characterised by opacity; limited political and bureaucratic accountability 
channels; a focus on procedures rather than performance or results; and (in the case of 
Mexico) informality and corruption (Méndez, 1997; Marcel, 1998d; Nef, 2003). Yet after 
two decades of reforms, both countries established several MFR tools; produced data about 
public sector performance and policy results on a regular basis; and made that information 
widely available to Congress and the general public. Furthermore, some of the issues they 
had confronted in terms of measurement, information use, or gaming are also common in 
advanced democracies (Shick, 1990; Hood, 2006; Hood and Bevan, 2006; OECD, 2007; 
Mackay, 2012). A recent OECD (2007:68) study on performance-budgeting even stated 
that ‘[m]ost OECD countries continue to struggle with these reforms’.  
But if cultural proximity, administrative traditions, and bureaucratic conditions did 
not completely constrain cross-national learning activities or policy changes, national 
factors still mattered. The legacies of the past were important in shaping two things: the 
original motivations of Chilean and Mexican officials to look at international experiences; 
and the process of formulating initial MFR tools. In the Chilean experience, the 
administrative legacies of the Pinochet dictatorship indirectly shaped the way in which 
DIPRES framed and formulated the first MFR initiatives. In response to what looked like 
ever-growing spending levels (because of government efforts to reverse poor administrative 
capacities and social conditions), Marcel and his team looked abroad for ideas on how to 
monitor and evaluate programme performance. They also thought foreign MFR practices 
would be an appropriate means to change the traditionally imbalanced Executive-
Legislative relationships, and thus would contribute to consolidating the new democratic 
regime. Performance indicators, evaluations, and general management reports could 
provide Congressmen with valuable information to better control the use of public 
resources by the executive power.    
In the Mexican experience, the authoritarian legacy of the past would equally 
influence how and why officials engaged in cross-national policy learning in the first place. 
The discretional and secretive use of public resources, the politicisation of social 
programmes, and the lack of accountability mechanisms were all legacies confronted by the 
Zedillo administration (see Chapter 4). In the light of a broader political democratisation 
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process, international practices on performance measurement, indicators, and policy 
evaluations were initially seen as potentially useful tools. From the perspective of SHCP 
and SECODAM officials, these MFR practices could contribute to improving administrative 
efficiency, transparency, and accountability. These same reasons were flagged throughout 
the 2000s, as SHCP and CONEVAL officials stressed how expanding and strengthening 
MFR tools was essential to fulfil citizen’s expectations about government transparency and 
accountability (Hernández, 2006, 2010; SHCP, 2009)  
National factors also influenced the contours of each country’s MFR policies. As 
noted above, the design of the Chilean MFR policy components was mostly controlled by 
DIPRES. Therefore, the search for, and adoption of, MFR tools was strongly conditioned 
by an interest in finding those which were relevant for budgetary policymaking purposes. 
Moreover, despite the existence of other MFR tools (e.g. MINSEGPRES’ monitoring 
systems), it was DIPRES’ tools which received the main attention government-wide. This 
can be partly explained by DIPRES technical capacity, and by the policy consolidation 
strategies Marcel and Guzmán developed in the early 2000s. Yet a full explanation needs to 
take into account the significant informal power and formal authority that DIPRES has 
traditionally possessed in the Chilean public sector (Blöndal and Curristine, 2004; Ramírez, 
2004; Curristine, 2005; Boeninger, 2007; Aninat et al., 2008).  
Similarly, in the Mexican experience the contours of the MFR policy were shaped 
by two complementary factors. First, the participation of officials from SECODAM-SFP, 
SHCP, and SEDESOL-CONEVAL, each of whom looked at a variety of international 
examples, departing from different interests and emphases in mind. Second, the 
involvement of Congress, which repeatedly asked for increased transparency and 
performance information. Thus, it contributed to keep the topic on the public agenda, and 
allowed government officials to introduce additional MFR initiatives. During the 2000s, 
when officials sought to provide MFR initiatives stronger legal support, Congressmen also 
had the (at least potential) chance to negotiate and modify legislative proposals. As a result 
of all these institutional particularities, Mexico’s MFR policy evolved in a less 
homogenous, internally coherent, and swift way than in the Chilean experience. 
Other national factors, such as politico-administrative cycles, further influenced 
how MFR policies developed across time. In Chile, the departure of Marcel from DIPRES 
in 1997 (and of his group of advisors shortly afterwards) affected the implementation of the 
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first round of MFR practices. His return as head of the same institution in 2000, on the 
contrary, provided new impetus to the reform process. More recently, the political changes 
of 2010 brought some modifications to the Chilean MFR policy. As detailed in Chapter 5, 
these included adjustments to the PMGs, as well as the creation of new government units 
dedicated to MFR. 
In the Mexican experience, the frequent leadership changes in SECODAM and 
SHCP during the 1990s had a significant impact over MFR reform initiatives. As new 
senior officials were appointed to substitute López-Presa and Chávez-Presa, reform 
priorities changed, initiatives lost momentum, and experiential learning was interrupted. 
Things were radically different in SEDESOL-CONEVAL during the 2000s. In this case 
cross-national learning processes resulted in broader and more sustained policy changes. 
This was at least partly due to the fact that senior officials (Székely and Hernández) 
remained in their positions for longer periods of time.  
Summing up,  national factors certainly influenced cross-national policy learning 
processes in Chile and Mexico. This did not happen, however, in terms of conditioning 
policymakers’ search for ideas among countries in the region, with similar administrative 
traditions or levels of development. Nor did it mean the longer term blockage of MFR 
policy changes. National factors mattered because policymakers sought abroad useful ideas 
and practices to react against their own countries’ political and administrative legacies. The 
institutional frameworks in Chile and Mexico determined which actors took part in the 
reform processes. This in turn shaped what they looked for abroad and how the contours of 
MFR policies were eventually designed. Politico-administrative cycles also affected the 
ability of governments to both learn from foreign experiences, and then use that knowledge 
in the making of their own MFR policies. As a result, national factors influenced the 
temporal unfolding of Chilean and MFR policies.   
 
The Influence of International Organisations  
The third and last set of variables flagged in Chapter 2 is that associated with international 
organisations (IOs) and how they potentially shape cross-national policy learning 
processes. The literature has pointed at various mechanisms through which this might 
occur. However, in the field of administrative reforms transfer/diffusion across developing 
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countries, authors suggest IOs tend to use some kind of coercive pressures to push for the 
adoption of specific policies or administrative reforms. Yet, how did IOs actually influence 
the Chilean and Mexican experiences? 
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 Table 7.5 above provides a useful point of departure. The first and rather obvious 
observation to make is that different IOs (e.g. OECD, WB, IDB, ECLAC) were involved at 
various times throughout the reform processes. This finding is highly relevant because it 
raises questions about the appropriateness of attributing IOs’ a very specific role or means 
of influence (e.g. that of coercive actors). The finding also suggests that an outright denial 
of IOs’ influence on how national governments learn from policies abroad should always 
be taken with some reservations.   
A second point to be made is that coercive influence (e.g. the capacity of IOs to 
shape reform processes through financial/political conditions) did not take place. All 
interviewees denied any kind of reform imposition by IOs. A partial exception to this 
seemed to happen when Mexico became an OECD member in the 1990s (Zomosa, 2005; 
Huerta, 2006; Carroll and Kellow, 2011). Yet, even at that time, the use of MFR ideas and 
practices in the Mexican government’s PROMAP and NEP-SED did not result from direct 
pressures. On the contrary, Mexican officials decided that international NPM trends (as 
reported and edited by the OECD) could be somehow relevant to support their own reform 
objectives.   
 Furthermore, it should be stressed that IOs involvement in the Chilean and Mexican 
reforms usually took place ‘by invitation’. In the mid-1990s, the IDB trained DIPRES 
officials in the use of the logical framework methodology because Marcel and his team 
wanted to apply it in the new programme evaluations (Marcel, 1998d:71). Similarly, in the 
late 1990s, it was SHCP’s Levy who asked IFPRI to lead the evaluation of PROGRESA. In 
the early 2000s, SEDESOL’s Székely approached the WB to support the creation of a new 
M&E unit, and refine the institution’s evaluation approach. Later in the decade, CONEVAL 
and SHCP officials asked ECLAC experts to support training activities on programme 
evaluations. In 2006, SHCP asked IDB for technical support to design its new performance-
based budget system.  
 In the case of their legitimation influence (e.g. certification or praise of reform 
efforts), IOs seem to have also responded to requests from the Chilean and Mexican 
governments. This was the case of the OECD review of the Chilean budget system 
(including its MFR components); and the WB reviews on the SECG’s evaluation 
components, and the PMGs. It was the same with the OECD review of the Mexican budget 
system (including recent MFR reforms); and the WB review of CONEVAL and the social 
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sector M&E system. In all these cases, it was clear for government officials that 
legitimation could be useful. They thus approached IOs, not the other way around.  
  However, even if the process of review and legitimation of Chilean and Mexican 
MFR policies did not originate on the side of these IOs, the influence they exerted on 
policy developments was obviously significant. The publication of reports which praised 
specific policy components; compared favourably these governments’ approach to MFR 
with other international experiences; or simply acknowledged their decision to engage in 
this kind of initiatives, provided government officials with valuable political ammunition. 
This international legitimation allowed policymakers to keep MFR reforms on the agenda, 
pre-empt criticisms, and delegitimise potential resistances from other actors. IOs 
participation in international conferences sponsored by the Chilean and Mexican 
governments was similarly important to ensure the continuity of the reform processes. 
The influence of IOs exerted through more subtle and sometimes indirect ways was 
equally relevant. First, they shaped MFR policies with their cognitive influence (e.g. 
socialisation of policy ideas and knowledge). Chilean and Mexican officials revised on a 
regular basis the comparative studies, reports, and other policy documents produced by IOs 
(or by academic experts closely associated with them). The concepts, definitions, and 
methodological approaches of these governments were often informed, when not even 
guided by this literature (see references in, for example, Guzmán, 2003, 2005; Arenas and 
Berner, 2010; Berner, 2010; Pérez Jácome, 2010; Caso, 2011). The relevance of this 
cognitive influence was further reinforced by the officials’ continuous participation in 
forums such as the OECD’s PUMA-PGC and SBO committees. This allowed them to 
follow up on international trends and the ‘global conversation’ on administrative reforms 
(Pal, 2012).  
 IOs’ further shaped national policies as their priorities and conceptualisations 
filtered in combination with their executive influence (e.g. technical and capacity building 
support). Thus, when international experts advised Mexican officials during the creation of 
an M&E system for the social policy sector and the new performance-based budget, they 
influenced the reforms in at least three ways. First, building the analytical capacities of the 
Mexican officials that participated in the project. Second, nudging officials by suggesting 
which international cases were worth looking at, and then facilitating exchanges with the 
relevant governments (e.g. Chile, Colombia, Canada). Second, pointing at the international 
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experience to indicate which technicalities could be relevant in the process of introducing 
MFR tools (e.g. the use of terms of reference for evaluation exercises). While government 
officials always acted in an autonomous way, they were also keen to listen to what IOs 
experts could say. This was particularly the case on topics about, or at the stage in which, 
government officials did not have much expertise on the subject (e.g. DGME officials in the 
early 2000s).  
 Lastly, Table 7.5 shows that, as reform processes evolved, IOs sought to reinforce 
their various mechanisms of influence. For instance, since 2005 the IDB and the WB co-
sponsored a regional network of officials related to M&E topics. This allowed them to 
strengthen their dissemination influence. Indeed, it was in the first meeting of this network 
that SHCP officials met their CONEVAL colleagues, and the latter kicked off exchanges 
with DIPRES officials. The WB and IDB similarly aimed to increase their cognitive 
influence, by coordinating, sponsoring, or collaborating in several publications on the 
subject of MFR in Latin America (May et al., 2006; Arizti et al., 2010; Arizti and Castro, 
2010; López-Acevedo et al., 2010, 2012). Then, the IDB recently published a comparative 
assessment of the state of Management for Development Results in the region (García and 
García, 2010). This might eventually broaden its cognitive influence (e.g. by pointing at 
which MFR elements should be taken into account when establishing a MFR scheme); and 
its legitimation influence (e.g. by praising regional leaders, or pointing at laggards, without 
the need to wait for countries to request a formal review).  
 Summing up, IOs have certainly influenced cross-national policy learning processes 
in Chile and Mexico. But as in the case of the other sets of variables discussed above, this 
influence has not necessarily been exerted as the transfer/diffusion literature commonly 
suggest. IOs have not coerced national governments into adopting certain kinds of MFR 
reforms. In fact, IOs usually participated in the reform process only after policymakers had 
requested them to do so. Yet IOs did partly shape policy developments in other ways. Their 
studies and reports have provided national policymakers with technical ideas and concepts. 
Their consultancies and capacity building exercises have improved the skills of national 
governments, and sometimes have reoriented the attention of policymakers towards certain 
countries or topics. Above all, the legitimation they have provided to the Chilean and 
Mexican MFR schemes has contributed to consolidate them. All of these influences have 
taken place at various points in time, thus raising questions about the appropriateness of 
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attributing IOs a particular influence throughout protracted cross-national policy learning 
experiences.  
 
Conclusions 
The previous pages have offered a detailed comparison of the processes by which cross-
national learning contributed to the making of MFR policies in Chile and Mexico during 
1990-2010. Building on the empirical findings of Chapters 3 to 6, and taking the analytical 
framework introduced in Chapter 2 as a basis, the pages have sought to answer the central 
questions of this thesis: What policy outcomes resulted from cross-national learning? How 
did policymakers use knowledge from abroad in making national policies? What strategies 
did they pursue to advance policy changes? How did cognitive, national and international 
factors influence cross-national learning processes?  
 The chapter first summarised the main empirical findings of the thesis and looked at 
two policy outcomes of the reform processes. It noted that most changes in the Chilean and 
Mexican MFR policies can be attributed to information and insights policymakers learned 
from MFR developments in other jurisdictions, or broader international practices and 
discussions on the same subject. Then it showed that despite significant differences in 
policy styles, timing, and implementation patterns, across time the Chilean and Mexican 
MFR policies became increasingly alike in very important respects. These included similar 
goals, such as reinforcing accountability or improving budget quality; similar explicit 
decisions, such as the need to strengthen links between MFR and budgetary policymaking; 
similar policy instruments, such as performance indicators and impact evaluations; and 
similar policy directions, such as the path towards a combined use of monitoring and 
evaluation. This significant degree of convergence further showed that policymakers had 
been learning from broader MFR international trends, as reported by organisations such as 
the OECD.  
The chapter then analysed how Chilean and Mexican policymakers used knowledge 
from MFR policies abroad, and suggested there were at least seven alternative uses: 
compass, inspiration, template, general information, training examples, evidence, and 
benchmarks. In discussing the meaning of these categories, and how they contributed to 
MFR policymaking, the section showed that cross-national learning is much more than the 
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transfer or diffusion of policies across jurisdictions. The section further indicated that 
knowledge from policies abroad is not only used at the agenda-setting or policy formulation 
stages. In fact, it might support implementation processes; contribute to keeping a topic on 
the government’s radar; legitimise changes; or offer policymakers ideas about how to adjust 
and reorient policies. Thus, for policymakers cross-national learning is also a means to 
rethink national policies; imagine new programmes and courses of action; assess existing 
practices; argue about policy topics; and inform and guide policy changes. All in the light 
of what is happening elsewhere in a similar policy field, with a particular focus on what 
policymakers think represents contemporary trends or modernity.   
This was followed by a section on the strategies policymakers devise to advance 
policy changes related to cross-national learning. It first discussed a set of policy building 
strategies: conceptualisation, professionalisation, fine-tuning, and persuasion. These were 
strategies which took as a point of departure the uses of knowledge discussed before. They 
aimed to establish the politico-administrative conditions which might secure a good policy 
design, as well as the future effectiveness of MFR initiatives. The section then discussed a 
set of policy consolidation strategies: institutionalisation, political deactivation, marketing, 
and international legitimation. These were all focused in guaranteeing the longer-term 
survival, use, and legitimacy of MFR reforms, and thus generally took place once policy 
changes had been enacted.  
The focus on policy strategies provided a better understanding of how policymakers 
connect cross-national learning with actual policy changes. In contrast to most scholarly 
accounts, the section demonstrated policymakers are not only busy fitting, adapting, or 
translating policies borrowed from abroad. Nor did they perform a policy entrepreneurial 
role, and were thus simply concerned about policy adoption. In fact, they know (or learn 
from experience) that they need to ‘power’ and not just ‘puzzle’ throughout the whole 
policymaking process.  
The last section of the chapter then explored how cognitive, national and 
international factors influenced the Chilean and Mexican cross-national policy learning 
processes. The analyses showed these variables certainly shaped how policymakers used 
knowledge from abroad and advanced strategies for policy change. Yet in many cases the 
influences of these variables contradict previous scholarly assertions, or at least open up 
new paths for research.  
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In the case of cognitive variables, the section supported the idea that bounded 
rationality rather than comprehensive rationality is what characterises cross-national 
learning activities. However, it was noted that across time policymakers might broaden 
their sources of information, expand the number of international examples under analysis, 
and increase their awareness about problems and limitations. Thus, learning from abroad 
might never be fully rational. Yet with time policymakers do make an effort to control for 
potential cognitive biases. Furthermore, policymakers do seem to take advantage of ‘second 
chances’ and/or use lessons accumulated from previous implementation cycles. In the 
longer term, learning from abroad is at least sometimes supported by learning from 
experience, thus producing broader and more complex sequences of learning and change.  
The section then showed that national factors certainly influenced cross-national 
learning processes. Yet not by conditioning how policymakers searched for international 
experiences, nor by permanently blocking MFR changes. The weight of administrative and 
political legacies became the main motivation for policymakers to look for MFR ideas and 
practices abroad. Institutional frameworks determined who and how participated in the 
reforms, and thus to some extent what they looked for and why MFR policies acquired the 
contours they did in each country. The temporal development of the Chilean and Mexican 
policies was similarly affected by national political and administrative cycles.  
Lastly, the section illustrated how IOs influenced cross-national policy learning 
processes in both countries. Against mainstream scholarly assumptions, coercion was not a 
relevant factor. In fact, policymakers maintained a high degree of autonomy, and more or 
less controlled how far IOs got involved in MFR reforms processes. It was through their 
reports and technical advice that IOs influenced in cognitive and executive terms how 
policymakers thought and acted about MFR policies. Moreover, with their evaluations and 
reviews, IOs exerted a significant legitimation influence, thus supporting the consolidation 
of the Chilean and Mexican policies.  
Therefore, cognitive, national, and international variables undoubtedly influenced 
cross-national policy learning processes. Yet after two decades of reforms summarised at 
the beginning of this chapter, it is clear that with the passage of time Chilean and Mexican 
policymakers figured out how to use knowledge from abroad; which policy strategies to 
devise; and how to get through these constraints in order to introduce significant policy 
changes. The result was not one of complete policy convergence. However, by the end of 
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the 2000s Chilean and Mexican MFR policies did look alike in several respects. Following 
their own pathways and timing, both countries had nonetheless arrived at similar points. 
This was not due to the transfer or adoption of foreign administrative models. It had 
happened through a process of ‘puzzling’ and ‘powering’ guided by ideas, insights, and 
examples learned from other jurisdictions, and with the support of relevant lessons learned 
along the way.    
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
This thesis has told the story of the Management for Results policies developed by the 
Chilean and Mexican governments during 1990-2010. In comparing these national 
experiences, the thesis has sought to shed light on a theoretical puzzle which runs across 
contemporary debates in the policy transfer, policy diffusion, and cognate literatures. 
Cross-national learning is said to be one of the key mechanisms by which ideas, policies, 
and administrative reforms travel across jurisdictions. However, cross-national learning is 
also said to be fraught with several difficulties, and thus to hardly exert any significant 
influence on policymaking.  
 The thesis has argued that these contradictions are partly related to how 
transfer/diffusion scholars think about ‘policy’, ‘learning’, ‘change’, and ‘convergence’ in 
different ways. But, above all, that they are grounded in the literature’s limited 
conceptualisation of what learning from abroad really means; the strategies policymakers 
devise to advance policy changes on the basis of that knowledge; and the various temporal 
implications of cross-national policy learning processes. The thesis thus remarked that a 
better understanding of whether and how cross-national policy learning matters for policy 
change implies addressing the former points.  
In response to these issues, the thesis has focused on how policymakers use 
knowledge from abroad and how they devise policy strategies to support policy changes. It 
has also departed from a broader definition of policy, and has taken explicitly into account 
the temporal dimension of cross-national learning processes. In following this approach, the 
thesis has challenged conventional accounts of policy transfer and diffusion. It has shown 
that cross-national policy learning is not limited to processes by which a more or less 
modified version of a policy travels across jurisdictions. In fact, knowledge from policies 
abroad is used in many different ways and at various points in time throughout the policy 
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stages. Nor do policymakers involved in these processes are merely worried about adapting, 
translating, or editing. They develop strategies to both build the administrative and political 
foundations of policy changes, and consolidate their longer term durability and legitimacy. 
The thesis has further shown that cross-national policy learning processes rarely are 
one-off imitation activities followed by local innovation efforts. On the contrary, they are 
usually immersed in broader dynamics of sequential learning and change. Ideas and 
examples drawn from the international experience generate new policy developments, 
which policymakers certainly need then to adapt to a new politico-administrative 
environment. This in turn provides policymakers with potential opportunities to learn from 
experience and diagnose which policy features might require adjustments. But because 
policymakers constantly participate in international forums, monitor international 
developments, and communicate with international actors in their policy areas, sometimes 
insights about these further adaptations also come from abroad. These sequential learning 
and change dynamics explain why across time developments in certain policy areas, such as 
MFR, simultaneously show persistent national particularities, and a certain degree of cross-
national convergence.  
This final chapter will provide a brief summary of the thesis' main empirical, 
analytical, conceptual, and theoretical contributions. It will first relate the thesis with 
discussions about Management for Results in Chile and Mexico. Then, it will set the thesis 
into the broader context of policy transfer and policy diffusion debates. This will be 
followed by some comments regarding the generalizability of the thesis’ conceptual and 
theoretical propositions. Lastly, the chapter will briefly suggest how the thesis speaks to 
broader political science discussions.  
 
The Thesis and Management for Results in Chile and Mexico 
This thesis has contributed to our empirical knowledge about how and why MFR ideas and 
practices emerged and developed in Chile and Mexico during 1990-2010. It joins a small 
number of works which have purposefully compared MFR policies in the Latin American 
region (Cunill and Ospina, 2003, 2012; Zaltsman, 2006; García and García, 2011; López-
Acevedo et al., 2012). It also represents the first attempt to approach these specific reforms 
with a focus on transfer/diffusion topics.  
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While the general stories told in these pages might be more or less familiar, most of 
their specific details probably are not. For instance, it is widely known that DIPRES 
officials went to the UK in the early 1990s; and that Mexican officials from SECODAM 
and SHCP attended OECD meetings around the same time (e.g. Orellana, 2004; Huerta, 
2006). Yet it is less well-known how these officials actually used the knowledge gathered 
during those visits. Even less, if anything, has been said about the various cross-national 
learning activities in which Chilean and Mexican policymakers engaged throughout the 
2000s.  
Chapters 3 to 6 thus fill a gap regarding our empirical knowledge about the 
processes by which Chilean and Mexican officials have made their governments’ MFR 
policies. One can certainly get an idea of the contents and rationale of these policies by 
looking at official documents (e.g. legislation or institutional reports). But that only gives a 
limited indication of why policymakers thought relevant to introduce MFR ideas and 
principles. The empirical chapters of this thesis, however, have offered an account of the 
many people involved in these reform processes. More importantly, they have detailed why 
Chilean and Mexican officials from different agencies developed an interest in MFR ideas; 
the sources and countries from which they obtained information; the ways in which they 
used that knowledge; and the strategies they devised to build and consolidate MFR policy 
changes related to international developments on the subject 
In addition, the stories and analyses provided in Chapters 3 to 6 contribute to 
refining our knowledge about how the Chilean and Mexican MFR policies evolved between 
1990 and 2010. As indicated in their titles, each chapter has aimed to revisit one important 
claim about these countries’ reform experiences. Thus, Chapter 3 showed how the 
introduction of well-functioning MFR tools by the Chilean government was certainly an 
incremental process, but less because of deliberate decisions made by DIPRES officials 
than because of several political and administrative challenges faced in the 1990s. Chapter 
4 showed how the Mexican democratisation process triggered a first round of transparency, 
accountability and performance management reforms in the second-half of the 1990s; but it 
did so through the initiative and pre-emptive actions taken by federal government officials, 
and not because of congressional or international pressures. Chapter 5 showed how 
labelling the Chilean MFR experience as a success in the early 2000s was probably related 
less to a proven track record of achievements, than to DIPRES officials’ ability to market 
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the SECG. Lastly, Chapter 6 showed that in spite of the influence exerted by CONEVAL 
since 2005, policy developments in Mexico during the last decade are much more than a 
simple scaling up of MFR tools from the social policy sector.   
The empirical information provided in Chapters 3 to 6 also adds to our knowledge 
about the relationships between democratisation and administrative reforms (e.g. Cejudo, 
2008; Pardo, 2009). The chapters showed that democratisation has been important for MFR 
because it has provided policymakers in both countries with a motivation to search abroad 
for reform ideas on how to improve public sector performance (e.g. efficiency, 
effectiveness, accountability, transparency); a rhetorical background and vocabulary from 
which they can pick up terms to frame MFR reform efforts; and a justification to pursue 
additional changes, either by introducing new MFR tools, or by reforming those already in 
place. The chapters further showed that different national democratisation patterns might 
have different effects on MFR policies in terms of contents, emphases, and actors involved.  
Lastly, the empirical information provided in Chapters 3 to 6 speaks to discussions 
on how administrative reforms might affect administrative traditions (e.g. Painter and 
Peters, 2010). The chapters demonstrated that policy changes associated with MFR have 
contributed to transforming long-standing administrative practices and values in these Latin 
American countries. While still a work in progress in several respects, the introduction of 
MFR instruments (e.g. impact evaluations, performance indicators, management reports); 
the broadening of their coverage; and the increased number and frequency in which these 
tools are being used have all undermined traditional features of the Chilean and Mexican 
governments. These include the asymmetrical power relationships between the Executive 
and the Legislative powers; the lack of public information about public sector performance 
and policy results; and the discretional, opaque, and unaccountable use of public resources.   
Of course, because this thesis has been mainly concerned about the relationships 
between cross-national learning and policy changes, these important links between 
democratisation processes, reforms, and administrative traditions can only be flagged here. 
However, the information and analyses provided in these pages might certainly be of use in 
future studies on any of these subjects. 
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The Thesis and the Literature on Policy Transfer and Diffusion  
This thesis has made a number of analytical, conceptual, and theoretical contributions to the 
transfer/diffusion literatures. The first relates to the thesis’ efforts to bridge the 
preoccupations, concepts, and empirical findings of these and cognate fields. While this has 
been often flagged as necessary for the future of the field, it has been attempted only rarely 
(Newmark, 2002; Wolman and Page, 2002; Wolman, 2009; Benson and Jordan, 2011; 
Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Marsh and Evans, 2012a, 2012b; Graham et al., 2013). Thus, 
Chapter 2 showed how ‘learning’ and the ‘uses of knowledge’ have become shared 
concerns of policy transfer/lesson-drawing and diffusion scholars. Also, how insights and 
concepts from the literatures on policy/organisational learning, knowledge utilisation, 
policy change, and international organisations can helpfully complement the main 
transfer/diffusion discussions.             
 Moreover, the thesis proposed a new framework to study cross-national policy 
learning. Without ignoring the complexities that characterise such processes, and taking 
into account previous scholarly works, this framework emphasises the need to look at how 
policymakers use knowledge from abroad and develop policy strategies to advance changes 
of some sort. The framework underlines the relevance of three set of factors: cognitive, 
national, and international. Whereas these have been commonly referred to in the literature, 
the framework actually elaborated on how each one of them might influence the 
relationships between learning from abroad and policy changes. Lastly, the framework 
flagged the need to take the time variable explicitly into account. Thus, it offers an 
alternative to both the ‘Dolowitz-Marsh model’ and Rose’s ‘steps for lesson-drawing’, and 
as such it might be usefully employed in future studies.  
Another contribution of this thesis relates to the new conceptualisations it has 
offered. Building on the Chilean and Mexican experiences, as well as on previous research 
on knowledge utilisation (e.g. Weiss and Bucuvalas, 1977; Bennett, 1991a; Page and Mark-
Lawson, 2010), Chapter 7 has shown that policymakers use knowledge from policies 
abroad in several ways. These go beyond the simplistic notion of just copying or 
transferring, and include inspiration, templates, benchmarks, general information, training 
examples, evidence, and last but not least a compass-like function. Some of these uses are 
directly related to policy formulation and implementation, and thus to more technical 
activities. Some others are associated with the agenda-setting or policy legitimation stages, 
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and thus to more political activities. Yet in some cases, particularly with what has been 
called here a ‘compass’, learning about international developments provides policymakers 
with a general orientation; a sense of what to do or how to think about a certain field or 
policy issue; or simply ideas to get in tune with trends they perceive to represent modernity.  
 Furthermore, the thesis has introduced the concepts of policy building and policy 
consolidation strategies. These are helpful for understanding how policymakers actually 
link learning from abroad with policy changes. As detailed in Chapter 7, policymakers 
embed cross-national learning into broader policy building strategies, which are aimed to 
create the necessary politico-administrative conditions for the effective functioning of new 
policies. Inspiration, templates, and general information help policymakers 
(re)conceptualise the contents and contours of (new) policies. By using cross-national 
evidence, policymakers seek to persuade other actors about the need for new policies. 
International examples support policymakers’ efforts to professionalise (e.g. train and 
increase the skills of) those actors involved in policy implementation. Benchmarks, 
inspiration, and new templates guide policymakers through the process of fine-tuning 
policies across time.  
Chapter 7 further showed that these policy building strategies are sometimes 
reinforced by policy consolidation strategies. These are aimed to ensure the longer term 
durability and legitimacy of policy changes introduced at least partly as a result of learning 
from abroad. Thus, policymakers might develop marketing activities to increase awareness 
about a new policy, or they may seek to deactivate potential conflicts. Furthermore, 
policymakers might promote the institutionalisation of policy changes through 
organisational and/or legal means. Lastly, they may seek international legitimation, via the 
endorsement or positive assessments provided by international organisations.    
 This thesis has contributed to refine our theoretical understanding about the 
influence that cognitive factors exert on cross-national learning processes. Chapter 7 
detailed how policymakers’ capacity to learn from previous reform experiences, as well as 
from policy implementation cycles, might significantly affect policy changes related to 
learning from abroad. Despite the several biases which constrain learning and impede full 
rationality, the thesis showed that policymakers do try to use different information sources; 
make an effort to broaden the number of countries that serve as a reference; and are aware 
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and take into account some of the limitations that characterise foreign practices 
(Mossberger and Wolman, 2003).    
Chapter 7 noted that national and international factors exert various kinds of 
influence at different points in time. National constraints and factors (e.g. legacies, 
institutions, culture, organisational features, and political cycles) neither necessarily, nor 
permanently block policy changes. Yet they certainly affect which actors are involved and 
how/where they look for ideas in the international experience; the specificities of the 
policy; and its temporal unfolding. The chapter remarked that international organisations 
are not the coercive and overwhelming forces some scholars have portrayed, particularly 
when studying administrative reforms in developing countries (Peters, 1997; Bissessar, 
2002; Ramió and Salvador, 2005, 2008). These organisations are certainly able to shape 
national policies in very significant ways and through various means (e.g. cognitive 
influence, executive advice, dissemination of best practices, legitimation). Yet most of the 
time they seemed to become involved in MFR reforms ‘by invitation’. Thus, their 
participation actually responded to each country’s needs, interests, and agendas more than it 
is usually thought.     
 In addition, the thesis underlined the relevance of taking time explicitly into account 
(Sabatier, 1998; Page, 2000; Meyer-Sahling, 2007). This is not only (nor mainly) related to 
the fact that the analysis of two decades of reforms provides more information than that of 
just one. By looking at cross-national policy processes with a deeper temporal awareness, 
one can better understand how policymakers learn from different sources and with different 
purposes across time; how they reflect upon their previous practical experiences; how 
policies change at various stages because of policymakers’ (re)assessment of the Zeitgeist 
and changing international policy developments; and how the influence(s) exerted by 
national and international factors are not static. While the thesis has not dedicated a specific 
section to these questions, its findings and analyses might be useful for future research on 
this subject (Dussauge-Laguna, 2012a).  
Other thesis’ findings might be helpful for refining theoretical statements on related 
topics. For example, the study of how Chilean and Mexican officials legitimised their MFR 
models with the support of international organisations is relevant for theories on how 
reform models or best practices are built, packaged, and disseminated (Wolman et al., 
1994, 2004; Sahlin-Andersson, 2002; Weyland, 2004a, 2004b; Sahlin and Wedlin, 2008). 
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Similarly, the finding that MFR policies in both countries seemed to become more durable 
once policymakers coupled policy building and policy consolidation strategies is something 
which speaks directly to debates on the success of policy transfers (Wolman, 1992; 
Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Fawcett and Marsh, 2012).    
 
The Thesis and Other Cross-National Policy Learning Experiences 
It is worth asking whether this thesis’ conceptual and theoretical contributions could be 
extended to other experiences. What would happen if the assumptions of the thesis were to 
be changed in the analysis of other cross-national learning processes, by using for instance 
a narrower definition of ‘policy’? To what extent are the statements offered in Chapter 7 
valid for understanding the relationship between learning from abroad and MFR policy 
changes in other jurisdictions? Would the same ideas apply in policy fields other than 
administrative reforms? The following paragraphs briefly tackle these three questions.   
Karen Alter’s (2012) study on the ‘global spread of European Style International 
Courts’ provides a useful example for addressing the first question. She asserts that there 
currently are 11 ‘operational copies’ of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), including 
some in Latin America and Africa. By taking the ECJ as the ‘policy’ to be studied, she 
applies a more restrictive definition than the one used in this thesis, and closer to the one 
traditionally used by policy diffusion scholars. The origins of some of these ‘copies’ go 
back to the 1960s, when regions started to look at the ECJ. While these regional courts have 
faced several challenges to function properly, they have resulted in successful systems 
‘with many rulings and mobilised enforcement constituencies’ (p. 151). Over time, some 
even have become closer to the ECJ model in significant respects (p.146). 
Alter concludes that these ‘regions are drawing lessons from the ECJ’s experience’ 
(p.150). However, she also argues that ‘Europe’s most important legal export is not so 
much its formal legal institutions, but rather the embedded approach to making legal 
institutions effective’ (p. 133). Indeed, she shows how knowledge about the ECJ’s 
experience has been used in several ways. First, the ECJ take on human rights and war 
crimes has served to refine regional policy goals (e.g. as a compass). Second, ‘[l]awyers 
and judges in regional systems regularly look at the ECJ and its doctrines as a guide’ 
(p.145) (e.g. as a benchmark). Third, ‘legal architects’ have used the ECJ experience to 
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overcome ‘difficulties arising in the process of regional integration’ (p.151; e.g. as 
evidence). Fourth, ECJ doctrines have been taken into account for designing the founding 
charters of other regional courts (e.g. as a template).  
Thus, Alter’s findings clearly echo the conceptualisations and propositions offered 
in these pages. In strict sense, she does not focus on cross-national but on cross-regional 
learning. Nor does she obviously uses the terms introduced by this thesis. However, the 
picture she portrays by using a narrower definition of policy is similar to the one offered in 
these pages: learning from the experience of other jurisdictions is not necessarily about the 
one-off transfer/adoption of policies intact (e.g. the ECJ). It is about drawing insights, 
comparisons, guidance, and knowledge which is then used throughout the policymaking 
process in various ways. Her description of how the ECJ model has spread globally also 
points at how, across time, the process of learning from abroad might lead towards policy 
outcomes which are different, yet closely related in significant respects.  
 The experience of MFR reforms in Colombia offers an opportunity to explore the 
second question posed above, regarding the applicability of the thesis’ propositions beyond 
Chile and Mexico. As in the case of the former two countries, Colombia’s Sistema 
Nacional de Evaluación de Gestión y Resultados (SINERGIA, or National System for the 
Evaluation of Management and Results) is currently thought to be a leading example in the 
region (García and García, 2011; Cunill and Ospina, 2012). SINERGIA was first introduced 
in the early nineties, and it has developed along two main phases (Castro, 2009; 
Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2010). During the first one (1991-2001), SINERGIA 
mainly focused on monitoring indicators, targets, and objectives, all of which were 
associated with participant agencies’ plans and logical frameworks (Castro, 2009:6).  
At the beginning of the second phase in 2002, SINERGIA’s past performance was 
revised by the incoming government. The system’s focus changed to reinforce a results-
based orientation. Thereafter, SINERGIA complemented monitoring activities with a set of 
externally conducted evaluations of programme operations, policy design, and impacts. In 
2003 the government also started to explore how to link performance information and 
spending decisions (Castro, 2009:15). After two decades of reform, the Colombian MFR 
policy resembled the Chilean and Mexican policies in at least three important aspects: the 
use of a variety of MFR tools; the combination of monitoring and evaluation practices; and 
the explicit decision to develop some kind of results-based budget.  
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 The similarities in policy outcomes between the Colombian experience and those 
studied here are strongly related to how policymakers’ have used knowledge from abroad. 
Since the early 1990s, Colombian officials studied the MFR experiences of Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Mexico, New Zealand, the UK, and the US. Yet none of 
these were transposed or adopted intact. The Mexican and Brazilian mechanisms for 
evaluating cash-transfer programmes were used as a reference to develop the Colombian 
impact evaluations (Castro, 2009:19; e.g. as a template). The Chilean and US schemes of 
rapid evaluations were similarly used to develop the Colombian executive evaluations 
schemes (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2010:23; e.g. as a template as well).  
Also, Colombian officials used the Spanish and Mexican evaluation agencies in 
public debates as an example of how to institutionalise evaluation practices within highly 
specialised independent bodies (Castro, 2009:34; e.g. as evidence). The Chilean experience 
served to compare the functioning of the Colombian Inter-Sector Evaluation Committee 
(ISEC), and the way it links evaluation results with policy decisions (Castro, 2009:31; as a 
benchmark). More broadly, the fact that the Colombian policy has come to resemble in 
many respects the other two (e.g. in policy goals and instruments) would seem to point 
towards the use of knowledge about international MFR developments as a compass.   
 In the Colombian MFR experience it is also possible to see how policymakers 
devised policy building and policy consolidation strategies similar to those found in the 
Chilean and Mexican processes. The diagnosis about SINERGIA’s performance in 2002 
resulted in a broadening of its focus, to include more evaluation activities and links with the 
budget (e.g. a policy (re)conceptualisation strategy). Colombian officials have tried to 
strengthen institutional capacities through several training courses on M&E tools for 
government officials and SINERGIA experts, and have sought advice from Harvard 
University and University College London evaluation specialists (e.g. a professionalisation 
strategy; Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2010:24).  
Between 2002 and 2009, Colombian officials organised eight international 
seminars, and several other public forums on MFR topics (e.g. a persuasion strategy). 
Similarly, SINERGIA published several evaluation reports and distributed those among 
‘more than 6 thousand contacts in the private sector, academic, Government and civil 
society organisations’ (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2010:27; e.g. a marketing 
strategy). Building on efforts since 2003 to link results and spending, policymakers 
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negotiated a congressional reform in 2005 which established the principles of a 
‘presentational performance budgeting’ (e.g. an institutionalisation strategy). Lastly, 
Colombian officials remark that SINERGIA is nowadays perceived as a ‘world-class 
successful model’ by the WB and the IMF; and that its ‘best practices’ are been used in 
other Latin American countries (e.g. an international legitimation strategy).   
Therefore, despite its differences regarding the Chilean and Mexican experiences 
(e.g. in specific policy contents, institutional actors involved, and temporal unfolding; 
Cunill and Ospina, 2012), the analysis of the Colombian MFR policy supports this thesis’ 
central claims. Colombian policymakers have gathered information from MFR policies and 
models abroad, and have used these insights and specific knowledge in various ways. 
Moreover, as their Chilean and Mexican counterparts, Colombian policymakers developed 
strategies to build the administrative and political conditions of an effective MFR policy. 
They also seem to have set in motion other strategies to institutionalise, market, and 
legitimise SINERGIA, and thus contribute to its longer term consolidation. Taking 
advantage of the lessons learned throughout years of reforms, Colombian policymakers 
have been able to introduce significant MFR policy changes on the basis of cross-national 
learning. None of this has taken place along the lines of conventional policy 
transfer/diffusion accounts.   
Lastly, the experience of network regulation reforms in Western European countries 
allows thinking about whether this thesis’ propositions might apply to other policy fields. 
In studying the effects of internationalisation on economic changes, Thatcher (2007) notes 
the UK, Italy, France, and Germany have reached similar regulatory policy outcomes in 
various policy sectors (e.g. telecommunications, electricity, postal services). Despite their 
different reform paths, cross-country commonalities are partly explained by the fact that 
national policymakers have continuously followed international policy developments. They 
then have used this knowledge about polices abroad for advancing policy changes.  
Thatcher notes that European policymakers have learned in several ways, for 
various purposes, and at different points in time. Thus, when reforming securities trading, 
British officials ‘looked at the US but not comprehensively’ (p. 263), and less for copying 
than for gathering ‘knowledge of the broad outlines of reforms’ there (e.g. as a benchmark). 
In other occasions, British officials used the US regulatory schemes as an example to 
further support their reform claims (e.g. as evidence). French regulators allegedly modelled 
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the Commission des Opérations de Bourse after the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission, but produced a rather different institution (e.g. as inspiration). German, 
French, and Italian policymakers do seem to have ‘copied’ British reforms in the securities 
trading sector (e.g. as a template). These countries have also transitioned from public 
monopolies to privatisation, regulatory liberalisation, and the setting of independent 
regulatory agencies in line with US and British-led reforms (e.g. as a compass).   
Moreover, Thatcher remarks that learning from other countries’ reforms was closely 
related to the strategies policymakers developed to advance regulatory policy changes. In 
the middle of a highly competitive and internationalised environment, information about 
international regulatory developments served policymakers to build coalitions, explain the 
risks of not reforming, introduce legal changes, and legitimate choices. Through those same 
strategies for policy change (e.g. conceptualisation, persuasion, political deactivation, 
institutionalisation, legitimation), by the mid-2000s ‘all four nations had greatly altered 
deeply rooted institutions that often dated back decades and sometimes centuries’ (p. 4).  
In Thatcher’s study, cross-national policy learning plays only a complementary role 
to internationalisation. Yet his description of how the former mattered for regulatory 
reforms in Western Europe uncovers similar dynamics to those proposed in this thesis. 
Policymakers engaged in various forms of learning to inform regulatory changes, which 
contributed to eventually steer national regulatory schemes towards similar policy 
outcomes. Furthermore, as in the Chilean and Mexican experiences, European 
policymakers devised policy strategies. These built the necessary political and 
administrative conditions for regulatory reforms, and contributed to their legitimacy and 
consolidation.   
  Summing up, the conceptualisations and theoretical propositions of this thesis 
would seem to be applicable beyond the contours of this research. These include 
circumstances in which one might use a different concept of policy to the one employed 
here (e.g. a more restrictive definition); the analysis of MFR reforms in other countries in 
the same Latin American region (e.g. Colombia); and the review of changes in a different 
policy field, and within a contrasting group of developed countries (e.g. network 
regulations in Western European countries).   
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The Thesis and the Broader Political Science Literature 
This research has confirmed that an understanding of cross-national policy learning 
processes is best achieved from a broader public policy perspective (Wolman, 1992; James 
and Lodge, 2003). By showing that policies and ideas do travel across jurisdictions and 
produce important changes; that national policymakers do purposefully look for 
information about specific policy topics in other nations; and that international actors do 
intervene and potentially influence national policy developments, the thesis has 
underscored that transfer/diffusion is a particular kind of policy development which 
deserves to be studied as such (Evans, 2009b, 2009c). Moreover, the research has proved 
the usefulness of framing the analysis on existing scholarship on the subject (Page, 2000). 
On the other hand, the thesis allows seeing that it would be rather difficult to discuss 
‘learning’, ‘change’, ‘influence’, or ‘uses of knowledge’ without referring to the concepts 
and theoretical statements provided by the broader political science literature.   
 The findings from this research similarly point at how a particular transfer/diffusion 
study might contribute to more general public policy discussions. For instance, the thesis 
has flagged how policy consolidation is a highly relevant component of these reform 
processes. Of course, some authors have already noted that policies need to be ‘legitimised’ 
once they have been devised and approved (e.g. Page, 2012a; Peters, 2012). Yet traditional 
policy cycle/stages approaches usually suggest policy formulation is followed by 
implementation, with the latter representing mainly a series of activities focused on 
ensuring a smooth day-to-day operation (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). The Chilean and 
Mexican MFR experiences, however, unveiled that policymakers develop a number of 
strategies in parallel to policy implementation. This was to ensure policies would not be 
reversed or eliminated. Therefore, just as some scholars have recently turned their attention 
to questions of policy dismantling (Bauer, et al., 2012), future public policy studies may 
explore in more detail the relevance and implications of policy consolidation.  
In addition, the thesis’ findings are useful to revisit some of the most cited theories 
on policy learning/change (Bennett and Howlett, 1992). With regards to Heclo’s (2010) 
classic research, the thesis clearly supports his view of ‘learning’ as the central contributing 
factor to policy changes. It also reiterates the relevance of policy legacies, and how they 
might condition policymakers’ decisions (e.g. by triggering reactions against previous 
policies). Similarly, it underlines the prominent place occupied by ‘administrators’. 
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However, in the experiences studied here there were no ‘policy middlemen’. In fact, the 
latter’s role seem to have been performed partly by senior officials (e.g. as people who are 
capable of sensing changes around), and partly by international organisations (e.g. as 
external agents with knowledge and capacity to connect developments across jurisdictions). 
Moreover, ‘puzzling’ certainly occupied a central place in the Chilean and Mexican stories. 
But the contributions that knowledge from policies abroad and experiential learning made 
to policy changes were significantly conditioned by policymakers’ capacity to ‘power’ (e.g. 
develop strategies).  
Regarding Hall’s (1993) propositions about social learning, paradigms and change 
in the economic policy field, this research has found both similarities and inconsistencies. 
The emergence of evaluation, performance indicators, and a focus on results as central 
features of administrative modernisation policies do seem to possess some of the properties 
of what Hall calls a ‘paradigmatic change’. First, MFR reforms have been associated with 
an ideational shift about the way in which public organisations and programmes should be 
managed, best illustrated by contemporary debates on the NPM (Hood, 1991; Christensen 
and Laegreid, 2010). Second, the rise of MFR ideas and practices do seem to have 
represented a reaction against the ‘anomalies’ accumulated in Chile’s and Mexico’s past 
(e.g. opacity, low levels of accountability, discretional and/or inefficient use of public 
resources). However, in both experiences, the process of learning about MFR did not 
follow a sequence of first, second, and third order changes. In fact, changes in policy 
settings, instruments, and goals often took place at the same time, or in reverse order than 
that suggested by Hall. Furthermore, adjustments to these three levels of change continued 
happening across time in both nations, associated with how policymakers followed and 
learned from new international policy developments.     
A last important reference is that of Sabatier’s (1988, 1993) advocacy coalitions 
approach to policy learning and change. The thesis shares with the latter the relevance of 
looking at policy changes ‘over a decade or more’ for understanding how policies change 
and how much they do so because of learning. In both Sabatier’s model and this research’s 
findings, policymakers seek to learn, and actively ‘advocate’ and develop strategies for 
producing policy changes. Yet this research did not really found well demarcated 
‘advocacy coalitions’ for/against a given policy subject. It was possible to find some groups 
of reformers, who then had to persuade/act against groups of sceptical actors. But it would 
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be difficult to assert the latter really formed part of a ‘coalition’ with clear ‘beliefs’ and 
‘strategies’. More importantly, the most significant changes in policy did not come from 
external conditions (e.g. economy or political cycles, as suggested by Sabatier). In fact, 
they happened because of how Chilean and Mexican policymakers learned from policies 
abroad and used this knowledge, sometimes taking advantage of broader processes of 
political transformation.   
 Summing up, the thesis findings are not only relevant for the transfer/diffusion 
literatures within which they have been framed. The research also speaks directly to the 
broader Political Science literature. It does so by pointing at some policy topics which 
might be worth exploring in more detail; and by offering a contrasting image to existing 
theories about policy learning and change.   
 
The Thesis and the Puzzle of Cross-National Policy Learning 
In discussing whether and how cross-national policy learning matters for policy changes in 
Chile and Mexico, this thesis has certainly found evidence which sides with claims about 
how learning from abroad is fraught with difficulties. Policymakers do face cognitive 
biases; lack time and resources to study international experiences; and confront important 
political and administrative challenges. They sometimes fail in their efforts to introduce or 
sustain policy changes, and sometimes simply manage to make superficial modifications in 
policy ‘talk’ or ‘labels’.  
 Yet the thesis has also found that cross-national learning might bring about 
significant policy changes, in time even leading to some degree of cross-national 
convergence. This does not necessarily occur through the transfer or diffusion of policies or 
models intact. It happens through policymakers’ use of knowledge from abroad in many 
ways and at various stages of the policymaking process. Policy changes are neither secured 
once policy elements are adopted, nor complete when the process of adaptation to a 
receiving environment starts. In fact, policymakers need to devise strategies to ensure 
policies will be effective, legitimate, and durable. Full policy convergence does not happen, 
but neither does absolute divergence. Across time, through sequences of learning and 
change, policymakers learn how to overcome cognitive biases and national barriers; how to 
combine experiential learning and knowledge from policies abroad; and how to better fit 
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policies to their national conditions, while also keeping them in tune with international 
policy developments.  
 Future studies will need to discuss the extent to which this thesis’ empirical 
findings, conceptual propositions, and theoretical claims have contributed to answering this 
puzzle. It is certainly difficult to predict how much those studies will converge around the 
contents of these pages. Yet if scholars make some use of the knowledge included here, 
then our collective understanding of whether and how cross-national policy learning 
matters for policymaking will probably have changed for good.  
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List of Interviews 
 
 
 
 
CHILE 
 
IC1  Academic Expert, Institute of Public Administration, August 18, 2009. 
IC2  Academic Expert, Institute of Public Administration, August 18, 2009. 
IC3  Academic Expert, Institute of Public Administration, August 20, 2009. 
IC4   Former Senior Official, DIPRES, August 21, 2009. 
IC5  Former Middle-Level Official, CIMGP, August 24, 2009. 
IC6  Former Senior Official, MINSEGPRES, August 25, 2009. 
IC7  Academic Expert, Institute of Public Administration, August 25, 2009. 
IC8  Middle-Level Official, DIPRES, August 25, 2009. 
IC9   Middle-Level Official, DIPRES, August 25, 2009. 
IC10   Senior Researcher, Libertad y Desarrollo, August 25, 2009. 
IC11  Academic Expert, Instituto Universitario Ortega y Gasset, August 27, 2009. 
IC12   Senior Official, MINSEGPRES, August 28, 2009. 
IC13  Senior Official, MINSEGPRES, August 31, 2009. 
IC14   Former Senior Official, DIPRES, September 1, 2009. 
IC15  Academic Expert, University of Chile, September 2, 2009. 
IC16   Senior Official, Civil Service Unit, September 2, 2009. 
IC17   Former Middle-Level Official, DIPRES, September 2, 2009. 
IC18   Middle-Level Official, MINSEGPRES, September 4, 2009. 
IC19   Former Senior Official, MINSEGPRES, September 10, 2009. 
IC20   Former Senior Official, DIPRES, November 4, 2011. 
IC21  Former Middle-Level Official, DIPRES, November 8, 2011. 
IC22  Former Middle-Level Official, MIDEPLAN, November 8, 2011. 
IC23   Former Senior Official, MINSEGPRES, November 9, 2011. 
IC24   Senior Official, MINSEGPRES, November 10, 2011 
IC25  Former Senior Official, DIPRES, November 11, 2011. 
IC26   Middle-Level Official, DIPRES, November 14, 2011. 
IC27   Senior Official, MINSEGPRES, November 14, 2011. 
IC28  Middle-Level Official, MINSEGPRES, November 16, 2011.  
IC29   Former Middle-Level Official, DIPRES, November 17, 2011. 
IC30  Former Senior Official, Budget Office, November 17, 2011. 
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MEXICO 
 
IM1  Senior Official, SFP, August 4, 2009. 
IM2   Academic Expert, UAM, August 5, 2009. 
IM3  Academic Expert, El Colegio de México, August 5, 2009. 
IM4   Senior Official, SFP, August 6, 2009. 
IM5  Former Middle-Level Official, August 10, 2009. 
IM6   Senior Official, SFP, August 11, 2009. 
IM7  Former Senior Official, Presidential Office of Government Innovation, 
August        13, 2009. 
IM8 Academic Expert, CIDE, September 20, 2009. 
IM9  Senior Official, SHCP, September 23, 2009. 
IM10  Senior Official, CONEVAL, September 28, 2009. 
IM11  Senior Official, CONEVAL, September 28, 2009. 
IM12 Former Senior Official, SHCP, September 30, 2009. 
IM13  Former Senior Official, SHCP, October 2, 2009. 
IM14  Former Middle-Level Official, SHCP, October 2, 2009. 
IM15  Senior Official, Office of the President, April 6, 2011. 
IM16  Former Senior Official, SEDESOL, April 6, 2011. 
IM17  Former Senior Official, SECODAM, April 7, 2011. 
IM18  Former Middle-Level Official, SHCP, April 17, 2011. 
IM19  Former Senior Official, SHCP, April 19, 2011. 
IM20  Senior Official, SFP April 20, 2011. 
IM21  Senior Official, CONEVAL, April 28, 2011. 
IM22  Senior Official, CONEVAL, April 28, 2011 
IM23  Middle-Level Official, SHCP, December 21, 2011. 
IM24  Middle-Level Official, SHCP, December 21, 2011. 
IM25 Academic Expert, El Colegio de México, December 21, 2011. 
IM26  Former Senior Official, SHCP, December 22, 2011. 
IM27  Former Middle-Level Official, SEDESOL, December 22, 2011. 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
 
IIO1  Senior Officer, World Bank, May 18, 2010. 
IIO2  Former Senior Officer, Organisation for Cooperation and Economic 
Development, May 19, 2010. 
IIO3  Senior Officer, Inter-American Development Bank, May 20, 2010. 
IIO4  Middle-Level Officer, Inter-American Development Bank, May 20, 2010. 
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